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Richard Burchill 
IABBSTRACT 
This thesis investigates the development of democracy as a principle of international law, 
primarily from the view of human rights law, with the purpose of developing a basis for 
an international law of democracy. It begins with the proposition that the international 
legal argument prevents current international human rights law, and a future international 
law of democracy, from being effective for the individual, for whom the law is supposed 
to benefit. Under the present arrangement human values do not have a great impact upon 
the law as individuals are excluded from the law making process which remains an affair 
exclusive to states and governments. Furthering democracy as a legal principle will assist 
in making the law more effective as individuals are able to participate In the decisions 
impacting their lives. 
At the global level the development of democracy as a legal idea has remained 
primarily as rhetoric expressed in a number of diverse texts coVering a wide range of 
international activity. The nature of democracy as an contestedtopic is demonstrated at 
the global level as the lack of agreement on its meaning and application have prevented 
the creation of substantive legal principles. At the regional level in Europe, the Americas 
and to a lesser degree Africa, existent intergovernmental organisations with a concern for 
human rights have made great strides in developing an international law of democracy for 
their specific region. Efforts in support of democracy globally and regionally are 
transforming international law in way that is more responsive to the needs and desires of 
individuals. Numerous obstacles hinder this progress but the large amount of rhetoric 
expressed in support of democracy and human rights provide individuals with the tools 
necessary to ensure the law does not remain only rhetoric. 
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INTRODUCTION 
1. DEMOCRACY AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 
The 1990s have experienced the growth of democracy as a topic of international law and 
relations. The end of the communist regime of the Soviet Union and its client states has 
been described as the international victory of democracy. ' This 'victory' of democracy 
across the world has in turn led to the belief that there now exists a right to democracy in 
international human rights law, as well as the existence of democracy as a principle of 
general international law. ' 
These developments are welcomed as a benefit to the international system In the long- 
term, however, an unquestionable acceptance of the existence of democratic principles as 
part of international law creates numerous difficulties. The most obvious is the lack of 
investigation or discussion as to what this idea of democracy does or could contain, and the 
basis upon which any action in its name may be claimed. Prior to the collapse of the 
communist regimes in Europe most states in the world claimed to be democratic in one way 
or another, even though there were drastic and noticeable differences between the various 
forms of democracy. Due to differences in practice and that 'one word passed as common 
currency in several different languages', democracy was not an idea taken seriously at the 
international level except in the context of ideological struggles. ' Now, it is claimed, the 
situation has changed and everyone is speaking the same democratic language allowing for 
a single notion of democracy to be seen as pad of international relations. ' It is undeniable 
that there has been a shift towards democracy M the international system, yet what it means 
to be democratic or how democracy is manifested in law and practice is an area not 
adequately investigated by international lawyers. ' The difference between unquestioned 
assumptions of the victory of democracy in the world and the real and actual events in the 
'See F. Fukuyama. The End ofHistory and the Last Man. (London: Hamilton, 1992). 
2 T. Frank. 'The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance. ' 86 American Journal of International Law (1992) p. 
46; A-M. Slaughter. 'International Law in a World of Liberal States. ' 6 European Joumal of Intemational Law 
(1995)p. 503. 
3 See S. Marks. 'The End of History? Reflections on Some International Legal 'Ibeses. ' 3 European Joumal of 
Inteniational Law (1997) p. 449. 
4 Introduction. John Locke: Political Writings. D. Wotton, ed. (London: Penguin, 1993) p. 9. 
5 D. Held. Models ofDemocracy, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Polity, 1996) p. 291. 
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day-to-day lives of many individuals often means that 'the New World Order appears more 
like a boot in the face than a triumph of democracy and the rule of law. " 
The existence of democracy as a principle of international law is primarily seen in the 
form of a human right, an entitlement to democracy. Textual evidence of democracy as a 
concern of the international system and for the protection and promotion of human rights 
can be seen with the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). ' 
Article 21 of the UDHR declares a right to participate in government and that the will of the 
people will be the basis of authority. The International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR)' followed with an expression of self-determination in Article I and includes 
Article 25 on the right to take part in government and to participate in elections. Subsequent 
human rights instruments have also contained aspects of a right to democracy through 
participation and voting. ' Democracy has been used in the international legal context as a 
justification for the use of force, 10 a condition for recognition of states, " a criteria for 
membership in international organisations, 12 and as a factor in international development. " 
Due to the wide use of democracy it is suggested that instead of discussing democracy 
exclusively as a human right, it would be more constructive to deal with what could be 
terined 'an international aw of democracy'. 
11. DEMOCRATISATION AS A BASIS FOR AN INTERNATIONAL LAw OF DEMOCRACY 
The recent global process of democratisation 14 is responsible for the growth of 
democracy as a topic of international law. " The current global spread of democratic ideas 
' D. Spitz. 'Solidarity and Disaggregated Property Rights: Roberto Unger's Recasting of Democracy. ' 23 Columbia 
Human Rights Law Review (1991/2) p. 47. 
'G. A. Resolution 217A (111), G. A. O. R., 3rd Sess., Part 1, Resolutions, p. 7 1. 
999 UNTS 17 1. 
Articles 1-3, Convention on the Political Rights of Women (1953) 193 UNTS 135; Article 5 (c), International 
Convention on the ElirrUnation of All Forrns of Racial Discrimination (1966) 660 UNTS 195; Article 7, Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forrns of Discrimination against Women (1979) 1249 UNTS 13; Article 3, First Protocol to 
the European Convention on Human Rights (1954) ETS No. 9; Article XX, American Declaration of the Rights and 
Duties of Man (1948) reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, 
OEA/Ser. L. V/11.82 doc. 6 rev. I at 17 (1992); Article 23, American Convention on Human Rights (1969) OAS Treaty 
Series No. 36; 1144 UNTS 123; Article 13, Affican Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (1981) OAU Doc. 
CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5. 
See Chapter 5 concerning the relevant provisions of the OAS Charter. 
'E. C. Guidelines on the Recognition of the New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union. ' (16 December 
199 1) reprinted in 31 ILM (1992) p. 1486. 
" Article 9, OAS Charter (1948) OAS Treaty Series No. I 
-E, OEA/Ser. A/2, Rev. 5; Article 3, Statute of the Council 
of Europe (1949) ETS No. 1. 
" See Chapter 3. 
14 Democratisation is defined as 'a highly complex process involving successive stages of transition, endurance, and 
consolidation. This process ultimately leads to both institutionalisation and consolidation of structures and conditions 
conducive to structural transforination and regime change from authoritarian rule. ' M. Monshipoun. 
Democratization, Liberalization and Human Rights in the 7-hird World. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995) p. 16. 
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and practice is not an unique event as the international system has seen similar 
developments in the past. 16 
At present the world is said to be experiencing a 'Third Wave' of democratisation with 
the demise of communism and authoritarian regimes around the world. " The current trend 
is differentiated fi7om past developments in the extent to which there are 'political changes 
moving In a democratic direction' at all levels of society; locally, nationally, regionally, and 
globally. " The impact of democracy in the international system is widespread as 
international institutions are reforming to become more democratic and to require 
democracy of their members. " At the local level, individuals and groups are calling for 
greater participation in the processes that impact their lives. " The efforts of these actors 
include establishing the institutional features necessary for democracy, the promotion of 
programmes and action that focuses at the grass-roots level and place concern on fostering 
education about a democratic society. " Concerns about good governance based on 
democracy are taking a prominent place in the global economy, development, trade issues, 
aid packages and in the general conduct of inter-state relations. " NGOs have proliferated in 
the new resurgence of democracy and have a large role to play in the ffirthering of the 
protection and promotion of democracy and human rights. " 
The present growth of democracy is also placing greater scrutiny upon established 
democracies in determining to what extent democracy is being effectively maintained. " 
Democracy is a dynamic process and not a one-off event that automatically provides 
" See 'Democratization and International Law: Building the Insfitutions of Civil Society. ' 88 ASIL Proceedings (1994)p. 197. 
" S. Huntington. The 7-hird Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. (Norman: Oklahoma University 
Press, 199 1) pp. 15-26; D. Rustow. 'Democracy: A Global Revolution? ' 69 Foreign Affairs (1990) p. 75-76. 
See generally Huntington (1991). 
D. Potter. 'Explaining Democratization. ' in Potter et a], eds. Democratiztion. (Cambridge: Polity, 1996) p. 3. 
'9 See Chapters 4-6. In Europe, the democratic transitions in Spain, Greece and Portugal had as much to do with 
membership in the European Union as with other factors normally associated with the downfall of authoritarian 
regimes, see G. Sorenson. Democracy and Democratization: Process and Prospects in a Changing World. (Boulder: 
Westview, 1993) p. 32. 
20 D. Held. Cosmopolitan Democracy and the Global Order: Reflections on the 200th Anniversary of Kant's 
"Perpetual Peace". ' 20 Alternatives (1995) p. 427. Groups involved in the promotion of democracy at the global are 
sometimes backed by initiatives from national governments, like the US Infon-nation Agency, meaning specific 
programmes which match a certain political agenda will be forwarded. This creates the problem of spreading 
ideology, which in the long-term, could prove dangerous for the maintenance of democracy, see L. Diamond. 
Promoting Democracy in the 1990s: Actors and Instruments, Issues and Imperatives. (Report to the Camegie 
Commission, New York, 1995) p. 29. 
See Diamond (1995) pp. 15,19. 
But this emphasis on good governance is not without its problems, see K. Tomagevski. Between Sanctions and 
Elections: Aid Donors and their Human Rights Performance. (London: Pinter, 1997) 
Monshipoun (1995) p. 66. 
A trend of greater centralisation of powers has been identified in many of the western industrialised democracies. 
See generally the contributors to 'The Western Allies 50 Years Later. ' 6 Journal ofDemocracy (1995) p. 3. Also G. 
Parry and M. Moran, eds. Democracy and Democratization. London: Routledge, 1994) p. II 
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guarantees in perpetuity. There is the need to ensure that any international principle of 
democracy would have to be of universal application and of continual necessity. There is at 
present an uneven process, as established democracies feel immune to any criticisms of non- 
democratic character. This places a selective emphasis on newer democracies, states in 
transition to democracy or states that are not allies. This selective reliance upon a global 
acceptance of democracy, differing in degree and substance depending upon the states 
involved, may be overcome by a more coherent international law of democracy which helps 
to ensure that the common language of democracy is backed up by a common 
understanding and meaning. If the third wave of democratisation brings a world based on 
democratic ideas then it will be necessary to establish an accepted international standard of 
democracy that applies to all regardless of their stage of political development. 
The present process of democratisation is unique for its breadth and depth but there 
remain important points to keep in mind when making any claim of a victory for 
democracy. Many of the recent transitions to democracy are returns to democracy, not the 
acceptance and creation of democratic structures where none previously existed but attempts 
to regain former democratic structures and practices. " There has also been an identifiable 
reactionary trend against democracy with the third wave. " A number of societies in the 
process of transitions to democracy are struggling to cope with the impact of an 
authoritarian past as in Latin America, central and eastern Europe and in Africa, notably 
South Africa. " These factors provide anomalies or exceptions to the victory of democracy 
and give rise to the necessity of continually engaging in examinations of the content, source 
and practice of democracy as part of the international system. 
The widespread use of democratic language in the world today shows less of a global 
acceptance of a legal principle of democracy but more of a global rhetoric of democracy. " 
This rhetoric is the product of the increased emphasis being placed on the existence of 
democracy along with human rights in the international system with an emphasis upon the 
issue of legitimacy of governments and institutions. " The lack of investigation into what 
constitutes democracy means the global rhetoric has produced numerous and often 
conflictMg interpretations as to how democracy fits into international law and relations. The 
multifarious definitions or claims to democracy allow for 'the propaganda advantages of 
" See Sorenson (1993) pp. 31-32. 
21 See Chapter 7. 
27 Sorenson (1993) pp. 29-30. 
" Even at the level of rhetoric the acceptance of democracy is not assured, Parry and Moran (1994) p. 11. 
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democracy without incurring its political risks'. " Investigating what is meant and 
understood by democracy, both in thought and practice, is crucial for its development as a 
principle of international law. It is necessary to demonstrate that the democracy spoken of 
by governments corresponds to a reality being experienced by individuals. This alone 
underlines the necessity for investigations into the content of an international law of 
democracy. It is important that political leaders and individuals have the same 
understanding of democracy, its concepts, the way in which is it institutionalised, or put into 
practice. " As Machiavelli expressed 
- 
power can easily take a name, but a name cannot 
give power. " To declare the existence of democracy as part of international law without 
ensuring that it actually exists or that it may be exercised in an effective manner is not a 
victory as it will only lead to disillusionment and disempowerment. 
111. DILEMMAS OF DEFINITION AND MEASUREMENT 
Democracy has been described as a term with no 'determinate content% 33 a definitional 
difficulty which has not been overcome with the recent resurgence in support for 
democracy. Human rights also suffer from deftnitional controversies in terms of 
applicability and content. " Due to the lack of agreed content to either democracy or human 
lights there exists a 'credibility gap' where there is a stark difference 'between the standards 
[that] governments proclaim, or accept, or at least pay lip-service to, and the reality of their 
practice'. " Whether it involves content, mode ofEMPlementation, obligations assutned or 
the way in which violations are addressed, the international system allows for multiple 
definitions in both theory and practice to be accepted as valid. In discussions of democracy 
and hurnan rights there may exist a common rhetoric but there is not a common 
understanding. The difficulty with both democracy and human lights is that the ideas and 
conceptions involved are at their most coherent when the theory is in isolation from practice. 
29 See Tom8evski (1997) pp. 7-14. 
'0 J. Kirkpatrick. 'Democratic Elections and Democratic Government. ' 147 World Affairs (1984) p. 61. 
" In Canada, where the government is considered a serious adherent to international human rights principles, the 
government and human rights NGOs are engaged in a sin-fllar rhetoric of human rights but there exists 'sharp 
differences in practice and perception' between them. See L. Pal. 'Competing Paradigms in Policy Discourse: The 
Case of International Human Rights. ' 28 Policy Sciences (1995) p. 185. 
32 N. Machiavelli. The Discourses. Book 1, Chapter XXXTV. 
33 Kirkpatrick (1984) p. 6 1. 
" On the issues of measuring democracy and human rights see, R. Claude and T. Jabine, eds. 'Symposium: Statistical 
Issues in the Field of Human Rights. ' 8 Human Rights Quarterly (1986) pp. 551-699; K. Vasak, ed. 'Enseignement 
des droits de I'homme dans les Universites. ' 6 Revue des droits de Vhomme (1973) pp. 4-192; A. Inkeles, ed. On 
Measuring Democracy: Its Consequences and Concomitants. (New Brunswick: Transaction, 199 1); D. Beetham, ed. 
Defining and Measuring Democracy. (London: Sage, 1994). 
" N. MacDen-not. 'The Credibility Gap in Human Rights. ' 3 Dalhousie Law Journal (1976) p. 262. 
6 
With both democracy and human rights there is a great deal of 'abuse of language' 
commonly based on ideological belief, resulting in competing or conflicting claims of 
16 legitimacy. An example of this can be seen in a statement by an US delegate at a human 
rights conference prior to the end of communism where it was said: '[w]e talk about human 
[i. e., political and civil] rights and they [the Soviets] talk about unemployment and 
racism. "' The problem of language and meaning is exacerbated by the tendency of scholars 
and academics to assume that conceptual terms are clearly understood and that meanings 
will eventually work themselves out. " Both democracy and human rights are emotionally 
charged topics making agreement on meaning almost an impossible task. At the same time 
this should not preclude establishing working definitions of what is being discussed. " An 
even more daunting task is providing objective proof based on empirical data concerning the 
existence of democracy or the nature of human rights abuses. A great deal of study has been 
instituted in order to detennine degrees of democracy in existence or what factors contribute 
or help prevent human rights abuses. Numerous approaches have been used but all face the 
same obstacle of dependence upon uncertain judgements about the value of the ideas in 
question 
. 
40 For any study, there needs to be decisions made as to what factors or phenomena 
will be measured, how to go about obtaining the data and how to be sure it is analysed in an 
impartial mamer. " The existence of competing world views makes the acceptance of ideas 
of democracy and human rights difficult to achieve, but not impossible if there is wide- 
based, open and active participation in the discussion and formulation of meanings and 
application. 
Related to the abuse of language spoken of above is the inclination of commentators and 
politicians to use democracy and human rights as interchangeable terms that mutually define 
each other. Democracy and human rights are not one in the same in either theory or practice 
and should not be utilised as such. One author has made the automatic connection between 
democracy and human rights by correlating the definitional development of human rights to 
include a right to peace as creating a right to democracy, '[t]hus, by definition, peace as well 
" J. Marie. 'Une methodologie pour une science des droits de Fhomme. ' 6 Revue des droits de Vhomme (1973) p. 
105. 
" Quoted in R. Goldstein. 'The Limitations of Using Quantitative Data in Studying Human Rights Abuses. ' 8 Human 
Rights Quarterly (1986) p. 609-610. 
" R. Barsh. 'Measuring Human Rights: Problems of Methodology and Purpose. ' 15 Human Rights Quarterly (1993) 
p. 92. 
" K. Bollen. 'Political Rights and Political Liberties in Nations: An Evaluation of Human Rights Measures. ' 8 
Human Rights Quarterly (1986) p. 568. 
" A. Ritter. 'Comparative Assessments of Freedom. ' 6 Connecticut Journal ofInternational Law (199 1) pp. 561-562. 
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as democracy become part of human rights and the promotion of one 
... 
promotes the 
whole. "' The problem with using the two terms as one are several as the language of 
democracy is often flagrantly used to cover up actual abuses of human rights and the 
promotion of democracy elsewhere is used by individual states to cover-up poor human 
rights records at home. " 
The greatest oversight in using the two terms as one is that adherence to human rights 
may exist where there is no democracy and violations of human rights continue in a 
democratic society. 44 Human rights rely heavily upon the existence of democratic systems if 
they are to be effective. This is natural considering that human rights are about the 
individual's existence and democracy entails individuals being able to be part of the 
processes impacting their lives. However, the extent to which a government may be said to 
be adhering to international human rights standards is not dependent upon whether or not 
they properly represent a society but is judged by the extent to which they meet the terms of 
an international treaty. The domestic system within which rights adherence is achieved is 
not a concern for the instrument's enforcement body so long as the conditions of the treaty 
are met. 45 It is most likely that respect for any human rights provisions by an authoritarian 
regime is either for its own self-serving interest or to appease outside pressure. 4' Either way 
the treaty supervision body will have to recognise that specific legal obligations are being 
met. Equally so, democracy may exist and there continues to be violations of human rights. 
The existence of democracy in no way guarantees adherence to human rights. Democracy 
" L. Bemt. 'Measuring Freedom? The UNDP Human Freedom index. ' 13 Michigan Journal of International Law 
(1992)p. 721. 
42 N. Gleditsch. 'Democracy and Peace: Good News for Human Rights Advocates. ' in D. Gomien, ed. Broadening 
the Frontiers of Human Rights. - Essays in Honour ofAsbjorn Eide. (Oslo: Scandinavian University, 1993) pp. 287- 
288. The connection between democracy and peace has attracted a great deal of academic debate but has yet to 
conclusively prove that democratic states are more peaceful in their international relations, for a review of the 
literature see S. Chan. 'In Search of Democratic Peace: Problems and Promise. ' 41 Mershon International Studies 
Review (1997) pp. 59-9 1. 
43 See statements by H. Burkhalter 88 ASIL Proceedings (1994) pp. 203-206; T. Carothers. 'Democracy and Human 
Rights: Policy Allies or RivalsT 17 Washington Quarterly (1994) pp. 109-120. 
44 Point raised by Burkhalter (1994) pp. 203-204, see also her comments on p. 207 concerning human rights 
adherence in the absence of democracy. 
4' For example, the comments of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights concerning Algeria (UN 
Doc E/C. 12/1995/17) acknowledge the lack of democracy (paragraph 12) but credit is given for meeting obligations 
related to trade union rights, education and housing (paragraphs 6-11). Shue notes that the ability of a non- 
democratic government to protect certain rights is a possibility, even though one that is not widely supported by 
practice, see H. Shue. Basic Rights, Subsistence, Affluence and US. Foreign Policy. (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1980) pp. 86-87. 
" The government of Malaysia has demonstrated the possibility of using authoritarian practices to ensure its power 
base while at the same time allowing for relatively open and competitive elections to which they need to respond to 
the expressed wishes of the electorate. See H. Crouch. 'Neither Authoritarian or Democratic. ' in K. Hewison, ed. 
Southeast Asia in the 1990s. 
- 
Authoritarianism, Democracy and Capitalism. (St. Leonards: Allen and Unwin, 1993) 
pp. 136-140. 
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will allow for rights to be a larger part of society and allow for individuals to demand their 
rights and to seek recourse for violations, but it will not end violations of rights or ensure the 
effectiveness of rights. Democracy is a process by which individuals are part of the 
processes that impact their lives. Human rights are part of the process by providing some of 
the essential tools to allow democracy to work properly, in a way that all benefit. " While 
the two are closely related and mutually supporting they remain distinct entities. 
IV. DEMOCRACY, HumAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Looking at the extent to which democracy has become part of international law, key 
issues emerge which will underpin the framework of this study. The existence of 
democratic principles in the international system implies the existence of processes of 
inclusion, participation, openness and accountability that is, beneficial to the individual and 
society. Human rights have the same purpose of acting as a tool of protection and 
empowerment for the individual's benefit. As will be shown in Chapter 1, human rights has 
an established rhetorical existence in the international system, but to date its ability to move 
beyond the rhetoric to providing substantive protection for the individual has been limited. 
International human rights law is a process that is exclusive to states, who in turn exclude 
the participation of other entities and do not necessarily act with any degree of openness or 
accountability either domestically or internationally with regard to the legal process. The 
result is that the system of international human rights law is based more on the needs and 
interests of states rather than individuals, the supposed purpose of the law. It is necessary to 
emphasise this major flaw in considering an international law of democracy. How is it 
possible to create principles that potentially allow individuals to be part of the decision- 
making processes that exist in their lives if they are excluded from the original norm 
creating process in the first place? Chapter 1 extends this inquiry to ask how international 
human rights law and the future development of democracy are to be beneficial for the 
individual when the law is more concerned with the maintenance of state interests and 
needs. If the 'new world order', or even the present world order, is to be based on respect 
for rights and the practice of democracy then it becomes necessary to ensure the systems of 
lawn are conducive to those who have the most at stake in the application of the law - 
individuals. 
"Idea inspired by J. Willer. 'Fundamental Rights in Democracy. '4 Human Rights Law Journal (1983)pp. 131-3. 
9 
A finther theme that underpins this work concerns the applicability of democracy and 
human rights as effective tools of empowerment for individuals. Presently in international 
human rights law the legal regime consists of Universal action manifested in the activities of 
the UN and the existence of three regional human rights systems. The activities of the UN 
have demonstrated a rhetorical commitment at the global level to create a system for human 
rights protection based on the belief that there are universal core elements of hw-nan 
existence which are deserving of legal protection. The development of the regional systems 
of human rights protection share this belief but with the understanding that the protection of 
rights is enhanced through institutions of smaller scope and greater homogeneity. These 
two developments should not be seen as contradictory but as a means of improving the 
protection and promotion of democracy and human rights. 
This raises the debate as to whether common standards applicable to all may be 
achieved or if there must be different standards for different situations and experiences. The 
relativist/universalist debate has heavily influenced the development human rights by 
bringing into question whether democracy and human rights can mean the same thing all 
over the world. The most practical way of approaching the issue is through recognition of 
both the universal and relative benefits of democracy and human rights. The sociological 
facts constitutive of a society, ethical judgements, prevailing evaluations of community, and 
specific world views of existence that differ among individuals and commurlities necessarily 
dictate that democracy and human rights will be interpreted and practised differently. " 
However, the inherent diversity of society does not automatically preclude any sort of 
universal attribute common to all individuals and groups. " Democracy and human rights 
are flexible concepts allowing for the accommodation of diversity. This flexibility is often 
abused and taken to the extreme as an apology for abhor-rent acts or practices justified by 
difference. Instead of seeing diversity as a threat to the overall systems of protection, 
diversity should be recognised as something working for the good of all individuals and not 
just an excuse for the promotion of selfish interests. " 
This work is to examine the extent to which democracy has developed as a principle of 
international law both globally and regionally. It begins in Chapter I with a discussion of 
the problems inherent in international human rights law which weaken its effectiveness and 
" P. Baehr. Ae Role ofHuman Rights in Foreign Policy. (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1994) pp. 21-22. 
49 C. Nino. The Ethics ofHuman Rights. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993) p. 103. 
" I. Nguema. 'Human Rights Perspectives in Affica: The Roots of Constant Challenge. ' II Human Rights Law 
Journal (1990) p. 270. 
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which will prevent the effective development of an international law of democracy. Chapter 
2 provides a definitional framework of democracy inclusive of both normative and 
institutional aspects necessary for an international law of democracy. Chapter 3 will 
examine the extent to which the ideas and practices of democracy as discussed in Chapter 2 
are part of global international law. From the global perspective of Chapter 3 the focus of 
Chapters 4-6 narrows to examine how the three established regional human rights systems 
of Affica, Europe and the Western Hemisphere have developed or dealt with the issue of 
democracy based on the regional peculiarities each one faces. Chapter 7 returns to the 
debate on the applicability of democracy and human rights based on the 
universalist/relativist argument and an examination of the absence of regional systems for 
the protection and promotion of democracy and human rights in other parts of the world. 
Throughout, emphasis is placed upon the extent to which individuals are able to 
participate in the decisions and processes of decision making surrounding lives and are able 
to access and utilise international legal rules and principles. " International law has 
developed into an iirnportant aspect of the day to day lives of individuals with areas such as 
international human rights law becoming integral to social ordering and governance. After 
World War 11, E. H. Carr stated that: 
The freedom and equality which the makers of the coming peace must seek 
to establish is not a freedom and equality of nations but a freedom and 
equality which will express itself in the daily lives of men and women. " 
If international aw is to be credible and relevant in the eyes of individuals it must consider 
and act upon the needs and desires of individuals, instead of only speaking of those needs 
and desires and acting for other interests deemed more essential. " International aw is and 
can be an effective tool for the development of the individual. At the same time the state 
centred nature of the international legal process directs the law away from the concerns of 
the individual even though the legal texts and public rhetoric attempt to create an opposite 
For a similar perspective concerning the ability of individuals to participate in the international legal process of 
environmental law see P. Sharma. 'Restoring Participatory Democracy: Why the US should Listen to Citizen Voices 
while Engaging in International Environmental Law-Making. 12 Emory International Law Review (1998) p. 1215. 
12 Quoted in R. Vincent. 'Groutis, Human Rights and Intervention. ' in H. Bull et a], eds. Hugo Groutis and 
International Relations. (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1982) p. 242. 
" P. Allott. Eunomia. 
- 
A New Orderfor a New World. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990) p. 115. 
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picture. " Therefore it becomes essential to 
expose the shams and inequities which may be concealed beneath this law. But 
the rule of law itself, the imposing of effective inhibitions upon power and the 
defence of the citizen from power's all-intrusive claims, seems to me to be an 
unqualified human good. " 
This work will attempt to reveal the sharn and inequities that exist 'in international law as it 
attempts to address issues of democracy and human rights. It will not condemn the law to 
useless rhetoric as it does provide a wealth of potential for the development of human 
goods. To uncover those potentialities the law needs to move in a direction that is open and 
inclusive, where more powerful voices will not drown out weaker, but no less significant 
voices. Only by allowing for all the relevant entities of the law to be heard can international 
law prove to be effective. " 
" International human rights law has been described as at once empowering, but cruelly deceiving, decisive, but 
irrelevant, Critical of state behaviour, but apologist for abuses of power, see S. Marks. 'Nightmare and Noble Dream: 
The 1993 World Conference on Human Rights. ' 53 Cambridge Law Journal (1994) p. 62 
E. Thompson. nigs and Hunters: Origins ofthe Black Act. (London: Penguin, 1975,1990 edition) p. 266 
E. Root. Ae Effect ofDemocracy on International Law. (Pamphlet No. 30. Carneige Endowment for International 
Peace. Washington, 1917) p. 3. 
CHAPTERI 
IN PURSUIT OF AN EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS LAW 
Perusing the list of parties to the major human rights treaties, any alert observer must wonder how 
many of these States have decided to join this great enterprise more for symbolic reasons than 
motivated by the desire to conforni their domestic laws and practices to internationally agreed upon 
human rights standards and to subject themselves to international scrutiny. ' 
1. INTRODUCTION 
International human rights law and democracy are distinct areas of consideration. 
However, they do share common theoretical formulations in international law that in turn 
impacts their practical application in the international system. This enquiry into an 
international law of democracy is to begin with an investigation of international human rights 
law for two reasons. The first is that the present development of democracy as a legal principle 
in the international system is occurring primarily (but not exclusively) in the area of 
international human rights law. The second reason relates to the fact that democracy, properly 
understood, is about participation and inclusiveness 
-a system which allows individuals to be 
part of the forces and processes which impact their lives. International human rights law 
supposes a similar purpose in creating an environment conducive to the development of the 
individual and society. Both human rights and democracy occupy a unique place in 
international law for they bring into question the position of the state whose values and 
interests have come to dominate the international system. Investigating the effectiveness of 
international human rights law provides insight as to how international law will react to 
democracy as a legal construct. 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the obstacles which currently prevent 
international human rights law from being effective, as regards to the position of the individual, 
and how this may impact an international law of democracy. It will look beyond the rhetorical 
level of what the international instruments say in favour of hwnan rights and investigate the 
valid legal techniques available to states allowing them to preserve their own interests and 
position. The reason for this investigation is to uncover the difficulties faced in the 
development of international human rights law and to see the extent to which an international 
law of democracy will be accommodated into the international system - 
I B. Simma. 'Reservations to Human Rights Treaties 
- 
Some Recent Developments. ' in G. Hafher, ed. Liber 
Amicorium Professor Ignaz Seidl-Hohanveldern. (The Hague: Kluwer, 1998) p. 659. 
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an international law of democracy that is concerned with the individual, not one concerned 
with the ideological or self-interested pursuits of states. The investigation brings into question 
the effectiveness of international human rights law but does not take the position that it has no 
use in curbing the arbitrary use and abuse of power. International human rights law has 
inherent problems in its effectiveness but it also possess a great deal of potential, as 
[t]he rhetoric and rules of a society are something a great deal more than a 
sham. In the same moment they may modify, in profound ways, the behaviour 
of the powerful, and mystify the powerless. They may disguise the true 
realities of power, but, at the same time, they may curb that power and check 
its intrusions. 2 
International human rights law is able to act as a limit on power through its rhetorical force. 
The rhetorical force of the law is important, as the language of international hutnan rights law 
is very much in favour of the values and interests of the individual. States 3 may be able to 
utilise the international legal system to their benefit, overriding concerns for the individual, but 
this does not erase what has been publicly agreed to. This chapter will begin by establishing 
the context of the international legal system in which human rights law operates. It will show 
through an application of the work of Martti KoskennieMi4 how this quest for effectiveness is 
severely constrained by the structure of the international legal argwrient demonstrating that 
state values and interests expressed through the idea of sovereignty conflict with the rhetoric 
and substance of international human rights. The focus will be with developments at the 
global level with the UN. Regional developments will be discussed in later chapters where a 
similar situation exists concerning the effectiveness of human rights instruments. 
H. HuMAN RIGHTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 
SMCe the end of World War H there has been a widespread proliferation of international 
legal instruments, at both the global and regional level, designed to develop and advance the 
intemational system for the protection of human rights. 5 The present system of international 
2 E. Thompson. Whigs and Hunters: The Origin ofthe Black Act. (London: Penguin, 1975,1990 ed. ) p. 265. 
3, By states, read: government in power. ' See A. Rosas. 'International Legitimacy of Governments. ' in G. Alfredsson 
and P. MacalisteT-Smith, eds. The Living Law ofNations: Essays on Refugees, Minorities, Indigenous Peoples and the 
Human Rights of Other Vulnerable Groups. (Kehl: Engel, 1996) p. 205. 
4 M. Koskenniemi. From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of the International Legal Argument. (Helsinki: Finnish 
Lawyers Publishing, 1989) hereinafter Apology to Utopia. 
5 The proliferation of international human rights instruments may be viewed as either an attempt to create concrete 
principles and protection or as an illusionary process of churning out instruments in the hope that something happens 
but with no real conviction as to results, see R. BildeT. 'Rethinking International Human Rights: Some Basic 
Questions. ' Wisconsin Law Review (1969) p. 175; T. Meron. 'Non-n Making and Supervision in International Human 
Rights: Reflections on Institutional Order. ' 76 American Journal ofInternational Law (1982) p. 754. 
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human rights law has its beginnings with the formation of the United Nations (UN) 
.6 The UN 
was conceived for a number of purposes, including the desire 'to save succeeding generations 
from the scourge of war' and 'to reaffirm faith in fimdamental human rights, *in the dignity and 
worth of the human person'. 7 The UN quickly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR)8 which recognises 'the inherent dignity' and the 'equal and inalienable rights 
of all members of the human family' as 'the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the 
world'. 9 The UDHR expresses the idea that 'it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to 
have recourse as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights 
should be protected by the rule of law5.10 To achieve this, it is necessary to protect the 
individual against the abuse of power, ensure the preservation of human dignity and 'to 
promote social progress and better standards of fife in larger freedom'. " 
The development of international human rights standards by the UN and regional 
organisations has created a wide array of legal instruments for the protection and promotion of 
human rights. In turn this has led to claims of a monumental shift in the international system 
from one based solely on the needs and interests of states toward one where the values and 
interests of individual human beings are a direct concern for the international system. 12 These 
claims are valid and a shift in priorities is discernible. However, these claims have to be 
approached with caution. A close examination of the structure and process of international 
human rights law shows that attempts to place human values as a genuine concern for the 
6 The primary focus of this work is conventional international law as expressed through international treaties. The role 
and importance of customary international law for the protection and promotion of human rights is beyond the scope 
of the work. The effectiveness of customary international law for the protection and promotion of human rights faces 
many of the same obstacles as treaty law that Will be discussed below. Furthermore, the creation of custom remains a 
process exclusive to states (see A. Cassese. International Law in a Divided World. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986) p. 169) 
and the ability of individuals to rely upon norrns of customary international law to redress violations of rights remains 
highly indeterminate as recently demonstrated in Rv Bow Street Magistrates, ex parte Pinochet (No. 3). [1999] 2 
WLR 827 (hereinafter Pinochet). In the UK it was expressed that customary international law was automatically part 
of the domestic legal system through the common law Trendtex Trading Corp v Central Bank ofNigeria 1977] QB 
529, per Lord Denning. But the very same judge had stated earlier that international law only applied to the UK 
when Parliament allowed it to be so, Blackburn v Attorney General [ 197 1]I WLR 1307. It has been recently argued 
that in the US customary intemafional law is only applicable after action taken by the government see C. Bradley 
and J. Goldsmith. 'Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modem Position. ' 
110 Harvard Law Review (1997) p. 816. On the difficulties of utilising customary international law as a source of 
obligation see Apology to Utopia, pp. 417; C. de Visscher. Theory and Reality in Public International Law, trans. P. 
Corbett (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968) pp. 161-162; W. Friedmann. 7he Changing Structure of 
International Law. (London: Stevens, 1964) pp. 121-123; M. Hunt. Using Human Rights Law in English Courts. 
(Oxford: Hart, 1997) pp. 29-31; T. Meron. Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law. (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1998) pp. 114-135. 
7 UN Charter, Preamble, paragraphs 1-2. 
8 G. A. Resolution 217A (111), G. A. O. R., 3rd Sess., Part 1, Resolutions, p. 71. 
9 UDHR, Preamble, paragraph I- 
10 UDHR, Preamble, paragraph 3. 
11 UN Charter, Preamble, paragraph 4. 
12 L. Henkin. 'Law and Politics in International Relations: states and Human Values. ' 44 Journal of International 
Affairs (1990) p. 184 
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international system and international law uncovers numerous obstacles which prevent the 
individual from truly enjoying the positive benefits expressed by the law. ' 3 There is a 
tendency to overlook these obstacles, preferring to triumph the successful side of international 
human rights law as providing an adequate system of protection for the individual. 14 The 
ability of international human rights law to maintain this 'double gesture' of appearing 
successful but riddled with difficulties is grounded in the structure of the international egal 
argument. 15 The international egal argument allows for proclamations of the importance and 
effectiveness of international human rights law (as well as democracy), at the same time 
ensuring that there is only a minimal shift in the priorities and practice of the international 
system towards a recognition of human values as an integral concern. 16 Any Shift in the 
defining of priorities for the international system has been primarily rhetorical and not 
necessarily substantive. ' 7 
The wide array of international human rights instruments which have been established with 
the goal of safeguarding the individual, have all been drafted from the point of view of the 
prevailing interests of states. Even though it is clairned that the concept and protection of 
human rights has moved from being confined to the exclusive jurisdiction of individual states 
to a concern for the international community, 18 this has not allowed international human rights 
law to escape manipulation by states in preserving their own interests. The present condition 
of international human rights law has been described by Judge Piza in his comments on the 
Inter-American human rights system; 
I have come to the conclusion that unfortunately the system of the Convention 
appears to make it [the protection of human rights] impossible because the 
American states in drafting it [the Convention] did not wish to accept the 
13 1. ShiNJ*i. 7he Concept ofHuman Rights in Afiica. (1989) pp. 82-83. 
14 See A. Fields and W-D. Narr. 'Human Fights as a Holistic Concept. ' 14 Human Rights Quarterly (1992) p. 1, 
where they observe '[t]he problem is that all of the momentum toward human rights remains at the level of ideology. '
Murphy states that there is a tendency of commentators to overlook the lack of substantive agreement concerning 
human rights meaning '[t]heory and reality grow further apart as academics work zealously for the implementation of 
human rights as the understand them. ' (emphasis in original) C. Murphy. 'Objections to Western Conceptions of 
Human Rights. ' 9 Ho/stra Law Review (198 1) pp. 434-435. 
15 M. Heiberg, ed. Subduing Sovereignty: Sovereignty and the Right to Intervene. (London: Pinter, 1994) p. 15. 
16 See the statement by Falký in the context of the intervention to restore democracy in Haiti, that the US is genuinely 
committed to encouraging human rights and democracy around the world 'at least to the extent that such 
encouragement is not too costly and does not come into conflict with strategic concerns relating to trade and 
influence. ' R. Falk. 'The Haiti Intervention: A Dangerous World Order Precedent for the United Nations. ' 36 Harvard 
International Law Journal (1995) p. 351. 
17 The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) (UN Doc. A/RES/44/25) demonstrates this double gesture as 191 
states have become parties to the treaty, but 75 of them have entered a variety of reservations and understandings, 
many of which nullify the impact of the convention. Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General Status 
as at 31 December 1997 UN Doc. ST/LEG/SER. E/I 6 (hereinafter Multilateral Treaties, 1997). 
18 See M. Reisman. 'Sovereignty and Human Fights in Contemporary International Law. ' 84 American Journal of 
International Law (1990) p. 869. 
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establishment of a swift and effective juridical system but rather they hobbled 
it 
... 
by establishing a veritable obstacle course that is almost insurmountable, 
on the long and arduous road that the basic rights of the individual are forced to 
travel. 19 
The ability of states to determine the creation and application of international human rights 
law raises conceptual difficulties as the law is supposed to have the purpose of limiting the 
arbitrary behaviour of governments in relation to the individual. It is not surprising that in 
creating limits upon themselves states and governments have found ways to manipulate the 
system so that it appears that human values and interests are important when in reality the 
values and interests of states and governments are maintained. 
M. T14E PURSUIT OF EFFECTIVENESS 
International human rights law has the purpose of protecting *individuals from the arbitrary 
use and abuse of power that has been entrusted to others as a matter of social ordering. The 
UDHR recognises that human dignity and equal rights for all individuals are 'the foundation of 
freedom, justice and peace in the world' 
. 
20 It sees human rights as those rights and freedoms 
an individual requires In order to ensure physical survival and the maintenance of their human 
dignity. The specific content of rights will vary over time and space and it is not possible to 
establish any precise list of absolute rights, or a hierarchy of rights, as the specific content will 
differ between communities and individuals in the same community. The final goal of human 
rights will, however, be constant over time and space 
- 
the protection and preservation of the 
individual In body and spirit. 21 
By describing international human rights law as 'ineffective' it is being held that the body 
of law in question does not achieve its purported goal of protecting the dignity and survival of 
human beings. Effectiveness is related to the real, the actual, and the existing, '[a] situation is 
-cr_ life,. 
22 
ej-. Lv.; ctive if it is solidly implanted in real Any instrument established for the purpose of 
19 Inter-American Court of Human Rights. In the matter of Viviana Gallardo et al. (13 November 1981) Advisory 
Opinion No. G 10 1/8 1, Inter-Arn. Ct. H. R. (Ser. A) (1984) Explanation of Judge Piza, paragraph 11. Buergenthal 
provides an equally applicable comment placing the onus upon states - 'It is one thing to establish institutions on the 
international plane to promote and protect human rights, it is quite another to give them the authority and tools they 
need to achieve their objective. ' T. Buergenthal. 'The Non-native and Institutional Evolution of International Human 
Rights. ' 19 Human Rights Quarterly (1997) pp. 712-713. 
20 Preamble, paragraph 1. 
21 Fein describes 'the right to exist and to be free from bodily invasion and terror of being caught, held and disappeared 
is a basic desideratum among humans which transcends cultures and ages. ' H. Fein 'More Murder in the Middle: Life 
Integrity Violations and Democracy in the World. ' 17 Human Rights Quarterly (1995) p. 17 1. For various lists of core 
rights see J. Donnelly. Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice. (Itbaca: Cornell University Press, 1989) pp. 
37-41. 
22 Cassese (1986) p. 26. 
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addressing issues of human rights must be accessible, effective and credible in the view of 
those is most closely impacts. 23 To determine effectiveness it is necessary to examine how the 
law works within the society which it exists. This entails looking at factors including, but not 
limited to, implementation, enforcement, impact and compliance in order to detem-line whether 
or not the law matters. Effectiveness depends upon the law having an impact on political, 
social and economic areas of society and not just merely rhetoric that is void of substance. 24 
Mere proclamations or declarations are not enough, there must also exist real and actual 
guarantees accessible to the individual. 25 
The effectiveness of international human rights law lies in its ability to correspond to, and 
when necessary, react to the needs and desires of those it proclaims to protect 
- 
individualS. 26 
In examining the effectiveness of any international human tights instrument it is necessary to 
determine to what extent their provisions accurately reflect the reality faced by an individual or 
if they exist only for symbolic purposes to create a myth that legality is observed. Thompson 
writes '[t]he essential precondition for the effectiveness of law, 
... 
is that it shall display an 
independence from gross manipulation and shall seem to be JUSt., 27 It is one thing to declare 
the existence of rights but if those rights are of no use to the individual as states manipulate the 
system of protection in favour of their own interests how can the law be effective? 
In the creation and ittiplementation of international human rights law there is a conflict 
between the values and interests of states and the values and interests of individuals. To speak 
of human or individual values means concern for human welfare, human rights, the ability of 
individuals to participate in or have an impact upon the decision-making processes that impact 
and shape their lives and society. State values/interests include concepts such as state 
autonomy, independence, the impermeability and definition of the national interest and 
23 M. Gomez. 'Social EconornIc Rights and Human Rights Commissions. ' 17 Human Rights Quarterly (1995) p. 155. 
24 F. Snyder. 'The Effectiveness of European Community Law: Institutions, Processes, Tools and Techniques. ' 56 
Modem LawReview (1993) p. 19; G. Christie. Law, Norms andAuthority. (London: Duckworth, 1982)pp. 11-12. 
25 H. Shue. Basic Rights, Subsistence, Affluence and US. Foreign Policy. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1980) p. 16. 
26 See Watson who feels that since violations of human rights exist then an international system of protection does not 
exist, J. S. Watson. 'Legal Theory, Efficacy and Validity in the Development of Human Rights Norrns in International 
Law. ' 79 University ofl7linois Law Forum (1979) p. 611. 
27 Thompson (1975) p. 263. 
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determmation of the development of the individual within the state. 28 Henkin describes 
egoism and selfishness on behalf of the state as the hallmark of the international system. 29 
International law, being the law of the international system, takes state values/interests as 
its primary concem. It serves the purpose of regulating intemational relations and allows states 
to retain their exclusive position in the law-making process and to legitimise this position, 
allowing states to define effectiveness in the international system. 30 The creation and 
development of international human rights law, being a process dominated by states, takes into 
consideration what is necessary to ensure and protect state values with considerations 
concenung human welfare being less influential 
.31 Henkin has expressed the position that 
even when states have expressed concems based on human welfare this action was not based 
on the genuine concem for individuals but was an expression of state interests conceming 
independence and autonomy. 32 
International law accepts the state as a rational actor whose self-interest cannot be brought 
into question. The consequence is that the state, or the government that controls the state, is 
seen to be wholly representative of and acting in a manner consistent with the needs and 
desires of the domestic society. The reality of this situation runs contrary to the views of many 
as to what the legitimate purpose of the state is. Rousseau saw the state as an artificial creation 
that consists of nothing but its members and needs to have a moving and compelling reason to 
dispose of any of its parts in a manner beneficial to the common good. 33 Madison felt that the 
character of a government lies in the foundations upon which it was established and is 
dependent upon this foundation for the source of its powers and the way in which these powers 
are to be carried out. 34 But, as Chomsky observes, the state has acquired the power to enforce 
a certain concept of what is legal, but this power does not imply justice. This is reflected by 
the use of the law to maintain existing power structures that define themselves as states against 
28 L. Henkin. International Law. 
- 
Politics and Values. (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1995) pp. 100-1,105. The 
situation has also been described thus: 'There are two streams in [international] society: emotions of conscience and 
the state system. The first is prevented by the second. ' See R. Kent. 'Humanitarian Assistance and Inter-Agency Co- 
ordination and Co-operation: Constraints and Prospects in an Affican Context. ' Special Issue International Journal of 
Refugee Law (1995) p. 244. 
29 Henkin (1995) pp. 106-107. Henkin also feels that international organisations, in general, serve a similar purpose in 
that they act With the primary purpose of facilitating co-operation among states for the benefit of states. But as we will 
see below international organisations have been able to overcome state domýinance in varying degrees. 
30 Henkin (1995) p. 99. 
31 Henkin (1995) p. 168. 
32 See Henkin (1995) pp. 169-173. 
33 J-J. Rousseau. The Social Contract. trans. M. Cranston. (London: Penguin, 1968) Book H, Chapter 4. 
34 J. Madison, A. Hamilton and J. Jay. The Federalist Papers. 1. Kramnick, ed. (London: Penguin, 1987), Federalist 
No. 39, p. 256. 
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the interests of masses of people who happen to be in opposition to states. 35 International aw 
clearly provides for the legitimacy of this situation making it necessary, as Paine noted, to 
'[flay then the axe to the root, and teach governments hurnanity. It is their sanguinary 
punishments which corrupt mankind. 36 
Any introduction of values/interests contrary to those of states will be met with resistance, 
as reflected in the law-making process. 37 Ideas such as democracy, human rights, concern for 
the environment, etc., all have the effect of impeding upon the exclusive position of states in 
the international system. In the formulation of international aw in areas where concern for the 
welfare of individuals is expressed as paramount, greater concentration is placed upon 
preserving the interests of states rather than fixfthering the welfare of individuals. While 
international law continues to take the interests of states as its defining dynamic, it is 
increasingly being forced to recognise that the interests of individuals are part of the 
international system. Oppenheim made the early observation: 
The importance of individuals to the Law of Nations is just as great as that of 
territory, for individuals are the personal basis of every State. Just as a State 
cannot exist without a territory, so it- cannot exist without a multitude of 
individuals who are its subjects and who, as a body, forni the people or the 
nation... 
. 
The Law of Nations is therefore compelled to provide certain rules 
38 regarding individuals. 
The creation of international human rights law is one area where international law has been 
compelled to provide certain rules regarding individuals'. 39 In doing so what is perhaps the 
greatest paradox of international law has also been created 
- 
those who create the international 
legal rules concerning human rights are, at the same time, the greatest violators of those rules. 40 
The unquestioned role of the state in the conducting of international relations has become well 
established in international law with commentators accepting the situation as the most 
35 See his debate with Foucault in Reflexive Water: The Basic Concerns ofMankind, F. Elder, ed. (London: Souvenir 
Press, 1974) pp. 176-179. 
36 In T. Paine. Rights ofMan, Common Sense and Other Political Writings. M. Philip, ed. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1995) p. 108 
37 The recent Rome Conference to create an International Crin-unal Court has been described as an exercise of 
'[n]aked, cynical self-interest... ' as efforts were made 'to get as broad a consensus as possible by shielding the largest 
number of states from provisions they find uncomfortable. ' 'Self-Interest brings Court into Contempt. ' The Guardian 
(15 July 1998) p. 17. 
38 1. Oppenheim. International Law: A Treatise. Part 1. (London: Longmans 1905) p. 341. Also A. Cassese. Human 
Rights in a Changing World. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990) p. 168 
39 Cassese (1986) pp. 99-100. 
40 Unfortunately, measurements of the effectiveness of international human rights law is embedded in this paradox, see 
Meron (1998) p. 80. 
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beneficial way to represent a society's interests at the international level 
.41 There does exist a 
substantial body of international human rights standards and obligations that states are required 
to abide by, but it is left to states themselves to develop the content and the extent of these 
obligations in actual practice. 42 In its final product international human rights law does not 
create a system which takes as its primary concern its proposed object 
- 
individuals. Instead 
greater concern and effort has been placed upon ensuring that the position and interests of 
states are not compromised or brought into question to any large degree 
. 
43 This has worked to 
create a process that excludes the ability of the individual to access and utilise international 
human rights instruments, devaluing the substance and purpose of those instruments with 
regard to the day to day lives of individuals. One author has commented that the current state 
based international system has little to offer it largest constituency 
- 
individuals and the 
communities that they create 
- 
as the concerns of individuals cannot be adequately expressed 
and are not readily accommodated. The author concludes that if individuals really did matter, 
then international institutional developments that claim to act In the interest of individuals 
would provide effective means for allowing individuals and groups to exercise their rights. 44 
As it stands the ability of international human rights law to be effective is dependent upon the 
will of states and in any clash of interests it is the priorities of states that prevail. It is necessary 
to always remember that a state is made up of individuals, maintained by individuals, it is 
individuals who make the decisions, and feel the impact of the law. Therefore it is impossible 
to eliminate human values from the international scene. 45 Theories of international law fail to 
realise the importance of this as international legitimacy is currently defined in terms of a 
41 P. Reuter. Introduction to the law of Treaties. (Geneva: Institute of International Studies, 1995) p. 5. Also the 
review provided by E. Benvensiti. 'Judicial Misgivings Regarding the Application of International Law: An Analysis 
of Attitudes of National Courts. ' 4 European Journal ofInternational Law (1993) pp. 160-16 1. 
42 The US Supreme Court in the Head Money Cases 112 U. S. 5 80 (1884) expressed that 'so far as a treaty made by the 
United States 
... 
can become the subject of judicial cognisance in the courts of this country, it is subject to such acts as 
Congress may pass for its enforcement, modification, or appeal. ' In Polites v Ae Commonwealth and Another (High 
Court of Australia) [1945] 70 CLR 60, Latham CJ recognised the place of international law but felt 'courts are bound 
by the statute law of their country, even if that law should violate the rule of international law' at pp. 68-69. In 
National Corn Growers Association v Canada (Canada Import Tribunal Federal Court of Appeal [ 1988] 58 DLR (4th) 
642, the court stated '[1]t should be remembered that treaties in the Canadian context require implementing legislation 
to have any force and effect under Canadian law'. See above the remarks of Lord Denning in Blackburn v Attorney 
General, note 6. 
43 Sea C. Schreuer. 'ne Waning of the Sovereign State: Towards a New Paradigm for International LawT 4 
European Journal ofInternational Law (1993) p. 448. 
44 C. Hamelink. The Politics of World Communication. (London: Sage, 1994) pp. 1-2. 
45 P. Allott. 'State Responsibility and the Unmaking of International Law. ' 29 Harvard International Law Journal 
(1988) p. 13. Ironically it is individuals who have developed the doctrine and practice of international law resulting in 
the present situation. 
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state's ability to control individuals and not dependent upon Whether they truly represent their 
nee s. 
46 
For international hwnan rights law to be effective there is the need to reconceive the state 
as a more practical unit which represents and acts for its population in an appropriate and 
realistic fashion as defined by that population. 47 This would have a major impact upon the 
construction and application of international law making it more responsive to the needs and 
desires of individuals beyond the rhetoric presently expressed by states. The development of 
international human rights law has provided numerous possibilities for change. However, 'the 
essential point of such activity must be to influence and transform the domestic context'. 48 
The ability of international human rights law to effectively transfonn the domestic context by 
being based more on the needs of individuals has been severely limited. In ideal circumstances 
law could be seen as a vehicle for change but with international law the emphasis has been on 
the needs and interests of states causing it to remain rigid and to become stagnant 
. 
49 This 
provides an impetus and justification for developing an international law of democracy to 
create a more open and dynamic process. 
IV. THE STRUCTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT 
International human rights law provides a clear example of the 'double gesture' of two 
opposing, but equally valid positions, that characterises the international legal argument. At 
one end it is possible to identify numerous international instruments which proclaim the rights 
individuals possess and obligations upon governments to confom'i to certain standards of 
behaviour. At the opposing end, any attempt by individuals to access and utilise international 
human rights instruments ranges from the impossible to the very difficult. Furthern-iore, in 
situations where individuals are able to access and utilise international human rights 
instruinents, there is no guarantee they will be able to make effective use of them. The ability 
of individuals to have access to and utilise international human rights instruments is wholly 
dependent upon the actions and attitudes of states as expressed through the international law- 
46 Contrary to the purpose of the state, see Chapter 2 and F. Te§on. 'Kantian Theory of International Law. ' 92 
Columbia Law Review (1992) pp. 53-54. 
47 For a similar view see S. Murumba. 'Grappling with a Groatian Movement: Sovereignty and the Quest for a 
Non-native World Order. ' 19 Brooklyn Journal ofInternational Law (1993) p. 566. 
48 J. Oloka-Onyango. 'Beyond the Rhetoric: Reinvigorating the Struggle for Economic and Social Rights in Africa. ' 
26 California Western International Law Journal (1995) P. 60. 
49 D. Verna. 'Rethinking About New International Law-Making Process. ' 29 Indian Journal of International Law 
(1989)p. 40. 
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making process. 50 The result is the illusion that governments have agreed to adhere to certain 
obligations and that individuals are able to benefit from the protection of international human 
rights instruments, when in reality individuals find that numerous obstacles are placed between 
them and the effective use of international human rights law. This illusion of effectiveness has 
existed since the laying of the foundations for an international system for the promotion and 
protection of human rights. There is a tendency among human lights advocates to overlook 
the obstacle course individuals face in relation to international human rights law and substitute 
a textual illusion for reality. 51 It is essential to look beyond the illusion of the textual existence 
of international human lights instruments to examine how states are able to manipulate the 
law-making process allowing them to proclaim the importance of human rights but prevent the 
individual fi7om benefiting from the international human rights instruments. Recent events, 
such as those in the former-Yugoslavia, demonstrate that the textual existence of international 
human rights instruments often gives way to other priorities, as determined by states, to the 
detriment of individuals. 52 
The illusion of effectiveness of international human rights law is a direct result of the legal 
53 
argument as determined by the theoretical structure of public international law. The 
international system takes the state as its primary, constituent entity. 54 International law, being 
the law of the international system, serves the interests and values of its constituent element 
- 
states. 55 As the international system has developed the values/interests of other entities have 
become a concern, but supremacy of state interests in the formulation of international law has 
not been substantially weakened. Through the application of a study produced by 
Koskenniemi in his work From Apology to Utopia: The Nature of the International Legal 
Argument, it is possible to discover how the illusion of effectiveness of international human 
rights law is maintained. Koskenniemi shows how through the international legal argument 
the paradox, or 'double gesture', of international human rights law is sustained through 
'0 This includes customary international law obligations as well, see generally the views expressed in Pinochet, where 
the existence and force of custom is recognised but the ability to prosecute the crime of torture in the domestic courts 
relies upon a state having accepted specific treaty obligations. 
51A primary example is the significance of the UDHR which is undoubtedly a document of great importance for 
international human rights law but with minimal actual legal significance, see below. 
52 See N. Milicevic. 'The Role and Relationship of the Constitutional and Non-Constitutional Domestic Human Rights 
Enforcement Mechanisms. ' in M. O'Flaherty and G. Gisvold, eds. Post-War Protection of Human Rights in Bosnia 
and Hezegovina. (Ilie Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1998) pp. 15-16. 
53 Watson (1979) feels that international human rights law constitutes a separate body of law from international law. 
54 Bull describes the state as the 'starting point for international relations'. A state possesses a government and asserts 
sovereignty internally and externally meaning full supremacy over the internal workings of the territory and 
independence from the competence of outside authorities. H. Bull. The Anarchical Society. (London Macmillan, 
1977) p. 8. 
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continual movement between extreme poles of possibility, which he terms apology and utopia. 
By maintaining continual motion in the formulation and application of legal arguments 
international aw is able to maintain an illusion of effectiveness through its own indeterminate 
nature. 56 In international human rights law this movement occurs between ideas of community 
and justice which includes protection of the individual on the one side, and the self-interest of 
states and the preservation of state sovereignty and international order on the other. 57 
Koskenniemi himself does not address the structure of international human rights law but his 
study provides a fitting framework for an investigation into the difficulties facing international 
human rights law and an international law of democracy. It shows how arguments 
proclaiming protection of the individual, as well as ideas of community values and justice, are 
easily seen as too utopian causing them to be diluted with arguments from the apologist side of 
international law which heralds the dominance of state interests. This allows for states to 
engage in rhetorical support for human values without j eopardisMg their own interests. 
International aw, as with any system of law, is determined by the social environment in 
which it exists. 58 For international law this means that any examination must take as a starting 
point the ideas of liberalism that have been transformed from theories about the individual and 
applied directly to the international system, with individual states being substituted for 
individual human beings. 59 It is worth noting that liberalism's conception of the individual at 
the domestic level is fraught with difficulties for it fails to address the larger existence of the 
55 Oppenhiern (1905) pp. 342-345. The PCIJ remarked that in the absence of explicit legal rules, states have 'a wide 
discretion' in their actions, The Lotus Case (France v Turkey, 1927) PCIJ Series A, No. 10, p. 19. If states are the 
only legitimate makers of the law then there may be little impetus on their behalf to narrow this area of discretion. 
56 The issue of indeterminacy looms large in any critical view of the law with assumptions that if the law is proven to 
be indeterminate it is naturally ineffective. Kress believes that this view is sometimes over stated and that before going 
to the extremes and claiming radical indeterminacy exists as a detriment to the entire system it is necessary to engage 
in a contextual sensitive inquiry for the reasons of the indeterminacy. K. Kress. 'Legal Indeten-ninacy. ' 77 California 
Law Review (1989) p. 337. The approach here is to demonstrate the detrimental impact upon the individual due to the 
indeterminacy of international human rights law. It is not concluded that the entire system is unworkable or has no 
future. 
57 One author has used the terms the 'nightmare' and the 'noble dream' of international human rights law. The 
nightmare is that 'the law and institutions which are supposed to protect human rights are powerless to constrain the 
excesses of governments and their lackeys. ' The noble dream is the belief that human rights can transforrn the lives of 
individuals by providing protection and empowerment, see S. Marks. 'Nightmare and Noble Dream: The 1993 World 
Conference on Human Rights. ' 53 Cambridge Law Journal (1994) p. 54. 
58 Apology to Utopia, pp. 188-191. Also M. Koskenniemi. 'International Law in a Post-Realist Era. ' 16 Australian 
Yearbook ofInternational Law (1995) p. 3. 
59 N. Purvis. 'Critical Legal Studies and International Law. ' 32 Harvard International Law Journal (1991) p. 93; N. 
Berman. 'Sovereignty in Abeyance: Self-Determination and International Law. ' 7 Wisconsin International Law 
Journal (1988) p. 53; A. Rosas. 'State Sovereignty and Human Rights: Towards a Global Constitutional Project. ' in D. 
Beetham, ed. Politics and Human Rights. (Oxford: Blackwells, 1995) pp. 634; D. Nincic. The Problem of Sovereignty 
in the Charter and in the Practice of the United Nations. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970) p. 37. But see S. 
Hoffmann. 'The Crisis of Liberal Intemationalism. ' 98 Foreign Policy (1995) pp. 160-161, who feels that the creation 
of an international system based on liberalism was not merely a transferring of the domestic to the global, but a 
creation in itself against illegitimate violence, tyranny and wars of aggression. 
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individual's place in society. 60 Liberal thought at the individual level fails to see that 
individuals do not exist in a vacuum making it necessary to incorporate other factors involved 
with the individual's existence. The same holds true for the international system In that 
international law has not recognised as valid other interests and values outside of those 
attributed to or created by states. 61 The recognition of human rights has weakened this position 
but it remains that action undertaken in the international system by entities other than states is 
described in terms of the state thereby preserving the status quo. International law generally 
associates individuals with membership to a particular state with their needs and desires being 
defined by that state inhibiting any consciousness of a common link of humanity beyond state 
borders. 62 The end result is that the ability of international human rights law to solve the 
problems it attempts to address is severely limited. 63 
The international legal process is conceptualised in terms of state interest, will or 
behaviour. Ideas based on concern for human interest are only considered legitimate to the 
extent in which they are able to correspond to the goals of the international system as defined 
by states. In the wake of international events tlýiis century protection of the individual, the 
environment and other community interests have emerged as concerns of the international 
system. While these communal concerns have attracted perfimctory agreement over time, their 
nature and content and how they are to be pursued remain an area of disagreement. It is 
accepted that states need to show respect for certain values and interests deemed important for 
the international system before they are accepted as principles for behaviour. This poses a 
dilemma for states for they are required to respect legal instruments that may limit their 
behaviour and the pursuit of goals deemed to be more important. International law attempts to 
solve this dilemma by trying to be simultaneously normative and concrete in the formulation of 
rules and principles. 64 In trying to be non-native there is the continual attempt to create a basis 
for obligation outside the action of states. Simultaneously, international law strives for 
concreteness in satisfying the need to show that the law is not based on an unidentifiable logic 
but can be demonstrated by observing the actual actions of states. Tlýiis combination of 
60 See further Chapter 2. 
61 C. Beitz. Political Theory and International Relations. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979) p. 76. 
62 For a discussion concerning the conflict between the interests of the individual as a member of the universal human 
race and as a citizen of a specific state, see A. Linklater. Men and Citizens in International Relations, 2nd ed. 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990) pp. 17-37, also D. Otto. 'Nongovernmental Organisations in the United Nations 
System: The Emerging Role of hiternational Civil Society. ' 18 Human Rights Quarterly (1996) p. 129. 
63 S. Sathirathi. 'An Understanding of the Relationship Between International Legal Discourse and Third World 
Countries. ' 25 Harvard International Law Journal (1984) p. 394. 
64 See P. Trimble. 'International Law, World Order and Critical Legal Studies. ' 42 Stanford Law Review (1990) p. 
811, who feels international law's fundamental connection to the state means that '[I]ntemational law is thus a 
powerful inhibition against creative thinidng', a necessary element for an effective international human rights law. 
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non-nativity and concreteness create what is considered the 'objectivity of international aw'. 65 
International aw is seen as being objective, able to provide solutions to problems, because the 
law is verifiable in its existence through an examination of state behaviour but the basis for the 
law is not exclusively dependant upon the behaviour of states. Nonnativity and concreteness 
are in direct opposition to one another and the integration of the two into a single coherent 
concept proves impossible. 66 By being concrete, international aw is able to provide a factually 
strong but uncritical doctrine, and by being normative it provides a desirable basis for 
obligation but one often distant from the realities of the international system. 
The international legal argument attempts to deal with this conflict between concreteness 
and normativity through ascending and descending patterns of justification in the formulation 
of rules and principles. 67 The descending patterns ofjustification deal with the normative side 
of international law, moving towards ideas such as human rights, justice and the common 
interests of the world community. This pattern of justification believes in the possibility of 
state behaviour being guided by normative ideas outside of self-interest and is criticised as a 
view towards utopia. The ascending pattern is associated with the apologist's view of 
international law whereby the foundations of international law are based upon what states 
actually do. In the apologist's pattern concrete state behaviour determines what the law is and 
the concept of state sovereignty is paramount. Both patterns are equally open to criticisms as 
being overly subjective and not indicative of how the law truly works, as Koskenniemi 
explains: 
From the ascending perspective, the descending model falls into subjectivism 
as it cannot demonstrate the content of its aprioristic norms in a reliable 
manner (i. e. it is vulnerable to the objection of utopianism). From the 
descending perspective, the ascending model seems subjective as it privileges 
State will or interest over objectively binding norms, (i. e. it is vulnerable to the 
charge of apologism). 68 
The international legal argument, in its quest to accommodate these conflicting patterns, proves 
to be structurally indeterminate by not being able to exclusively base itself in either extreme, 
rather it must rely on constant movement between the two to create an illusion of effectiveness. 
Koskennien-ii provides a nuraber of examples of this movement of international law as it 
attempts to establish and maintain effectiveness from the doctrine of international law and 
65 Apology to Utopia, pp. 2-8. 
66 Apology to Utopia, pp. 9-40. 
67 Apology to Utopia, pp. 40-42. 
68 Apology to Utopia, pp. 41-2, references omitted. 
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decisions of the International Court of Justice (lCj). 69 A more recent case before the ICJ has 
also demonstrated the movement of international law between apology and utopia and the 
tensions between human and state values, with state values remaining the dominant 
70 
consideration. In the Case Concerning East Timor (Portugal v Australia), the ICJ was faced 
with the question as to which state is the legitimate administering power of the territory of East 
Timor, which in turn would affect the ability of Australia to enter into treaty relations with 
regards to the natural resources of the area. Portugal claimed that it was the administering 
power of the territory based on resolutions of the UN General Assembly (GA) and the Security 
Council (SC) stating that Indonesia's control over East Timor occurred through illegal means 
and that it remained the legitimate power 
.71 Australia responded that it had the right to enter 
into a treaty for the exploitation of its natural resources and the only logical entity with whom 
to enter into treaty arrangements was Indonesia since it was the defacto power in control of 
East Timor. For Australia, how Indonesia obtained that control was not an issue, its only 
concern was who was in a position to negotiate in relation to the resources surrounding the 
territory. The welfare of the individuals and society of East Timor was inconsequential with 
the determining factor being the right of a state to pursue its own interests. 
Portugal's arguments relied upon the textual decisions of the UN that declared Indonesia's 
occupation as illegal, affirmed Portugal's position as the administrating authority and 
confirmed the East Timor's right to self-determination. 72 Australia's arguments were based on 
the need to accept de facto situations and its own nght to be able to exploit its natural 
resources. 73 The ICJ's final decision was that it did not have the jurisdiction to hear the case 
since it directly involved the interests of Indonesia who was not a party before the ICJ in this 
particular case. 74 In its conclusion the ICJ declared that the opposing positions of Portugal and 
69 See Koskennien-ii's discussion of the Southwest Alýica Case (ICJ Reports (1966) p. 18) Apology to Utopia, pp. 407- 
410. 
70 1. C. J. Reports (1995) p. 90, hereinafter Case Concerning East Timor. The final opinion delivered by the ICJ in 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons ICJ Reports (1996) p. 226, hereinafter Legality of Nuclear 
Weapons) also demonstrates the indeterminate nature of the international legal argument. For an analysis of the ICJ's 
opinion see D. Akande. 'Nuclear Weapons, Unclear Law? Deciphering the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion of 
the International Court. ' 68 British Yearbook of International Law (1997) p. 165; D. Warner. 'The Nuclear Weapons 
Decision and the ICJ: Locating the Raison behind Raison dEtat. 27 Millennium (1998) p. 299. 
71 For a review of the relevant resolutions see Case Concerning East Timor, pp. 95-97. 
72 Case Concerning East Timor, pp. 95-97. 
73 Case Concerning East Timor, pp. 97-98. 
74 Case Concerning East Timor, p. 105. This is another area where the Court was faced with two opposing but equal 
legal arguments. Their reasons for not exercising jurisdiction due to Indonesia's non-appearance was based on the 
accepted Monetary Gold doctrine (Monetary Gold Removedftom Rome in 1943 (Italy v France, United Kingdom and 
United States, 1953) ICJ Reports (1954) p. 19) see pp. 102-103. The Court also noted that it is possible to adjudicate 
when a third party is not present before the Court, pp. 104-105. The essential difference in coming to their situation is 
whether or not the interests of the third-party are 'affected' or are the 'subject matter', a vague and dubious legal 
distinction indeed. See 1. Scobbie and C. Drew. 'Self-Determination Undetermined: The Case of East Timor. ' 9 
Leiden Journal of International Law (1996) p. 185; N. Sybesma-Knol. 'The Indispensable Parties Rules in the East 
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Australia were both correct. It held in two separate paragraphs that 'East Timor remains a 
non-self governing territory and its people has the right to self-determination. 75 It based this 
affirmation on GA activities lending support to Portugal's position. If East Timor remains a 
non-self governing territory, then under UN practice there must exist an administering power 
which will work with the territory until a different status is obtained. 76 In a contradictory 
fashion, the ICJ felt that the resolutions from the GA could not be taken as authoritative for 
determining Portugal as the exclusive administrating power of East Timor and that the defacto 
position of Indonesia had to be recognised as state practice has confirmed. 77 
in its reasoning (or significant lack of) the ICJ responded to utopian arguments by 
declaring East Timor still maintained a right to self-determination as a non-self governing 
territory. The ICJ also followed a practical view that to triumph the right of self-determination 
for the society of East Timor over the hard facts of state practice would not be conducive to the 
international system. Therefore it was necessary to recognise defacto situations so that other 
states, like Australia, are able to go about their own business regardless of past illegalities 
which may be an issue. No consideration was given to the situation which exists III East Timor 
from the initial illegal use of force and continual repression which has followed, nor to the 
suffering experienced by the population through the denial of self-determination. The 
acceptance of defacto situations so that states are able to go about their business was held to be 
more important despite the claims that self-determination is possessed of obligations erga 
omnes. 
78 The ICJ's dismissal of the erga omnes character of self-determination demonstrates 
that no matter how forcefully one might claim the existence of a human right as an essential 
element of the international system if that right clashes with the interests of states it will be the 
right, not state interest, which will be sacrificed regardless of the evidence which exists in 
79 
support of the existence of the right 
. 
The ICJ demonstrated that a legal position fim-dy rooted in either the ascending or 
descending argument is easily criticised from the opposing view as being either too utopian or 
apologetic and not representative of the true situation in the international system 
. 
80 To 
counteract criticisms it is necessary to move from the original pattern of justification to the 
Timor Case. ' in E. Denters and N. Schrijver, eds. Reflections on International Lawftom the Low Countries: in Honour 
ofPaul de Waart. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1998) p. 442. 
75 Case Concerning East Timor, pp. 103,105. 
76 UN Charter, Article 73. 
77 Case Concerning East Timor, p. 104. 
78 Case Concerning East Timor, p. 102. 
79 For a study of self-deten-nination as a peremptory norm in the context of the conflict in the former-Yugoslavia, see 
A. Weisburd. 'The Emptiness of the Concept of Jus Cogens, as Blustrated by the War in Bosnia-HerzegoV]na. ' 17 
Michigan Journal ofInternational Law (1995) p. 1. 
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opposing pole so as to not appear subjectively biased to either position 
.81 There appears to be 
no easy resolution to this indetem-iinacy as those who use the rules and principles of 
international aw will be able to find plenty of evidence to support their position, but only in 
relation to the opposing position. International law is able to maintain an illusion of 
effectiveness through the continual movement from apologist to utopian, subjective to 
objective, community to particular, all in an attempt to appear as a coherent set of legal rules 
and principles. 
In the Case Concerning East Timor a wide spectraim of legal rules surrounding the status 
of East Timor were covered, backing was given to both human interests and states interests, 
but in the end it was the state interest which prevailed. In terms of international human rights 
law, the ascending and descending patterns of justification help to perpetuate the situation 
whereby state values are considered superior to human values, but at the same time provides 
states with the ability to declare a concern for human welfare and to create the illusion of 
progress III this area. 82 To triumph human values over state values as a legitimate concem for 
the international system is easily criticised as being too utopian, ignoring the realities involved 
in the international system. A position where huirian values have no role and only state values 
and interests are determiriing factors for the international system is equally susceptible to 
criticism for being too apologist in scope. 83 International law calls upon governments to 
adhere to certain forms of behaviour, it also allows for governments to manipulate the law to 
minimise any unwanted impact of its principles. 84 Therefore, states utilise the international 
legal argument to rhetorically demonstrate concern for human values without placing any real 
limitations upon their own values or interest. The movement of international human rights law 
from apology to utopia is clearest in the conflict between the two defining concepts of 
85 international human rights law 
- 
state sovereignty and concern for the individual 
. 
V. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA 
A. Sovereign Apology 
The primary obstacle to the development of human values and priorifies In the 
international system is the concept and practice of state sovereignty which legitimises the 
80 The ICJ's opinion in the Legality ofNuclear Weapons came to the same conclusion, see Akande (1998) p. 217. 
81 Apology to Utopia, pp. 42-45. 
82 Koskenniemi (1995) describes the international system as being more inclined to the concrete aspects of 
international law as opposed to the normative, pp. 1-5. 
83 The House of Lords addressed both of these issues in Pinohet, see the discussion of Lord Hutton, p. 887. Also 1. 
Brownlie. 'Reality and Efficacy of International Law. ' 52 British Yearbook ofInternational Law (198 1) p. 8. 
84 J. Quigley. 'Tlie International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Supremacy Clause. ' 42 DePaul Law 
Review (1993) p. 1287. 
85 For Marks (1994) this uneasy co-existence between opposing reflects the reality of human rights, p. 62. 
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actions of states and the supremacy of state values and interests. 86 Sovereignty has been 
defined as; 
[t]he supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power by which any independent 
state is governed; supreme political authority; the supreme will; paramount 
control of the constitution and frame of government and its administration; the 
self-sufficient source of political power, from which all specific political 
powers are derived; the political independence of a state, combined with the 
right and power of regulating its internal affairs without foreign dictation; 
... . 
The power to do everything in a state without accountability, to make laws, 
to execute and to apply them... 
. 
87 
International law enshrines the concept of state sovereignty as the basis of the international 
system creating conflict with the development and existence of ideas such as human rights and 
democracy. 88 The conflict of sovereignty with hui-nan values creates a situation whereby 'state 
sovereignty emerges victorious; individuals disappear from the international scene, and the 
89 violations they have suffered remain unexposed' 
. 
Sovereignty confirms state values by 
granting an exclusive jurisdiction over territory and population, creating a duty of non- 
intervention in the domestic affairs of other states, and obligations only by consent, 90 allowing 
a state 'to define for itself those of its interests that it holds vital'. 91 
The position of state sovereignty In the theory and process of international law is most 
likely outdated for today's world, however this does not overcome the continuance of 
sovereignty in the fon-nulation of international law, making it the primary issue to be 
addressed. 92 The continuance of sovereignty as a concept of the international system and as a 
86 See Murumba (1993) pp. 829-849. 
87 Black's Law Dictionary. 6th ed. (St. Paul: West Publishing, 1990) p. 1396. Also A-M. Burley. 'Toward an Age of 
Liberal Nations. ' 33 Harvard International Law Journal (1992) p. 395. 
88 Because of sovereignty '[I]ntemal differences of political and economic ideology have been regarded as irrelevant 
and unmentionable', A-M. Burley. 'Law among Liberal States: Liberal Internationalism and the Act of State 
Doctrine. ' 92 Columbia Law Review (1992) p. 1926. 
89 Cassese (1990) p. 57. Also P. Jessup. The International Problem of Governing Mankind. (Claremont: Claremont 
College, 1947) p. 2 who expressed: 'National sovereignty is the root of the evil-the freedom of states to enforce their 
will by the use of power. ' Delbrueck concludes that sovereignty and human rights are incompatible both in theory and 
practice, see J. Delbrueck. 'International Protection of Human Rights and State Sovereignty. ' 57 Indiana Law Journal 
(1981/2) pp. 567-8. 
90 1. Brownlie. Principles of Public International Law, 4th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 1990) 287; Rosas in 
Beetham (1995) p. 63; Nincic (1970) p. 193. 
91 de Vi sscher (1968) p. 102. 
92 Reisman (1990) claims that the traditional sovereignty of the state has been removed and replaced by the 
sovereignty of the people based on democracy, p. 869. The position and character of sovereingty in international law 
remains contested, see Koskenniemi, Apology to Utopia, pp. 201-212; Schreuer (1993) pp. 448-449; Henkin (1995) 
pp. 8-10. Perhaps the most accurate view comes from Foucault who has expressed the idea that two centuries after the 
European revolutions which overthrew absolute monarchs we have yet to cut off the king's head. M. Foucault. The 
History ofSexuality, vol. 1. trans. R. Hurley (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 198 1) pp. 8 8-89. 
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tool for interpreting legal rules, allows states to maintain control of the law-making process by 
legitimising their position as the exclusive formulator of international legal rules. Sovereignty 
allows for the creating and defining of the space of 'domestic jurisdiction' where the 
application of international human rights primarily occurs. Koskennierni points out that the 
creation of international norrns which lirnit sovereignty occurs only by reverting back to the 
original authority that sovereignty preserves 
- 
the state. 93 In international human rights law this 
is demonstrated by the fact that obligations exist concerning the behaviour of states in relation 
to their conduct vis-a-vis individuals. However, the way In which these obligations are created 
and applied is based on the sovereign prerogative of states. The sovereign prerogative allows 
states to decide whether or not to create a human rights instrument, the form and content of the 
instrument, whether or not to sign and ratify an instrument thereby actually creating legal 
obligations, and how those obligations will be applied in actual practice within the domestic 
jurisdiction of the state. 94 Through sovereignty states are able to construct a body of law that is 
more in tune with their interests, needs and desires, rather than those of individuals, for whom 
the law supposedly benefits. 
The ability of states to legitimately utilise the international legal argument through the 
principle of sovereignty to create obstacles for individuals in accessing or utilising international 
human rights instruments is displayed in the context of 'domestic jurisdiction'. International 
human rights law is based on the idea that by signing a treaty a state is agreeing to the 
obligations set forth and will make efforts to incorporate those obligations into the domestic 
legal system. There is no rule in international law requiring international human rights norms 
to be recognised at the domestic level allowing states the exclusive position in determining the 
reach of international human rights standards. 95 In the process of signing and ratifying a treaty 
the state may issue reservations or declarations which determine what aspects of the treaty will 
fall within their domestic competence and to what degree. 96 States are able to determine the 
exact tenns and conditions under which an international instrument will be part of the domestic 
legal system and accessible to the individual and at times the final result may not bear any 
93 Koskenniemi (1989) p. 193. 
94 Therefore even though certain actions may be prohibited by international law, the domestic state must still take 
action to ensure its applicability under domestic procedures, see Pinochet, per Lord Browne-Willdnson, pp. 832-833. 
Also Delbrueck (1981/2) pp. 574-75. 
95 Rosas in Beetharn (1995) pp. 64-65. 
96 The debate over the validity of certain reservations which are against 'the object and purpose' of the instrument in 
question is only a question of international law and will not necessarily impact the way in which the instrument is 
incorporated into a domestic system, L. Lijnzaad. Reservations to UN-Human Rights Treaties: Ratify and Ruin? 
(Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1995) pp. 3-4. 
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resemblance to the original international instrument. 97 By relying on states to institute, apply, 
and enforce international human rights standards through domestic arrangements the 
effectiveness of the law is brought into question. 98 Dinstien points out the extreme paradox of 
this situation in that no matter how impartial a domestic judicial system of a particular state 
may be, it is still an instrument of the state and its absolute impartiality may not always be 
relied upon. 99 Umozurike claims this to be a problem endemic to the structure and process of 
international aw as domestic courts will most likely apply domestic laws even if they run 
contrary to international obligations. ' 00 
The incorporation and application of the Refugee Convention'01 into domestic legal 
systems illustrates the ability of states to take advantage of the indeterminate nature of 
international law through applying different perceptions of what constitutes a refugee. There is 
a tendency, especially in western states, to implement restrictive definitions of what constitutes 
a refugee or discard the term altogether in order to minimise obligations regarding certain 
individuals under international law. 102 If an individual who appears to constitute a refugee 
under international law does not meet the strict criteria laid down in the domestic law of a state 
then they are not afforded the protection provided by international instruments regardless of 
97 As demonstrated by the US and the ICCPR, see L. Henkin. 'US Ratifications of Human Rights Conventions: The 
Ghost of Senator Bricker. ' 89 American Journal of International Law (1995) p. 341 where he describes the US 
reservations as 'specious, meretricious, and hypocritical. ' The UK's reservation to ICERD creates its own definition 
of discrimination as 'the United Kingdom does not regard the Commonwealth Immigrants Acts, 1962 and 1968, or 
their application, as involving any racial discrimination within the meaning of paragraph I of article 1, or any other 
provisions of the Convention, and fully reserves it right to continue to apply those Acts. ' Multilateral Treaties (1997) 
p. 101. Also see B. Schliiter. 'The Domestic Status of the Human Rights Clauses of the United Nations Charter. ' 61 
California Law Review (1973) pp. 115-116. 
98 Donnelly (1989) pp. 266-268. 
99 Y. Dinstien. 'Human Rights: Implementation through the United Nations System. ' 89 ASIL Proceedings (1995) p. 
234. Also Benvenisti (1993) and the examples therein. The doctrine of the UK legal system of Parliamentary 
supremacy reinforces the idea that the courts cannot be truly independent. As expressed in Manuel v Attorney-General 
[1983] Ch 77, at p. 86 'The duty of the court is to obey and apply every Act of Parliament'. Also N. Moller. 'The 
World Bank: Human Rights, Democracy and Governance. ' 15 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights (1997) p, 33 
who in assessing domestic monitoring arrangements for international obligations feels '[1]f the government is checking 
itself for violations of human rights abuses then I do not think that any would be found. The institution would have to 
be completely independent and free from government influence for it to have any real value. ' But see H. Jannul. 
'Effects of Decisions of Regional Human Rights Tribunals on National Courts. ' in T. Franck and G. Fox, eds. 
International Law Decisions in National Courts. (Irvington: Transnational, 1996) at p. 247 where he expresses that 
6national courts are the institutions best situated to protect those rights'. 
100 U. Umozunke. The African Charter on Human and Peoples'Rights. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1997) p. 109. 
Commentators have expressed that a sin-fflar situation holds true for international tribunals who rely on states their 
creation as well as their budgets, administrative support and enforcement. D. Shelton. 'The Independence of 
International Tribunals. ' in A. Cancado Trindade. The Modern World of Human Rights: Essays in Honour of Thomas 
Buergenthal. (San Jose: Inter-Amencan Institute of Human Rights, 1996) pp. 300-1. Also A. Cassese. 'On the Current 
Trends towards Criminal Prosecution and Punishment of Breaches of International Humanitarian Law. ' 9 European 
Journal of International Law (1998) p. 2, concerning the reluctance of states to support the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the fon-ner-Yugoslavia. 
101 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951) 189 UNTS 137. 
102 G. Goodwin-Gill. The Refugee in International Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1996) pp. 3-4. 
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their circumstances. 103 The ability of the individual to challenge strict domestic criteria will be 
first addressed through the domestic courts and administrative procedures, with no guarantee 
that international standards will be applied, making it difficult to determine if a violation of an 
international obligation has occurred since the state has been able to define the content and 
applicability of a right. 104 As a final note, since an individual as a refugee has left their country 
of citizenship they are unable to participate in the political process thereby having no influence 
upon the system they are subjected to. 105 Regardless of the existent international framework 
for the protection of refugees and the opinions of commentators, the plight of an individual will 
depend wholly upon the terms established by a state that may or may not correspond with the 
international position. Protests concerning the treatment of an individual may be raised by 
other states or international institutions but it will be primarily political considerations and not 
regard for legal obligations that will ultimately impact the individual's fate. 
The present system of international human rights protection has its roots in the 
Enlightenment period when monarchs were able to create a theory of sovereignty that spoke of 
justice, rights, freedoms, liberty, etc. The reality was that it created a space in which the 
monarch was able to exercise a greater degree of control over society and individuals. 106 
International hurnan rights law remains firmly in touch with sovereignty as an integral 
characteristic of the international system despite changes and developments that have worked 
to undermine the dominant position of sovereignty. 107 In the creation and implementation of 
international human rights law there continues to be a focus on the rights, power, and 
limitations of the sovereign instead of focusing on the needs and desires of the individual. 108 
Governments are still able to exercise control while speaking of justice, rights and freedom by 
excluding the individual from the process of determining the meaning of human rights texts as 
legitimised by international law. 109 The result is a system which appears to protect the 
individual, but it is a system of 'a double gesture 
- 
it speaks of individual freedom, while 
103 See generally, J. Hughes and F. Liebaut, eds. Detention ofAsylum Seekers in Europe: Analysis and Perspectives. 
(Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff 1998). 
104 M. Stohl et a]. 'State Violations of Human Rights: Issues of Problems and Measurement. ' 8 Human Rights 
Quarterly (1986) p. 594-596. A further example arises with the issue of torture where in the US it has been held that 
customary international law prohibited acts of torture and that it may be utilised. before the domestic courts, 
Filartiga v Peha-Irala 630 F. 2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). But in the opinion expressed in Forti v Suarez Mason 672 F. 
Supp. 1531 (1987) it was held that there existed no customary rule against torture since there was no clear 
definition of what constituted torture. 
105 G. Noll. 'Tbe Democratic Legitimacy of Refugee Law. ' 66 Nordic Journal ofInternational Law (1997) p. 429. 
106 See R. Gaete. Human Rights and the Limits of Critical Reason. (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1993) p. 4 1. 
107 Donnelly (1986) p. 233. On the history of sovereignty see J. Bartelson. A Genealogy of Sovereignty. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
108 M. Foucault. 'Two Lectures. ' in PowerlKnowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977. C. 
Gordon, ed. (New York: Harvester, 1980) pp. 94-95. 
109 Gaete (1993) pp. 31,70-7 1. 
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legitirr-ýising the exercise of state power. "' 0 In the final analysis international law confirms 
much more power and authority to states than it denies. The ability to identify the textual 
existence of legal standards that appear to place limits on the actions of governments clouds the 
issue and allows for the reality to be overlooked. For the future of international human rights 
law it is necessary to realise that the existence of legal instruments does not automatically 
produce a favourable result. The effectiveness of those instruments depends upon the degree 
to which the individual is able to access and utilise them. 
B. International Human Rights Law 
- 
Movingftom Apology to Utopia 
From its inception, international human rights law has expressed the goal of safeguarding 
the individual from the arbitrary use and abuse of power without actually jeopardising the 
exclusive position of states. The result is a legal system which legitimises forms of state 
control over the individual. ' 12 The creation of an international system for the protection of 
human rights gained full force in the wake of the events of WW H. The primary concern then 
was the creation of stable international system, of which protection of human rights was only 
one aspect. Governments recognised the implications raised by a system of international 
human rights protection as one of the strongest public supporters of international human rights, 
Franklin Roosevelt, spoke with caution concerning an international system for human tights 
protection. Roosevelt famously declared the need to recognise the Four Freedoms 113 as a 
definite possibility in the international sphere, but was reluctant to apply these ideas at home or 
to empower an international organisation with the power to scrutinise US law and practice. 1 14 
The drafting of the UN Charter, and subsequent international hwnan rights instments, 
demonstrate the reluctance of governments to place limitations on their own behaviour and the 
ability to utilise the international legal argument for safeguarding their own interests while 
proclaiming a commitment to human interests and creating the illusion of progress through 
law. The UN Charter begins with 'We the Peoples' and carries on to profess a determination to 
110D. Litowitz. 'Foucualt on Law: Modernity as Negative Utopia. ' 21 Queen's Law Journal (1995)p. 15. 
III Trimble (1990) p. 833. In the US context, Lillich points to issues such as standing, sovereign immunity, act of 
state, and the political question doctrine as obstacles to anyone wanting to invoke international human rights standards 
at the domestic level, see R. Lillich. 'Invoking International Human Rights Law in Domestic Courts. ' 54 Cincinnati 
Law Review (1985) p. 413. Also M. Small. 'Enforcing International Human Rights Law in Federal Courts: The Alien 
Tort Statute and the Separation of Powers. ' 74 Georgetown Law Journal (1985) p. 183. 
112 Litowitz (1995) p. 15. 
113 Public Papers and Addresses ofFD. Roosevelt, vol. 10. S. Rosenman, ed. (New York: Russell and Russell, 1950) 
p. 65. A similar attitude was held by Churchill with regard to the Atlantic Declaration which proclaimed a universal 
respect for human values such as self-determination. After the Declaration was pronounced Churchill made it clear it 
was only applicable to the territories impacted by Nazi aggression, see A. Cassese. Se6F-Detennination of Peoples. - A 
Legal Reapprasial. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) p. 37. 
114 Cassese (1986) p. 294. 
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reaffirm faith in hurnan rights, to establish conditions ofjustice and to promote social progress 
and a better standard of life all within a larger freedom. ' 15 The Charter and the human rights 
documents that have evolved from the framework of the UN are the result of collaboration and 
agreement among individual states whose legitimacy, in many cases, as the proper 
representative of the various people of the globe can easily be brought into question. ' 16 At its 
inception there existed a belief that the UN was an institution to bring together all the peoples 
of the world through their appropriate representatives. This came with the understanding that a 
government with a seat in the UN must in one way or another represent the population of the 
territory from which it carne-' 17 As the organisation grew it became clear that membership in 
the UN did not mean that the government concerned legitimately represented the population of 
a state, a situation which continues today. 118 It is clear that the opening statement of the UN 
Charter did not refer to the collectively of individuals populating the globe at the time. ' 19 The 
statement seems better fit as describing the government delegations of the various states 
gathered at San Francisco, rather than the societies of those states. 120 
The aspirational statements of the Preamble appear to express the rationale of the UN to be 
based on human values and interests. The fact that they appear in the Preamble creates two 
possible, and opposable, conclusions concerning their legal significance. It is generally 
understood that the preamble of an international instrument is considered part of the text and 
may be used in the interpretation of the instrument, especially in defining the object and 
purpose of the instrument. 121 However in the case of the UN Charter, the preamble does not 
create any legal obligations for members 122 and has been used little in interpreting the 
115 UN Charter, Preamble. 
116 Van Boven comments that for the UN 'We the People', meaning governments represent their society, is 'more a 
fiction than a fact', T. van Boven. 'The Role of NGOs in International Human Rights Standard Setting; Non- 
Governmental Participation a Prerequisite of Democracy? ' in A. Castermans, ed. The Role of NGOs in the Promotion 
and Protection ofHuman Rights. (Leiden: Stichting-NJCM, 199 1) p. 66. 
117 See Ben-nan (1988) p. 53. Also Higgins on how this belief was based mainly on rhetoric and not action, R. Higgins. 
The Development of International Law through the Political Organs of the United Nations. (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1963) pp. 21,24. 
118 R. Higgins. Problems and Process: International Law and How we Use It. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1994) p. 43. Also 
Chapter 3, below. 
119 For an opposing perspective see A. Berle. 'The Peace of Peoples. ' 77 Recueil des Cours (1950/1) pp. 8-9 and J. 
Perkins. 'The Changing Foundations of International Law: From State Consent to State Responsibility. ' 15 Boston 
University Journal ofInternational Law (1997) p. 474. 
120 This was the perceived understanding as to how the opening phrase fit into the overall document, see F. Jhabvala. 
'The Draffing of the Human Rights Provisions of the UN Charter. ' 44 Netherlands International Law Review (1997) 
pp. 7-8. For a discussion concerning this opening phrase of the Charter and how it does not imply the idea of popular 
sovereignty or legitimacy of government, see H. Kelsen. The Law of the United Nations. (London: Stevens, 1959) pp. 
5-9. 
121 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 1155 UNTS 33 1, Article 3 1. 
122 Kelsen (1964) p. 29. 
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Charter. 123 The Preamble may be seen as expressing values which should guide the actions of 
member states but it is not possible to ground any binding obligations concerning human 
rights. To do so would be subject to criticism as an utopian aspiration detached from the 
practical realities of the world. 
Beyond the Preamble the legal position of human rights in the Charter is a contested 
topic. 124 Henkin claims that we wish to, therefore we exaggerate, the impact of the Charter on 
international human rights, but in the Charter it is state values that prevail. 125 This appears to 
be the most accurate description of the human rights provisions of the Charter even though 
there exists two other opposing interpretations of their significance. Kelsen posits that the 
Charter itself does not impose an obligation upon members to ensure the various rights and 
freedoms which are mentioned in the Preamble and text. 126 Humphrey takes the opposite 
position in that Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter combine to form clear legal obligations 
concerning human rights. He fiu-ther establishes that any reference of an obligation to respect 
the purposes of the Charter does by association include an obligation to respect human 
rights. 127 Kelsen's view appears to be the most accurate in actual practice with Humphrey's 
position being the more desirable. The Charter is undoubtedly an important document for the 
development of international human rights law for it did bring the issue of human rights onto 
the international agenda. 128 What the Charter did not do is herald the beginning of human 
values and interests as an integral aspect of the international legal system. 129 
The purpose of the UN Charter is the maintenance of the peaceful relations of states and 
international co-operation. Promotion and respect for human rights is one of a number of ways 
towards these goals, often one of secondary concern. 130 The inclusion of Article 2 (7) in the 
Charter ensures tates a legitimate legal argument through which they are able to place human 
interests secondary. It reads: 
123 L. Goodrich, E. Hambro and A. Simmons. Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and Documents, 3rd ed. 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1969) p. 2 1. 
124 See the discussion in Nincic (1970) pp. 193-259. 
125 Henkin (1995) pp. 174-5. 
126 Kelsen (1964) p. 29. Also E. Daes. Status of the Individual and Contemporary International Law: Promotion, 
Protection and Restoration of Human Rights at National, Regional and International Levels. (New York: United 
Nations, 1992) p. 5. But see Sclihiter (1973) pp. 118-127, who refutes Kelsen's view. 
127 J. Humphrey. 'The UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. ' in E. Luard, ed. 77ze International 
Protection of Human Rights. (London: Thames and Hudson, 1967) p. 46. But see T. Beurgenthal. 'International 
Human Rights Law and Institutions: Accomplishments and Prospects. ' 63 Washington Law Review (1988) p. 4, 
pointing out that Article 56 only pledges states to promote the purposes of Article 55. 
128 Article 13 gives the GA the responsibility of initiating studies of maldng recommendations on human rights among 
other issues, an activity it has engaged in regularly. This brings the rhetoric of international human rights law into a 
more public fora but does not automatically give rise to obligations. 
129 But see Berle (1950/1) as to how the UN is an institution for individuals, protecting their interests and desires, pp. 
38-46. 
130 UN Charter, Article 1 (3), Article 55 (c). 
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Nothing in the present Charter shall authorise the United Nations to intervene 
in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or 
shall require members to submit such matters to settlement under the present 
Charter 
... . 
By appealing to Article 2 (7) states are able to rely upon an accepted legal rule which helps 
them to avoid international obligations concerning human rights by claiming a situation is 
within their own self-defined domestic jurisdiction. ' 31 The inclusion of the dominance of 
sovereignty means that the ideals of human rights as expressed in the Charter may be 
legitimately denied to individuals. ' 32 
Interpretations of the human rights obligations of the Charter demonstrate, as Henkin 
observes, the tendency of hwnan rights supporters to overemphasise its impact. SchRiter 
declares that the human rights obligations in the Charter are binding at the national level and 
that national courts may not 'reject any direct application of the human rights provisions on the 
grounds that the provisions are not obligatory'. 133 This is a utopian argument based on the idea 
that there exists objective criteria for human rights norms in the Charter construed from the 
character, language, content and context of the provisions. ' 34 Schlifter finds he must move to 
the apologist argument by concluding that states are legitimately able to classify obligations in 
the Charter as political agreements based on sovereignty and the domestic jurisdiction clauses 
of the Charter. 135 This provides a more realistic assessment of state practice for it recognises 
that states are able to bar invocation of possible Charter obligations from impacting domestic 
legal action concerning hurnan rights. 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was adopted in 1948 to provide an 
interpretation of the human rights references in the Charter. The UDHR was accepted by 
members of the UN as a non-binding resolution, 136 which proclaims high ideals and provides a 
131 T. Farer and F. Gaer. 'The UN and Human Rights: At the End of the Beginning. ' in A. Roberts and B. Kingsbury, 
eds. United Nations, Divided World, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993) p. 246. 
132 Daes (1992) p. 3. Also Watson (1979) p. 6 10 who feels that the existence of Article 2 (7) completely precludes the 
inclusion of human rights into international law. 
133 SchlCiter (1973) p. 127. Also M. Freeman. 'The Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights. 16 Human Rights 
Quarterly (1994) p. 494. 
134 SchlCiter (1973) p. 116. He demonstrates the application of the domestic impact of the Charter through six national 
cases, three from Canada, two from US and one ftom India, pp. 125-126. 
135 Schl iiter (1973) pp. 13 3 
-134. In the US, in Diggs v Shultz 470 F. 2d 461 (D. C. Cir) regarding the UN Charter it was 
expressed that 'Congress can denounce treaties if it sees fit to do so'. It would be difficult for any state to denounce the 
UN Charter but there exists no expressed prohibition against it, as Indonesia demonstrated in its withdrawal from the 
UN in 1965, see Multilateral Treaties (1997) p. 9, note 15. 
136 On the legal force of United Nations Resolutions in general see B. Sloane. UN General Assembly Resolutions in 
Our Changing World. (Ardsley: Transnational, 1991). 
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great deal of moral support, but offers little in concrete legal terms. 137 The actual legal status 
of the UDHR remains a contested issue. 138 The acceptance of the UDHR and its subsequent 
development in international law exemplifies the high degree of rhetoric involved in 
international human rights law, rhetoric that attempts to gloss over inaction. Any attempt to 
legally apply the standards of the UDHR concerning a violation of human rights will show that 
while the UDHR is an aspiurational ideal of considerable moral import, it is not something 
concrete that individuals are able to access and utilise beyond its moral rhetoric. 139 
The nature of the international legal argument, the prominence of state sovereignty and the 
conflict between the interests of states and individuals, all seriously undermine the 
effectiveness of international human rights instruments. 140 The lack of effectiveness is 
attributable to the process of international aw as one controlled by states and reflecting their 
interests. An international egal instrument for the protection and promotion of human rights 
cannot come into existence unless states agree to create one. The language and provisions 
contained therein deten-nining the extent to which an individual is able to access and utilise the 
instrument must receive final approval by states. Once created, states are left with the option 
whether or not to sign the instrument, whether or not to ratify it and the terms of incorporation 
into the domestic legal system. 141 The process of ratification allows a state to express its 
interests as legal facts through reservations, understandings and declarations that may be made 
137 See Cassese (1986) p. 299. The United States Supreme Court declared in Diggs v Richardson 555 F. 2d 848 'that 
even assuming there is an international obligation that is binding on the United States-... 
-the United Nations Resolution 
underlying that obligation does not confer rights on the citizens of the United States that are enforceable in court in the 
absence of implementing legislation. ' 'Ibis comment was in regards to the binding impact of Security Council 
resolutions that are non-nally seen as having greater legal impact than GA resolutions. 
138 See D. Donoho. 'The Role of Human Rights in Global Security Issues: A Normative and Institutional Critique. ' 14 
Michigan Journal of International Law (1993) p. 837; Reisman (1990) p. 867; Scliftiter (1973) pp. 144-145. 
Regardless of the opinion held by scholars this does not change the fact that the UDHR is not a directly enforceable 
lwal document. 
13 The standing of the UDHR in domestic courts vanes. In Italy, in Ministry ofHome Affairs v Kemali 40 ILR (1962) 
p. 195 it was expressed that the UDHR was more than a declaration being 'a general principal of law which must be 
held to have become part of our law. ' However, in this case the legal force of the UDHR came from the incorporation 
of the European Convention on Human Rights into Italian law, not by its own measure. In Belgium, in DeMeyer v 
bat Belge, Ministre de la Famille (Belgium Conseil dttat) 47 ILR (1966) p. 197, the Court felt the UDHR was a 
declaration of principle 'which does not, as such, engender any legal effect and consequently cannot serve as the legal 
basis for an application'. In Ireland, in The States (Duggan) v Tapley (Eire Supreme Court) 18 ILR (1950) 336, the 
Court held the UDHR to be of great importance and significance but 'not a guide to discover the existing principles of 
international law. ' A middle of the road approach was Viewed in Israel, in American European Beth-El Mission v 
Minister of Social Weýtare (Israel Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice) 47 ILR (1967) p. 205, referring 
to the UDHR as 'morally if not judicially' important to the Court. In Huynh Thi Anh v Levi (United States Supreme 
Court) 586 F2d 625, the Court stated that the language used in the UDHR prevented its use before the Court and that it 
did not create private rights or duties enforceable in domestic courts. 
140 See 0. Osterud 'Sovereign Statehood and National Self-Deten-nination: a World Order Dilemma. ' in Heiberg 
(1994) pp. 26-30. 
141 
'I'liere is no legal obligation upon states to sign any treaty, or to ratify it once signed. See Meron (1982) who shows 
that if states are not willing to ratify a treaty that establishes high standards a less ambitious document with lower 
substantive standards Will be prepared, p. 733. It is worth remembering also that while international institutions are 
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with regard to the instrument. Finally, states are not bound forever by any international 
instrument as they may withdraw their agreement at any time. 142 The general reluctance of 
states to develop international instruments effective for the individual is shown by the 
International Covenants which were open for signature in 1966 but did not enter into force for 
ten years even though they only required 35 ratifications. 143 The considerable delay has been 
explained as the obstinacy of states to ratify a treaty limiting their freedom of action, as under 
the ICCPR states are required to bring their domestic law in line with the provisions of the 
treaty, action they Will not obligingly agree to. 144 
The content of international huinan rights instruments is often biased to the interests of 
states through the use of broad and often indeterminate language allowing for multiple valid 
interpretations of the content and application of a fight. To a certain degree less rigid language 
is necessary as different societies will express the content of a right in a different fashion. 
There cannot be one strict model of a human rights provision that is applied without exception 
(see below Chapters 4-6). However, the need for flexibility cannot be used to overfide 
effectiveness, as Donoho has commented: 
Perhaps the most ftmdamental weakness M the present hw-nan rights normative 
framework is its continuing textual and interpretative indeterminacy. To varying 
degrees depending upon the right, the catalogue of rights consists of extremely 
vague, generally stated principles. 145 
The use of vague and indeterminate language occurs throughout international law and is seen 
as necessary for ensuring states will sign up to the instruments. Accommodation clauses are 
added to allow for rights to be limited based on subjective conditions as determined by the 
state, such as 'to protect national security, public order, public health or morals'), or dependant 
upon self-defined criteria as with 'progressive achievement'. 146 The vague and indeterminate 
effective in creating effective protection and promotion of human rights they are also possible violators of rights, 
Schreuer (1993) pp. 465-466. 
142 On 23 October 1997 Jamaica withdrew from the Optional Protocol to the lCCPR. See Multilateral Treaties (1997) 
p. 164, note 1. There is a possible exception with the two Covenants which do not provide for withdrawal. Nowak 
states that is would be impossible to do so concerning the ICCPR, see M. Nowak. United Nations Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary. (Kehl am Rhein: Engel, 1993) p. xxvii. 
143 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1996) 993 UNTS 3 (ICESCR); International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR). 
144 See V. Pechota. 'The Development of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. ' in L. Henkin, ed. The 
International Bill of Rights: The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. (New York: Columbia University Press, 
198 1) p. 65. 
145 Donoho (1993) p. 839 (footnote omitted). 
146 See Articles 12,14,18,19,21,22 of the lCCPF, Article 8 of the ICESCR. Other provisions which allow for a state 
to disregard obligations concerning rights exist in the ICESCR, Article 2 says the rights in that Covenant should be 
implemented based on maximum available resources through progressive achievement mainly through legislative 
means. The same article also allows Third World countries (not defined) to determine to what extent they can allow 
for the rights for non-nationals. Article 4 of the ICESCR allows for the limitation of rights as 'determined by law only 
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language of rights combined with accommodation clauses allow the state to limit rights in a 
147 legally acceptable fashion. Some human rights instruments also contain derogation articles 
allowing for an outright suspension of certain rights in emergency situations. 148 The definition 
of the emergency and its extent are part of the domestic jurisdiction of the state with regards to 
the terms of the instrument in question. Treaty monitoring bodies are able to scrutinise 
emergency situations and enter into a dialogue with a state concerning the protection of rights 
during an emergency. 149 The ability of treaty bodies to engage in dialogue with a government 
during an emergency is a useful and effective tool but it does not overcome the problem of the 
state's exclusive position in having the firial say concerning the existence and extent of an 
emergency situation. 1 50 The totality of indeterminate language, accommodation clauses and 
other legal measures all result in excluding individuals from the process of international human 
rights law. 151 
Enforcement of international human rights obligations entails various methods as included 
in the different instruments. Treaties will create or endow a body with the responsibility of 
ensuring obligations are met through procedures for inter-state complaints, individual 
complaints, and for reporting obligations. ' 52 In general, states show a certain degree of 
hostility to, or reluctant acceptance of, the work of bodies who exist to ensure human rights 
obligations are being met. 153 It is ironic that the majority of international human rights 
instruments provide for inter-state complaint procedures, allowing states to complain about the 
in so far as they may be compatible with the nature of these rights and solely for the purpose of promoting the general 
welfare in a democratic society. ' Roberston describes the ten-n 'maximum' as 'the sword of human rights rhetoric' 
and 'available' as 'the wiggle room for the state', R. Robertson. 'Measuring State Compliance with the Obligation to 
Devote the "Maximum Available Resources" to Realizing Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. ' 16 Human Rights 
Quarterly (1994) p. 694. 147 Donoho (1993) pp. 841-2. 
148 ICCPR, Article 4. Also Gaete (1993) p. 86. 
149 Generally see J. Fitzpatrick. Human Rights in Crisis: The International System for Protecting Human Rights 
During States ofEmergency. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994). 
150 See S. Marks 'Civil Liberties at the Margin: the UK Derogation and the European Court of Human Rights. ' 15 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (1995) pp. 91-93. France's reservation with regards to the derogation clause of the 
ICCPR in that the constitution will define what measures Will apply and to what extent. Multilateral Treaties (1997) p. 
124. For the role of the HRC see D. McGoldrick. The Human Rights Committee: Its Role in the Development of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Oxford: Clarendon, 199 1) pp. 301-327. Israel has had a declared 
state of emergency since 1948 (Multilateral Treaties (1997) p. 144) with the HRC continually expressing its concern 
over its existence, UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add. 93 (18 August 1998) paragraph 11. 
151 See Gaete (1993) pp. 51-9 1. 
152 At the global level, provisions for reporting procedures are Article 40 (1), ICCPR; Article 16 (1), ICESCR; Article 
18 (1), Convention on the Elimination of All Forrns of Discrimination Against Women; Article 19, Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; Article 44, Convention on the Rights of the 
Child; Article 73, International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of 
Their Families. Efforts to create further enforcement procedures are troubled with political squabbles over finances 
and other resources, see L. Leblanc. Yhe Convention on the Rights of the Child: United Nations Lawmaking on Human 
Rights. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995) pp. 210-226. 
40 
behaviour of other states concerning human rights practices, which are rarely used. 154 At the 
same time individuals, for whom the instruments are supposed to benefit, are not always given 
the ability to seek redress of any fonn. 155 
The common method used to deny the access of individuals to international instruments is 
demonstrated by the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (ICERD). 156 Articles 11-12 establish an inter-state complaint mechanism that 
is automatically agreed to through ratification of the treaty. Article 14 allows states to make a 
separate declaration allowing individuals to petition the Committee on Racial Discrimination 
in relation concerning alleged violations of the Convention, wl-fich may be withdrawn by the 
state at any time. 157 Of the 150 states parties to ICERD, only 24 have made the declaration 
allowing individuals to lodge complaints but all 150 are able to utilise the inter-state complaint 
procedures. 158 Under the ICCPR there exists a mechanism for inter-state complaints 159 but 
nothing for individual complaints which is only possible through the state accepting another 
treaty which is subject to all the above legal manoeuvres to limit its effectiveness. 160 The 
reporting procedures created by the treaties are often an effective method for the promotion 
and protection of human rights (see below) but they are also dependant upon co-operation 
fi7om states to actively participate, something they have shown a clear reluctance to do. 161 
153 See the statement by an Australian Senator who declared that the HRC should not be 'interfering in disputes 
between individual Australians', reprinted in T. Tenbensel. 'International Human Rights Conventions and Australian 
Political Debates: Issues Raisedbythe Toonen Case. '31 Australian Journal ofPolitical Science (1996)p. 17. 
154 Article 40 of the ICCPR has never been used, D. Harris. Cases and Materials on International Law, 5th ed. 
(London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1998) p. 649. Under the Affican Charter the inter-state complaint has only been used 
once, see Umozurike (1997) p. 75. The European Convention on Human Rights has seen its inter-state complaint 
procedure used on a few occasions but primarily for political reasons, see D. Harris, M. O'Boyle and C. Warbrick. The 
Law ofthe European Convention on Human Rights. (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1995) p. 587. 
155 This is demonstrated by the US and UK who are the only two states under the Convention against Torture to have 
accepted the inter-state complaint procedure under Article 21 of the Convention but not the individual complaint 
procedure under Article 22, Multilateral Treaties (1997) p. 199. Instruments possessing an individual petition 
procedure include the Torture Convention, Article 22; Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, Article 1; Convention on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Article 14; Convention on the Protection of Migrant Workers, Article 77. An 
Optional Protocol to CEDAW has just been adopted by Commission on the Status of Women UN Doc. 
E/CN. 6/1999/WG/L. 2. A similar idea is being considered for the ICESCF, see Report of the Comrnittee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to the Comn-iission on Human Rights on a Draft Optional Protocol for the 
Consideration of Commitments concerning Non-Compliance with the ICESCR, reprinted in 5 IHRR (1998) p. 527. 
156 (1966) 660 UNTS 195. 
157 ICERD, Article 14 (3). 
158 Multilateral Treaties (1997) pp. 105-107. 
159 Articles 41-42. 
160 Optional Protocol to the ICCPR (1966) 999 UNTS 17 1. 
161 As of February 1998 138 states were overdue to submit reports under the ICCPR, 134 under the ICESCR, 100 
under the Convention Against Torture, 421 under the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discriminaiton, 206 
under the Covention on the Elimination of Discrinunation Agaianst Women and 135 under the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child. Status of the International Human Rights Instruments and the General Situation of Overdue 
Reports. UN Doc. HRI/MC/1998/2 (17 February 1998). One author feels that the failure to submit a report is a clear 
violation of the treaty concerned, see V. Dimitrijevic. 'The Monitoring of Human Rights and the Prevention of Human 
Rights Violations through Reporting Procedures. ' in A. Bloed et al, eds. Monitoring Human Rights in Europe: 
Comparing International Procedures and Mechanisms. (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1993) p. 16. The lack of reports 
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Further measures open to states to exclude individuals from international human rights 
instruments include making reservations, declarations or interpretative statements of 
understanding when signing or ratifying an international instrument. 162 The purpose of these 
manoeuvres is to allow a state to make official statements as to what it believes the meaning of 
a treaty provision to be. It has been observed that these legal manoeuvres 'restrict the potential 
domestic effect of a human rights treaty'. 163 The ability of states to make reservations to 
intemational treaties is established through Articles 19-23 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties (VCLT). The underlying rule concerning the validity of a reservation is that it 
should not be 'Incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty. 'I 64 The Human Rights 
Committee (HRQ adds that all reservations must be 'specific and transparent'165 and 
reservations to the IC! CPR and its Protocols cannot include reservations that offend peremptory 
nonns. Therefore a state must no remove those measures that give domestic effect to the 
provisions or remove the framework of guarantees for securing rights under the treaties. 166 
There exists a number of reservations to the ICCPR which do not conform to the HRC's 
requirements. Algeria has reserved that it interprets Article 23 (4) (rights in marriage) 'as in no 
way impairing the essential foundations of the Algerian legal system'. 167 Similar reservations 
have been expressed by Ireland, Israel and Kuwait. 168 The Congo has declared that is does not 
consider itself bound by Article 11 (not to be imprisoned for failing a contractual obligation) 
because it is incompatible with domestic provisions. 169 India has declared it will apply Article 
concerns all states and not just the poorer ones which suggests a deeper reason exists. Of the six UN human rights 
treaties, over 1,155 reports overdue, see Annual Meeting of Chairpersons of the Human Riots Treaty Bodies. 'Status 
of the International Human Rights Instruments and the General Situation of Overdue Reports. ' (30 April 1999) UN 
Doc. HRI/MC/1999/2. 
162 P. Imbert. 'Reservations and Human Rights Conventions. ' 6 Human Rights Review (198 1) p. 28; Lijnzaad (1995); 
C. Redgwell. 'Reservations to Treaties and Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 24 (52). ' 46 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1997) p. 390; W. Schabas. 'Reservations to Human Rights Treaties: 
Time for Innovation and Reforrn. ' 32 Canadian Yearbook of International Law (1994) p. 39; D. Shelton. 'State 
Practice on Reservations to Human Rights Treaties. ' I Canadian Yearbook on Human Rights (1983) p. 205; and 
generally Gardner (1997). 
163 Lijnzaad (1995) p. 3; Schabas (1994) p. 41. But see M. Schmidt. 'Reservations to United Nations Human Rights 
Treaties 
- 
the Case of the Two Covenants. ' in Gamder (1997) p. 20. 
164 VCLT, Article 19 (c). The legal regime concerning the validity of reservations to human rights treaties is 
considered 'inconsistent' and 'unclear', Human Rights Committee (HRC). General Comment No. 24 (52). UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev. I/Add. 6, paragraph 17. Also C. Redgewell. 'The Law of Reservations in Respect to Multilateral 
Conventions. ' in Gardner (1997) p. 9. 
165 Kuper observes that '... sweeping reservations couched in vague terrns; and covering the treaty as a whole pose 
enon-nous problems in terms of monitoring State compliance with human rights treaties 
... 
' J. Kuper. 'Reservations, 
Declarations and Objections to the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child. ' in Gardner (1997) p. 113. 
166 General Comment No. 24, paragraphs. 8-10,19. The HRC understands 'peremptory non-ns' as those rights which 
are pail of customary international law. The US, UK, and France have all expressed doubts over this position, see R. 
Higgins. 'Introduction. ' in Gardner (1997) p. xxvin. 
167 Multilateral Treaties (1997) p. I 11. 
168 Multilateral Treaties (1997) pp. 125-6. 
169 Multilateral Treaties (1997) P. 124. 
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9 (right to liberty and security of person) only in consonance with the domestic constitution. 170 
Malta has lodged a reservation to Article 14 (2) (right to be presumed innocent until proven 
guilty) in a way which negates the right altogether. 171 The US has lodged a reservation with a 
similar purpose concerning Article 6 (2) (application of the death penalty) which reserves its 
right to apply the death penalty on its own terms. The reservation of France concerning the 
protection afforded by the derogation clause of Article 4 of the ICCPR is strictly on its own 
terms and is mirrored by a similar reservation of Trinidad and Tobago. ' 72 
Reservations to human rights treaties demonstrate a reluctance of states to concern 
themselves with the welfare of individuals, being more interested in sigriing a human rights 
treaty for symbolic effect. 173 The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) demonstrates 
the emptiness of states' intentions in signing the treaty with over half making reservations of 
one form or another. A nurnber of the reservations are in direct contrast to the purpose of the 
instrument. For example, the reservation of Indonesia reads that 
ratification [of the Convention by Indonesia] does not Imply the acceptance of 
obligations going beyond the Constitutional limits nor the acceptance of any 
obligation to introduce any right beyond those prescribed under the 
Constitution. 174 
The reservation of Malaysia goes one step fin-ther in saying that the government accepts the 
provisions of the CRC so long as 'they are in conformity with the Constitution, national laws 
and national policies of the Government of Malaysia. 175 The Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) 176 shares a similar disregard from 
states as a considerable number have reserved the right not to apply entire lists of rights 
contained within. 177 The UK currently has reservations in effect with regards to four different 
provisions of CEDAW where it will apply domestic law over the international obligation, the 
list was previously more extensive. 178 
170 Multilateral Treaties (1997) p. 113. 
17 1 The reservation reads that Malta '... interprets paragraph 2 of article 14 of the Covenant in the sense that it does not 
preclude any particular law from imposing upon any person charged under such law the burden of proving particular 
facts; ' Multilateral Treaties (199 7) p. 126 
172 See Multilateral Treaties (1997) p. 124 (France) and pp. 129-130 (Trinidad and Tobago). 
173 S. Hossain. 'Equality in the Home: Womens' Rights and Personal Laws in South Korea. ' In R. Cook. Human 
Rights of Women: National and International Perspectives. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994) p. 
470. 
174 Multilateral Treaties (1997) p. 214. The reservation of Singapore uses similar wording, p. 217. 
175 Multilateral Treaties (1997) p. 215. Thailand further subjects its obligations to 'national practices'. p. 218. 
176 1249 UNTS 13. 
177 See B. Clark. 'The Vienna Convention Reservations Regime and the Convention on Discrimination Against 
Women. ' 85,4merican Journal of International Law (199 1) p. 317; C. Chinkin. 'Reservations and Objections to the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. ' in Gardner (1997) p. 65 
178 Multilateral Treaties (1997) pp. 178-179, also pp. 189-190. 
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As with the indeten-ninate language of human rights treaties, it is argued that reservations 
serve a useful purpose in allowing states to sign-on to an international instrument without the 
pressure of having to accept unconditionally all obligations in an immediate fashion. 179 The 
example of the UK's action of progressively withdrawing reservations to CEDAW 
demonstrates this point. The idea that not all human rights obligations can be met immediately 
is accepted in international human rights law. 180 The UDHR states that the document is a 
common standard to be strived for, the ICESCR obligates states to undertake the provisions of 
the Covenant through progressive achievement. 181 The HRC recognises that the meeting of 
human rights obligations is a progressive process, 
182 
and the Vienna World Conference called 
, 
183 it 'a dynamic and evolving process 
. 
The realisation of human rights is a continual and 
development process but to see reservations as a means for a state to join up to an agreement 
without demanding full compliance immediately is only giving in to the apologist position of 
state sovereignty. 1 84 Schmidt points out that with the ICESCR it is those rights which lend 
themselves most easily to 'immediate implementation' that have the most reservations. 185 
States do engage in the progressive withdrawal of reservations but this is far from the common 
trend and does not get around the fact that it will be states themselves who decide how long a 
reservation is applicable. ' 86 The argument of McBride that reservations reflect the lack of 
material capabilities to comply with a treaty does not explain reservations such as France's to 
non-discrimination clauses in human rights treaties which are claimed to be inapplicable based 
on domestic provisions which contradict the purpose of the clauses. ' 87 The problem hes in 
who is to determine whether the content or duration of a reservation is valid to which the HRC 
179 In Gardner (1997) see M. Schmidt. 'Reservations to the United Nations Human Rights Treaties 
- 
The Case of the 
Two Covenants. ' p. 20; Schabas (1994) pp. 40-4 1. 
180 See Redgewell who discusses progressive obligations to international treaties, including the European Social 
Charter, in Gardner (1997) pp. 16-18. 
181 Article 2. 
182 General Comment No. 24 (52), paragraph. 4. 
183 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action. UN Doc. A/CONF. 157/23 (12 July 1993) paragraph 26. 
184 McBride presents a convincing case for the beneficial aspects of reservations since it is difficult for states to adhere 
to obligations for a variety of reasons but his reasoning cannot detach itself from the ultimate conclusion that states 
themselves will decide under what ten-ns and conditions they will adhere to obligations, in Gardner (1997) pp. 120- 
184 
185 In Gardner (1997) p. 32. 
186 When Chile signed CEDAW in 1980 it declared it was 'mindful of the important step which this document 
represents' but was '... obliged to state, however, that some of the provisions of the Convention are not entirely 
compatible with current Chilean legislation. ' and that it had established a commission to examine the issue. Eighteen 
years later the reservation remains in place. Multilateral Treaties (1997) p. 172. 
187 France's reservation to the ICCPR reads '... in light of article 2 of the Constitution 
... 
article 27 [of the ICCPR] is 
not applicable so far as the Republic is concerned. ' Multilateral Treaties (1997) p. 124. Article 27 of the ICCPR holds 
that minorities Will not be denied the right 'to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or'to 
use their own language. ' Article 2 of the Constitution of France reads in part 'ne language of the Republic shall be 
French. '
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has proposed some suggestions. ' 88 These proposals for regulating the issues of reservations do 
provide guidance, but it is up to states themselves to decide whether or not to follow the 
suggestions and turn them into binding law 
. 
189 
The use of reservations is an explicit legal tool available to states to publicly announce they 
are not bound by certain obligations, whatever the reason. The fact that a state has not made a 
reservation does not automatically lead to the conclusion that obligations are being met. As 
Marks observes with relation to the Affican Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, 'a small 
nurnber of reservations does not necessarily correlate with a high level of compliance with a 
treaty's substantive norms. ' 190 Legal manoeuvres uch as signature, ratification, reservations, 
declarations, withdrawal clauses, self-execution issues, 191 federal issues, 92 all allow for states 
to set the terms of their obligations under international human rights law. For individuals in 
the UK an international human rights instrument cannot be seen as a source of legally 
enforceable rights until Parliament 'has blessed it with legitimacy and truly "legal" 
pedigree'. 193 The same holds true in the US where Article 7 of the Constitution says treaties 
make up part of the 'supreme Law of the Land' and judges are to be bound by them. 
However, the signature of a human rights treaty by the US is accompanied by a statement that 
the rights in the treaty are 'non-self executing' meaning individuals will not have access to the 
international instrument until the government allows it on its own terms through the ratification 
process. 1 94 In light of these and similar practices by states, one author has commented that the 
use of international human rights standards is not a negation or weakening of the sovereignty 
of the state but rather an application of it. 195 
188 General Comment No. 24 (52) paragraphs 18-20. For the inadequacy of the VCLT concerning reservations for 
human rights treaties, see Clark (1991) pp. 281-321. 
189 With regard to the complication over reservations to human rights treaties Redgewell concludes '[u]ltimately the 
question is one for States to resolve, 
... 
' in Gardner (1997) p. 19. McBride also concedes the point that states 'advance 
reservations which 
... 
do not appear to set themselves effective targets for overcoming the obstacles to full 
implementation. ' p. 183. Schabas (1994) p. 79, who also points out how monitoring bodies have been reluctant to 
push the issue of reservations for fear that a state may denounce the treaty, p. 44. 
190 S. Marks. 'Three Regional Human Rights Treaties and Their Experience of Reservations. ' in Gardner (1997) p. 6 1. 
Also Imbert (198 1) pp. 4647. 
191 Quigley (1993) p. 1297. 
192 See E. Landry. 'States as International Law-Breakers: Discrimination against Immigrants and Welfare Reform. ' 71 
Washington Law Review (1996) p. 1095, as to how the US Federal Government is leaving it up to individual states to 
pass legislation concerning welfare benefits for iMrn1grants, and how the discrimination which occurs brings into 
question whether the US is meeting international obligations, even though it is not the Federal government passing the 
le 'I* 
, 9T, 
s ation. 
Hunt (1997) pp. 8-9. 
194 Buergenthal comments that the US has gone from being 'International law-friendly' to putting 'increasing obstacles 
in the way of giving domestic effect to its international legal obligations. ' T. Buergenthal. 'Modem Constitutions and 
Human Rights Treaties. ' in J. Charney et al, eds. Politics Values and Functions: International Law in the 2 Ist Century. 
(The Hague: Marfinus Nijhoff, 1997) p. 198. 
195 M. Kirby. 'The Impact of International Human Rights Norms: "A Law Undergoing Evolution. "' 25 Western 
Australia Law Review (1995) pp. 42-3. 
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The application of sovereignty to restrict the domestic effect of an international human 
rights instrument is demonstrated with regards to the Convention of the Rights of the CI-ffld in 
Australia in the case of Teoh. 196 In the Federal Courý Lee J, speaking of the role of the CRC, 
which had been ratified by Australia but not incorporated into domestic law, stated 
ratification of the Convention by the executive was a statement to the national 
and international community that the Commonwealth recognised and accepted 
the prmciples of the Convention, That statement provided parents and 
children, whose interests could be affected by action of the Commonwealth 
which concerned children, with a legitimate expectation that such actions 
would be conducted in a manner which adhered to the relevant principles of 
the Convention. 197 
Through the international legal argument Lee J's statement that individuals In Australia are 
able to utihse the signed CRC for the protection of their rights, based on legitimate 
expectations, is utopian in nature. In terms of practical realities this position cannot be 
sustained for it would mean that states are bound by human rights instruments just by signing 
the documents and individuals would be able to invoke the obligations contained therein. 
Furthennore, if signature gives rise to expectations, those expectations will have to be defined 
based on the stated goals of the instrument in question that would allow for valid arguments 
that favour the individual to a large degree. Lee J, quickly qualified his utopian position by 
appealing to the apologist argument. 
After executive ratification of the Convention persons exercising delegated 
administrative powers to make decisions which concerned children were 
expected to apply the broad principles of the Convention in so far as it was 
consonant with the national interest and not contrary to statutory provisions to 
do so. 198 
Any expectations an individual may have in relation to an international human rights 
instrument are now subject to the national interest and domestic laws, all of which will be 
defined by the government of a state. Lee J travelled the full route from utopia to apology and 
concluded his journey at the apologist end. The journey from utopia to apology was a smooth 
196 Teoh v Minister of Immigration, Local Government, and Ethnic Affairs (Federal Court of Australia) [ 1994] 121 
ALR 436. Another example of the application of sovereignty to resist international human rights is currently 
underway in the US where there are attempts in Congress to nullify current legislation that commits the US to respect 
and implement obligations under international human rights treaties. See T. Franck. 'Notes from the President. ' ASIL 
Newsletter (January 1999) pp. 1,4. 
197 Teoh, at p. 449. 
198 Teoh, at p. 450. 
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one for Lee J but it creates numerous obstacles for the individual to overcome in order to have 
access to and utilise international human rights instruments effectively. 
C The Position Today 
- 
Illusions of Utopia 
The purpose of the discussion so far has been to show that international human rights law 
proclaims the individual as its purpose but in application deals more with the concerns of 
states. This is not to say that international human rights law has not had any impact or is 
completely ineffective. ' 99 Instead it has tried to demonstrate how the desire to believe that the 
existence of international human rights instruments has resulted in a more humane world 
overlooks the actual realities involved when an individual attempts to access and utilise 
international human rights instruments. It is naturally in the interests of proponents of 
international human rights law to proclaim the victory of human fights M limiting state 
behaviour. VVThile this utopian view is favoured it is necessary to keep in mind the realities that 
correspond more closely to the actual impact of international human fights law upon the day to 
day lives of individuals. 200 
Recent work by Thomas Franck demonstrates the desire to proclaim the existence of a 
better world through the development of intemational human rights law without stopping to 
examine the actual implications of the law. Franck's study of the growth of the limits and 
possibilities of personal freedom 201 proclaims progress for the individual based on the 
development of human rights as evidenced by the textual existence of intemational human 
rights instruments. He takes the existence of these documents to declare the emergence of a 
new form of self-determination for the individual in the international system based on 'a world 
in which each individual will freely chose a personal identity constructed out of a broad array 
of building blocks'. 202 He feels the world has entered 'an era of freely imagined identities, one 
in which personal choice is no longer circumscribed by accidents or manipulations of genetics, 
class, place or history. -)203 The ability of the individual to express and define the self has been 
expanded through the creation of greater space for personal fi7eedom as individuals 'are being 
freed to design their own identifies. 204 This freedom is a direct result of the existence and 
199 See Buergenthal in Chamey et al (1997) pp. 197-208. Also Tenbensel (1996) p. 7; J. Claydon. 'The Application of 
International Human Rights Law by Canadian Courts. ' 30 Buffalo Law Review (1981) p. 727; R. Lillich. 'Invoking 
International Human Rights Law in Domestic Courts. ' 54 Cincinnati Law Review (1985) p. 367. 
200 As demonstrated by Pinochet. 
20 1 These works include 'Is Personal Freedom a Western ValueT 91 American Journal of International Law (1997) p. 
593, hereinafter Personal Freedom; 'Clan and Superclan: Loyalty, Identity and Community in Law and Practice. ' 90 
Americana Journal ofInternational Law (1996) p. 359, hereinafter Clan and Superclan. 
202 Personal Freedom, p. 3 59. 
203 Personal Freedom, P. 383. 
204 Personal Freedom, p. 3 83. 
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development of international human rights instruments that Franck believes are effective in 
limitmg the capacity of governments to interfere with the individuals ability to detennine the 
self 
In this sense, Frank's ideas are misguided. The emergence of a world as he describes is 
fully desired but it would be difficult to claim that it has been achieved. Franck himself notes 
serious limitations to the development he describes. He explains that 'a formal 
accommodation by the state to personal individuation has achieved near-global normative 
recognition, even if it is not invariably evident in state practice. 205 It appears difficult to claim 
that there exists a greater degree of personal freedom if there is no practical evidence to support 
it. However, the structure of the international egal argument allows for Frank to put forth such 
claims as valid, for he is appealing to the normative side of law, to utopian arguments of how 
things should be. To the contrary, the apologist is able to point to the very lack of state practice 
of being demonstrative of the situation where human fights have not achieved 'near-global 
normative recognition'. Franck points to the ICCPR as the fundamental instrument for greater 
personal freedom since it 'has been fon-nally ratified as binding by almost all states and 
establishes in law most of the essential elements of personal autonomy. 206 What then of the 
individuals who live in states that have not ratified, or have not moved beyond 'formal 
ratification' to actual domestic implementation? What of the reservations to the ICCPR lodged 
by states, the US in particular, or the restrictions placed on the exercise of certain rights by 
states or the derogation of the ICCPR declared by 22 different parties, some of which are still 
in force? 207 How can the ICCPR stand as an essential element of individual personal 
autonomy if a large proportion of individuals do not have access to its provisions? 208 
With international human rights law there remains a fundamental problem with 
effectiveness due to a 'gap between its public rhetoric and its private realities. 209 The public 
rhetoric is demonstrated through the existence of numerous international egal instruments and 
the surTounding discourse. The private reality hes in the inability of the individual to access 
and utilise legal instruments that were created for the purpose of protection for the individual. 
Allot has commented that the final effect of this situation is the creation of a world system that 
205 Clan and Superclan, p. 593. 
206 Personal Freedom, p. 594. 
207 For a complete listing see Multilateral Treaties (1997) pp. 139-158. 
208 Of the 140 states parties to the ICCPR, 93 have also ratified the Optional Protocol for individual complaints, two 
notable exceptions being the UK and US, Multilateral Treaties (1997) p. 161. Franck admits a second limitation to 
his 
own thesis related to the question of access as the developing trend of increased personal self-determination may only 
be exercised by professional, commercial or intellectual elites who are 'small in number 
but wielding disproportionate 
influence on how society and identity are structured and defined', Personal Freedom, p. 
382. 
209 Phrase from D. Coates. Running the Country, 2nd ed. (Bath: Hodder and Stoughton, 1995) p. 136. 
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has resulted in the oppression of the individual and a denial of human dignity. 110 To ensure a 
more effective international human rights law the public rhetoric must be utilised to bring 
about improvement to the private realities individuals face. Franck relies solely on the textual 
existence of international human rights instruments as evidence of substantive progress. What 
he overlooks is that the effectiveness of human rights for the individual remains confined to the 
text as states are able to retain exclusive control over the substance and meaning of the text. It 
becomes necessary to remove this exclusive control over the text so that its significance and 
meaning may be shared by all, not least those whom it impacts the most. 
V1. THE CONTINUING PATH TO UTOPIA 
- 
THE DEMOCRATIC ROUTE 
Despite the obstacles discussed above, international human rights law has been able to 
overcome, albeit with limited success, the issue of state sovereignty to bring benefits to 
individuals. These meagre gains are significant for they provide a beginning for more effective 
action and demonstrate that issues such as sovereignty and domestic jurisdiction are not 
absolute but are relative and historically conditioned 
. 
21 1 The PCU has stated that the question 
of domestic jurisdiction, which allows for the manipulation of international hurnan tights law, 
is an essentially relative question dependent upon the development of international relations. 212 
International human rights instruments, including the UN Charter, keep state sovereignty 
intact, often with detrimental results for the individual. On the other hand, claims of 
sovereignty and domestic jurisdiction are being overridden more and more by monitoring 
bodies and courts and ignored by others who are actively pursuing an international hw-nan 
rights law based on the needs and desires of individuals, not states. 
The influence and ability of international human rights instruments to be effective has 
occurred in those situations where the text and process of international human rights law is 
taken out of the exclusive domain of states. For improvements to be made in the international 
system of human rights protection the dominating conception of the state must be reconsidered 
to take into account and increase the involvement of other participants in the international 
system. 213 The involvement of monitoring bodies, intergovernmental institutions (IGOs), 
NGOs and other non-state entities has worked to ftuther the effectiveness of international 
210 P. Allott. International Law and International Revolution: Reconceiving the World. (Hull: University of Hull Press, 
1989) p. 3. 211 Nincic (1970) p. 136. 
212 Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunisia and Morocco (French Zone) on November 8,1921 Advisory Opinion No. 4 
(7 February 1923). PCIJ Reports, Series. B No. 4 (1923) pp. 23-24. 
213 For a discussion on participants other than states and the influence they exert on international 
law see Higgins 
(1994) pp. 39-55. 
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human rights law. The involvement and impact of non-state entities in the process of 
international human rights law remains limited but opens spaces of possibility for a more 
effective system of law increases as the needs and desires of all those who are affected may be 
articulated. 
Morfitoring bodies which have the responsibility for overseeing international human rights 
instrurnents, are either able to accept petitions concerning violations or are entrusted with 
supervising a reporting procedure whereby states provide information in relation to the specific 
treaty obligations. 214 Reporting procedures are a relatively weak forrn of ensuring compliance 
with human rights obligations as states are not bound by any reporting procedure, except by 
choice, and a great many who are under an obligation do not fulfil this obligation or do so In 
the most superficial manner. 215 What the reporting procedure is able to do, when it does 
operate, is to bring the discussion of human rights and related issues into a larger forum out of 
the exclusive control of the state. 216 Under the various reporting procedures states are required 
to disclose practices and mechanisms of protection in relation to agreed upon standards. These 
reports are scrutinised by the treaty monitoring bodies who are able to question a state's 
representative, ask for more information and provide conclusions as to how well a state is 
meeting its obligations along with recommendations for future action. 217 The conclusions and 
recommendations are not binding but the resultant dialogue does remove human rights from 
the exclusive control of the state. 218 
Combined with the efforts of monitoring bodies created by international instruments, the 
UN GA has also created mandates for a number of special rapporteurs and working groups 
who either deal with the human rights situation in a certain country or a certain topiC. 
219 At 
214 See above and M. O'Flaberty. Human Rights and the UN. - Practice before Treaty Bodies. (London: Sweet and 
Maxwell, 1996). 
215 For the problems faced by the HRC, see 0. Prounis. 'The Human Rights Committee: Toward Resolving the 
Paradox of Human Rights Law. ' 17 Columbia Human Rights Law Review (1985) pp. 103-119. There is the added 
difficulty that as a state signs up to more international instruments it may not be able to meet all of its reporting 
obligations, M. Nowak. 'Future Strategies for the International Protection and Realization of Human Rights. ' in A. 
Eide and J. Helgesen, eds. The Future of Human Rights Protection in a Changing World: Fijýy Years since the Four 
Freedoms Address: Essays in Honour of Torkel Opsahl. (Oslo: Norwegian University Press, 1991) p. 71. 'Me 
supervision bodies provide details on how the reports should be drafted and offer states assistance in doing so. 
216 The examination of state reports is usually conducted over a number of meetings and held in public see Rules of 
Procedure of the Human Rights Committee. UN Doc. CCPR/C/3/Rev. 3, Rules 66-71. Similar exist under the 
ICESCR, see UN Doc. E/C. 12/1990/4/Rev. 1, Rules 28 and 62 and ICERD, see UN Doc. CERD/C/65/Rev. 
3, Rules 
63-68. 
217 Lijnzaad (1995) observes that questions are not always answered but addressed on a cpick-and-choose' basis, p. 
414. 
218 The Human Rights Committee under the ICCPR has furthered this role by expanding its reporting procedures 
by 
requesting further information from states during emergency situations and providing concluding observations which 
provide the HRC's assessment as to how well a state is meeting their obligations, see 1. 
Boefefijn. 'Towards a Strong 
System of Supervision: The Human Rights Committee's Role in Reforming the Reporting 
Procedure under Article 40 
of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. ' 17 Human Rights Quarterly (1995) p. 766. 
219 See J. Flood. The Effectiveness of UN Human Rights Institutions. (Westport: Praeger, 1997). 
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present there are 36 mandates covering specific countries and topics all reporting to the UN 
Human Rights Commission. 220 The activities of these bodies have not been as proactive as 
desired due to a number of other considerations, however their existence does open up the 
international human rights process beyond the exclusive control of states. 221 
The participation of NGOs, social movements and other non-state actors in the process of 
international human rights law has also had a significant impact on furthering effectiveness. 222 
These bodies are often able to operate beyond the constraints of the state, placing human rights 
in a wider public fora. NGOs and social movements emanate from individuals who are 
demanding certain standards of behaviour from those in power based on the existing human 
rights rhetoric. Their demands work on the understanding that if rights are said to exist then 
they should be adhered to in reality. NGOs are able to criticise and make public violations that 
have occurred, to further information and education about rights, and in general empower 
individuals in relation to human lights. Due to the nature of NGOs as voluntary associations 
whose interests will often conflict with that of the state in hurnan rights matters, their ability to 
function tells a great deal about the development of democracy and human rights in a given 
area. 223 The impact of NGOs is, however, limited as states may use domestic law to silence 
and hinder their activities. Also, in the newly democratised states governments are hostile to 
any efforts that continue to claim that hurnan rights violations occur. 224 It is possible to over 
stress the role of NGOs for even though they increase the participation process they are not the 
absolute solution to ensuring human rights protection. On the whole NGOs are limited in the 
scope of rights they deal with, the geographical application of their activities and with regards 
to the fact that the organisations themselves have their own interests and agendas which they 
wish to pursue. 225 
220 For further information see the internet site of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 
[http: //www. unhchr. ch/html/menu2/xtraconv. httn]. 
221 Amnesty International has been critical of the Commission on Human Rights for being reluctant to take action due 
to considerations of cultural, political, trade or economic sensitivities, see Amnesty International. Annual Reporl 1996. 
(London: Al Publications, 1996) pp. 60-61. On the positive side the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights holds a 'general discussion' day during its sessions 'to encourage inputs into its work from all interested 
parties. ' OTIaherty (1996) pp. 79-80. See Lijnzaad (1995) with respect to the reluctance of monitoring bodies to 
question reservations to human rights treaties. The author goes on to explain how a more active and productive role 
could be achieved by removing the authority of reservations from the control of states, pp. 412-420. 
222 O'Flaherty (1996) places NGO's as essential to the ability of monitoring bodies to carry out their tasks effectively, 
pp. xi, 1- 15. Also J. Smith et al. 'Globalizing Human Rights: The Work of Transnational Human 
Rights NGOs in the 
1990s. ' 20 Human Rights Quarterly (1998) p. 379. 
223 COE. The Challenges of a Greater Europe: the Council of Europe and Democratic Security. (Strasbourg: COE, 
1996) p. 121. Kooijmans sees NGOs as a natural opponent to governments when it comes to human rights issues, 
P. 
Kooijmans. 'The Non-Governmental Organisations and the Monitoring Activities of the United Nations in the Field of 
Human Rights. ' in Castermans (199 1) p. 15. 
224 L. Wisenberg. 'Human Rights NGOs. ' in Casten-nans (1991) pp. 35-36. 
225 Kooijmans feels that the motives behind the activities of NGOs is irrelevant so long as human rights violations are 
being exposed, in Casten-nans (199 1) p. 19. For surveys of the effectiveness of NGOs see 
M. EdNvards and D. Hulme, 
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IGOs face limitations in removing human rights from the exclusive domain of states in that 
226 they are constituted by states who dictate the scope of powers and abilities. They have, 
however, been able with varying success to create wider more inclusive spaces for the process 
of international human rights law. IGOs cannot make new international law or demand certain 
standards of behaviour from states unless properly mandated by states to do so. They can only 
encourage states to engage in different sorts of behaviour. Chapters 4-6 will show how 
development of IGOs has resulted in a certain degree of independent existence with regards to 
issues of human rights and democracy. Their ability to ftirther the effectiveness of hurnan 
rights protection has occurred through pressures being placed directly on the state by virtue of 
conditions of membership or through a bypassing of the state as the IGO becomes to be seen as 
a legitimate protector of human rights in the eyes of individuals. 
V11. CONCLUSION 
VAiile the process of international hwnan rights law continues to favour the interests of 
227 
states, the above developments have all worked to weaken that control 
. 
Efforts which open 
up the hw-nan rights process to a wider inclusive audience, including individuals, demonstrates 
that the law is part of who it affects and not some abstract notion that may give hope, but has 
very little to offer in real situations. 228 These efforts all show that if international human rights 
is not limited to the actions and desires of states, it has the potential to become a much more 
effective system. Without being able to participate in a process which has a direct impact upon 
their lives individuals are susceptible to the use and abuse of power which justifies efforts to 
make the process more inclusive. 229 The creation of international human rights law as a more 
inclusive process recognising and responding to the needs and desires of individuals will be 
assisted through the finiherance of democracy in the international system, so that states, IGOs, 
eds. Non-Governmental Organisations, Performance and Accountability: Beyond the Magic Bullet. (London: 
Earthscan, 1995); A. Clayton, ed. Governance, Democracy and Conditionality: "at Roles of NGOs. (Oxford: 
INTRAC, 1994). 
226 States have been reluctant to provide IGOs with much power concerning the scrutiny of government behaviour, see 
D. Caron. 'Governance and Collective Legitimation in the New World Order. ' 6 Hague Yearbook of International 
Law (1993) p. 32. 
227 This has been demonstrated in the case of Unity Dow v Attorney General of Botswana, unreported Civil Appeal 
No. 4/9 1, Misca No. 124/'90 (3 July 1992) and appeal to the Constitutional Court, unreported, where a challenge to the 
citizenship laws of Botswana on the basis that they were discriminatory against women was upheld. The courts looked 
to international human rights instruments to establish prohibition against arbitrary discrimination, see E. Quansah. 
'Unity Dow v Attorney General ofBotswana - One more Relic of a Women's Servitude Removed. ' 4 RADIC (1992) 
p. 195; E. Quansah. 'Unity Dow vA ttorney General of Botswana - The Sequel. ' 5 RADIC (1993) p. 189. It is worth 
noting that after the initial decision the government of Botswana kept the disputed law in force and spoke of 
incorporating legal discrimination against women into the constitution, see A-B. Preis. 'Human Rights as Cultural 
Practice: An Anthropological Critique. ' 18 Human Rights Quarterly (1996) p. 304. 
228 Trimble (1990) p. 83 5. 
229 See Landry (1996) who discusses immigration and welfare reform in the US and points out how immigrants are 
without a voice in the political process and therefore vulnerable to decisions that impact their interests, p. 1126. 
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NGOs, and most importantly individuals can all participate in a process where all have 
interests at stake. 
It is held that opening up the process of intemational human rights law to non-state entities 
will enhance its effectiveness and provide greater possibilities for democracy. Opening up the 
process Will allow the needs and desires of the individual to be articulated and properly 
considered. There exists the need to bring decision-making processes closer to those who 
depend upon them in order to avoid totalising procedures. 230 In international human rights law 
it is the individual, not the state, who is most dependent upon the law, but the decisions 
surrounding the law are made by states to the exclusion of the individual 
. 
23 1 This question of 
'decisional distance' is becoming a serious concern which international law must address. As 
the exercise of power over the lives of individuals is not exercised solely by the traditional 
government machinery, it is necessary to bring the individual closer to the decision making 
process so that the individual has some form of say as to what is done and that the ultimate 
decisions made are intelligible and applicable. 232 It is recognised that for any law to be 
accepted as valid it must be seen as being legitimate. 233 For law to possess legitimacy its 
constituent elements must be identifiable to those the law addresses. This includes the 
processes by which it was made, its connections with general norms or mythologies Within a 
234 
society. Decisions need to reflect a form of consensus so that all participants are able to 
recognise part of themselves in the decisions made and the underlying values. 235 The 
application of international human rights law revolves around struggles for the appropriation of 
the meaning of rightS236 and states occupy a privileged position in this struggle allowing them 
the final authoritative decision. Donnelly has taken the view that in trying to decide issues of 
compliance and ultimately, the meaning of rights, '[t]he only plausible candidates are the 
people whose rights are at stake. ý237 
Creating wider and more active participation in the international system will not 
necessarily immediately overcome the obstacles created by the state-based system. The 
230 L Kristzman, ed. Michael Foucault: Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings. (London: 
Routledge, 1988)p. 165. 
231 Slaughter feels that if international law fails to take regard of individuals and groups it will become increasingly 
irrelevant to state behaviour. A-M. Slaughter. 'International Law in a World of Liberal States. ' 6 European Journal of 
International Law (1995) p. 504. 
232 From Foucault's debate with Chomsky in Elder (1974) pp. 168-169. The closing of the decisional distance is 
essential based on Jennings' observation that '[n]owadays, treaty law affects the everyday life of people', R. Jennings. 
'Universal International Law in a Multicultural World. ' in M. Bos and 1. Brownlie, eds. Liber Amicorum for the Rt. 
Hon. Lord Wilberfocrce. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1987) p. 39 
233 See generally T. Franck. 7-he Power ofLegitimacy among Nations. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990). 
234 Trimble (1990) pp. 840-842 
235 Kristzman (1988) p. 174. 
236 Gaete (1993) p. 168; Thompson (1975) p. 261. 
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structure of the international legal argument will undoubtedly remain in its present fonn but 
within this structure the language of the law provides the opportunity for change. Intemational 
human rights law has a public rhetoric that does not necessarily correspond to the private 
realities as to how the law works in practice. There exists within the language and rhetoric of 
international human rights law the possibility to remove the exclusive control exercised by 
states. Thompson accurately determines the power of rhetoric: 
... 
the rulers were, in serious senses, whether willingly or unwillingly, the 
prisoners of their own rhetoric; they played the games of power according to 
rules which suited them, but they could not break those rules or the whole 
game would be thrown away. And, finally, so far from the ruled shrugging off 
this rhetoric of hypocrisy, some part of at least was taken over as part of the 
238 
rhetoric of the plebeian crowd,... 
. 
International human rights law speaks of the rights of the individual and the need to limit the 
power of the state. The structure of international law allows states to find ways around this, but 
this does not nullify the existence of the legal rules and the message they convey. Governments 
cannot continually espouse adherence to human rights and democratic credentials without 
expecting demands for substantive action based on the expressed rhetoric. The individual may 
be excluded from accessing and utilising the actual machinery of an international human rights 
instrument, but they cannot be excluded from the language used. In turn individuals can make 
full use of this language demanding governments to honour in reality the obligations they have 
undertaken and it is here where the power of international human rights lies. International 
human rights law does not at present provide an effective voice for the individual but it does 
provide a language an individual may utilise for pursuing greater empowerment. 239 c The law 
may be rhetoric, but it need not be empty rhetoric. 240 
237 J. Donnelly. 'International Human Rights: A Regime Analysis. ' 40 International Organisation (1986) p. 617. 
238 Thompson (1975) pp. 263-264. 
239 S. Chesterman. 'Human Rights as SubjectiVity: The Age of Rights and the Politics of Culture. ' 27 Millennium 
(1998) p. 118. 240 Thompson (1975) p. 263. 
CHAPTER2 
DEMOCRACY: WHAT IS IT? AND FOR "OM? 
... 
one of the most striking changes during this century has been the virtual disappearance of an 
outright denial of the legitimacy of popular participation in government. Only a handful of 
countries have failed to grant at least a ritualistic vote to their citizens and to hold at least nominal 
elections; even the most repressive dictators usually pay some hp service today to the legitimate 
right of the people to participate in the govemnient 
... 
' 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The development of democracy as a legal principle of the international system is 
welcomed. It means, however, that before there can be claims concerning the victory, or even 
existence of democracy as part of international law there must be continual examination of 
what democracy is or means, both in normative terms and institutional/procedural terms. The 
wealth of literature on democracy demonstrates that a comprehensive definition of universal 
applicability is impossible. This chapter will only be able to provide the briefest examination 
of the ideas and practices which will inform an international law of democracy. The structural 
and institutional aspects of democracy will vary considerably making a specific model for all 
to follow impossible. Regardless of the specific structural and institutional set-up of a 
democratic society, it must be based on a normative framework with a specific purpose. The 
basis for democracy is expressed in the UDHR 'the will of the people shall be the basis of the 
authority of government 2 This is accomplished through participation and autonomy allowing 
the individual and society to continually engage in the process of self-determination. The 
examination below will stress these points as necessary elements for the development of 
democracy as a principle of international law. 
In the general literature of democracy, and the relevant works of international legal 
literature, there is a tendency to take a limited view of democracy confined to procedural 
aspects, most notably voting. ' The favouring of this procedural view of democracy is 
attributable to the work of Joseph Schumpeter and has had a considerable influence on the 
bulk of subsequent writing on democracy. ' A procedural View of what democracy is or should 
be is perhaps the easiest approach to the sub ect. When discussions of democracy deal with 
normative issues concerning ends and ideals numerous complications arise when the theory 
presented contrasts with the reality in practice. Schwupeter and others have overcome this 
' R. Dahl. Polyarchy: ParliciPation and Opposition. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 197 1) p. 5. 
2 UDHR, Arficle 21 (3). 
' See Chapter 3. 
'embarrassing situation' by limiting democracy to a verifiable event 5 
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-elections. Schumpeter's 
approach to democracy, with some modifications, is perhaps the easiest way to define 
democracy, 6 as well as being the barest minimum agreement possible in determinirig the 
existence of democracy! By limiting democracy to a procedure, an understanding of what 
democracy is or should be not only becomes limited but also allows for claims that democracy 
exists when in reality the will of the people has no irnpact as individuals are not part of the 
processes urrounding their lives. In those situations a rhetorical form of democracy may exist 
but this does not mean that it is effective for the protection and development of the individual! 
As with international human rights law, democracy is caught in the tension between apology 
and utopia. If any theory of democracy 'seems intolerably remote from reality, it may be 
charged with utopianism" which explains the emphasis on elections. Conversely, as will be 
shown below, maintaining Schumpeter's idea of democracy only being the vote is easily 
criticised as an apology for exclusionary government power, as it creates legitimate obstacles 
preventing individuals and groups from effectively pursuing self-deterinination. " 
U. THEORY ANI) REALiTY OF DEMOCRACY 
Democracy is 'one of those concepts which is hard to define with precision but which 
most people claim to be able to recognise in practice when they see it. "' Any definition of 
democracy depends upon who is proViding the definition and the context, in which they are 
speaking, making democracy an 'essentially contested concept'. " Even though democracy in 
both meaning and practice is essentially elastic in nature allowing for numerous forms, this 
does not preclude efforts at establishing foundations for an effective democracy. " 
4 For the influence of Schumpter on democratic theory see D. Ricci. 'Democracy Attenuated: Schumpeter, the 
Process Theory, and American Democratic Thought. ' 32 Journal of Politics (1970), pp. 239-240; C. Macpherson. 
The Life and Times ofLiberal Democracy. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977) pp. 77-78. 
' Ricci (1970) p. 255. 
6 See Ricci (1970) pp. 262-263. 
7 See P. Dunleavy. 'States, Votes and Other Conundrums. ' New Statesman 1998 Political Studies Guide. p. 3. 
' F. Zakari a. 'Doubts about Democracy. ' Newsweek (29 December 1997) p. 26. 
9 G. Duncan and S. Lukes. 'The New Democracy. ' II Political Studies (1963) p. 165. 
" This piece is taking the position that individuals means all individuals of society. It is recognised that women face 
different obstacles in the pursuit of human rights and democracy but discussion of the these obstacles is beyond the 
present scope. For a treatment of the place of women in the present state of democracy in intemational law see D. 
Otto. 'Challenging the 'New World Order': International Law, Global Democracy and the Possibilities for Women. '
3 Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems (1993) p. 371. 
F. von Prondzynski. Law, Sovereignty, and Democracy. (Hull: University of Hull Press, 1992) p. 2. 
T. Ball and R. Dagger. Political Ideologies and the Democratic Ideal. (New York: Harper Collins, 199 1) pp. 22-23. 
Also Bollen who observes that providing a definition of democracy that everyone finds acceptable is impossible, K. 
Bollen. 'Political Democracy: Conceptual and Measurement Traps. ' in D. Beetham. Defining and Measuring 
Democracy. (London: Sage, 1994) p. 5. 
" R. Harrison. Democracy. (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 134. 
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Despite the differing definitions of democracy, democracy is ah-nost universally thought to 
be of value today. " The majority of today's definitions of democracy concentrate on 
institutional frameworks and procedural undertakings which have come to be identified as 
democratic without investigating the wider iirnplications of these frameworks in relation to 
society. It is essential to view democracy as existing beyond political acts and seeing it as 
integral to the social, economic, and cultural spheres of society. Democracy cannot be merely 
a set of political practices but must consist of the ability of individuals to fully participate in 
society and governance and provide for the necessary protection of human dignity. " At the 
UN World Conference in 1993, the Vienna Declaration defined democracy as being 'based on 
the freely expressed will of the people to determine their own political, economic, social and 
cultural systems and their full participation in all aspects of their lives. " The inclusion of full 
participation in all aspects of life shows that democracy is more than a political system or a 
method designed for choosing leaders but a set of practices and values based on the respect of 
human dignity. " 
Differing, and often conflicting, definitions of democracy continue to inform the 
surrounding discourse contributing to its nature as a vague concept in the realm of international 
law. Much of the vagueness is a result of its extensive usage and rhetorical abuse of the term 
in the history of international relations. Almost every government in the world claims or has 
claimed to be some sort of democracy. Yet democracy is not as widespread as it appears. One 
author has remarked that '[d]emocratic reality is certainly pretty thin on the ground. "' The 
differences of democracy on the ground leading to debate as to what constitutes 'true' 
democracy is exacerbated by the differences in democratic theory. Dahl has stated that there is 
no one democratic theory, only democratic theories. " This piece will not attempt to fit 
perfectly With any established democratic theory, nor does it try to create a new theory of 
democracy. Instead it will attempt to draw out various elements from existing democratic 
theories and practices. In determining the content of an international law of democracy it will 
be necessary to have a concept of democracy that in practice will protect the individual from 
the arbitrary use and abuse of power, whatever the source. Democracy exists to allow 
" Ham' son (1993) p- 13 2. 
15 von Prondzynski (1992) p. 4. In Morocco the monarchy has instituted a wide range of supposed democratic 
refon-as, however the king keeps control over the government, the constitution and the legal system, see 'The King's 
Gift to His Country. ' Economist (21 March 1998) pp. 80-82. 
16 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (12 July 1993). UN Doc. A/CONF. 157/23, paragraph 8. 
17 L. Diamond. The Democratic Revolution: Struggles for Freedom and Pluralism in the Developing World. (New 
York: Freedom House, 1992) p. xiii. 
" J. Dunn. Western Political Theory in the Face ofthe Future. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979) p. 2. 
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individuals to be pall of the decisions and processes which affect their fives, it helps to create a 
better thinking about others in society, and provides non-violent means to settle differences in 
society. As with international human rights law, democracy contains many internal 
contradictions. The primary paradox is that democracy presents itself as inclusive, allowing all 
to participate regardless of position or status, " but it also allows for the legitimate domination 
of a group over the larger society. An effective democracy needs to strike a balance between 
individual aspirations and collective responsibilities to ensure the development of the 
individual and society. " 
111. HISToRicAL DEVELOPMENT OF DEMOCRACY 
A. Ancient Democrats 
Throughout the development of democratic thought and practice there are common trends 
which may be used as the basis for an international law of democracy. These common trends 
are the product of debates and conflicts over what democracy ought to be, what ideas or values 
should underpin it, what basic practices are needed to articulate these ideas and values, and the 
problems faced carrying these ideas into practice. These basic trends include 
- 
authority being 
based on the will of the people (however defined), the ways M which that authority will be 
determined and expressed, the relationship between the individual and society, and the 
practical need to create a working system of government. The origins of democracy are 
commonly attributed to the Ancient Greeks, " but the precedents of democracy are not 
exclusive to the European world and its descendants, as early societies outside of Europe 
possessed limited ideas and practices resembling different levels of democracy. " As with 
Europe, ideas of democracy were mixed with other fon-ns of governing and social ordering 
such as monarchy or oligarchy. " The development of the Sumerian city-states (c. 3000 B. C. ) 
provides evidence of primitive forms of democracy, but the political and social institutions that 
'9 R. Dahl. A Preface to Democratic 7heory. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956) p. 1. 
" I'lie idea of all inclusive equality is certainly democracy in the ideal theoretical sense, something which has rarely 
corresponded with practice, see D. Held. Models ofDemocracy, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996) pp. 2-3. 
21 Council of Europe. The Challenges of a Greater Europe: The Council of Europe and Democratic Society. 
(Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 1996) p. 168. 
22 Held (1996) puts forth the city of Chios as having the first democratic polity (c. 500 BC) and from here the idea of 
democracy spread throughout the Greek civilization, p. 14. Harrison claims that democracy was invented by the 
Greeks, being a Greek word and idea. Harrison (1993) p. 15. Generally see M. Finley. Democracy: Ancient and 
Modern, rev ed. (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1988). 
2' D. Treadgold. Freedom: A History. (New York: New York University Press, 1990) pp. 10- 12. 
24 See J. Plamenatz. Man and Society: Political and Social Theories ftom Machiavelli to Marx. Vol. 1. (London: 
Longman, 1992) pp. 86-87. 
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would be recognised as democratic did not develop. 
25 In the ancient Nfiddle East, the Jewish 
version of freedom (predating later Christian traditions) came from the belief that no man 
could possess absolute rule since that was the position of God. The covenant of society was 
between God and the entire people, not to a certain secular authority, which allowed for a 
21 
relatively democratic framework in the context of the era and area. 
The democratic ideas and practices of the Ancient Greeks, and their later revival during the 
Roman Republic mark an acceptable starting point for studying democracy. " The Greeks and 
Romans had a limited conception of the extent of democracy as those entitled to be part of the 
polity was narrowly defined to those who were citizens. Even though these groups were 
exclusionary M relation to the overall society it was within these narrowly defined bodies that 
democracy was said to exist. " Within the defined polity there was direct participation for 
citizens in the legislative and judicial functions with an assembly that possessed most of the 
power encompassing the common affairs of the society. Decisions were taken after 
consultations with the wider group of citizens giving a greater degree of legitimacy to these 
decisions as the citizens felt they had the ability to be part of the decision-making process. " 
Popular jury courts dealt with the majority of legal matters" and the rule of law became a 
significant factor in the settlement of disputes for both government and society with violence 
no longer accepted as a satisfactory regulator of human relations. " The Roman Republic 
possessed a greater inclusiveness of individuals in the decision making process, 32 a slight 
separation of powers in government with a system of checks and balances, and the existence of 
the rule of law for both the community and government which affirtned the tights of citizens. " 
The democracy of Ancient Greece and the Roman Republic held the idea of community in 
prominence with emphasis on the participation of the individual for the benefit of the 
community. " The belief was that the private life of the individual was subordinate to public 
affairs and the common good as the good life for the individual was only obtainable through 
the wider society. Active participation of the individual in the community was an essential 
Treadgold (1990) pp. 13-15. 
Treadgold (1990) pp. 32-33,75-76. 
27 For a comparison of the democracy in Greece and Rome see M. Finley. Politics in the Ancient World. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1983). 
2' For the extent of exclusion inherent in Athenian democracy see R. Dahl. Democracy and Its Critics. (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1989) pp. 21-22. 
29 See Held (1996) p. 18, who sees this as an early expression of the rule of law. 
'0 Sinclair (1988) pp. 19-20. 
" Treadgold (1990) p. 46; Ober (1989) p. 4. 
12 Treadgold (1990) p. 64. 
33 Treadgold (1990) p. 55. 
14 Held (1996) pp. 34-3 5. 
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element of this idea. It was believed individuals would best improve themselves by Improving 
their surroundings. Citizens were required to be active and eager to exercise their liberty and 
to protect it, in turn creating a sense of personal development within the communal 
framework. 35 This ancient ideal is necessary for present societies and is crucial for the smooth 
functioning of democracy. Within the res publica of Rome, the individual was recogni sed as 
possessing certain civil rights, but equally important to these rights were the corresponding 
duties, the over arching duty being respect for others in the community. As Ancient Greece, 
Rome and subsequent empires since have demonstrated, the actual application of the law for 
the maintenance of the civic virtue or communal good was often not democratic and easily 
abused in an authoritarian manner. " 
In these early democracies there developed a tendency identifiable today where certain 
individuals took on the leading roles in the process of governance. In the assemblies of Greece 
and Rome it was in the form of specific speakers who dominated the assemblies and were able 
to get others to follow their ideas. " The practice of democracy became a more exclusive affair 
within the defined group of participants as there developed concentrations of power where 
certain individuals emerged as leaders. In the words of Cicero: 
The commonwealth is the people's affair; and the people is not every group of 
men, associated in any manner, but is the coming together of a considerable 
number of men who are united by a common agreement about law and rights and 
by the desire to participate in mutual advantage. " 
The practices of ancient Greece and Rome present numerous difficulties with democracy that 
are still debated. This dilenima of democracy 
- 
speaking of inclusiveness while practising 
limited participation remains a difficult issue today for democratic theory and practice. They 
also provided ideas and practices such as freedom and liberty for individuals, equality and 
participation which continue to influence democracy today. " From this early existence core 
" Ball and Dagger (199 1) p. 28; Treadgold (1990) p. 73. Finley (1983) describes the importance in Roman society of 
the wide-scale participation of the citizens in formal and informal settings- Fon-nal in the sense of participating in the 
bodies of government, infon-nal through the high degree of public discussion and debate which occurred outside of 
the assemblies, p. 70. 
" See C. Wirszubski. Libertas as a Political Idea of Rome during the Late Republic and Early Principate. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950); J. Kelly. A Shon History of Westem Legal Theory. (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1992) pp. 22-26; Dahl (1989) pp. 14-18. 
Harrison (1993) p. 19. Also the speech of Pericles in Thucydides. The Pelopennesian War. Book 11, paragraph 37. 
Cicero. De Republica. Part 1, paragraph 25. But see Sabine and Thorson who interpret this statement as describing 
an all inclusive society of citizens, G. Sabine and T. Thorson. A History of Political Theorý,, 4th ed. (Hinsdale: 
Dryden Press, 1973) p. 163. 
39 See Sinclair (1988) p. 2 1. 
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elements of democratic thought and practice emerge 
-a sovereign people entitled to govem 
itself through its own resources and institutions. " 
In general, throughout he period leading up to the early 18th century, democracy was not 
seen as a desirable form for organising society. " There is evidence of continuing Roman 
institutions and judicial habits related to democracy but for the most part the authority of 
secular leaders became absolute. Kelly identifies the brief emergence of democratic practices 
in the early Germanic tribes in Europe based on the belief that power rested with the people 
and leaders were in turn expected to act for benefit of the community. This never developed 
fin-ther than rudimentary actions and was soon overtaken by competing conceptions of 
governance. " 
In Europe the Christian Church and man's existence relative to God dictated the prevailing 
world-view and the form of government and society. " Christian belief, as with earlier Hebrew 
notions, theoretically did not allow for absolute secular rule, as the position of God was 
absolute in the heavens and upon earth. Aquinas put forth the position that the secular 
monarch was not absolute since it was bound by natural laws that derived from God. " The 
Church could over rule a monarch and the dominance of religious thought lead to certain 
democratic ideas as to the equality of individuals. " While spiritual belief held that all 
individuals were equal in God's eyes and writers like Aquinas held that the masses could reject 
a monarch who violated the natural law" there was no support for the wider participation of 
individuals in the way society was ordered or governed. In fact, in common with 
Schurripeter's View of democracy today, wider participation for all individuals was 
vehemently opposed. Aquinas described democracy as 'a form of popular power in which the 
common people, by sheer force of numbers, oppress the rich, with the result that the whole 
populace becomes a kind of tyrant', " a recurring argument against democracy. 
Even though the Christian doctrine professed the belief of moral equality among 
individuals authority in governance was not democratic. The general will of the community 
was determined by specific individuals in consultation with the monarch with no system of 
"Dahl (1989) p. 13. 
4' For writers who did advocate democracy see Kelly (1992) pp. 128-13 1. 
42 Kelly (1992) pp. 91-95. 
4' Held (1996) pp. 37-39. 
44 On Aquinas' View of popular sovereignty, see A. D'Entr6ves. The Medieval Contribution to Political Thought. 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1939) p. 32. 
4' Kelly (1992) pp. 104-105. 
46 Plamenatz (1992) p. 25. 
47 Quoted by Q. Skinner 'The Italian City-Republics. ' in J. Dunn, ed. Democracy. - The Unfinished Journey, 508 BC to 
1993. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992) p. 60. 
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accountability or wider participation. " Furthermore the Church as an institution proved to be 
an authoritarian administrative body which promoted hereditary rule with a divine sanction. In 
response to the authoritarian tendencies of the Christian church, the early Italian City- 
republics" developed their own political institutions which rejected the concept of hereditary 
rule as well as that of divine sanction, instead seeing the body politic as the source of 
legitimate authority. As with the Greeks, the composition of the body politic which was to be 
involved in the decision making process did not attempt to include the majority of members of 
society. " Within this narrow inclusion there existed a firm belief in the validity of choice in 
determining who governs and participation in society so that individuals may feel part of the 
decision making process. 
A supporter of the Italian City-republics and strong opponent of the all-embracing 
authority of the Church was Marsilius of Padua who formulated ideas of popular sovereignty 
and legitimate government M his work Defensor Pacis (1324). " For Marsilius there was no 
question that government had to be based on the will of the people to be considered legitimate, 
as the people were the 'primary and proper efficient cause of the law'. 52 Marsilius favoured a 
form of government where the people make the laws, the ruler is elected by the people and the 
ruler governs according to the laws as passed by the people's representatives If the laws are 
51 not followed the people are entitled to dispose of the ruler. Marsilius placed great importance 
in the people being the source of the law for if the law emanates from a single individual or 
small group it Will be based on their own narrow personal interests rather than the community 
interests. If the people are the source of law then 'each would seem to have set the law upon 
himself, and hence would have no protest against it, but would rather tolerate it with 
5 54 equanimity 
. 
Marsilius had placed the authority to govem with the people since he believed 
that the will of the people was with the common good of the community and proved to be the 
most efficient form of governance for society. 55 
48 Plamenatz (1992) pp. 24-25; Treadgold (1990) p. 78. 
49 On the Italian city-state see Skinner in Dunn (1992) pp. 57-70. 
'0 See Plamenatz (1992) pp. 24-25; Skinner in Dunn (1992) p. 60. 
" A. Gewirth. Marsilius of Padua: The Defender of Peace. vol. 1. Marsilius of Padua and Medieval Political 
Philosophy (hereinafter Gewirth, Marsilius). vol. 2. The Defensor Pacis (hereinafter Marsilius, Defensor Pacis). (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 195 1). 
Gew-irth, Marsilius. p. 167,172-3. Marsilius, Defonsor Pacis, p. 28; D'Entr6ves (1939) p. 55. 
Gewirth, Marsilius. p. 237. As With previous writers 'the people' were a narrowly defined group, see 
Marsilius, 
Defensor Pacis, pp. 45-46; Gewirth, Marsilius, pp. 176-9. 
54 Marsilius, Defensor Pacis. p. 47. Also Skinner in Dunn (1992) pp. 61-62 
" Gewirth, Marsilius, p. 316. 
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For Marsilius the overall goal of government is the attainment of peace as an ideal and as a 
condition to a well ordered society. " The purpose of government fies not in maintaining a 
spiritual belief but in running the state and society in the most efficient way. " The measure of 
efficiency for government is providing for the common benefit which is defined as 
- 
ensuring 
the minimal conditions for the attainment of a sufficient life, the will which controls political 
authority comes from the whole people, and that the dynamic of the whole process is the desire 
for sufficient life and freedom. " The common benefit is to be reflected in the decision making 
process of government. The body of participants called the Legislator who possess the real 
power of government for they make the law and the law is only for the benefit of society. In 
this Legislator, Marsilius called for quantitative majorities but also emphasised a need for 
qualitative factors in the decision making process as not all individuals are to be considered 
equal. " Marsilius' notion of qualitative factors demonstrates a continual belief in democratic 
thought that there is the need for certain individuals to be at the forefront of governing but that 
the authority to govem remains with the wider society. " 
Niccolo Maclýiavelfi was another writer of the Italian city-state era and is most famous for 
his work The Prince, which is interpreted as a guide for authoritarian rule. " He also wrote of 
more democratic ideas such as having a system of elections for rulers, " that rulers should act 
in the public interest and not in their own self interest, 63 equality before the law, 64 the necessity 
that even those who govern conform to the law and recourse to repressive means of control 
should not be tolerated 
. 
65 Machiavelli was a firm non-believer in the ability of the people to 
rule themselves,, coming to the conclusion that the only way to ensure stability and forward 
progress is to have a strong individual or small group leading the people. 66 Machiavelli admits 
this conclusion is a personal one as his investigations show that the best way of safeguarding 
liberty is to leave the task of government to the people. It is the people who are the best suited 
for the task since they only desire the enjoyment of liberty and therefore will take better care of 
it by not taking it away from themselves or letting others take it away. His personal view was 
" D'Entr6ves (193 9) pp. 50- 1. 
5' Gewirth, Marsilius. pp. 171-2. 
Gewirth, Marsilius. p. 3 10. 
D'Entr6ves (1939) pp. 55-6; Gewirth, Marsilius, pp. 190-2. 
J. McClelland. A History of Western Political Thought. (London: Routledge, 1996) pp. 142-143. 
6' For a study of Machiavelli and democracy see M. Hullung. Citizen Machiavelli. (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1983). 
6' The Discourses, Book 1, Chapter 20, pp. 174-75. 
61 7he Discourses, Book 1, Chapter 9, pp. 138-39. 
64 The Discourses, Book 1, Chapter 24, p. 18 1. 
65 7he Discourses, Book 1, Chapter 45, pp. 229-230 and Book 3, Chapter 19, pp. 470-47 1. 
66 The Discourses, Book 1, Chapter 2, pp. I 10- 117. 
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that the nobles should hold the power for their position will make them more suited for the 
task and the 'restless spirit' of the masses, which is apt to cause problems, is eliminated. " 
Machiavelli, pre-empting Schumpeter, felt the people are much too susceptible to being misled 
by elusive goods leading to their eventual rUM. Strong central leadership will ensure that this 
does not occur 
. 
6' Even though Machiavelli felt that an individual or small group was best 
suited for the government he stressed that individuals need to remain active participants in the 
affairs of society. It was felt that even if the citizens themselves are not able to rule themselves 
they could not become lazy and indifferent to affairs around them for then a tyrant would be 
able to take control of SoCiety. 69 
B. Enlightened Democrats 
The impact of the thinkers from the Italian city-states and the resultant practice was 
minimal as the democratic practice of many of them soon eroded into authoritarian forms of 
government. The Reformation of the Sixteenth century brought the weakening of religious 
and spiritual control over society. The Enlightenment, which followed, began the questioning 
of where authority rests in society and how it is to be exercised. 'O The actual practice of 
democracy remained the exception" but greater efforts were now being placed on developing 
practices and institutions that ensured limitations upon power and allowed for development of 
the individual Ma particular fashion. Debates on democracy became less concerned with 
determining what best develops the virtue of citizens and the strengthening of community to 
creating specific spaces and institutions of politics concerned with the role and actions of the 
individual in relation to the government. 72 Attempts were made to formulate ideas of 
governance whereby the source of authority was based with the individuals in a society and 
exercised through a certain form government. Previous ideas which fostered equality and 
liberty of and among individuals did so with the idea that this was the best way to strengthen 
or acquire glory and greatness for the entire community. " Now the focus featured the 
individual first and then moved on to decide which is the best forrn of social ordering for the 
67 The Discourses, Book 1, Chapter 5, pp. 121-22. 
68 The Discourses, Book 1, Chapter 53,246-252. The idea of a strong central power was common in this Period, even 
with writers who spoke of individual freedoms and popular participation, see P. King. The Ideology of Order. - 
A 
Comparative Analysis ofJean Bodin and Thomas Hobbes. (London: Allen and Unwin, 1974) pp. 29-30. 
69 See Ball and Dagger (199 1) pp. 31-32. 
70 Held (1996) pp. 72-73. 
71 See R. Williams. Keywords. - A Vocabulary of Culture and Society, Rev. ed. (London: Fontana, 1983) p. 94. also 
C. Macpherson. The Real World ofDemocraQ,. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1966) p. 1. 
7' Held (1996) pp. 56,69. 
73 Skinner in Dunn (1992) p. 65. 
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individual, not what is the best form of individual behaviour for the benefit of the 
COMMUnity. 74 
In describing the position of the individual in society Thomas Hobbes developed a concept 
of the state of nature where the individual was paramount and all behaviour was based on self- 
interest 
- 
making life solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short. " Government for Hobbes was an 
exclusive position not based on the needs and desires of the individuals of society. Instead, a 
government's only concern was the survival of the state through any means and the pursuit of 
self-interested goals. Hobbes rejected previous beliefs of the individual being part of a larger 
spiritual world or of the individual having a responsibility or duty to a larger community as a 
pre-existing form. " For Hobbes, the only way in which individuals may obtain security is to 
enter into a contract with each other through which all submit themselves to a higher power 
whose authority is absolute, supreme and above the law and rules which govern society. " 
Hobbes did not believe that the sovereign owed any obligation to the individuals in society, as 
it had the right to act of its own accord and there was nothing individuals could do to change 
the sovereign. " The political theory of Hobbes is far from democratic but commentators have 
noted that the overall authority of the Leviathan could be seen as being representative of those 
it rules, and since all have contracted to give up their rights, there is at least a democratic 
agreement to be ruled by a monarch. " Hobbes held a similar view of the democratic process 
for it mirrored the existence of the monarch in that eventually responsibility is given up to 
representatives and the individual has no personal control over events, with majority rule 
prevailing. " The idea of the Leviathan being democratic must be rejected as there is no 
opportunity for the individual to participate in governance and there exists no safeguards 
against the abuse of power. 
John Locke" developed an idea of the state of nature contrary to Hobbes as he saw it not 
based on individual self-interest but on the existence of basic laws requiring individuals to treat 
each other with respect. Individual rights existed in the state of nature to ensure peaceful 
" Harrison (1993) pp. 37-38. 
75 See T. Hobbes. Leviathan. Part 1, Chapter 15. This view has been transplanted as an explanation of the 
international system, see R. Walker. InsidelOutside: International Relations and Political Theory. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993) pp. I 10- 112. 
7' Hobbes. De Cive. Chapter 1, paragraphs 11-Ul. 
77 M. Goldsmith. Hobbes' Science of Politics. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966) pp. 195-196. For an 
interpretation of Hobbes that stresses the liberal values of his work see G. Kavka. Hobbessian Moral and Political 
Theory. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986). 
" Leviathan, Part 11, Chapter XVIN. Also Goldsmith (1966) pp. 178-185. 
79 See H. Schneider, ed. 7homas Hobbes Leviathan. (NY, 1958) introduction by editor, p. xii. 
'0 Leviathan, Pail 11, Chapter XV11; Harrison (1993) p. 41-43. 
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coexistence. These rights were then transferred to the government for functional reasons but 
the source of rights remains With indiVidUalS. '2 These inalienable rights could not be given up 
or taken away, even with the creation of society. 83 Locke saw individuals coming together first 
to create a society then to create a government which remains based on the needs and desires 
of the individuals responsible for its formation. 84 For Locke the contract between government 
and individuals was based on trust and that individuals maintained final control over their 
rights and may take control back if they feel the government is not acting appropriately for the 
interests of society. The idea that individuals continually remain in possession of their 
inalienable rights acts as a foundation for democracy by giving it a moral legitimacy that may 
be transferred to actual practice. " 
To maintain the concept of trust between individuals and the goverriment Locke stated that 
government should be based on the will of society and include a separation of powers to 
ensure that the law is not abused. " Any government whose legitimacy is self-defined and is 
responsible only to itself will not act as a independent arbiter in its relations with individuals in 
society, for 
it may be too great a temptation to human frailty, apt to grasp at power, for the 
same persons who have the power of making laws to have also in their hands the 
power to execute them, whereby they may exempt themselves from obedience to 
the laws they make, and suit the law, both in its making and execution, to their 
own private advantage, and thereby come to have a distinct interest from the rest 
of the community, contrary to the end of society and government. " 
For Locke government cannot be an end in itself, empowered to pursue its own goals and 
interests, only a government that consults and gains the agreement of society and remains 
bound by the rules of society is legitimate. " The importance of consent stressed by Locke 
seems to be lost once society is established. Locke saw the active consent of individuals only 
necessary in the creation of the state, after that it comes through decisions carried out by 
representatives who remain bound by the original contract but there exists no need for 
" Writings of Locke relevant to the discussion here may be found in John Locke. Political Writings. D. Wootton, ed. 
(London: Penguin, 1993). 
" Second Treatise, Chapter 7, paragraphs 87-89. 
" Second Treatise, Chapter 4, paragraph 23. 
84 Locke. Second Treatise on Government, (hereinafter Second Treatise) Chapter 8, paragraphs 96-97. 
" Harrison (1993) p. 48. 
86 Second Treatise, Chapter 12, paragraphs 143-148. 
" Second Treatise, Chapter 12, paragraph 143. 
Harrison (1993) p. 47. Held (1996) p. 80. 
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obtaining continual consent. " As with the Romans and Machiavelli, Locke stressed that 
vigilance and participation on the part of citizens within society was the best way of protecting 
rights. Participation was seen as a safeguard to the arbitrary use and abuse of power as it 
allows individuals to develop their personal qualities and to exercise some control over their 
lives. " The problem with Locke is that his ideas of participation and vigilance do not fit well 
with the lack of continual consent needed to legitimise the government. 
The idea of active participation was taken on by Jean-Jacques Rousseau. He saw 
individuals originally coming together into a society in order to overcome the difficulties of the 
state of nature. Rousseau described the original social contract for society being based on the 
idea that each individual has an equal contribution to make to society and that co-operation 
among individuals was the best way of ordering their common relations. " Once individuals 
have entered into society, the state and government that is created has the single purpose of 
maintaining what is best for the society, or as Rousseau termed it 
- 
the general will. " Rousseau 
felt that there needed to be a great deal of participation by individuals in the process of 
governance so that needs and desires are adequately expressed. Participation also gives the 
individual a sense of greater freedom because it allows the individual to exercise a degree of 
control over the events that shape their life and environment. Participation leads to a greater 
acceptance of collective decisions and greater feeling of belonging in the community. " 
Participation has a protective by possessing a psychological aspect 'ensuring that there is a 
continuing interrelationship between the working of institutions and the psychological qualities 
and attitudes of individuals interacting within them. 94 
In the process of participation Rousseau viewed individuals as being equal, a fundamental 
aspect of society which allows each person to enjoy the same rights. " By equality Rousseau 
meant more than equal political rights guaranteed by law for he felt that such a condition is 
useless in the face of grave economic inequalities. " The only acceptable economic policy in 
society was one that places the benefits and burdens equally among the population. " While 
'9 See Second Treatise, Chapter 9, paragraphs 114-122. Also J. Dunn. Political Obligation in its Historical Context. - 
Essays in Political Theory. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980) pp. 36-37. 
90 Duncan and Lukes (1963) p. 174 
9' J-J. Rousseau. The Social Contract. trans. M. Cranston. (London: Penguin, 1968) Book 1, Chp. 6. (hereinafter 
Social Contract). 
9' Social Contract, Book 2 Chapter 1, p. 69. On the general Will see Book 2, Chapter 3, p. 72 
9' C. Pateman. Participation and Democratic Theory. (Cambddge: Cambridge University Press, 1970) pp. 26-27. 
94 Pateman, 1970, p. 22 
9' Social Contract, pp. 46,76; Pateman (1970) pp. 22-23. 
96 Social Contract, p. 96; J-J. Rousseau. A Discourse on Inequality (1755), trans. M. Cranston (London: Penguin, 
1984) pp. 130-134. 
97 Social Contract, p. 76. 
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Rousseau advocated equality among individuals and govemment based on the authonty of 
society his idea of the general will could be used to implement authoritarian practices justified 
by virtue of the necessity to IMPlement and uphold the general will. " 
The democratic ideas of the Enlightenment moved from philosophical discussions to 
actual practice as the United States and France established democratic forms of government at 
the end of the eighteenth century. These large-scale experiments with democracy provided 
evidence of the practical possibilities of democracy for those battling against the existence of 
authoritarian rule. At this time a loud critic of any form of authoritarian rule was Thomas 
Paine' who saw any form of governance that was self-legitimising as a threat to both domestic 
and international peace. Paine spoke of equal rights for individuals, a degree of economic 
equality and combining representation with direct democracy to create a system of governance 
capable of embracing all the various interests of a society. '00 The true purpose of a 
government is to provide freedom and security to the individual within society. "' He 
explained that '[g]overnment on the old system (monarch), is an assumption of power, for the 
aggrandisement of itself-, on the new, a delegation of power, for the common benefit of 
society. "" Paine insisted that the government be for the benefit of society, it must be created 
by society and retains its legitimacy through a continual process of change and 
reassessment. "' Paine's idea of continual consent is a step above Locke and was based on the 
belief that society is dynamic and must continually adapt to changes in the needs and desires of 
the individuals that constitute it. 0 
Paine believed that within society 'every individual is bom equal in rights with his 
contemporary'. The equality of rights is the fundamental basis of human existence and 
integral to society as individuals do not enter into a society to be worse off or to loose their 
rights. "' Along with equal rights Pame saw a certain degree of econormic justice being 
necessary. He recognised that the creation of society will lead to inequalities among 
individuals. These inequalities may not have existed in the state of nature and since 
individuals enter into society for improvement it is necessary to compensate for the negative 
9' See McClelland (1996) pp. 251-274; Kelly (1992) pp. 257-25 8. 
99 I'lie writings of Tbomas Paine relevant for this work may be found in a single edition, M. Philip. Thomas Paine: 
Rights ofMan, Common Sense and Other Political Writings. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995) All references 
will be to the page numbers of this edition. 
'00 Rights ofMan, p. 202. 
'0' Common Sense, pp. 31-2; Rights ofMan, pp. 195-6. 
'O'Rights ofMan, p. 223. 
'0' 'Every age and generation must be as free to act for itself, in all cases, as the ages and generations which preceded 
it. ' Rights ofMan, p. 92. 
" Paine sees this as the oldest doctrine on record, Rights ofMan, pp. 117-9. 
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effects. "' Paine also provided a practical reason for economic equality since economic 
inequality through unequal taxation has the impact of placing large parts of society into 
poverty which in turn creates unrest. ' 06 it is then necessary for governments to take an active 
role in ensuring some degree of equality, both civil and econorrfic as the purpose of 
government is to ensure the best possible society for individuals. 
Paine's writings were influenced by events in the United States that also produced 
discussions concerning the policy and practice of democracy in the new country through the 
Federalist Papers. "' The Federalists dealt with the best ways of making the new country into 
'a republic' which spanned a large area and would allow the people to assemble and 
administer government through representatives and agents, "' as '[i]t is essential to such a 
government that it be derived from the great body of society, not from an inconsiderable 
proportion of a favoured class of it. "" 
The structure of government depended upon a separation of the three main institutions, the 
legislature, the executive and judiciary. For the Federalists this separation was essential as the 
accumulation of all three areas of powers into a single person or group was 'the very definition 
of tyranny'. " 0 The Federalists took the philosophical stance on the separation of powers from 
the writers discussed above and combined it with the practical view of Montesquieu. "' The 
belief was that if power is decentralised and diffused then there will be support for the decision 
making process as it will be closer to the individuals it impacts and will also prevent any abuse 
of power by the government as a whole or from a particular branch. "' The framework created 
by a separation of powers consisted of a legislature which is the direct representative of the 
will of the people, an executive to provide national leadership, and the judiciary which acts as 
an intermediary between the legislature and the executive and the people, with the purpose of 
keeping the government within the bounds of its assigned authority. This did not make the 
judicial superior in any way since the will of the people remains the final authority for all the 
'0' Agrarian Justice pp. 420-1. 
106 Rights ofMan, p. 217. 
'0' 1 Madison, A. Harriilton and I Jay. The Federalist Papers. 1. Krarnnick, ed. (London: Penguin, 1987). 
'0' Federalist No. 24, p. 14 1. 
Federalist No. 39,255. 
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... Baron de Montesquieu. The Spirit of the Lmts (1748), trans. T. Nugent. (New York: Hafner, 1949). For the 
influence of Montesquieu on the Federalists see A. Cohler. Montesquieu's Comparative Politics and the Spirit of 
American Constitutionalism. (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1988). 
112 Federalist No. 48, pp. 309-312. 
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branches. "' This led to an inimediate difficulty of how the common Will of the people is to be 
expressed and how best ensure its virtuous side prevailed. "' 
It was believed that in the context of a large society it was not possible to give individuals 
political equality and expect that no animosity would exist, for political equality would not 
automatically solve the problems created by differences in possessions and opinions. "' For 
Madison this made direct forms of democracy and participation in government impractical. He 
felt the common interest could best be discerned through the use of representatives and agents 
engaging in a 'filtering process' that would distil the various public views. For Madison the 
filtering process would 
refine and enlarge the public views by passing them through the medium of a 
chosen body of citizens whose wisdom may best discem the true interest of their 
country, and whose patriotism and love ofjustice will be least likely to sacrifice it 
to temporary or partial considerations. "' 
The Federalists' version of government based on the filtering process faced numerous 
problems with how to ensure the will of the people is properly expressed, how minorities and 
their interests are to be accommodated and how to ensure that representatives carry out the 
purposes for which they were chosen. Elected representatives were considered to be the most 
qualified and appropriate persons to represent the interests of society as a whole and to 
undertake the fimctions of governance while still being (Erectly responsible to the whole of 
society. I" The role of representatives, their nature and function remains an issue for all 
democracies. 
John Stuart NEW" wrestled with the problem of representation as he investigated how to 
order a large society in a way that allows for individual development as well as ftirthering the 
common good for society. Mill looked for an approach which would balance the individual 
and society, or at least make the interests and needs of the two compatible. The sanctity of the 
individual was paramount for Mill but he also believed that individuals owed a duty to society 
"' Federalist No. 46, p. 297. This point was firmly stated in Federalist No. 22 'The fabric of the American empire 
ought to rest on the solid basis of THE CONSENT OF THE PEOPLE. The streams of national power ought to flow 
immediately forrn that pure, original foundation of all legitimate authority', (capitals in original) p. 184. 
114 Harrison (1993) p. 82. 
"'Federalist No. 10, p. 124. 
"'Federalist No. 10, p. 126. 
117 Federalist No. 39, p. 255 and Federalist No. 10, p. 126. See the study by Gamble demonstrating the benefits of the 
filtering process over direct democracy in the area of civil rights and liberties, B. Gamble. 'Putting Civil Rights to a 
Vote. ' 41 A merican Journal ofPolitical Science (1997) pp. 245-269. 
"' References to Mill's work are from John Stuart Mill. Utilitarianism, On Liberty, Considerations on Representative 
Government. G. Williams, ed. (London: Everyman, 1993). 
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that was in turn responsible for their development. "' Mill felt that in a democratic society 
individual actions were propelled less by self-interest and more by recognition of the existence 
of others living together in the larger society. Therefore, behaviour such as the act of voting 
would move beyond being merely personal expressions but a true reflection of the opinion of 
the public good. 120 Authoritarian forms of government which limit participation deny the 
individual their 'potential voice in their own destiny', undermining their hurnan dignity. The 
denial of participation threatens social justice, denies the ability of individuals discover their 
own needs and desires, to develop intellectual, moral and political excellence and in general to 
enjoy life to the best possible extent. 121 
For Nfill the criteria for good government was based on its ability to helps individuals 
develop their personal attributes through active participation in society. "' Mill advocated a 
high degree of participation by individuals in the process of governance as essential to their 
personal development and the development of society. Participation would create a direct 
interest in the way society is governed and act to develop an informed polity. "' Mill's version 
of government was a representative system along with certain rights and freedoms that would 
prevent the abuse of power by government and allow for individuals and minorities to develop 
within society. There would be checks on the central government through the creation of a 
parliament to protect liberty and be a centre for debate. To enhance participation government 
was seen not just as a power structure but as an instrument for education. For Mill, 
representative democracy provided the best type of education since the purpose of such a 
government was to promote a certain kind of individual character and to do so it has to possess 
the necessary institutions. "' 
To effectively create an informed polity participation begins in those areas with the most 
direct effect upon the individual's life. The educative process of participation begins at the 
local level as 
[a] political act, to be done only once in a few years, and for which nothing in the 
daily habits of the citizen has prepared him, leaves his intellect and his moral 
dispositions very much as it found them. "' 
"' For Mill's views on the individual, see his work On Liberty. 
120 Harrison (1993) p. 109. 
121 Considerations, 300-301. 
H mi son (1993) p. 105. 122 Considerations, pp. 211-212. Also Macpherson (1977) p. 47-48; a 
121 Consideration, pp. 207-208. 
124 Harrison (1993) p. 106; Paternan (1970) p. 29. 
125 Quoted in Pateman (1970) p. 30. 
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Mill saw no sense in having universal suffrage and participation in elections for national 
government every few years if there did not exist the opportunity for participation at local or 
sub-state levels where decisions occur closer to the individual. His belief was that it is more 
important for a person to be actively involved in the processes that most closely affect the 
individual's day to day life. "' This would also provide means for minorities to have an 
effective voice for '[iln a really equal democracy every or any section would be represented, 
not disproportionately, but proportionately. ' 127 For the working classes this would mean 
greater participation in the community and workplace, for the more educated elite, there would 
be participation on a wider scale. 121 
Based on this formulation Mill's theory begins to weaken as it losses its idea of equality 
among individuals. The electoral process would find the individuals who posses the 
leadership qualities best suited for society. `9 This creates a contradiction in his Views for he 
believed, like Marsilius, that only the qualified elite should be the ones who govem, with the 
majority of individuals never being able to reach such a high role. Fhs discriminatory attitude 
also comes through in his opinion on suffrage, for he had the idea that the vote should not be 
totally equal, with those individuals with advanced knowledge and talent getting more votes 
than others. "' Mill's version of democracy resembles an elitist version (discussed below) with 
certain specific individuals being entrusted with the workings of government. The difference 
hes in the fact that for Mill individuals are able to be involved in the decision making process 
by being able to participate at all levels of society and more so at those closest to them. "' Mill 
recognised the need for representatives but did not see this as resulting in the total exclusion of 
individuals from the process of governance as individuals need to be actively involved in 
governance for their own personal development and to benefit the long-term considerations of 
society. 
IV. DEMOCRACY BY THE FEW VERSUS DEMOCRACY FOR ALL 
The issue of representation has come to dominate democratic thinking since the 
Enlightenment and lies at the core of democracy today. lt is accepted that representation is a 
126 See Pateman (1970) p. 31. 
"' Considerations, p. 278, see Chapter 7 of Considerations for Mill's discussion on m1nority groups under a 
representative government, pp. 277-298. 
128 Mill's way to greater participation through the increased ftanchise and change in work relations did not have the 
intended effect of creating a more participatory society, see Macpherson, 1977, p. 101. 
129 Considerations, pp. 258-260. 
"0 Considerations, pp. 308-312; Macpherson (1977) 56-60. 
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social and political fact of domestic society and for the international system. Representation 
does not mean that individuals are automatically limited in their ability to participate 'in the 
process of governance. ' 32 It does, however, mean that those chosen to be representatives must 
be able to reflect individual needs and desires as well as act as effective agents for the good of 
society while undertaking their tasks of the body to which they belong. Representation is a 
fimctional necessity and should not be used to limit the possibilities of wide-based active 
participation by individuals in the process of governance. An effective democratic system 
needs to combine the practical necessities of representation with the possibilities of active 
participation by individuals. 
A. Representation and Democracy 
James Mill, summed up the problem facing democracy and the need for representation. 
The people, as a body, cannot perform the business of Government for 
themselves. If the powers of Government are entrusted to one man, or a few men, 
and a Monarchy, or governing Aristocracy, is formed, the results are fatal: And it 
appears that a combination of the simple fortris is impossible. "' 
James NEIL like his son, struggled to formulate an acceptable form of representation but if 
contemporary observers are an accurate indication, there remain numerous problems in finding 
an acceptable form. By their very nature representation and democracy are opposable 
concepts, even though current thought has brought the two together as compatible or as one in 
the same. "' Democracy is about individuals being able to be part of the decisions impacting 
their lives, representation entails individuals passing over this ability and responsibility for 
others to exercise. "' It is problematic for developing a theory and practice of democracy that 
includes representation as participation, equality and autonomy are brought into question. At 
"' See A. Ryan. 'Mill and Rousseau: Utility and Rights. ' in G. Duncan, ed. Democratic Theory and Practice. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983) p. 41. 
"' See B. Barber. Strong Democracy: Participatory Politicsfor a New Age (Berkeley: University of Califomia Press, 
1984)p. 145. 
"' On representation see A. Birch. Representation. (London: Pall Mall, 1971); H. Pitkin. The Concept of 
Representation. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967); 1 Pennock and I Chapman, eds. Representation. 
(New York: Atherton, 1968); H. Eulau and I Whalton, eds. The Politics of Representation: Continuities in Theory 
and Research. (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1978). 
"' I Mill. 'Essay on Government. ' Part VI, in I Livey and I Rees, eds. Utilitarian Logic and Politics: James Mill's 
'Essay on Government', Macauly's Critique and the Ensuing Debate. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1978) p. 72. 
"' For a historical treatment of political representation, see Birch (197 1) pp. 30-49; Pennock and Chapman (1968) pp. 
55-94. 
136 M. Hamilton. 'Discussion and Decisions: A Proposal to Replace the Myth of Self-Rule with an Attomeyship 
Model of Representation. ' 69 New York University Law Review (1994) p. 479. The origins of undemocratic practices 
of representation can be seen in the histories of England and Sweden where the monarchs called together hand picked 
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that same time it is necessary to come up with a system of governance that possesses 
ftmctional capabilities at all levels. 
Representation has been defined as 'one of the core concepts of politics, but elusive 
because it is used with incompatible meanings'. 137 Further '[i]t is still not wholly clear what 
representation consists in, or what conditions determine its just and efficient functioning'. "' 
This has been attributed to the fact that 'the idea of representation is associated with persistent 
theoretical controversies and incompatible definitions. 13' Eulau has concluded that 'our 
contemporary real-life problems are such that none of the traditional formulations of 
representation are relevant to the solution of the representation problems the modem polity 
faces. "" In dealing with democracy there is the dilemma that representation '[a]s a theory of 
political obligation it is inadequate, but as a fact it is effective. ' 141 
Any society depends upon some forin of representation at the various levels in which it 
operates. "' The idea behind political representation is that representatives are elected by those 
who are governed and do not obtain their authority to act from any other source. The 
representatives are not necessarily tied to the wishes of those they represent but are expected to 
act upon the needs and desires as expressed by those represented. The governed have an active 
role in choosing their representatives on a regular basis and by voicing their opinions to their 
representatives. "' Representatives are in a double position of having an obligation to those 
they represent but also an obligation to the body of which they are a member and which has 
been entrusted with a specific degree of responsibility. The functions of representatives consist 
of ensuring popular control over the government, some forrn leadership and responsibility in 
decision making and contributing to the maintenance and fimctioning of the Society. 144 
Representation is finding out what is wanted and then being able to carry out those policies. 145 
assemblies to legitimise their rule. An early form of the 'double gesture' concerning democracy, see Dahl (1989) pp. 
28-29. 
1. Mclean, ed. 7he Concise Oxford Dictionary ofPolitics. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996) p- 427. 
R. Scraton. A Dictionary ofPolitical 7hought, 2nd ed. (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996) p. 473. 
"9 D. Miller, ed. The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Thought. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987) p. 432 'any 
exploration of the concept of representation must start by acknowledging that the concept is far from simple. ' Also 
Birch (197 1) p. 13; Pitkin (1967) pp. 5-12. 
H. Eulau. 'Changing View of Representation. ' in Eulau and Whalton, eds. (1978) p. 36. 
J. Lucas. Democracy and Participation. (London: Penguin, 1976) p. 177. 
Rao has categorised three forms of representation - juristic representation where the representative acts for others 
on the basis of a contract or mandate; sociological representation where the representative represents a group due to 
personal characteristics or attributes, and; political representation which includes elements of the previous two forms 
with the added procedural function of the representative accepting responsibility for the interests of a specified group. 
N. Rao. 'Representation in Local Politics: A Reconsideration of some New Evidence. ' 46 Political Studies (1998) p. 
19. Also Birch (197 1) pp. 72-105; Pitkin (1967) pp 
- 
60-143. 
14' B. Manin. 'The Metamorphoses of Representative Government. ' 23 Economy and Society (1994) pp. 139-146. 
144 Birch (197 1) p. 107. 
14' Lucas (1976) p. 175. 
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The problem posed by representation for democratic thought and practice hes in the 
connection between the representatives and those they represent. Regardless of the function 
they serve representatives need to be accountable and responsive to those who have chosen 
them. Rousseau observed that the representatives to the English Parliament were not able to 
vote based on the popular opinion of the electorate of their constituency instead having to 
adhere to a strict party line. The led to his conclusion that even though the English had 
elections there was no democracy the rest of the time since society had no control over their 
representatives. 14' Hobbes saw the Leviathan as a proper representative of society since all 
individuals had turned over their rights to it. It could speak and act on their behalf even though 
there was no way for individuals to question or participate in any way. 141 One author 
concludes that political representation has never been a form of self-government rather it has 
been an undemocratic form of organising a political system in various ways. 141 Representation 
then raises the issue as to who decides what is best for society. 
From Plato to today, it is understood that when democracy is based on majority rule there 
is the strong possibility that the rights and liberties of minorities will be limited 
- 
the tyranny of 
the majority is legitimised. "' It has been shown that the negative impacts of the majority can 
be lessened through elected representatives, which in turn proves beneficial for society in the 
long term. "' This does not solve the problem of who or what is to be represented at the 
different levels of government and calls for special forrns of representation for distinct groups 
raise even greater difficulties. "' Barber denies the possibility of representation working in a 
democracy since '[t]he representative principle steals from individuals the ultimate 
responsibility for their values, beliefs and actions. ' He feel that if direct responsibility does not 
exist then there is no freedom, making representation incompatible with social justice since it 
prevents individual autonomy and self-sufficiency. "' Barber's view of 'strong democracy', 
the need for participation and responsibility, is welcomed but such an extreme view of 
diSMIssing the possibility of any form of representation is not helpful. Representation at some 
level 
, 
in some form is going to exist, a point even conceded by Marx in his ideas of direct 
democracy (see below). It is necessary to ensure that representative bodies do not become 
146 Social Contract, p. 14 1. Commentators today still view this as an issue, see von Prondzynski (1992). 
14' For a discussion of Hobbes' View of representation see Pitkin (1967) pp. 14-37. 
148 Manin (1994) p. 13 8; Pitlcin (1967) p. 2. 
149 See Gamble (1997). 
"0 Gamble (1997) p. 262. 
"' See A. Phillips. 'Dealing with Difference: A Politics of Ideas or a Politics of PresenceT I Constellations (1994) p. 
74. 
152 Barber (1984) pp. 145-147. 
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entities in and among themselves for they must retain the link to individuals, not just 
procedurally but substantively. "' Furthermore, it is inadequate to confine discussions of 
representation to issues related to political representation as individuals may have stronger 
concerns and interests in other areas of society where the issue of representation is equally 
applicable. "' 
In concert with democracy and human rights, theories of representation are fraught with 
flaws in thinking and contradictory supporting evidence preventing the discovery of the 'true 
nature of representation'. "' Pitkin describes the quest for a proper theoretical model as being 
caught between the ideal and the actual achievement in establishing proper representation. This 
tension should not lead to the abandonment of reconciling representation with democracy but 
should be seen as a continual challenge 
to construct institutions and train individuals M such a way that they engage in the 
pursuit of the public interest, the genuine representation of the public; and, at the 
same time, to remain critical of those institutions and that training, so that they are 
always open to ffirther interpretation and reform. "' 
Representatives are necessary for the functioning of society but the existence and actions of the 
representative must be susceptible to measures of control in order to prevent the arbitrary use 
and possible abuse of power inherent In the position. Numerous measures exist to ensure the 
accountability of representatives and enhance participation. These include 
- 
regular elections, 
open legislative meetings, access to legislative documents, voting records and debates, the 
ability of mass media to cover the legislative process, freedom to voice opinions, the ability to 
engage in discussion and correspondence with legislators, and systems for recall and 
removal. "' If effective, representation serves a number of purposes; it ensures responsiveness 
to the interests and opinions of society, it allows for the peaceful change of govemment, it is 
responsible for organising the long term national interests as well as immediate pressures 
within society, it provides a form of consent for policies, it gives stability to the political 
"' See Hamilton's (1994) theory of an 'Attomeyship Model of Representation' where the representatives have 
independent judgement in acting in the best interests of those they represent and are under an obligation to maintain 
continual communication with the represented, pp. 523-558. 
154 Phillips (1994) p. 88; J. Pennock. 'Political Representation: An Overview. ' in Pennock and Chapman, eds. (1968) 
pp. 26-7. For representation as a process see M. Sobolewski. 'Electors and Representatives: A Contribution to the 
Theory of Representation. ' in Pennock and Chapman (1968) pp. 106-107. 
"' See Birch (1971) pp. 103-5, who feels it is not necessary to come up with such a theory, as opposed to Pitkin 
(1967) pp. 124-125. 
"' Pitkin (1967) p. 240. 
157 On control over representatives see Birch (1971) pp. 109-114; E. Rekosh. 'Parliamentary Transparency: An 
Essential Element of Democratic Legitimacy and the Rule of Law. ' 4 ODIHR Bulletin (1995/6) p. IT 
76 
systern, and contributes to decisional effectiveness. "' How representation is able to achieve 
these goals is a highly contentious issue and solutions will be particular to individual societies 
but will only be effective if representation is in line with underlying ideas of participation and 
autonomy. 
B. Representation in the Twentieth Century 
- 
Elites and the Masses 
Ultimately, the role and purpose of representatives will depend upon the way in which a 
society chooses to organise itself Two dominant forms of representation have developed this 
century which have served as the ideological battleground for the claim to real democracy. The 
Marxist idea claimed by communist states and the Sch-umpeterian view of procedural 
democracy and elite rule as practised in one form or another in the majority of western 
states. 159 These two fonris in no way encompass all versions of democratic thought or practice 
but do contain the dominant themes of the literature and the opposing poles of ideological 
thought and state practice in the international system this century. 
The idea of direct democracy as developed by Karl Marx"O was put into practice with the 
Russian Revolution of 1917 and the establishment of the communist govemment of the 
USSR. Since then, the now former-USSR and subsequent commurnst regimes have claimed 
the mantle of being true people's democracy, with western writers preferring to classify them 
as authoritarian regimes. "' The ideas of Marx (and Frederiech Engels) were manipulated by 
Soviet-era leaders resulting in the practice of authoritarian regimes. 16' However the basis of 
the beliefs held by Marx provides a substantial contribution to discussions of democracy due to 
the emphasis placed on the necessity of equality within society and the relation between the 
ftLee development of the individual and the free development of society. 161 
Marx's political thought looked to create a society allowing for the free development of all 
members through the ending of all exploitation, creating economic and social equality 
alongside political equality. It is only through the establishment of this true equality that the 
"' Birch (1971) pp. 107-8; E. Nordlinger. 'Representation, Governmental Stability, and Decisional Effectiveness. ' in 
Pennock and Chapman (1968) p. 108. 
"9 Macpherson (1977) p. 22. 
160 In discussing Marx in a short space problems arise as to the depth and breadth of his work and its subsequent 
interpretations. For studies concerning Marx and democracy see D. Doveton. 'Marx and Engels on Democracy. ' 15 
History of Political Thought (1994) p. 555; C. Pierson. Marxist Theory and Democratic Politics. (Cambridge: Polity, 
1986). 
161 See P. Corbett. Law and Society in the Relations of States. (New York: Harcourt, 1951) pp. 260-261 and D. 
Moynihan. On the Law ofNations. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990) pp. 126-127. 
"' See R. M011crson. 'Socialism and Human Rights. ' in A. Eide and J. Helgesen, eds. The Future of Human Rights 
Protection in a Changing World. - Fifty Years since the Four Freedoms Address. - Essays in Honour of Torkel 
Opsahl. 
(Oslo: Norwegian University Press, 199 1) p. 9. 
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potential of all individuals may be reahsed. "' Marx rejected the idea of the independent 
individual as championed by liberal thought since the Enlightenment. Instead he saw human 
beings living in concert with one another, whose relations were determined by interactions 
forrning the individual as a socially and historically conditioned product. "' Marx felt that 
democracy did not exist In a capitalist state since it was unable to represent the population as it 
only worked for the interests of the dominant capitalist class while oppressing the working 
class. "' Marx saw capitalist society as being a contradiction where there existed supposed 
political equality but massive social and economic inequalities preventing the individual from 
achieving any real social purpose. 167 Democracy could not occur under these circumstances 
since the needs and desires of the lower classes were not a consideration in the ordering and 
governance of society, barring the possibility of true equality. 16' The contradiction of capitalist 
democracy manifested itself in the belief that one possessed the right to dispose of one's 
property as they desired, which Marx showed to be of limited use if one did not have anything 
of which to dispose. 161 
Marx's conception of democracy was broad in scope concentrating on the participation of 
the whole of society at multiple levels. A capitalist system could not claim the title of 
democracy since not all sectors of society would be adequately accounted for due to 
unrepresentative voting systems, limited electorates and the use of repression against certain 
classes. "O Due to the unequal situation caused by the capitalist system, large proportions of 
the population must devote the majority of their time to work in order sustain their physical 
existence. This in turn does not allow them to obtain an appropriate degree of education or to 
have the necessary time to participate in politics, therefore democracy is controlled by the elite. 
Marx emphasised the need to establish conditions where all individuals in society are able to 
become political citizens and able to participate in society on an equal basis. "' 
Participation figures heavily for Marx since he believed that individuals can and do 
attempt to master their environment, as 'creativity and control of one's circumstances are thus 
16' For Marx's contribution to Westem legal systems, see Morrison (1997) pp. 271-273. 
164 K. Marx and F. Engels. The Communist Manifesto. D. McCellan, ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992) p. 
127. 
16' Held (1996) p. 122. 
166 Morrison (1997) pp. 264-267. See also Doveton (1994) pp. 559-60 and examples provided at pp. 566-572. 
167 Held (1996) pp. 264-5. Marx realised that capitalism allowed for the productive forces necessary for the 
revolution, see A. Callinicos. The Revenge of History: Marxism and the East European Revolutions. (Cambridge: 
Polity, 199 1) p. 102. 
16' Held (1996) p. 137. Marx held a wide view of what class meant, a view which would incorporate a large section 
of society, see Graham (1993) p. 237; Pierson (1986) pp. 9-11. 
169 Morrison (1997) p. 267; Barber (1984) p. 98. 
"o Doveton (1994) p. 558. 
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an intrinsic part of what it is to be "human7'. '172 The system he envisaged which would allow 
individuals to participate on an equal basis resembles a pyramid shape where each level of the 
society would elect their own representatives to make decisions at that particular level and 
delegates to represent them at the next level in the system. 17' The pyramidal structure of 
democracy would offer direct and indirect forms of participation with direct occurring at the 
lower levels of the community and moving on to some form of representation at each 
succeeding level as needs dictated. The representatives at each level would have to be chosen 
by election and be accountable to the level below therefore acting for the good of society and 
not certain sectional interests. 17' Beyond this Marx did not develop to any specific 
programmes to ensure the expression of the whole of society, instead he felt that each society 
would develop under its own circumstances. 175 
Marx's original view of full participation by individuals was perverted by cornmunist 
regimes who under the guise of the pyramid system described by Marx, established 
authoritarian forms of elite rule with no accountability and no system for the protection of 
rights. "' Interpretations of Marxism, as demonstrated in the USSR, consisted of leaders 
believed that it was necessary to have a professional leadership to lead the revolution which 
justified the authoritarian governments which resulted. "' The form of authoritarian rule that 
developed in the USSR was characterised by 'hierarchically organised control of all aspects of 
social life, political, economic and cultural, by a narrow oligarchy seat at the apex of the party 
and state'. 178 The centralisation of power in the communist regimes demonstrated 
Montesquieu's belief of the detrimental effects of unrestrained power. 17' The application and 
practice of the 'people's democracies' show the necessity of procedures and institutions which 
allow for discussion and debate on differences of opinion and the existence of effective rights 
and law protecting individual autonomy. 
... See Doveton (1994) p. 558. 
"' Held (1996) p. 137. 
17' Held (1996) pp. 145 
-146. 174 Pierson (1986) p. 15; Held (1996) p. 141. 
175 Marx and Engels, Communist Manifesto, p. 25. 
176 See Macpherson (1977) pp. 112-114. 
177 Callinicos (199 1) makes the claim that Marxist thought does not call for the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' with 
only those claiming to represent the workers being legitimate, p. 115. 
178 Quote in Kelly (1992) p. 402. Further see Callinicos (199 1) pp. 15-20. 
179Kelly (1992) pp. 401-402. 
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The leaders of the communist regimes instituted authoritarian forms of elite rule while 
expressing the rhetoric that authority remained with the people. "' The idea of elite rule has a 
large following M democratic theory with an element of accountability added to justify the 
structure of the system and the lack of participation within it. "' In the practice of governance 
the communist and democratic forms of elite rule do not differ greatly. The essential 
difference lies in the actual existence and practice of rights, accountability and the rule of law 
in the democratic fort-ris. However, as Barber points out, the existence of accountability and 
guarantees against the arbitrary use of power does not necessarily define democracy as the 
ability of individuals to participate in the decision making process. Elite rule comes with the 
idea of limited participation for individuals bringing its democratic credentials into question. 
Democracy depends on wide-based and active participation for the development of individuals 
and society. Elite rule with limited participation is not conducive to these ideas but at the same 
time has proven to be the preferred and dominant method of governance. "' 
C The Marketplace ofElite Democracy 
As a criticism of Marx, Schumpeter formulated a 'realistic' conception democracy - 
defined as a system where elites compete for the vote. Schumpeter began with the 
presumption that democracy is a political system guaranteeing certain civil lights to all 
citizens, maintaining a stable balance of social and economic forces, enjoying moderate 
cleavages of opirfion, and, above all, employing competitive electoral and other political 
procedures. "' He felt that by defining democracy as the process of voting for elites, who will 
control the process of governance, the above conditions would all be met. For Schumpeter the 
modem state and society is diverse, complex and technically complicated thereby preventing 
the possibility of wide based participation and agreement on common goals in society. To 
avoid getting bogged down in the pursuit of normative values or common. goals which were 
unattainable Schumpeter felt it necessary to confine democracy to an observable method or 
act: 'the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions 
in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the 
"' Held (1996) notes that communist rule in practice eliminates 'a place for systematically encouraging and tolerating 
disagreement and debate on public matters. ', p. 153. But see Callinicos (1992) who refutes this view in theory but 
does not provide evidence of practice, pp. 128-132. 
See Barber (1984) p. xiv. 
R. Bellamy. 'Schumpeter and the Transforrnation of Capitalism, Liberalism and Democracy. ' 26 Government and 
Opposition (199 1) pp. 500-501. 
... Ricci (1970) p. 240. 
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people's vote. "" Schumpeter's reason for confining democracy to a singular process was that 
it is the easiest way to determine the existence of democracy and that it would overcome the 
difficulty of reconciling democratic practice and individual freedom. "' For Schumpeter true 
democracy could only be seen as 
a political method, that is to say, a certain type of institutional arrangement for 
arriving at political 
- 
legislative and administrative 
- 
decisions and hence incapable 
of being an end in itself, irrespective of what decisions it will produce under given 
historical conditions. 186 
Limiting the process of governance to a single act is seen as the most effective way of 
goveniing as it reduces complexity and diversity allowing for the decision making process to 
operate smoothly and achieve consensus on issues. "' Schumpeter recognised that his 
democratic method is easily susceptible to criticism as being authoritarian so he added that 
there must be 'free competition among would-be leaders for the vote of the electorate. "" This 
competition among elites ensures that the process of governance is not fixed to a certain group 
and the competition for votes equates to the ability of the society to choose and change the 
government, keeping any excesses of power in check and ensuring that the resultant 
government Will be responsible to society. "' Elections are seen as the method for choosing 
the elite decision-makers but they also serve to legitimise their ability to rule and the 
effectiveness of the entire system. Schumpeter saw it as inevitable and necessary that authority 
in society comes from above rather than originate from below. "' He held that his view as to 
how society should be ordered was rightly called democracy even though there existed no 
safeguards upon the use of power beyond the procedural act of voting every few years and that 
there were no mechanisms for society to have an impact upon the decision-makers on a regular 
basis. "' 
Schumpeter's view of democracy, regardless of its attractions of simplicity and verifiable 
nature, "' has considerable shortcomings and cannot adequately inform the development of an 
"' J. Schumpeter. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. (London: Allen and Unwin, 1943) p. 269. 
... Schumpeter (1943) pp. 269-270. 
186 Schumpeter (1943) p. 242. 
187 On the impossibility of a common will see Schumpeter (1943) pp. 250-264; 
"8 Schumpeter (1943) pp. 284-285. 
"9 Bellamy (1991) p. 509, see pp. 511-2 as to how this may be manipulated by political parties in presenting 
candidates and information in a selective fashion. Also Santoro (1993) pp. 127-128,14 1. 
'90 Schumpeter (1943) pp. 270-272. 
'9' Bellamy (199 1) p. 512, who also provides the example of Thatcher's government in the UK to illustrate his point, 
pp. 515-6. See also Pitkin (1967) pp. 43-44. 
'9' See Huntington who feels that the problems of ambiguity and imprecision which come from trying to define 
democracy through source or purpose leads one to conclude that procedural definitions are the only adequate way 
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international aw of dernocracy. '9' The primary difficulty of this view is its exclusion of the 
possibilities of individuals being actively part of the process of governance. It cannot be 
accepted that 'the electoral mass is incapable of action other than a stampede'. 194 Schumpeter's 
own theory on this point is contradictory as he precludes the possibility of individuals 
understanding the issues involved with governance but are still capable of choosing leaders 
and decision-makers. Schurnpeter conveniently answered this criticism by explaining that 
individuals had a lin-fited capacity for rationalisation. that could extend to the choosing of 
leaders but not beyond. Schumpeter ftuther justified excluding individuals from the decision 
making process with the claim that individuals too easily yield to irrational prejudice and 
impulse, that they make decisions too much under the influence of personal experiences, and 
that 'without the initiative that comes from immediate responsibility, ignorance will persist in 
the face of masses of information however complete and correct. '19' In Schurnpeter's view the 
inability of individuals to be capable of effective participation in governance is endemic. 
The reduced sense of responsibility and the absence of effective volition in tum 
explain the ordinary citizen's ignorance and lack of judgement in matters of 
domestic and foreign policy which are if anything more shocking in the case of 
educated people and of people who are successfully active in non-political walks 
of life that it is with uneducated people in hwnble stations. "' 
The practice of individuals participating in decision making processes has been 
acknowledged as a beneficial attribute for democracy as well as a way of increasing a sense of 
responsibility in society. "' By limiting participation, the reduced sense of responsibility 
Schumpeter puts forth as the reason why individuals are unable to achieve the necessary 
competence to be involved in govemance is naturally increased. Schumpeter's claim that the 
art of goveming is too complicated for the average individual cannot be a reason for limiting 
democracy as it is based on a very narTow view of the political and dismisses the idea that 
decisions and participation outside the political issues is of any great importance. It also fails 
forward, S. Huntington. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. (Norman: Oklahoma 
University Press, 199 1) pp. 6-7 
"' On the narrowness of Schumpter's view of democracy see J. Hyland. Democratic Theory: The Philosophical 
Foundations. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995) pp. 162-164. 
194 Schumpeter (1943) p. 283. 
'9' Schumpeter (1943) pp. 262-263. 
196 Schumpeter (1943) p. 26 1. 
197 See generally above, particularly Mill. Also Barber (1984) and A. Tocqueville quoted in Birch (197 1) p. 65. 
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to see how individual experiences and diversity are able to contribute and enrich the 
democratic process. "' 
Schumpeter felt that wide based participation would be dangerous to the stability of the 
state. "' This threat to stability is due to the character of modem society possessing numerous 
competing priorities and claims upon the government as individuals express their needs and 
desires. "' This threat to stability is the reason why democracy is to be limited to a process or 
method whereby the numerous competing demands are channelled into manageable 
policies. "' Whether or not wide based and active participation does threaten the stability of 
government and society is a disputed point with evidence supporting both views. "' The 
position here is that democracy must consist of the active participation of individuals In all 
aspects of governance which surround their lives, there can be no justification for exclusion. 
As one author has concluded '[r]educing the legitimacy of the government to elections is not a 
way to restrict democracy, but a way to abolish democracy. 203 
Schumpeter's limited view of democracy conceptualises the democratic system as a 
market 
- 
where the voters are consumers and politicians the entrepreneurs. This in turn 
appears to explain how the political system works and justifies the system itself and the 
behaviour within it. "' In this market of democracy voters have choices in the form of policies 
supplied by the politicians with the market mecharfism causing competition between policies 
in the pursuit of votes. Writers as early as Jeremy Bentham and James Nfill felt that the only 
way to ensure that individual liberty is maximised is through participation in market 
mechanisms with the minimal intervention of the state in society. 20' The market-based view 
has become dominant in the 1980s and 1990s especially in western states and has had an 
influence on how democracy is understood at the international level. The belief in the market 
mechanism as a way of ordering society sees the market able to allow for individual freedom 
and reconcile the conflicting issues of the individual and common good. Supporters of the 
'9' See A. Winkler. 'Expressive Voting. ' 68 New York University Law Review (1993) p. 330. 
"9 Idea inspired by C. Schrmtt- Ae Crisis ofParliamentary Democracy. trans. E. Kennedy. (Cambridge: NET Press, 
1985). See HaTrulton (1994) pp. 484-492; R. Bellamy and P. Baehr. 'Carl Schmitt and the Contradictions of Liberal 
Democracy. 23 European Journal ofPolitical Research (1993) pp. 170-17 1. 
2' Bellamy and Baehr (1993) pp. 171-172. 
201 Schumpeter (1943) pp. 267-269. See Bellamy (1993) for the example of how in the transitions to democracy in 
Central and Eastern Europe there is a desire for a strong group to lead as too many democratic demands are causing 
problems, p. 117. 
20' Bellamy (199 1) p. 516. 
201 V. pUSiC. 'Dictatorships with Democratic Legitimacy: Democracy versus Nation. ' 8 East European Politics and 
Societies (1994) p. 397. 
204 Macpherson (1977) p. 79; Held (1996) p. 95. 
205 See Macphearson (1966) pp. 6-11. 
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market claim it is superior to other forms of social ordering in being more democratic and 
allowing full sovereignty for the individual and responsiveness to choice. "' 
The marketplace of democracy sees individuals, in the absence of a common will, as 
competing for their own interests according to economic competition and free exchange. It is 
supposed that the market allows for the unfettered freedom of individuals allowing for more 
choice and the ability to express more diverse opinions. 'O' It is believed that the market not 
only leads to the maximum benefit for individuals but is also the best way to achieve common 
goods for it provides an efficient way of allocating the scarce resources of society in the face of 
multiple competing interests and desires. 'O' The achievement of common goods through the 
market is preferred on the belief that actions by a government in pursuit of those goods leads to 
the possible abuse of power and limitations to individual freedom. 'O' It is believed the market 
will produce outputs which are seen to be in line with the common good, which the 
government is then able to act upon. A market-based system is seen to disperse political 
power, create flexibility in governance and encourage grassroots participation. " 0 its 
proponents see it as dynamic, innovative and responsive, meaning that its deficiencies are far 
outweighed by its advantages and benefits. "' 
The idea that the market mechanism is the best method of democracy is based on the 
assumption that there exists a perfect market 
- 
where all participants are on an equal footing 
with equal access to the marketplace. The idea of a marketplace of democracy overlooks the 
fact that no market is ever perfect and society does not provide full equality or access. "' The 
market may allow choice, but one needs purchasing power to be part of the market, be it 
money, information or even access. "' A lack of market power reflects one's influence on the 
overall system 
- 
one may be free to buy whatever they choose but it is necessary to have the 
"' D. Beetharn. 'Four Theorems about the Market and Democracy. ' 23 European Journal of Political Research 
(1993) pp. 187-20 1. 
207 Beetharn (1993) pp. 195-196. 
20' Held (1996) p. 96; K. Klare. 'Legal Theory and Democratic Reconstruction: Reflections on 1989. ' 25 University 
ofBritish Columbia Law Review (199 1) p. 75; Bellamy and Baehr (1993) pp. 165-6; Macpherson, (1977) p. 80. 
209 Held (1996) pp. 256-60. 
210 Mare (199 1) pp. 75-76. 
211 See Held (1996) p. 260. 
212 Held (1996) pp. 282-283; C. Nino. Ae Ethics of Human Rights. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1991) pp. 242-243; 
Macpherson (1977) pp. 87-89 
211 0. Fiss. 'Capitalism and Democracy. ' 13 Michigan Journal of International Law (1992) p. 915-916. Access to 
information is an essential element to democracy and for the market mechanism. In the marketplace of 
democracy 
available information is also shaped by market forces meaning that it is open to manipulation 
by those who have 
market power. 
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means to make the purchase. ' 14 Market ideas are ineffective for democracy as the market 
responds to demand and not needs making it unresponsive to the needs of society unless they 
are expressed within the market mechanism, where not all are able to access or express 
demands equally. "' Proponents of the marketplace of democracy overcome the inequality 
issue by believing that the interests of the strongest actors, those who are able to control the 
market, are representative of the common good. A Schumpeterian view found to be invalid. "' 
Instead of creating equality the market sustains and ftu-thers the inequalities of society and 
does not encourage participation but provides reasons for non-participation. "' Recent years 
have seen the idea of market extended to more aspects of society with a lessening role for the 
state undoubtedly related to the belief that the victory of democracy has also meant a victory 
for free markets. "' The lack of normative content to the market mechanism overlooks that 
individuals suffer because of inequalities in society which directly influence the functioning of 
the market mechanism. "' If one is without food, shelter, is this because they are not worthy 
participants of the market or that the market is ineffective? Either way the desire to participate 
and feel part of the process will diminish, as the rhetoric of market benefits will not be played 
out in reality. "' 
V. DEMOCRACY 
- 
PARTICEPATION AND AUTONOMY 
The lack of normative content in the marketplace of democracy and Schumpeter's 
'democracy as a method' leaves them lacking as effective and useful explanations of 
democracy. It is necessary for a 'realistic' concept of democracy to be informed by a 
normative basis that will enable it to achieve its desired purpose without being manipulated by 
rhetorical support for democracy that is void of actual content. The purpose of democracy is to 
provide a system where the individual is able to achieve personal self-determination while at 
the same time fostering communal development within society. "' These two purposes are 
"' Callinicos (199 1) p. 104. The lack of market power will also mean one's civil and political rights are lirruited, see 
C. Pateman. 'Democracy Freedom and Special Rights. ' John C. Rees Memorial Lecture, Swansea, University of 
Wales (30 January 1995). 
2" Bellamy (199 1) p. 516 
216 Klare (199 1) pp. 81-82. 
211 Macpherson (1977) pp. 86-91; Bentham (1993) p. 192; On non-participation see Fiss (1992) pp. 913-914. On 
exclusion see K. Remmer. 'Exclusionary Democracy. ' 20 Studies in Comparative International Development 
(1985/6) pp. 73-74. 
2" Held (1996) p. 253 
219 Macpherson (1977) p. 80. 
22' Klare (199 1) refers to the need to ensure that promises are backed up with real results as unfulfilled promises will 
give rise to cynicism and a lack of respect for the law and rights, p. 92. 
22 ' For a historical account of this point see I. Berlin. Four Essays on Liberty. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1969)p. 118. 
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often seen as contradictory but there exists the possibility that they can be accommodated into 
a single conception of democracy. "' This accommodation is achieved through two 
foundational elements 
- 
participation and autonomy 
- 
which have been identified as common 
ground in democratic theories. "' Participation is necessary for it allows individuals to be part 
of the processes impacting their lives. It is not confined to political acts but 'includes actions 
occurring in all aspects of society that are important to the individual. Participation allows for 
the pursuit of self-detenytination and ultimately fosters a greater sense of community. 
Autonomy is necessary to respect the individual, not in the extreme liberal sense but as a way 
of allowing participation, the expression of diversity and development of the self Autonomy 
recognises the importance of the individual but also the necessity of respect among the needs 
and desires of individuals within a society. "' 
A. Democracy as Participation 
From as early as Aquinas and up through Schumpeter it has been espoused that wide 
based active participation in the democratic process creates instability in society. "' in the 
development of democracy there has been a greater concern placed on what form of 
democratic governance will give the greatest degree of stability, not necessarily the form that 
will allow for the widest degree of participation beneficial to the individual. Barber points out 
that the democracies of this century have relied on 'distant representation' to create stability 
and efficiency but with the effect of minimising participation. "' Wide based and active 
participation is often discouraged but at the same time there are criticisms of the extent of 
apathy M society. Participation in the working of the state and society is to be welcomed since 
it leads to autonomous structures whereby individuals and groups find levels of organisation 
appropriate to effective participation. "' Even in large and diverse populations, if there exists a 
greater opportunity for participation in the decision making process this will lead to greater 
... This is possible by combining elements related to Marxism and liberalism that provide positive contributions to 
ideas of the individual and the community without taking on the extreme outcomes of either position. Similar to the 
approaches of Held (1996) and Fine (1984). 
22' Held (1996) p. 300. 
224 Howard expresses the position that a highly individualised society is an indication that not all human rights are 
being respected, R. Howard. 'Cultural Absolutism and Nostalgia for Community. ' 15 Human Rights Quarterly 
(1993)p. 333. 
12' Dahl (1989) notes a 'countercurrent' favouring Wide-based and active participation, p. 225. 
226 Barber (1984) pp. xiv-xv, 140-4. 
227 p. Thomberry, 'The Democratic or Internal Aspect of Self-Deten-nination and some Remarks on Federalism I in C. 
Tomuschat, ed. The Modern Law of&ý(-Determination- (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1993) p. 134; Klare (1991) p. 
71. 
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attention being given to the problems facIng society as a whole. "' Participation encourages 
the active role of individuals in the decision making process resulting in a greater sense of 
political efficacy, concern for collective problems and the fon-nation of a knowledgeable 
citizenry with sustained interest in govemment. "9 
In modem democratic theories it is believed that voting alone constitutes adequate 
participation and that individuals must distance themselves from politics through a barrier of 
individual liberties. "' The idea of participation as a means of securing liberty, as supported In 
the Italian City-republics and by Locke, provides a good lesson for today since the average 
citizen for the most part feels unable to exert any influence upon the political will of a state. 
This in turn makes it easy for governments to act without regard for the rights or will of the 
individuals of society. The lesson to be learnt from the Italians city-republics, and proven 
throughout history, is that if the process of governing is left to the rulers exclusively they will 
act in their own interests not necessarily in the interest of the community. "' Low levels of 
participation have been linked with inequality so, at the very least, increased participation will 
assist M achieving greater equality in society. "' Participation ensures the maximum input into 
society so that there exists outputs ofjust policies leading to the development of the social and 
political capacities of individual and society. "' 
Participation relies upon and will precipitate a change in the consciousness of individuals 
234 
to View their actions not as only self-serving but beneficial to the larger community. Barber 
advocates active participation as a necessary element of strong democracy; 
where conflict is resolved in the absence of an independent ground through a 
participatory process of ongoing, proximate self-legislation and the creation of a 
political community capable of transforming dependent, private individuals into 
free citizens and partial and private interests into public goods. "" 
Enhancing participation does not mean subjecting the individual to the demands of the 
community since the two work in concert and rely on each other for a fulfilling existence. "' 
... N. Kittrie. 'Democracy: An Institution Whose Time Has Come. ' 8 American University Journal of International 
Law and Policy (1993) p. 3 86. 
229 Held (1996) p. 262; Pateman (1970) p. 105; Barber (1984) p. 147. 
230 See Schumpeter (1943). 
211 Skinner in Dunn (1992) pp. 68-69. 
232 Macpherson (1977) p. 94. 
233 Pateman (1970) p. 43. 
234 See Macpherson (1977) pp. 99-100. 
23' Barber (1984) p. 132. 
236 Barber (1984) pp. 152-5. 
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Participation develops a common responsibility among individuals through deliberation, 
decision making and action in determining their common lives. 237 
Participation allows individuals to be part of the forces surrounding their lives and assists 
in lessening the 'decisional distance' discussed in Chapter I Democracy needs to be 
inclusionary allowing individuals to be part of those processes in society that they hold 
important. Democracy becomes an exclusionary process if participation is prevented or 
discouraged or is merely ignored as unimportant. Voting in elections and running for 
government office are obvious forms of participation but there must also be the possibilities of 
participation in community bodies, school boards, workplaces, health care, etc. Participation 
may also take the form of interest groups or causes. These are all areas of concem for the 
individual as decisions affecting society do not always arise directly from the centralised 
structures of government or its institutions. "' Participation in areas of life outside of the 
political should not be dismissed as trivial or of less importance as concentration on these areas 
will create a greater understanding of the needs and desires of individuals. "' If individuals are 
given the opportunity to participate they will feel part of the system and be more active with 
decisions taking on greater relevance. If excluded, the only development Will be the 
harbouring of negative feelings. "' 
B. Democracy as Autonomy 
Participation must occur wiflýiin a specific framework so that the ability and right of ail 
individual to participate does not infringe the rights of others and to prevent abuse of the 
participatory process through claims of a duty to participate. "' It is known that strict personal 
autonomy 
- 
the ultimate and unfettered ability of the individual to exercise personal rights with 
no regards to others 
- 
is an unworkable concept. "' The converse holds equally true in that the 
individual cannot be made subject to the will of the community with arbitrary limits on 
personal autonomy. The existence of rights and the rule of law is needed to ensure that all can 
participate equally with the understanding that individual rights are not supreme but carry 
... Barber (1984) pp. 145-6. 
"' See Pateman (1970) p. 38. Studies from the Third World demonstrate that elections alone do not ensure a 
government acts for the benefit of society as many states have the appearance of political democracy but individuals 
are not able to improve their lives or be pail of the factors impacting them, see A. Seidman and R. Seidman. 'Beyond 
Contested Elections: The Process of Bill Creation and the Fulfilment of Democracy's Promises to the Third World. ' 
34 Harvard Journal ofLegislation (1997) p. 1. 
131 Pateman (1970) chapters 2,6. 
240 Held (1996) p. 268. Transitions to democracy in the fonner-Yugoslavia demonstrate the need to have participation 
from all members of society in order to avoid arbitrary treatment and the abuse of rights, see Pusic (1994) p. 3 83. 
24 
'Held (1996) p. 303. 
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equal obligations of respect. 24' To ensure the ability of participation and to secure against he 
excesses of power Held has formulated a principle of autonomy stating that 
persons should enjoy equal rights and, accordingly, equal obligations in the 
specification of the political framework which generates and limits the 
opportunities available to them; that is, they should be free and equal in the 
determination of the conditions of their own lives, so long as they do not deploy 
this framework to negate the rights of others. "' 
The idea of autonomy is central to many of the diverse theories of democracy and 
demonstrates a set of common aspirations each approach possesses. The aspirations include; 
an environment where the individual is able to develop and express their own individuality, 
protection from the arbitrary use and abuse of power, involvement of individuals in 
determining how society is ordered, and the ability to maximise the resources of society. "' 
Held's idea of autonomy provides protection for the individual allowing for the pursuit of self- 
determination without allowing the unimpeded triumph of individual rights over all other 
considerations. There is the need to balance individual and communal considerations in 
fort-fitilating autonomy to reflect the reality of society, for 'the individual generally has no 
absolute or unfettered right in any matter and 
... 
the welfare of the individual as a member of a 
collective society lies in a happy compromise between his rights as an individual and the 
interests of the society 
. 
246 
Institutional and structural arrangements are necessary to the realisation of the principle 
autonomy as they Will provide rules and stability when agreed forms and methods are used in 
the process of governance instead of arbitrary behaviour. The purpose of these arrangements 
will be to promote discussion and debate among the divergent views of the society. Active 
participation will occur within an accepted framework that protects and nurtures the principle 
of autonomy. "' Stability depends upon the effective protection of human fights, maintenance 
of the rule of law, the ability to carry out effective social and economic policies and other areas 
of governance. "' Human rights alone cannot create democracy but they can assist in ensuring 
242 Harri son (1993) p. 17 1. 
24' Held (1996) p. 318. 
244 Held (1996) p. 301. 
24' Held (1996) p. 300. 
24' L. Loucaides. 'Restrictions or Limitations on the Rights Guaranteed by the ECHR. ' 4 Finnish Yearbook of 
International Law (1993) p. 335. 
247 Held (1996) pp. 280-28 1. 
248 L. Diamond. Promoting Democracy in the 1990s: Actors and Instruments, Issues and Imperatives. (Report to the 
Carnegie Commission, New York, 1995) p. 
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the effective exercise of democracy by allowing for individuals to be active participants in 
socie 
. 
For both autonomy and participation it is necessary to address all spaces in society where 
power, resources, agents, institutions, etc., have an impact upon the individual. 14' By moving 
democracy from a confined place (politics) in the ordering of society it takes on a greater 
degree of social importance where the individual is no longer seen as an abstract entity in 
either political or economic terrns. An expanded understanding of the applicability of 
democracy allows for a greater awareness of the needs and desires individuals possess and 
how they may best be achieved in the overall context of society. 
VI. A Democracy for International Law 
The development of an international law of democracy will need to distinguish between 
formal and substantive manifestations of democracy, between democracy of paper and words 
and democracy on the ground. Otherwise democracy will remain tied to ideological 
ramblings With no substantive content resulting in an embarrassment for international law as 
'[n]ormatiVe creativity, without effective implementation, promotes contempt for law and its 
institutions. "" Formal democracy is marked by the appearance of rules, institutions and 
procedures one normally attaches to the workings of democracy. This includes, but is not 
limited to, elections, the structure of government, a written constitution with the existence of 
rights, the rule of law, etc. The existence of these practices and institutions may mark an 
effective democratic system or they may only exist on paper or through rhetoric for public 
consumption. Fortnal democracy must be backed up with substantive democracy which 
involves the continual process of individuals being part of the decision-making processes and 
the placing of real limits upon the exercise of power so that society is able to maximise their 
opportunities. "' Democracy must consist of structures and institutions that are effective 
means individuals rely upon and utihse. Holding elections for pre-selected candidates, or only 
at limited levels, having government offices formally separate but under the control of a single 
individual, or the existence of a constitution with rights guarantees no one knows of, or 
adheres to, cannot be considered as democratic. 
See Held (1996) pp. 3 09-10. 
T. Franck and G. Fox. Introduction: Transnational Judicial Synergy-' in T. Franck and 
Fox, eds. International 
Law Decisions in National Courts. (h-vington: Transnational, 1996) p. 3. 
"' See M. Kaldor and 1. Vejvoda. 'Democratisation in Central and Eastern Countries. ' 73 International Affairs 
(1997) 
pp. 62-63. 
90 
An international aw of democracy will have to take into account three broad areas that 
will define the existence of democracy 
- 
structures, institutions, and substance. All three areas 
need to be present to declare the existence of democracy. Participation and autonomy for 
individual and communal self-development are the substance of any democratic system. The 
structures of democracy are the ways M which the government is organised. This includes the 
government of the state as well as the sub-state levels of governance. "' The institutions of 
democracy will be primarily the conducting of elections, how they are organised and 
conducted. Institutions will also include how the relation between the elected and the electors 
is maintained and how accountability and openness of government are ensured, primarily 
through the existence of rights and the rule of law. Structures and institutions Will be the 
clearest detern-iinations for identifying democracy, they will be the facts on the ground that the 
law will begin with, but democracy does not stop there and the law does have a role beyond. "' 
Democracy In practice will differ between societies allowing many variations to be possible, 
the legitimacy of these variations will depend upon their substance and the reality faced by the 
individual. 
The structure of a government Is important for democracy for the design of government 
and how it works Will be determinative of the extent of participation and autonomy in society. 
Of the writers discussed above there is agreement that democracy cannot exist if the power of 
government is vested in one person or small group of persons. Montesquieu found it was 
necessary to disperse the powers of government into an arrangement that ensures checks upon 
the exercise of power, otherwise power would be abused impacting the fimctioning and 
security of society. "' When power is centralised, autonomy and participation are threatened as 
an authoritarian system 
paralyses human behaviour, fear also paralyses certain social behaviours, 
particularly those apt to put into action the due process of law when what is at 
stake is the relation between the rulers and the ruled, the might and the mean, the 
haves and the have-nots, the Establishment and the diSSenter. 255 
252 It is important to keep in mind the growth of supra-state institutions and their impact on society giving rise to the 
need for democratic structures at this level, see the discussion of the EU in Chapter 4. 
211 See Klare (199 1) pp. 73-74. 
y ofMontesquieu. (Cambn 254 Montesquieu, Spirit, Chapter 11, section 4. Also M. Richter. The Political Aeor 
Cambridge University Press, 1977) p. 57 and R. Bellamy. "Ibe Political Form of the Constitution: the Separation of 
Powers, Rights and Representative Democracy. ' 44 Political Studies (1996) p. 436. 
255 S. Lozada. 'Tbe Successful Appeal from Ballots to Bullets: The Herculean Hardships of JudicialiZing Politics in 
Latin America. ' 25 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics (1992) p. 123. One author 
comments how under long periods of authoritarianism things such as torture 
become to feel routine. M. Urquidi. 
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If the power to judge the legitimacy of the functions, of the structures of government is not 
separate then the life and liberty of citizens is subject to arbitrary power. "' 
The general belief for separation of powers is that the separation of the legislature and 
executive allows for the government to work freely, creating space for discussion and 
disagreement in the creation of policy. "' The separation of the judiciary from the other two 
branches is seen as a check on the possible arbitrary exercise of power of the legislature and/or 
executive as well as protection for the individual in relation to the activities of the other two 
branches. "' The role of the judiciary in a democracy is problematic in that it is commonly 
appointed rather than elected in order to ensure a degree of independence and impartiality, 
creating a decision making body detached from the democratic principles of society. "' This is 
a problem that is most likely to plague all democracies as it will be up to a society to determine 
how best to select the various branches of governments and the specific functions with which 
they have been entrusted. The underlying necessity will be to ensure the structures uphold the 
substantive principles of democracy. 
Institutionally, elections are the leading indicator of democracy as the most fundamental, 
visible and accessible measure of democracy for elections represent 'the pressure point at 
which the political body's pulse most readily can be taken. "" Elections are evidence of the 
continual process of self-determination for society and the individual as they determine and 
allow for the continuation of democracy. In regarding elections as evidence of democracy it is 
necessary to look beyond the act itself M order to determine if there exists a real choice for the 
electorate and that there are no constraints upon individuals limiting the exercise of their 
vote. "' If elections are to be considered as an adequate indicator of democracy they must be 
free and fair in real terms and extend to all applicable areas of power. Elections are important 
not just as a means of pursuing political ends by making a specific choice on policy or for a 
personality, but they can also be a way of communicating ideas that individuals possess and as 
a way to exert and shape their own personal identity. In this sense voting and elections extend 
'Under the Volcano: Human Rights, Official Torture and the Future of Mexican Democracy. ' 54 The Humanist 
(1994), p. 27. 
256 Montesquieu, Spirit, Chapter 11, sec. 6. The work of Hobbes demonstrates the problems of power vested into a 
single body, see Goldsmith (1966) pp. 202-205. 
25' Generally, A Vile. Constitutionalism and the Separation ofPowers. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1967). 
258 See L. Mer. 'Monstesqueiu's Paradox on Freedom and Hungary's Constitutions, 1790-1990. ' 16 History of 
Political Thought (1995) p. 79. 
259 S. Croley. "Me Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law. ' 62 University of Chicago Law 
Review (1995) p. 689. 
260 T. Franck. 'United Nations Based Prospects For a New Global Order. ' 22 New York University Jounial of 
International Law & Politics (1990) p. 63 3. 
26' Doveton (1994) p. 575. 
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beyond choices for politicians to be a meaningful form of social participation in shaping the 
individual's identity and giving a sense of attachment to the community. 262 
Respect for the rule of law by all sectors of society and the existence of rights guarantees 
are also essential to democracy. The rule of law and tights will stand as indicators of the 
continual legitimacy of democracy in between elections as they ensure the proper fitrictioning 
of democracy on a day to day basis. "' Issues such as participation, free speech, access to 
information and a free press, allow the actions of the government to be monitored and the 
opinions of the people to be heard. 264 If rights are not respected and the exercise of power is 
not kept in check, resulting in individuals not being able to express their needs and desires, 
then those who are elected will face serious legitimacy problems and undermine the 
democratic advances of a society. The rule of law infornis the ways in which a society 
organises its government and institutions of society and the how the interaction between these 
institutions is conducted. The existence of the rule of law ensures that the government is not 
above the law and is accountable to society. It ftirther provides for the independence of the 
branches of government allowing them to avoid being subjected to executive control. Finally, 
the existence the rule of law recognises the inherent dignity of the individual and equal 
261 entitlement to rights as well as providing remedies to ensure rights are accessible. 
VH. CONCLUSION 
The development of an international law of democracy is no easy task as the actual forms 
of democracy and human rights Will vary between societies in the international system. There 
can be no single model of democracy, as the existence of diverse democratic states has proven. 
Democracy cannot be reduced to a structure of government or an act of society (elections) as it 
goes ftirther to include the social, economic and cultural environments in which individuals 
exist. The interaction between society and the democratic structures and institutions it has 
created is important since the two work together. "' A society Will work to detenTiine its 
democracy through institutions and structures that in turn will also react to the evolution of 
262 See Win ki er (1993) pp. 330,3 63 -3 64. 
263 Pusic (1994) pp. 396-397. 
264 See the work by D'Souza who relates the existence of rights and the rule of law as a way of preventing 
famine in 
non-democratic states. F. D'Souza. 'Democracy as a Cure for Famine. ' 31 Journal ofPeace 
Research (1994) p. 369. 
'6' N. MacDermot. 'The Credibility Gap in Human Rights. ' 3 Dalhousie Law Journal (1976) p. 264. 
266 See I Anaya. 'A Contemporary Definition of the International Norm of Self-Deten-runation. ' 3 Transnational 
Law 
and Contemporary Problems (1993) p. 143. 
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society. "' This interaction means that the democratic structures and institutions of a society 
must uphold the underlying beliefs of the purposes of democracy. All democracies will have 
the same purpose 'to provide conditions for the full and free development of the essential 
human capacities of all members of the society. "" Democracy is a dynamic process that 
carries on through thought, practice, experiences and reflection. It is not natural, spontaneous, 
or inherent in human nature or society. It is a product of history, sustained though effort 
dependant upon all involved participants having a shared capacity to discover its benefits and 
meanings on a continual and equal basis. Democracy is much more than appearance as '[a] 
democratic culture should mean more than simply periodically giving the people the chance 
"to kick the rascals out' however efficiently this is engineered. The wider issues need to be 
addressed urgently. "" Addressing the wider issues means ensuring that the structures and 
institutions of democracy are constantly connected with the substantive normative issues, a 
task international law has not actively pursued beyond the rhetoric of support for democracy 
and human rights 
. 
27' However as will be examined in the next chapter the rhetoric does exist 
and provides opportunities and possibilities to ensure 'the real and effective participation of the 
people in the decision-making processes'. 271 
267 A-M. Rieu. 'Introducfion. ' in Rjeu and G. Duprat, eds. European Democratic Culture. (London: Routledge, 1993) 
P. 10. 
... Macpherson (1966) pp. 36-37. 
... J. Monson and S. Livingstone. Reshaping Public Power: Northern Ireland and the 
English Constitutional Crises. 
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1995) p. 50. 
270 S. Marks. 'The "Emerging Norm": ConceptualiZing "Democratic Governance". ' 91 Proceedings of the 
American 
Society ofInternational Law (1997) pp. 372-376. 
271 Vienna Declaration Part 11, paragraph 67. 
CHAPTER3 
AN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF DEMOCRACY 
International law presently does not recognise or incorporate any concept of representing the needs 
and desires of individuals at the international evel, therefore the only voices which are heard are those 
of governments and these voices to not always speak for the societies they claim to represent. ' 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Democracy, as a concern for the international system, has noticeably been populalised in 
2 
recent years in the discourses surrounding international aw. It is interesting to note that a 
section of this recent scholarship makes claims concerning the existence of a right to democracy 
dating back 50 years. ' Primarily the scholarship chooses to selectively look to recent events in 
the international system, as evidence of the existence of democracy as a principle of 
international law. The lack of clear substantive vidence of the acceptance and actual practice of 
democracy by states at all levels of society does prevent the unquestioned existence of a 
concrete legal principle of democracy In the international system. Instead there exists a global 
rhetoric of democracy that provides a starting point for the international scrutiny of domestic 
governance and international efforts in support of democracy. ' As with international hurnan 
rights law, the rhetoric often clouds over the actual reality that is being experienced by 
individuals. 
The starting point for much of the recent discussion of democracy and international law is 
the end of communism III Europe with most states, not all, in that particular region adopting 
democratic forms of governance. Other, less substantive, developments towards democracy are 
also identified in parts of Asia and Africa. The foremost indicator used for determining the 
existence of democracy in states in these areas is the conducting of elections. The increase in 
electoral activity in areas where none previously existed does demonstrate the acceptance, albeit 
limited, of the democratic process. What these events do not create is a universal acceptance of 
P. Allott. Eunomia A New orderfor a New World. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990) p. 303. 
Further demonstration comes from its inclusion in the Vienna Declaration (1993) Part 1, Paragraph 8. 
3 The bulk of the writing on democracy and international law dates from 1990. For the existence of a right to 
democracy since 1948 see C. Cema. 'Universal Democracy: An International Legal Right or the Pipe 
Dream of the 
WestT 27 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics (1995) p. 290; M. Reisman. 'Sovereignty 
and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law. ' 84 American Journal ofInternational Law 
(1990) p. 868 
4 L. Diamond. Promoting Democracy in the 1990s. - Actors and Instruments, Issues and Imperatives. (Report to the 
Carnegie Commission, New York, 1995) p. 38. 
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democracy. ' Greater use of elections has been observed but this has not meant a reciprocal 
increase of the ability of individuals to participate in the decision making process of society. ' 
The existence of rhetoric in support of democracy, combined with the existence of 
procedural practices connected to democracy, has allowed scholars to express claims of an 
international system based on liberal democracy' and the existence of a 'democratic entitlement' 
in international aw. ' With regard to the recent attention given to democracy in connection with 
international law Schachter has observed that 'popular sovereignty can be considered the 
prevailing myth' in the international system today. ' Tes'on has recently remarked; 
[e]ver since Thomas Franck published his famous article, international lawyers 
... 
have been particularly excited about the fact that state practice increasingly seems to 
support the proposition that all persons and groups have an individual and collective 
right to elect their governments 
... 
"' 
The unquestioned belief of democracy as a guiding principle of the international system was 
expressed most forcefully by Fukuyama. 11 Others, notably Slaughter, have expressed the idea 
that the increase in democratic states has transformed international law into a law based on 
liberal democratic ideas, moving away from its traditional manifestation based on state 
sovereignty. " Another group, led by Franck, offers the idea that there is a firm right or 
entitlement to democracy in international law. An important issue common to all of these 
streams of thought is that they express the need to re-consider the position of the individual in 
intemational law and relations in fight of recent developments related to democracy and human 
' The limited impact of regional developments creating the existence of a global standard of acceptance is explained by 
the Brazilian representative to the OAS concerning the obligation to democracy in the OAS 'It is not, 
... 
a principle of 
international law. It cannot be invoked or defended as a principle in any context other than that of the present Charter'. 
Quoted in V. Vaky. The Future of the Organization ofAmerican States. (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1993) p. 
30. 
' Elections have recently been held in Qatar which, in the eyes of some, would contribute to the growth of democracy in 
the world. However these elections were only for the purpose of choosing a non-binding advisory body in the area of 
food safety. This is not to say the concerns over food are not important, but a single event with little substantive impact 
cannot herald the existence of democracy. A US government observer in Qatar disagrees saying that the opportunity to 
have these limited elections means democracy exists in Qatar. 'Qatar Holds Rare Democratic Elections. ' (8 March 
1999) Available on CNN's Internet site [http: //www. cnn. corrdworld/meast/9903/08/ qatar. elex/index. htm]. 
' A-M. Slaugther. 'Toward an Age of Liberal Nations. ' 33 Harvard International Law Journal (1992) p. 394 and 
'International Law in a World of Liberal States. ' 6 European Journal ofInternational Law (1995) pp. 514-515. 
' T. Franck. 'The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance. ' 86 American Journal ofInternational Law (1992) p. 46. 
9 0. Schachter. 'The Decline of the Nation-State and its Implications for International Law. ' in J. aamey et al, eds., 
Politics, Values and Functions: International Law in the 21st Century, Essays in Honour ofLouis Henkin. (The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1997) p. 25. 
'0 F. T8on. 'Two Mistakes about Democracy. ' 92 ASIL Proceedings (1998) p. 127. 
" F. Fukuyama. 7he End offfiytory and the Last Man. (London: Han-alton, 1992). On the impact of Fukuyama see S. 
Marks. 'The End of History? Reflections on Some International Legal Theses. ' 8 European Journal of 
International 
Law (1997) pp. 449-460. 
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rights. " However, the cukiination of these thoughts and ideas and the distance that exists 
between their conclusions and the actual practice on the ground globally concerning democracy 
lead to the 'myth' spoken of by Schachter. 
The work here will examine the idea of democracy in international aw from the perspective 
of the individual. It will expand beyond a 'right to democracy' to elaborate upon an 
international aw of democracy. This international aw of democracy will be constructed from 
the position of the individual addressing the issues as to how international aw can be effective 
for the individual, not just in terms of inter-state relations. " It will look at existing possibilities 
within international law that contribute to the positive nature of democracy as a means of 
individual and communal self-detennination that extends to all aspects of society. While 
democracy promises much, and usually offers little, it remains a desired aspiration throughout 
the world, and on that basis alone it becomes a necessary issue for international law to address. 
11. THE DEmocRATic ENTITLEMENT 
-A CRITIQUE 
As stated, Franck has been at the forefront of claims to the existence of a right to democracy, 
or the democratic entitlement. " Franck's position is grounded in democratic thought and 
practice as defined by western industrialised nations, not least of all the US. He marks the 
beginnings of the democratic entitlement in international law with the US Declaration of 
Independence (1776). From there he formulates statements which describe the development of 
western industrialised nations and the democracy they created as a 'hard-won tradition that most 
of the world now seeks to emulate' and that 'people almost everywhere now demand that 
government be validated by western-style parliamentary, multi-party democratic process. ' 16 
Self-determination is put forth as the oldest aspect of the democratic entitlement acting as 
the matrix of the entitlement. " For Franck, '[s] elf-detenTiination postulates the right of a people 
organised in an established terTitory to determine its collective political destiny in a democratic 
" The underlying belief is that peace and prosperity is 'a domain of representative governments' who 
internally have 
liberal laws and use the same at the International level, Slaughter (1995) p. 53 8. 
Slaughter (1995) p. 516. B. Fitzgerald. 'An Emerging Liberal Theory of International Law and the Non-Enforcement 
of Foreign Public Laws. ' 16 Australian Yearbook ofInternational Law (1995) p. 311. 
" Since the perspective of this work focuses on the individual less concern will be given to the 
liberal internationalist 
agenda of creating an international law between states based on democratic principles. 
" Franck (1992). His work on the democratic entitlement is also to be found in 'Democracy as a Human Right. ' in L. 
Henkin and J. Hargrove, eds. Human Rights: An Agenda for the Next Century. 
(Washington: ASIL, 1994) p. 73 and 
Fairness in International Law and Institutions. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995) p. 83. 
16 Franck (1992) pp. 48-49. 
17 Franck (1994) pp. 91 and (1992) p. 52. 
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fashion and is therefore at the core of the democratic entitlement. "' Franck attempts to trace a 
historical development of self-determination highlighting the involvement of the League of 
Nations in post-WW I elections and plebiscites in Europe. " The practice of self-determination 
as the basis for the democratic entitlement increased in the post WW H era with the advent of the 
UN who 'implemented zealously' the idea of self-detennination. " The exercise of self- 
detem-iination which proliferated under the UN encompassed primarily fortner colonial 
territories, but for Franck it potentially became 'both universalized and internationalized, for it 
could now be said to portend a duty owed by all governments to their peoples and by each 
government to all members of the international community. "' The UN's application of self- 
determination to non-self-governing territories and former colonial possessions through 
Chapters 12-14 of the Charter is viewed by Franck as being based on firm democratic principles 
whereby individuals were able to participate in the decision making process. He concludes from 
his historical survey of self-determination that it is 'a remarkable saga that tells of a rule that 
gradually augments its compliance pull, overcomes resistance and ultimately brings about an 
incontestable, historic transformation. 22 
Franck defines self-determination as 'the right of a people organised in an established 
territory to determine its collective political destiny in a democratic fashion. "' To a certain 
degree this is an accurate description of how self-determination has been exercised - primarily 
through the use of a single vote to determine the political status of a territorially defined unit in 
relation to its previous status under the control of another state. The holding of a single vote did 
determine the status of a territory but there was no guarantee of the continual exercise of self- 
determination or an ongoing right of a people to continually deterrnine their destiny. The 
limited nuraber of plebiscites and referendums sponsored by the League of Nations were rarely 
if ever followed by regular elections or other forms of participation by individuals in their 
collective destiny. The same holds true in the practice of the UN as many of the former colonial 
territories soon saw authoritarian regimes in place with a full-scale denial of self-determination. 
It is difficult to sustain self-determination as exemplifying or acting as a basis for a democratic 
" Franck (1992) p. 52. 
'9 Franck (1992) p. 54. M. Nowak. United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary. (Kehl 
am Rhein: Engel, 1993) p. 6 states that before 1921 self-detern-unation was only exercised on five occasions as 
stipulated by the Paris Peace Treaties. Orentlicher feels that in the inter-war period self-detenTunation was only applied 
to specific cases With states limiting its impact, D. Orentlicher. 'Separation Anxiety: 
International Responses to Ethno- 
Separatist Claims. ' 23 Yale Journal ofInternational Law (1998) pp. 4,22. 
'0 Franck (1992) p. 57. 
2' Franck (1992) p. 54. 
22 Franck (1992, p. 55. 
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entitlement sMCe its actual application only provided for an isolated tnstance, of territorial 
deten-nination. 
A. SELF-DE TERmiNA TioN iN INTERNA TioNAL LA w 
Franck's position on self-detem-iination as exemplifying democracy is based on the belief 
that there exists state practice which he feels emulates the ideals of the right, and 'a large and 
precise textual canon' in the international system. " This position contradicts the majority of 
work and practice on the subject. " 
The forerunner to the UN Charter, the Atlantic Charter included ideas of self-determination 
as a governing standard for territorial changes and domestic society. " However, Winston 
Churchill stated that the ideas of the Atlantic Charter did not apply to the colonies of the M 
being limited to those states affected by Nazi occupation. 17 From its earliest elaboration, self- 
determination has been limited by states. The signing of the UN Charter marked the first 
multilateral expression of a principle of self-determination but with the attitude of Churchill 
towards self-determination proving to be the prevailing one. " In the drafting of the Charter, the 
idea of self-detem-fination was heavily contested with arguments that it was against the statist 
nature of the international system or that it would allow for secession. " Others argued that self- 
determination, as a principle, had universal application and must contain the essential element 
that there is the genuine and free expression of the will of the people. " Cassese shows how this 
final point was not the intention of the drafters as the idea of genuine and free expression was 
not seen as an absolute requirement, but only a guideline for those situations where people were 
actually given the opportunity to express their views. " 
" Franck (1992) p. 52. 
2' Franck (1992) p. 57. 
2' N. Berman. 'Sovereignty in Abeyance: Self-deten-runation and International Law. ' 7 Wisconsin International Law 
Journal (1988) p. 54; A. Cassese. Sel(-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995) p. 1; M. Koskennierru. 'National Self-Deterrriination Today: Problems of Legal Theory and 
Practice. ' 43 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1994) p. 24 1; G. Simpson. 'The Diffusion of Sovereignty: 
Self-Deten-nination in the Post-Colonial Age. ' 32 Stanford Journal ofInternational Law (1996) p. 256. 
26 144 British and Foreign State Papers (1940-1942) p. 683. 
27 See Cassese (1995) p. 37 
21 See 1. Brownlie. 'An Essay in the History of the Principle of the Right of Self-DetenTunation. ' Grotian Society 
Papers, 1968. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970) p. 97. But see Franck (1992) p. 54. 
29 See Cassese (1995) for a review of the various positions, pp. 3 840. 
'0 A. Cristescu. The Right to Seý'-Determination: Historical and Current Development on the Basis of United Nations 
Instniments. (New York: United Nations, 198 1) p. 2. 
" Cassese (1995) pp. 39-41. 
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The Charter makes two direct references to self-detern-iination as a condition for 'friendly 
relations among states'. " There is no elaboration of the meaning or application of the right. 
There are two finther provisions regarding non-self-governing territories and trustee territories 
which imply self-deten-nination without explicitly declaring the necessary existence of the 
right. " SIIMPson attributes very little significance to the idea of self-determination in the Charter 
due to the scant reference to the idea demonstrating the lack of importance attached to it by the 
drafters. He ftuther feels that in relation to Chapters M and XII, which make the process of self- 
determination for non-self-governing and trust territories dependent upon the colonial 
administrators, the whole scheme is 'an exercise in legitin-iised colonial paternalism. "' Higgins 
takes the view that self-determination in the Charter has been understood as more than it really 
is. She points out that Chapters XI and XR do not utilise the phrase self-determination and the 
remainder of the Charter does not provide for a right of self-determination. " Conversely to the 
dominant View, Thomberry follows Franck's position and sees self-determination as a key 
element of the Charter with its explicit mention and that it is linked to the democratic principles 
in Chapters M and XII. ` 
Self-determination in the UN framework developed from the Charter through two General 
AA Lssembly (GA) resolutions; the 1960 Declaration on Decolonisation, " and the 1970 
Declaration on Principles of International law Concerning Friendly Relations. " The 
combination of both declarations created within the Charter context the 'potential for a 
development towards more genuine requirements of a democratic order'. " The Declaration on 
Decolonisation includes a statement similar to the common Article 1 of the International 
Covenants providing for a right of self-detennination (see below). However, the decolonisation 
process has shown that self-detem-fination in this context has only meant allowing for colonies 
to obtain independence and nothing fin-ffier. " The Declaration on Friendly Relations marks a 
significant point in the rhetoric of self-detenytination by containing reference to the character of a 
governinent. It implies that if a state has exercised the right to self-determination then it will 
possess 'a government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without 
3' Articles 1 (2) and 55. 
33 Articles 73 and 76. 
34 Simpson (1996) p. 266. 
3' R. Higgins. Problenu and Process. 'International Law and How we Use It. (Oxford: Clarendon., 1994) p. II 1- 112. 
36 P. Tbombeny. 'The Democratic or Intemal Aspect of Self-Detem-driation With some Remarks on Federalism. ' in C. 
Tomuschat. Modern Law of&ý'-Determination. (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1993) pp. 107-109. 
37 GA Res. 1514 (XV) (14 December 1960). G. AOR 15'hSess., Supp. 16, p. 66. 
HGA Res. 2625 (XXV) (24 October 1979). GAOR 25hSess., Supp. 28, p. 12 1. 
'9 A. Rosas. 'Internal Self-Determination. ' in Tomuschat (1993) p. 23 8. 
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distmction as to race, creed or colour'. 
41 There exists little evidence of tl-ýs aspect of the 
Declaration being consistently applied in practice in a way reflecting an ongoing requirement of 
democracy. " 
Further textual support of a right to self-determination exists with common Article I of the 
International Covenants, whereby '[a]ll peoples have the right to self-deterinination. By virtue 
of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social 
and cultural development. ' Franck sees common Article I as entitling 'peoples in all states to 
free, fair and open participation in the democratic process of governance freely chosen by each 
state'. and specifically the ICCPR 'clearly intends to make the right of self-determination 
applicable to the citizens of all nations. "' During the drafting of the Covenants common Article 
I was purposely left vague for 'it was thought that any numeration of the components of the 
right of self-detennination was likely to be incomplete. A statement of the right in an abstract 
form 
... 
was thought to be more preferable. 44 
In its comment on Article I of the ICCPR the Human Rights Committee (HRC) does not 
provide any specifics on the right's content. They firtlier observe that few states have provided 
infort-nation concerning Article I in their reporting obligations and 'that many of them 
completely ignore Article 1, provide inadequate information in regard to it or confine 
themselves to a reference to election laws. "' The only indication from states concerning the 
meaning and scope of the common Article 1 has arisen from India's reservation that the right to 
self-determination 'appl[les] only to peoples under foreign domination and that these words do 
46 not apply to sovereign and independent States or to a section of a people or nation'. In 
response, France lodged an objection that the reservation attaches conditions not contained in 
40 See Simpson (1996) 270. 
4' GA Res. 2625 (XXV) Section entitled 'The Principle of equal rights and self-detennination of peoples. ' 
42 Salmon sees the reference to human rights in GA Res. 1514 (XV) as 'too distant to mean anything precise', J. 
Salmon. 'Internal Aspects of the Right to Self-Detern-unation: Towards a Democratic Legitimacy PrincipleT in 
Tomuscbat, ed (1993) p. 257. 
4' Franck (1992) pp. 57-59. 'The belief that common Article I is customary international law is supported by Rosas in 
Tomuschat (1993) p. 247. But See Cassese (1995) who argues against the idea that it represents custom due to its 
indeten-ninate nature and lack of evidence of state practice beyond moral backing given in principle, pp. 102-103. 
44 M. Bossuyt. Guide to the "Travaux preparatoires" of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
(Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1987) p. 34. 
4' HRC General Comment 12 (1984). GAOR 396'Sess., Supp. 40 p. 142. A petition concerning a violation of Article I 
has been brought before the HRC, Lubicon Lake Band v Canada (26 March 1990) GAOR 45" Sess., Supp. 40, vol. 2, 
p. 27, which was declared inadmissible since groups or 'peoples' are not able to utilise the petition procedures undei-the 
Optional Protocol to the ICCPR. Also M. Turpel. 'Indigenous Peoples' Rights of Political Participation and Self- 
deten-nination: Recent International Legal Developments and the Continuing Struggle for Recognition. ' 25 Cornell 
International Law Journal (1992) p. 579. 
46 Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General Status as at 31 December 1997 UN Doc. 
ST/LEG/SER. E/ 16 (hereinafter Multilateral Treaties, 199 7) p. 113. 
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the UN Charter 
. 
4' Germany and the Netherlands also responded on the basis that all peoples 
have the right to self-detennination and any attempt to limit the scope or add conditions to self- 
determination weakens the right 
. 
4' These positions, and the actions of states toward Article II 
demonstrate the lack of agreement or clarity of the idea of self-determination. It would be 
difficult to establish a clear textual canon surrounding self-determination as it would be to claim 
there is clear and consistent international practice. 49 
The right to self-detem-fination does have an inherent democratic nature, a point that has yet 
to reach fruition in the international system. In the development of the right in the past fifty 
years the ideology and foreign policy goals of states appear to be the only guiding factors for the 
application of the right. Post WW H, socialist states saw self-determination containing external 
and internal demands with the external allowing for the creation of a state, while the internal was 
limited to the right of a people to chose a socialist government only. Former colonial territories 
used self-detennination to limit the presence of colonial powers and to end the various forms of 
colonial domination. Western states have used the idea of self-detenTjination as a way of 
promoting their own ideology of liberal democracy. " The only clear use of self-detertnination 
has been as a self-interested ideological tool, which has had the net result of draining self- 
determination of its true worth and value. 
Ultimately, Franck's position that self-determination is the matrix for a democratic 
entitlement in international law must be rejected. For self-determination to be the matrix for an 
entitlement to democracy there must be less indeterminacy and ambiguity as to its meaning 
along with wider effective application. " The development of self-determination in international 
law has been confined to a singular detennination of territorial status and has not been able to 
deal with denials of internal democratic aspirations or disenfranchised groups within a state. " 
Self-determination stands as another example of the ability of the international legal argument to 
maintain two opposing positions as it 
47 MUltilateralTreatieS (199 7) p. 116. 
48 MUltilateral TreatieS (199 7) p. 117. 
49 Cassese (1995) pp. 48-49. The UK spoke out in favour for self-determination but was staunchly opposed to any 
provisions concerning self-determination that would compromise their colon a] possessions. The US was in favour of 
the bulk of common Article I but refused to back the inclusion of natural resources. On the whole, Cassese (1995) 
points out, Western states must be seen as being opposed to the development of the idea of self-detern'llination which 
makes it difficult to classify the right as part of custom, pp. 50-51 
'0 See Cassese (1995) pp. 44-46. 
Orentlicher (1998) feels that self-determination as a principle to be included in intemational instruments is not 
challenged, however, its actual meaning and application are seriously contested, p. 39. 
52 Simpson (1996) pp. 271-274. 
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reflects the cyclical oscillation between positivism and natural law, between an 
emphasis on consent, that is, voluntafism, and an emphasis on binding 'objective' 
legal principles, between a 'statist' and a communitarian vision of world order. " 
Self-determination remains confined within the realm of state values and not for the benefit of 
the individual for development of the self or society. " 
B. FuR THER CLAims To THE DEmom Tic ENTiTLEmENT 
Writers along the same vem of Franck do not offer any compelling evidence contributing to 
an acceptance of an unassailable right to democracy in international law. Fox, " writing at the 
same time of Franck, claims that any indeterminacy regarding democracy that may have existed 
in the past are no longer an issue. " To show the concreteness of a right to democracy he 
provides evidence from human rights treaties, UN election monitoring, and decisions of the UN 
and regional monitoring bodies. He states '[q]uestions concerning the boundaries of 
participatory rights no longer require resolution of ideological debates about the proper fitriction 
of government, but involve treaty interpretation. "' In conclusion he feels that the '[r]eceipt of 
an electoral mandate bestows legitimacy upon governments'. 58 
Cernaý' follows a similar line to that of Fox relying upon statements from Franck and the 
former US Ambassador to the UN, Jean Kirkpatrick, as evidence to describe the democratic 
entitlement as 'rich in implications-). 60 She claims the existence of a right to democracy since 
1948 with the adoption of the UDHR, but that the right has been honoured more in breach than 
observance 
. 
6' For Cema, the end of the Cold War and the reunification of Europe has moved 
democracy from western ideas to the 'currency of universal values' resulting in its global 
61 recognition as an international legal right. She gathers evidence from the activities of regional 
systems, statements by the UN SG and the belief that the UDHR and ICCPR create a direct 
Cassese (1995) p. I- 
Koskenniemi (1994) p. 250. 
G. Fox. 'Tlie Right to Political Participation in international Law. ' 17 Yale Journal of International Law (1992) p. 
539. 
56 H. Steiner. 'Political Participation as a Human Right. ' I Harvard Human Rights Yearbook (1988) p. 77. 
57 Fox(1992)p. 607. 
s' He also adds the further requirements of political parties, freedom of media, and elements which contribute to fair 
elections, which 'seem to flow inevitably from treaties announcing a commitment to representative government. ' Fox 
(1992)p. 606. 
59 Cema (1995) p. 289. Also see the argument in R. Ezetah. 'The Right to Democracy: A Qualitative Inquiry. ' 22 
Brooklyn Journal ofInternational Law (1997) p. 495 
60 Cema (1995) p. 289. 
61 Cema (1995) p. 290; Reisman (1990) p. 868. 
" Cema (1995) pp. 290-291. 
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obligation of democracy as it is 'the only pen-nissible form of political organisation enshrined M 
these instruments because it is the only form of government which provides for the respect and 
protection of human rights. 63 
The views expressed by these authors are admirable in terms of the goals they Wish to 
achieve. They are inaccurate as descriptions of the present condition of democracy in 
international law and their approaches are unhelpful for the future development of democracy as 
an accepted international principle. Democracy in practice cannot be limited to elections or 
textual statements. It must go firther to have a real impact upon the lives of individuals. The 
existence of democracy cannot be deduced from the aspirational statements within treaties in the 
absence of actual practice on the ground. Finally, democracy is not exclusive to any particular 
region of the world. The democratic forms of North America or parts of Europe are not desired 
in toto by others in the world. Democracy is very much about the ability of individuals and 
society to engage in detenninations of the self As individuals and societies throughout the 
world differ, so too will the practice of democracy. 
111. DEMOCRACY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Previous waves of global democratisation did not have any significant impact upon 
international law" and even today international law is slow in coming to terms with democracy. 
The reluctance of international law to incorporate democracy is not surprising since it is the 
governments of states that have been and continue to be the one group of the international 
system averse to an acceptance of democracy. " International law presently does not recognise 
or incorporate any concept of representation, therefore the only voices which are heard are those 
of governments and these voices to not always speak for the societies they claim to represent. " 
There exists the argument that international law could not endorse a specific form of 
government since the law itself is ideologically neutral. " As any legal system is characterised 
by the social setting in which it exists, arguments for the ideologically neutral content are 
63 Cema (1995) p. 327. 
64 J. Crawford. Democracy in International Law. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) p. 7. 
6' Hobsbawrn describes how in the period of 1870-1920 governments introduced democratic reforms 'without 
enthusiasm' only giving in to demands for change based on the rhetoric of democracy that existed at the time. E. 
Hobsbawm. The Age ofEmpire, 1875-1914. (London: Widenfeld and Nicolson, 1987) pp. 86-87. 
66 Allot (1990) p. 303. Also J. Pennock. 'Political Representation: An Overview. ' in Pennock and J. Chapman, eds. 
Representation. (New York: Atherton Press, 1968) p. 7; Chapter 2 (above). 
6' E. Binavince. 'Canadian Practice in Matters of Recognition. ' in R. StJ Macdonald et al, eds. Canadian Perspectives 
on International Law and Organization. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974) pp. 168-169; H. Blix. 
'Contemporary Aspects of Recognition. ' 130 Recued des Cours (1970-2) p. 643; B. Sen. A Diplomat's Handbook of 
International Law and Practice, 3rd ed. (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 198 8) pp. 123-4. 
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implausible. " From the Treaty of Westphalia to today the international system and its legal 
framework have seen numerous changes in ideology and conceptions of legitimacy. " The end 
of the Cold War has led to changes in the ideology of international aw once again, this time 
towards democracy and human rights as wider concerns for the international system. 
A. INTERNA TIONAL DEmocRA CYAND THE UNITED NA TIONS 
The growmg attention being given to democracy In the international system has been 
reflected in the work of the UN, as has the reluctance of states and international law to embrace 
democracy. Overall the UN has been slow In responding to the growth of democracy with the 
response often being contradictory and half-hearted at best. In 1988, the then Secretary-General 
(SG) Perez de Cueller, in relation to the issue of election observation stated that the UN 'could 
send observers to referendums or elections relating to the exercise of the right of colonial 
peoples to self-determination, that sort of thing, but it does not take part in political elections. 70 
This attitude changed in 1992 with his successor, SG Boutros Boutros-Ghah, presenting his 
Agenda for Peaci' where it was stated that '[r]espect for democratic principles at all levels of 
social existence is crucial: in communities, within States and within the community of States. 172 
He pledged the role of the UN in providing assistance in the transformation and strengthening of 
democratic institutions at all levels as a way of securing peace in world. " 
Boutros-Ghali ftuther expressed support for democracy in his Agenda for DevelopmeW' 
and Agenda for Democratization. " These reports emphasised that peace, development and 
democracy are inextricably linked and that the UN has a major role to play by assisting states 
" The ideological differences which exist have prevented the pursuit of common goals in the international system, see 
J. Quigley. 'Law for a World Community. ' 16 Syracuse Journal ofInternational Law and Commerce (1989) p. I- 
6' For the changes in ideology in the international system see J. Bartelson. A Genealogy of Sovereignty. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995) pp. 88-248; A. Cassese. International Law in a Divided World. (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1986) pp. 34-73. 
70 Press Conference of the Secretary-General (5 July 1988). U. N. Doc SG/SNV4158/Rev. I (1988), cited in D. Stoetling. 
'Tbe Challenge of UN-Monitored Elections in Independent Nations. ' 28 Stanford Journal ofInternational Law (1992) 
p. 372, note 1. 
7' An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping. UN Doc. A/47/277-S/241 11, 
hereinafter Agendafor Peace. 
" Agendafor Peace, paragraphs 19,82. 
73 Agenda for Peace, paragraph 59. Which relies upon a social setting for productive growth and where people can 
readily express their will through strong domestic institutions, paragraph 81. 
74 An Agendafor Development. UN Doc. A/48/935 (1993). Also D. Forsythe. 'The United Nations, Human Rights and 
Development. ' 19 Human Rights Quarterly (1997) pp. 33 7-3 3 8. 
75 I'he SG set out his ideas in three reports entitled 'Support by the United Nations 
System of the Efforts of 
Governments to Promote and Consolidate New or Restored Democracies. ' UN Docs. A/50/332 and 
Corr. 1 (7 August 
1995), A/51/512 and A/51/761 (20 December 1996). The final report contains the Agendafor Democratization. 
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involved with the democratisation process. " He believed that the ideas of self-deten-nination 
and human rights as contained in the Charter provide a basis for democracy, and that the Charter 
is flexible and capable of incorporating change, such as an inclusion of democracy. " He saw 
the role of the UN as assisting in creating a 'culture of democracy' allowing for the participation 
of all individuals in the decision-making process on issues which affect their lives. " He stressed 
that any action by the UN in support of democracy can only come at the request of the parties 
concerned" based on the concept of individual state sovereignty as articulated in Article 2 (7) of 
the Charter" and in the belief that the UN does not endorse or promote any specific form of 
government. " The views of the SG reflect the nature of the international egal argument as he 
expresses full support for democracy as a principle for the international system but only to the 
extent states will allow its development. 
The present SG, Kofi Annan, has followed the ideas of his predecessor in supporting the 
merits of democracy expressing the belief that the will of the people is the basis for 
governmental authority and that good governance is necessary to give citizens 'a real and lasting 
-) 82 
stake in the future of their societies-politically, economically and socially 
. 
His definition of 
democracy and good governance includes 'the rule of law, effective state institutions, 
transparency and accountability in the management of public affairs, respect for human rights 
and the meaningful participation of all citizens in the political processes of their countries and in 
decisions affecting their lives. "' He has stated that human security depends upon sustainable 
development and democratic governance, along with human rights, equal opportunity and social 
justice, to provide the best defence against the ills facing the world. " He also makes the 
connection between democracy and development by seeing competent, accountable and 
responsive state institutions as part of achieving prosperity and stability. " 
Agendafor Democratization, paragraphs 118,126. 
Agendafor Democratization, paragraphs 26-35. Also B. Boutros-Ghali. 'The United Nations at Fifty. 1 20 Melbourne 
University Law Review (1995) pp. 112-113. 
" Agendafor Democratization. paragraph 24. He stressed that the development of democracy depends heavily upon 
the individual circumstances of a society, parargraphs 21-22. 
'9 Agendafor Democratization. paragraph 43. 
'0 Agendafor Democratization. paragraph 75. 
" Agendafor Democratization, paragraph 10. 
82 Address to the International Conference on Governance for Sustainable Growth and Equity, New York. (28 July 
1997) UN Doc. SG/SNV629 1. Also see his statements in 3 (4) UN Chronicle (1997) p. 3. 
83 Report of the Secretary General on the Work of the Organization. GAOR 52nd Session 
Supp. No. I (A/52/1) 
(hereinafter Report ofthe SG 52nd Session) paragraph 22. 
" 'Best Defence Against 'New Global Ills' Is Society Based On Equal Opportunity, Social Justice, Human Rights, 
Democracy. ' Address to the Academy of Social Sciences and Institute of International Relations in Shanghai, China. 
UN Doc. SG/SNI/6234. Also Report ofSG 52nd Session, paragraph 15. 
" As well as a conducive and supportive economic environment, Report ofSG 
52nd Session, paragraph 42. 
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The positions of the respective SGs demonstrates a belief at the Secretariat level that 'the 
practice of democracy is increasingly regarded as essential to progress on a wide range of human 
concerns and to the protection of human rights. "' Unfortunately for the development of 
democracy, the views of the SG do not reflect those of the organisation as a whole. The GA has 
given its backing to the process of democratisation generally" and in relation to individual 
countries" and regions, " and on issues such as elections, peace" and education. " The GA's 
involvement with democracy is based on its interpretation of the role given to self-determination 
and human rights in the Charter and human rights instruments. It is exercised through the 
residual role of the GA in preserving international peace and security and its broad mandate to 
promote peace, human development and human rights. " 
Support for democracy expressed by the GA is conditioned on respect for state sovereignty 
and the right of a state to deterniine its own social and political system, " which makes the 
organisation's support for democracy specious at best. " The UN's reluctance to whole- 
heartedly support democracy has been expressed by the Presidents of the GA. The President of 
5 0" Assembly (1995), Diego Freitas Aramal, expressing his own support for democracy, felt the 
UN has made a significant contribution 'to consolidating and concretising the process of internal 
democratization on which many countries have embarked' and which must be stressed and 
welcomed. " The opinion of a more recent GA President, Razah Ismail (52' Session, 1997), 
differs substantially as he expressed the belief that there has been a politicalization of liberal 
global values such as human rights, democracy and free markets which are being promoted as 
the answer to all of humankind's problems. In his view the UN was an inappropriate forum for 
86 Agendafor Democratization, paragraph 3. 
" 'Support by the United Nations System of the Efforts of Governments to Promote and Consolidate New or Restored 
Democracies. ' GA Res. 52/18 GAOR 52nd Sess., Supp. 49, p. 19. 
81 'The situation of democracy and human rights in Haiti. ' GA Res. 52/174 (13 February 1997). GAOR 52nd Sess., 
Supp. 49, p. 68. 'Situation of human rights in Chile. ' GA Res. 44/166 (15 December 1989) GAOR 44" Sess., Supp. 48, 
P. 10. 
'9 'The situation in Central America: procedures for the establishment of a firm and lasting peace and progress in 
fashioning a region of peace, freedon-ý democracy and development. ' GA Res. 52/176 GAOR 52"' Sess., Supp. 49, p. 
70. 
9' 'Culture of peace. ' GA Res. 511101 (3 March 1997) GAOR 51' Sess., Supp. 48, p. 247. 
9' 'Human Rights Education Decade. ' GA Res. 48/127 (20 December 1993). GAOR 48t' Sess., Supp. 50, p. 120. 
9' D. Donoho. 'Evolution or Expediency: The United Nations Response to the Disruption of Democracy. ' 29 Cornell 
International Law Journal (1996) pp. 337-338; M. Hodgson. 'When to Accept, When to Abstain: A Framework for 
U. N. Election Monitoring. ' 25 New York University Journal ofInternational Law and Politics (1992) pp. 139-145. 
9' See GA Res 52/18 which explicitly provides that UN support for democracy is based on the UN Charter and/or the 
specific request of an individual state. 
94 Forsythe (1997) describes the UN's approach to democracy as 'schizophrenic', p. 335. 
9' 2 (4) UN Chronicle (1995) p. 67. 
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the development of democracy as the prominent notion that exists within the organisation is not 
widely accepted in Asia and in a great number of other states in the world. " 
In 1988 the GA adopted its first resolution dealing with the issue of democratic elections 
(outside of the Trusteeship System) which supported the idea that government is to be 
representative and accountable. " The GA's support for elections is seen as emanating from 
existing human rights instruments such as the ICCPR and UDHR. These resolutions stress that 
'periodic and genuine elections are a necessary and indispensable element of sustained efforts to 
protect the rights and interests of the governed' and that 'the rights of everyone to take part in the 
government of his or her country is a crucial factor in the effective enjoyment by all of a wide 
range of other human rights and Rindamental freedoms'. " Within these resolutions, the GA 
voices the contradictory position that all states have the sovereign right to choose and develop 
their own political, social and economic systems whether or not they conform to the preference 
of other states, that no single political system or electoral method is equally suited to all nations, 
and that decisions concerning the choice and development of electoral institutions must be 
respected. The GA has also found it necessary to counteract any resolution in support of 
democracy by adopting a separate resolution in support of state sovereignty and non-interference 
in internal affairs. " The GA has ftirther limited the ability of the UN to become involved in 
elections by stating there is no universal need for election involvement and that such activities 
are to be limited to exceptional circurnstances. "' The ability for the GA to deal with issues of 
democracy does exist but the actual support given by member states to institutional efforts has 
been weak. 
The GA has recently expressed more explicit support of democracy in recognising that the 
UN has an important role to play in the process of democratisation and that the SG should 
continue to improve the ability of the UN to support democracy. '01 Included in the resolution is 
not a statement that there shall be respect for sovereignty and the internal affairs of states but 
96 4 (3) UN Chronicle (1997) p. 13. 
9' 'Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle of Periodic and Genuine Elections. ' GA Res 43/157 (8 December 1988) 
GAOR 43' Sess., Supp. 49 p. 226. From 1990 the GA has authonised the SG to act on behalf of the organisation in the 
area of electoral support, see GA Res 45/150, but Within the existing resources of an already impoverished organisation 
which demonstrates a lack of true comn-fitment to election involvement. 
9' GA Res 43/157. For a review of the resolutions see See Y. Beigbeder. International Monitoring of Plebiscites, 
Referenda and National Elections: Seýf-Determination and Transition to Democracy. (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1994) pp. 100- 104. 
99 See 'Respect for the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of States in their 
electoral processes. ' GA Res 46/130 (17 December 199 1). GAOR 46 th Sess., Supp. 49, p. 202. 
'00 GA Res. 46/130. 
'0' 'Support by the United Nations System of the Efforts of Governments to Promote and Consolidate New or Restored 
Democracies. ' GA Res. 53/31 (5 January 1999) paragraphs 7,9. 
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only that the work of the UN must be in accordance with the Charter. 102 Unfortunately this does 
not offer as much progress as could be hoped since the Charter is based on respect for state 
sovereignty and non-intervention in domestic affairs. 'O' The position of the GA towards 
democracy demonstrates the growth of the rhetoric of democracy in the international system. It 
also provides evidence of the growth of the favourable nature of democracy. At the same time, 
the rhetoric and evidence is countered by equal stances against issues of democracy and 
deferring to the control of states over the international legal process in developing an 
international law of democracy. 
B. STA TEs AND Go vERNmENTs 
- 
REcoGmnoN 
With the exception of international human rights provisions there is no effort by 
international law to examine the relationship between the government and the individuals within 
a state. Examination of this relationship along with discussions of the overall role and purpose 
of the state are traditionally more of a concern with political theorists... with few international 
legal scholars In the post WW R period addressing the issue. 'O' For international law states are 
not abstract entities but existing units necessary for organisation and representation in the 
international system. It is difficult to sustain any denial of the physical existence of a state for 
this will contradict a legal fact. 'O' A state in the international system is a territorially defined unit 
that will continually be associated with a specific identity. 'O' Governnients, on the other hand, 
are not constant and are susceptible to various forms of change. 10' Dugard, citing Oppenheim, 
'0' GA Res. 53/3 1, pargraph 8. 
"' UN Charter, Article 2. 
'04 Even political theory has not properly addressed the changes made to the international system by democracy, 
preferring to concentrate on domestic structures and mechanisms, keeping everything neatly tucked into defined 
borders, see D. Held. Cosmopolitan Democracy and the Global Order: Reflections on the 200th Anniversary of Kant's 
"Perpetual Peace"'. 20 A ltematives (1995) p. 420. 
'0' An exception is F. T8on. Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality, 2nd ed. (h-vington: 
Transnational, 1997) pp. 81-99. 
'06 Brown (1950) pp. 630-633. Also M. Peterson. 'Recognition of Governments Should not be Abolished. ' 77 
American Journal ofIntemational Law (1983) p. 41, note 3 1. 
'0' M. Shaw. Intemational Law, 4th ed. (Cambndge: Grotius, 1997) p. 305. For discussion and examples see P. Brown. 
'Tlie Legal Effects of Recognition. ' 44 American Journal of International Law (1950) pp. 628-632; D. Devine. 'The 
Requirements of Statehood Re-examined. ' 34 Modern Law Review (197 1) pp. 411-412. Even this aspect is changing 
as recent years have seen the dissolution of states and the break-up of single states into separate independent units. 
'0' Menon observes that states are perpetual and that they withstand the most radical change of government. P. Menon. 
The Law of Recognition in Intemational Law. (Lewiston: Larripeter, 1994) p. 6 1. For the most part this remains true 
but there does exist the emerging phenomenon of collapsed states, see Chapter 6. 
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explains how over time conditions change and governments can be considered as losing their 
legitimacy based on their inability to adhere to certain principles of international law. 109 
Traditionally the only concern for international aw is the determination of the existence of 
an entity that may be duly regarded as a state based on generally accepted legal definitions. "' 
The starting point for such a determination comes from the Montevideo Convention on Rights 
and Duties of States, "' which established the following criteria for statehood 
-a permanent 
population, defined territory, a government and a capacity to enter into relations with other 
states. These criteria are not definitive and have been subject to varying interpretations. "' 
In establishing the criteria for statehood the Montevideo Convention includes that the 
government must possess 'effective control' over the territory in question with no clear meaning 
as to what constitutes 'effective-). 113 International law has tended to not deal with how effective 
control is established or maintained (for some this is not a matter for international law' ") so long 
as international obligations and relations may be undertaken. "' Dugard points out, rather 
apologetically, that at the time of the Montevideo Convention ideas such as democracy, human 
rights and self-detenydnation did not have a place in international law, so they were not 
considerations with regards to the meaning of effective. "' Crawford observes that international 
law has never required effective to mean that governments are to be democratically elected or 
based on popular support. "' 
Effectiveness for international law is linked to the ability of a controlling force to exercise 
physical and administrative control over a population so that it is able to engage in international 
relations. Effectiveness has been, and remains, the predominant principle in determining 
whether a government meets the requirements for recognition. The means through which 
'0' Oppenhiem states that '[r]ecognition is a declaration, on the part of the recognising State, that a foreign community 
or authority is in possession of the necessary qualifications of states... 
. 
These qualifications are not necessarily 
enduring for all time. A State may lose its independence; a government may cease to be effective ... in all these cases 
withdrawal of recognition is both permitted and indicated. ' quoted in J. Dugard. Recognition and the United Nations. 
(Cambridge: Grotius, 1987) p. 129. 
"0 Higgins (1994) p. 43. 
... 165 LNTS 19. 
112 See 1. Brownlie. Principles of Public International Law, 4" ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990) pp. 72-79. Blix 
(1970) pp. 632-635 
... Shaw (1997)pp. 304-305. Blix (1970) adds the requirement of a measure of stability, p. 622. 
114 Brownlie (1990) p. 73. During the decolonisation period once a state was established considerations concerning the 
effectiveness of government were not addressed by international law, see Higgins (1994) pp. 40,43. 
"' P. Jessup. The International Problem of Governing Mankind. (Claremont: Claremont College, 1947) p. 57; Sen 
(1988) p. 519. Peterson (1983) points out that within the limits of effectiveness there is the possibility for other criteria 
to be established, but effectiveness remains the key, p. 37. 
116 Dugard (1987) p. 127. 
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effectiveness i achieved with regards to the internal makeup of a state do not matter. Any other 
criteria beyond effective cannot be determinative and may only assist in verifying whether or not 
a government is effective. ' 18 The principle of effectiveness for recognising governments has a 
long history in international law as demonstrated by the remarks of Pufendorf. - 
He who actually holds the supreme sovereignty should, despite the fact that he 
seized it by base methods, be held for the time by the citizens as a lawful prince, so 
long as there is none who can lay a better claim to the sovereignty. ( 
... 
) These 
conclusions are all the more to the point with respect to foreigners, who have no 
concern in examining the title whereby a man secures sovereignty, but merely 
follow along with the possession.... "' 
Pufendorfs point that outsiders do not have a concern as to how effectiveness has been 
maintained continues to dominate debates surrounding the ability to utifise democratic criteria in 
determining the legitimacy of a government for the purpose of recognition. "' 
For determining whether or not effectiveness has been achieved, basic standards guiding the 
recognition process do exist, but these remain heavily indeterminate with little in the way of 
concrete agreement either in practice or principle. "' This indetern-iinacy is partly due to the 
fluctuating practice of whether the question at hand involves the recognition of states or the 
recognition of governments. Some commentators feel there is no difference With state practice 
showing cases where they are treated as the same. "' The practice of recognising governments 
has come under heavy criticism from a legal perspective since the process is deemed to be 
political, resulting in indetern-iinate situations which did not correspond with reality. "' One 
commentator has even gone further to describe recognition of governments, by relying upon 
117 Crawford (1994) p. 7; Also Binavince in St. J Macdonald (1974) p. 168; G. Joffe. 'Sovereignty and Intervention: The 
Perspective from the Developing World. ' M. Heiberg, ed. Subduing Sovereignty: Sovereignty and the Right to 
Intervene. (London: Pinter, 1994) p. 82. But see J. Fawcett. The Law ofNations. (London: Penguin, 1968) pp. 38-39. 
"' Lauterpacht, 1947,115; A. Bundu. 'Recognition of Revolutionary Authorities: Law and Practice of States. ' 27 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1978) p. 40. 
"' Quote from H. Lauterpacht. Recognition in International Law. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1947) pp. 
99-100, see also 100- 102 for the views of early scholars. 
"o See Lauterpacht (1947) pp. 91-92. 
Much of the indeterrrunacy focuses on the purpose of recognition as either a declaratory act or a constitutive act. On 
the debate between declaratory and constitutive recognition, see Lauterpacht (1947) pp. 3 8-66; Chen (195 1) pp. 13-29. 
Lauterpacht feels the debate over the declarative or constitutive effects of recognition is not relevant to the question of 
recognition of governments, see H. Lauterpacht. International Law: Being the Collected Papers ofHersch Lauterpacht, 
vol. 1. E. Lauterpacht, ed. (London: Cambridge University Press, 1970) p. 323. 
122 Chen (1951) pp. 102-104; H. Kelsen. 'Recognition in International Law: Theoretical Observations. ' 35 American 
Journal of International Law (1941) pp. 614-615; R. Higgins. The Development of International Law through the 
Political Organs ofthe United Nations. (London: Oxford University Press, 1963) p. 134. 
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character and policy, causes more difficulties than it is Worth. 124 In current international practice 
there is a tendency not to engage in the practice Of recognising governments and limiting 
recognition to a state entity based on the accepted criteria for statehood, which keeps the 
principle of effectiveness fin-nly in place. This has been the predominant practice of a number 
of states, 125 which allows for recognising the existence of a state for the purposes of international 
relations but with no judgment being made as to the legality or preference of the government in 
power. 12' Through this policy it is possible to bypass the difficult choices that come with 
recognising overnments, preferring instead to accept a situation as a legal fact regardless of the 
circurnstances. If a government is unfavourable all that remains is the choice as to what level of 
relations will be established with the government in question. 127 
State practice in the recognition of governments has seen a nurnber of ideological shifts 
reflecting changes in the international system. Legitimacy of a government at one time meant 
that only monarchs achieving power through the proper hereditary process were recognised as 
legitimate rulers. "' This practice set the precedent for a later position that a government was 
legitimate if it held its power through the terms of the internal laws of a state whether they were 
democratic or not. "' In either case, if another power attempted to become the government 
through means outside the accepted internal law or customs it was considered illegitimate. "' 
Following the French Revolution, the UK utilised democratic criteria for recognising 
governments in a number of situations where domestic constitutions called for the democratic 
process. "' The belief at the time was 'to acknowledge the constitutional doctrine that the people 
of every country have the right to choose their own sovereign without any foreign 
interference'. "' This was followed by developments in the Western Hemisphere such as the 
Tobar Doctrine and subsequent agreements which established that democratic criteria was to be 
12' Lauterpacht (1947) expressed that once we get beyond the accepted criteria of statehood for recognition 'the clear 
path of law is abandoned and the door is Wide open to arbitrariness, to attempts at extortion, and to intervention at the 
very threshold of statehood', p. 3 1. 
124 Peterson (1983) p. 3 1. 
125 Shaw (1997) p. 307. 'US practice has been to de-emphasise and avoid the use of recognition in cases of changes of 
governments and to concern ourselves With the question of whether we wish to have diplomatic relations with the new 
government... ' (US Dept of State Bulletin 1977). See C. Warbrick. 'The New British Policy on Recognition of 
Governments. ' 30 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1980) p. 568. 
126 Higgins (1994) p. 44. 
"' Brown (1950) p. 632. Also Kelsen (194 1) 'A state is, however, free to enter or refuse to enter into political and other 
relations With a government, that is, it may grant or refuse to the government political, but never legal, recognition. ' p. 
615 
128 Jessup ( 1947) p. 38 
129 See Binavince in St. J Macdonald (1974) p. 166. 
"0 Chen (195 1)p. 105. 
"' See Sen (1988) pp. 523-524. 
112 Lord Malmesbury quoted in Sen (1988) p. 524. 
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used for determining if a government was legitimate. 133 Through Woodrow Wilson and his 
efforts III the League of Nations, the idea of democracy legitimising government was forwarded 
to the international arena post WW 1.. 134 Wilson saw the goal of the international system as 
creating 'the reign of law, based upon the consent of the governed and sustained by the 
organised opinion of mankind. 1135 Wilson's hopes and aspirations were soon overcome by 
events M the world as governments came to power through extra-constitutional non-democratic 
means, and remained in power, constitutional legitimacy based on democratic ideals was no 
longer considered a factor for recognition. 136 The idea of effectiveness returned based on 
practical considerations from the perspective of the international system for it brought perceived 
stability and facilitated international relations. 137 
The concept of effectiveness for determining the legitimacy of government depends upon 
the position from which effectiveness is defined. In the practice of international law there has 
been a failure of adequately addressing the question 'in whose interest and for what legal 
purpose is government 'effective'T"' From the point of view of the individual, authoritarian 
rule is seldom effective, but for the international system it is often a practical means of ensuring 
stability. "' It is recognised that in situations of authoritarian rule society is often paralysed by a 
fear that prevents any active opposition. Furthermore, when faced with an environment of fear, 
individuals are hesitant to act, so long as the basic needs for life continue to exist. International 
law measures the effectiveness of a government internally by the extent to which there exists the 
acquiescence of a society to those who are ruling. Acquiescence may be publicly expressed 
through various means, such as regular elections, or the functioning of a group capable of being 
the government with no sustained or substantial public challenges to its authority. 140 However, 
history has also shown that governments which control a population through force and the 
... See C. Cochran. 'The Development of an Inter-Amencan Policy for the Recognition of De Facto Governments. ' 62 
American Journal ofInternational Law (1968) pp. 462-464. For the Tobar Doctrine and related agreements uch as the 
1923 Treaty of Peace and Amity, see I HackwoHh 186. 
134 Shaw (1997) p. 306. 
13' Address at Mount Vernon (4 July 1918) reprinted in A. Link, ed. The Papers of Woodrow Wislon, vol. 48. 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985) p. 514. 
136 See generally Lauterpacht (1947) pp. 115-140. 
137 Sen(1988)p. 525. 
13' Brownlie (1990) p. 73. Lauterpaucht (1947) points to the need for internal stability to be present otherwise the state 
is 'deprived of a representative and effective government, it Will be lacldng a vital condition of statehood', p. 28. Also 
see Fawcett (1968) pp. 38-39. 
139Lauterpacht (1947) p. 13 7. 
140 Bundu (1978) p. 39. 
113 
widespread denial of rights usually do not hold power for long with the end result of a great deal 
of instability both domestically and internationally. "' 
Despite the detrimental iiinpact of authoritarian forms of rule upon the individual and 
eventually to the international system, the way in which a society is ordered and the government 
operates have been for international law 'domestic concerns' and not necessarily a matter for 
legal regulation. International human Tights law has begun the process of scrutinising the 
behaviour of governments when their action constitutes a denial of recognised rights but this 
scrutiny is limited to responding after the event, after the detrimental impact has been felt. The 
larger issue of trying to prevent abuses, through addressing the legitimacy of the government to 
represent and govern a society, is not addressed. Recent activity whereby governments are 
required to be constituted on a democratic basis has not been based on overarching concerns for 
the individual but as a necessary measure for the preservation of international peace and 
security. "' 
The idea of effectiveness remains the leading factor in recognising governments for it 
provides a practical means of dealing with changes in the international system and avoiding 
ideological differences. In response to the changes occurring in the international system 
international law must adjust to changes and redefine effectiveness. Roth concludes that while 
there may be movement beyond the traditional understanding of effective control there has not 
been established the requirement of democratic legitimacy for recognition. "' An effective 
government must be recognised as one that adequately represents and is accountable to the 
society which occupies the territory it represents. There can no longer be the minimal 
requirement of having control over the society and territory through any possible means. 
Attempts to adopt any criteria beyond effectiveness in determining the legitimacy of a 
government may be criticised for creating more confusion than already exists M t1iis area of 
international practice. It is also feared that any criteria beyond effectiveness becomes too 
subjective and will mean that recognition will be accorded purely on the basis of political 
preferences and not objective legal criteria. These claims cannot stand-up as barriers to the 
development of an international law of democracy requiring governments to be more than just 
'effective'. If the law is to remain confined to the exclusive domain as states as a repressive tool 
"' Chen (195 1) forwards this idea in support of basing recognition on principles of legitimacy, p. I 11. 
14' Requirements for democratic governance with respect to peace and security were applied in the cases of Haiti 
(Security Council Resolutions S/RES/1007 (1995) and S/RES/1048 (1996)) and with Yugoslavia (General Framework 
Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 35 International Legal Materials (1996) p. 75). 
"' Roth (1997) p. 3 64. 
114 
for control then perhaps effectiveness is all that is necessary. However, the law claims to have 
moved beyond this, movement which now must be followed up with substantive development. 
C ELEmoNINvouEmENT 
In Chapter 2 it was emphasised that elections alone are not indicative of the existence of 
democracy. At the same time elections do provide an indicator of democracy In practice if those 
elections are conducted on a free and fair basis and extend to all levels of society and 
governance. The UN has been involved in elections through the process of decolonisation and 
with the Trusteeship System, but this action has always been 'premised on and limited by an 
overriding deference to state sovereignty. ' 144 From 1956 to 1990 the UN had a part in thirty 
elections, plebiscites, or referenda which occurred in territories covered by the Trusteeship 
system. 145 The objective of the system was the 'progressive development towards self- 
government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each 
territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned' 
. 
146 It is 
questionable to what extent this objective was achieved in light of the subsequent development 
of many of the territories involved, but once a territory attained independence the continuation of 
democracy was not a matter for the UN. Cassese views the practice of organising and observing 
elections during this period as an attempt by the UN to five up to its expressed principles but he 
questions to what extent the states concerned felt legally bound to have the UN involved. 147 
More recently governments have requested UN involvement in elections but the UN has not 
agreed to become involved in all requests. When Romanii a requested the UN to participate in its 
first elections since the overthrow of communist rule the SG declined saying the UN did not 
become involved in 'internal elections. "" The involvement of the UN in elections is based on 
its own internal rules and not any international legal obligations. In the case of the Trusteeship 
system the UN provided the basic legal structure for the process making its involvement 
inevitable. "' In the case of any other state, involvement must have the invitation of the state 
authorities involved. "' For the UN to become involved in national elections after an invitation 
144 Donoho(1996)p. 340. 
145 'Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle of Periodic and Genuine Elections. ' GA Res. 46/137, GAOR 46 th 
Sess., Supp. 49, p. 365. 
146 UN Charter, Article 76 (b). Paragraph c includes respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
147 Cassese (1995) pp. 78-79. 
14' Hodgson (1992) pp. 170- 1. 
149 UN Charter, Articles 83 and 85. 
"0 See A. Rigo Sureda. The Evolution of the Right ofSelf-Detennination. - A Study of United Nations Practice. (Leiden: 
Sijthoff, 1973) p. 313. 
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has been accepted certain criteria are to be met 
- 
there must be an international dimension, the 
UN is to be involved in the entire electoral process, and all the major political groups involved 
must agree to UN participation. "' These criteria do not appear to be stringent and depend upon 
the situation as exceptions were made with Haiti demonstrating the flexibility of the tern 
'international dimension'. "' Involvement of the UN in elections has also become part of 
peacekeeping operations as authorised by the Security Council, as with Angola, Narr6bia and 
Cambodia. "' This overcomes the invitation issue as it involves directly mandated action 
authorised by the SC which in turn expresses support for democracy but based on primary 
considerations of peace and security. "' 
The involvement of the UN in elections has been limited because of resource issues... and 
due to the tensions which arise between the implicit show of support for democracy that election 
involvement entails and the opposing principle of state sovereignty with the belief that each state 
is free to decide its own domestic structure. ' 16 Despite the UN's effort not to directly support the 
idea or practice of democracy while engaging in electoral activities, governments have still 
criticised the UN's involvement in this area. China, Cuba and Mexico have all declared that 
electoral systems and the conducting of elections are internal affairs established in accordance 
with internal legislation based on the character and history of the individual state. They have 
stressed that the UN does not have the mandate or authority to intervene in internal matters 
including electoral matters. "' This position fails to realise that the present level of UN 
involvement in elections has only occurred through the invitation of a government or through 
Security Council action, both of which are deemed legitimate in international law and do not 
bring into question violations of sovereignty or intervention into domestic affairs. "' In 
attempting to promote democracy through election support the UN has generated some general 
agreement on the issue but in the end, actual action and belief In its legitimacy is left up to states 
which in turn will determine the future of the LN's support for democracy. "' 
"' For a full discussion of this criteria see Stoelting (1992) pp. 3 86-393. 
152 Stoelting (1992) pp. 388-9. 
"' N. White. Keeping the Peace: The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security. 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997) pp. 196-199. 
154 But see Stoelfing (1992) p. 3 88 concerning the acceptance of this point. 
... White (1997) p. 273. 
156 J. Ebersole. 'The United Nations' Response to Requests for Assistance in Electoral Matters. ' 33 Virginia Journal of 
International Law (1992) p. 97. 
... See Beigbeder (1994) p. 10 1. 
"' Hodgson (1992) p. 148; Beigbeder (1994) p. 36. 
"9 See the ICJ statements in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua. (Nicaragua v United States 
of America) Judgment, I. C. J. Reports 1986, pp. 121-122. The UN's position on elections depends upon the 
Organisation defining its goals as to whether it will explicitly support the democratic process, see M. Evans and D. 
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D. COERCIVE MEASUWES ANDDEMOCRACY 
Due to the state-centric nature of international law support for democracy through 
recognition and election monitoring attract criticism for being violations of the principle of non- 
intervention in domestic affairs. "' Further forms of intervention include the use of force and 
sanctions with are direct forms of intervention in support of democracy. "' international law has 
witnessed various levels of unilateral or loosely collective measures through public 
condemnations, economic sanctions and the threat and actual use of force in support democracy. 
The recent use of coercive measures with regards to Iraq and Haiti has led to claims that there 
now exists ajustification for the use of coercive measures to enforce democracy. "' It has also 
spurred debate over whether the use of coercive measures, especially the use of force, in the 
absence of any form of agreed institutional framework is justified, even if it has the purpose of 
enhancing democracy or human rights. "' 
The opinion of scholars on this issue varies. Reisman favours the use of force, even 
unilaterally, in situations to restore or preserve democracy based on the idea that such measures 
are acceptable when they entail allowing for the exercise of hw-nan rights or self- 
detem-fination. "' Tes'on has strongly defended the position that the use of force is pen-nissible to 
alleviate human suffering but he draws a line at the preservation of democracy for he feels that 
the use of force to restore democracy is disproportionate to the problem involved. "' Schachter 
points out that the unilateral use of force in support of democracy is often based on policy 
decisions, meaning it will not work in practice since there exists a great deal of disagreement 
over meanings allowing policy inspired action to be abused under the guise of law. "' 
Olidge. 'What Can the Past Teach the Future? Lessons from Internationally Supervised Self-Determination Elections, 
1920-1990. ' 24 Now York University Journal ofInternational Law and Politics (1992) pp. 1752-55. 
160 See generally, K. Asante. 'Election Monitoring's Impact on the Law: Can it be Reconciled with Sovereignty and 
Non-InterventionT 26 New York University Journal ofInternational Law and Politics (1994) p. 23 5. 
16 ' D. Acevedo. 'The Haitian Crisis and the OAS Response: A Test of Effectiveness in Protecting Democracy. ' in L. 
Damrosch, ed. Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts. (New York: Council on Foreign 
Relations, 1993) p. 120. 
162 See L. Fielding. 'Taking the Next Step in the Development of New Human Rights: The Emerging Right of 
Humanitarian Assistance to Restore Democracy. ' 5 Duke Journal of Comparative. and International Law (1995) p. 
329. 
16' Higgins (1994) pp. 251-253. 
164 See M. Reisman. 'Article 2 (4) The Use of Force in Contemporary International Law. ' 78 Proceedings of the ASIL 
(1984) pp. 74-87 and 'Coercion and Self-Determination: Construing Charter Article 2 (4). ' 78 American Journal of 
International Law (1984) pp. 642-645. 
16' Tes6n (1997) pp. 305-308. 
166 See 0. Schachter. "Me Legality of Pro-Democratic Invasion. " 78 American Journal ofInternational Law (1984) pp. 
645-650 and 'In Defense of International Rules on the Use of Force. ' 53 University of Chicago Law Review 
(1986) pp. 
143-146. 
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The use of force is generally prohibited in the international system by Article 2 (4) of the 
UN Charter with possible exceptions involving cases of self-defence and involvement in 
collective security exercises authorised by the UN Security Council. 167 The prohibition of the 
unilateral use of force is considered a 'primary rule of the international system' that cannot be 
disregarded by other concerns. 161 Collective measures for the use of force have gained 
legitimacy through the UN in situations considered to be 'threats to the peace' 
. 
16' Determination 
as to what constitutes a threat to the peace has not been consistent due to political considerations 
but has rarely included considerations of democracy and human rights (see below). 17' As 
Higgins notes the Charter does not allow for the use of force in situations of human rights 
violations unless the effect of the violations are seen as a threat to the peace. 17' The inability of 
the UN to act in this sphere has perhaps created more difficulties than it has tried to avoid for as 
Schachter has recognised; 'The weakness and politicisation of collective institutions enhance the 
danger that ideological confrontation will turn into clashes of military force. -)172 
Events in Haiti stand as an example of the institutional use of force based on considerations 
of democracy and human rights. "' However, in authorising the use of force, the SC made it 
clear that human rights and democracy were not the primary consideration for action, only a 
residual issue. "' There does exist the emerging acknowledgement of human suffering as 
constituting a threat to the peace but this has been a selective process with limited application 
and initiative on behalf of the SC demonstrating that state interests remain the primary concern 
for the international system. "' The lack of sustained practice beyond Haiti demonstrates the 
167 Generally, H. McCoubrey and N. White. International Law and Anned Conflict. (Dartmouth: Aldershot, 1992). 
168 McCoubrey and White (1992) p. 116, save for the situations where another peremptory rule of international law is 
violated, pp. 116-123. 
169 UN Charter, Article 39. 
"o McCoubrey and White (1992) p. 130; White (1997) p. 47. 
17 'Higgins (1994) pp. 254-257. As was the case in Haiti, see R. Cryer. 'The Security Council and Article 39: A nueat 
to Coherence. ' I Journal ofA nned Conflict Law (1996) pp. 180-18 1. 172 Schachter (1986) p. 144. 
"' See SC Res/1007 (1995) and SC Res/1048 (1996). Democracy was also a consideration for the SC with regards to 
events in Burundi, SC Res/I 040 (1996), but it was two years before any action was taken, see White (1997) p. 172. 
174 Donoho (1996) comments that the action of the SC in Haiti appears to be a strong commitment to democracy but in 
reality only 'created a legally and politically ambiguous precedent for future UN efforts to preserve or restore 
democratic governance. ' p. 331. Falk's opinion on Haiti is that it only provides an indeterminate precedent for 
democracy in international law, see R. Falk. 'The Haiti Intervention: A Dangerous World Order Precedent for the UN. ' 
36 Harvard International Law Journal (1995) pp. 353-355. But see Fielding (1995) who uses Haiti as a 'good model 
for intervention', p. 363 and Pierce (1996) who says that the SC statement does not matter as the action taken has 
established a precedent, p. 506. 
"' It is recognised that the SC did make a move toward human values by declaring support and action for human rights 
and democracy, White (1997) p. 58. But this has been considered a limited anomaly, see M. O'Connell. 'Regulating 
the Use of Force in the 21 sTentury: The Continuing Importance of State Autonomy. ' in Chamey (1997) pp. 443-444. 
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acceptance of the collective use of force, even if sanctioned by the UN, for the preservation of 
democracy appears to be an unlikely development in the near future. 176 
The US has been the primary unilateral actor in using justifications of democracy and 
human rights regarding the use of force. 177 The position of the US corresponds with those 
favouring the liberal internationalist position that the international system is determined by 
liberal laws which in turn allows for action to be taken when those laws are violated. 17' The idea 
of the unilateral use of force in the name of democracy, which is understood as a community 
value, is not favourable as it depends upon an individual state defining which community values 
are to be protected, how they are to be protected and under what circumstances. Concerning the 
actions of the US in Nicaragua, the ICJ declared that even if a state has entered into treaty 
arrangements calling for an obligation to democracy, it is up to the institution to ensure 
implementation, not individual members. "' 
Another form of coercive measure used to 'enforce' democracy and/or human rights is the 
implementation of sanctions. "' The use of sanctions as an international enforcement measure 
has gained greater popularity recently as sanctions have been tenned the 'liberal alternative to 
war, ). 181 The effectiveness of sanctions depends on being able to target those who are actually 
responsible for the act giving rise to the imposition of sanctions. "' As with the use of force in 
support of democracy, the use of sanctions is equally indeterminate in both theory and practice 
with no fin-n evidence to support that sanctions are effective or even acceptable. "' The use of 
sanctions raises finther complication as it is often difficult to get states to participate collectively 
176 For a discussion on the role of the UN in supporting democracy through deterrence, see J. Moore. 'Toward a New 
Paradigm: Enhanced Effectiveness in United Nations Peacekeeping, Collective Security and War Avoidance. ' 37 
Virginia Journal ofInternational Law (1997) p. 811. 
177 B. Roth. 'Governmental Illegitimacy Revisited: 'Pro-Democratic' An-ned Intervention in the Post-Bipolar World. ' 3 
Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems (1993) p. 48 1. 
17' K. Smits. 'International Identity Construction and the Liberal Peace. ' 7 Pacifica Review (1995) p. 53. But see Roth 
(1997) who feels '[m]ischief frequently results' when interference for democracy occurs, p. 367. 
179Nicaragua case, ICJ Reports (1986) p. 122. 
"o On the use of sanctions see 0. Elagab. The Legality of Non-forcible Countermeasures in International Law. 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1988); G. Hufbauer, J. Schott, and K. Elliott. Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 2nd ed. History 
and Current Policy and Supplemental Case Histories. (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1990). 
"' R. Pape. 'Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work. ' 22 International Security (1997) p. 90; G. Lopez and D. 
Cortright. 'Economic Sanctions and Human Rights: Part of the Problem or Part of the SolutionT 1 (2) Inter-national 
Journal ofHuman Rights (1997) p. I 
"' Lopez and Cortright (1997) p. 6. They create a 'smart sanctions theory' where sanctions target weakness of problem 
and minimise humanitarian impact, pp. 9-22. Also see the criteria established by M. Doxey. 'International Sanctions: 
A 
Framework for Analysis With Special Reference to the United Nations and Southern Rhodesia. ' 26 International 
Organization (1972) pp. 532-533. 
"' M. Krinsky and D. Golove, eds. United States Economic Measures Against Cuba. - Proceedings in the 
United 
Nations and International Law Issues. (Northampton: Aletheia, 1993) pp. 135-163, on the subjective nature of 
unilateral sanctions as enforcement see the comparison with US action against Cuba and China, 
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to achieve a common goal. 184 International organisations can call on member states to impose 
actions but there is little preventing a state from ignoring the implementation of sanctions as 
events in South. Affica and Haiti have proven. 181 In the final analysis there is no guarantee 
sanctions will provide a solution or the achievement of a desired goal. Sanctions upon Iraq 
through the UN, and unilaterally upon Cuba by the US, have been in place for a considerable 
length of time and there appears to be no progress made, while at the same time support for the 
sanctions is deteriorating. "' Pape believes that sanctions are an ineffective tool for forcing 
compliance due to the structure of the international system and the modern state making the 
impact of sanctions upon the targeted transgressor minimal at best. "' 
The use of sanctions in support of democracy and the impact they have creates a paradox for 
international law as sanctions are used to force compliance by a government who is seen to be 
violating legal or moral standards. In turn, the imposition of sanctions often results in the rights 
of individuals in the targeted state to be violated, as their basic needs cannot be met as a direct 
result of sanctions. "' It is argued that sanctions have the effect of levelling the playing field 
between an oppressive regirne and its opposition allowing the opposition to exert pressure for 
changes. "' More commonly, the imposition of sanctions has the negative result of causing 
greater harm to the population who is not responsible for the transgression, sometimes actually 
strengthening the position of the targeted government. 190 The imposition of sanctions is 
primarily a political decision, with their impact being a non-justiciable matter. This leaves the 
individuals who are adversely affected with no recourse to the law for the protection of their 
rights creating the contradictory situation of disregarding the rights of individuals In order to 
gain compliance from a government. 19' This contradiction is intensified when sanctions are 
seen as a failure and force is then used to gain compliance, as in Iraq and Haiti. "' The use of 
184 In 1982, the EC imposed sanctions on Turkey when the military took control of the government, suppressing both 
democracy and human rights. The EC based their decision on the necessity of democracy evolving in Turkey, which 
the take-over did not do. The US on the other hand supported the generals for being able to bring law and order to the 
country. See Hufbauer et al (1990) Supplemental Case Histories, pp. 532-536. 
"' Hufbauer et al (1990) Supplemental Case Histories, p. 226 for South Africa, p. 598 for Haiti. 
186 B. Bourtros-Ghali. 'Supplement To An Agenda For Peace: Position Paper Of The Secretary-General On The 
Occasion Of ne Fiffieth Anniversary Of The United Nations. ' UN Doc. S/1 995/1, paragraph 68. 
"' Pape (1997) pp. 106-108. See also K. Elliot. 'The Sanctions Glass: Half Full or Half EmptyT 23 International 
Security (1998) pp. 59-60. 
118 See K. Tom8evski. Between Sanctions and Elections: Aid Donors and their Human Rights Performance. (London: 
Pinter, 1997) pp. 215-225 and pp. 218-219 where she points out that sanctions do not differentiate between the rulers 
and the ruled. 
189Lopez and Cortright (1997) p. 1-3. See Pape (1997) who argues how authoritarian rulers are more able to turn the 
blame for sanctions around on to the opposition, p. 107. 
'90 Damrosch in Damrosch, ed, pp. 274-5. Also Boutros-Ghali 'Supplement to An Agenda For Peace' paragraph 
70. 
"' Tom8evski (1997) pp. 218,223. 
'9' See Hufbauer et al (1990) Supplemental Case Histories, pp. 573-577. Also Pape (1997) p. I 10. 
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sanctions against Iraq and Haiti show that the liberal's 'alternative to war' is not humane and is 
difficult to justify due to the human costs MV01ved. "' 
E GOOD GovERNANcE"' 
The concept of good governance is significant for the development of an international 
law of democracy for it recognises that the political, socio-economic and cultural spheres of 
society are interrelated. "' Good governance is understood in a broad sense to include the form 
of the political authority in a state, how that authority is exercised in all areas of society and that 
it is done so efficiently, effectively, and equitably. "' Good governance moves beyond 
traditional understandings of the functions and purpose of political power to ensure the creation 
and implementation of policies which reflect the needs and desires of a society through 
democratic decision making and wide based participation in all areas of governance. "' It looks 
to develop economic and social planning with rights and obligations in society for both 
individuals and the government so that society is able to build and sustain its own institutions 
and structures which reflect and preserve those values and norms accepted as legitimate. "' The 
inclusion of issues of good governance in international egal agreements has been described as 
'essential, and one of the most sensitive elements of the permanent sovereignty of states. ' 199 
The UN first approached good governance through SG Bhoutros-Ghali's report An Agenda 
for Development where he expressed the importance of democracy in the process of 
development; 
because democracy provides the only long-term basis for managing competing 
ethnic, religious, and cultural interests in a way that minimizes the risk of violent 
internal conflict. They are linked because democracy is inherently attached to the 
"' Elliot (1998) p. 50. Even if sanctions are lacking in bringing about real results they do have a symbolic effect of 
demonstrating support for human rights or democracy which does contribute to the rhetoric of democracy, see Lopez 
and Cortriglit (1997) p. 5. 
194 Generally, K. Ginther, et al., eds. Sustainable Development and Good Governance. (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1995); F. Weiss, et al., eds. International Economic Law with a Human Face. (The Hague: Kluwer, 1998). 
'9' A similar idea underlies the concept of the right to development, see 'Declaration on the Right to Development' (4 
December 1986). GA Res. 41/128, GAOR 41" Sess., Supp. 53, p. 186, Articles I and 2. 
196 World Bank. Development and Governance. 1992, pp. 3-6. The Bank states that the first element, the forrn of 
authority, is outside its mandate, p. 58; Concerning the Bank's mandate and democracy and human rights see the 
relevant works in 1. Shihata. The World Bank in a Changing World: Selected Essays, vols. I&2. (Dordrecht: Martinus 
Nijhoff. 1991,1995). 
'9' A. Tolentino. 'Good Governance through Popular Participation in Sustainable Development. 'In Ginther (1995) who 
calls it 'a people centred approach', pp. 137-149. Also Agendafor Development, paragraph 59. 
'9' H. Okoth-Ogendo. 'Governance and Sustainable Development in Afi7ica. ' in Ginther (1995) pp. 107-108. 
'99 P. van Themaat. 'Ten Years after the ILA Declaration of Seoul. ' in E. Denters and N. Schrijver, eds. Reflections on 
International Lawfrom the Low Countries, in Honour ofPaul de Waart. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1998) p. 23. 
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question of governance, which has an impact on all aspects of development efforts. 
They are linked because democracy is a fundamental human right, the advancement 
of which is itself an important measure of development. They are linked because 
people's participation in the decision-making processes which affect their fives is a 
basic tenet of development. '00 
He also described how democracy and development are to be viewed as a continual process and 
in the absence of democracy 'development will remain fragile and be perpetually at risk -) . 
201 
The ideas in the Agendafor Development have been put into motion on a global scale by the 
UNDP... who views good governance as an essential element for society. Its importance hes in 
its efforts to create 'a conducive environment for people, individually and collectively, to 
develop their full potential and to have a reasonable chance of leading productive and creative 
lives in accord with their needs and interests. "O' To achieve this goal it is necessary to ensure 
that '[p]ohtical, social and economic priorities are based on a broad consensus in society and that 
the voice of the poorest and most vulnerable are heard in the decision-making over allocation of 
development resources'. "' The UNDP's view of good governance and the development 
process takes a broad view incorporating areas of health, education, standards of living, political 
freedoms, human rights and self-respect. 'O' 
International econornIc organisations, such as the World Bank and the EMIF, have begun 
adopting measures of good governance into their workings. The World Bank has been at the 
forefront of developments in this field directly addressing the issue in 1989 with a report on sub- 
Saharan Africa and a 1991 report entitled Governance and Development. Through these reports 
the Bank's position on democracy and good governance are set out establishing the important 
point that the Bank's concern with good governance extends only to those areas conducive to 
economic development and the Bank's goals. In line with the Bank's Articles of Agreement 
[t]he Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member; 
nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political character of the 
'00 Agendafor Development, paragraph 120. 
20' Agendafor Development, paragraphs 119,122. 
20' The UNDP has produced a great deal of practice and information in this area, see their internet site 
[http: //www. undp. org/toppages/govem/govframe. htTn]. 
201 UNDP. Human Development Report (1990). (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990) p. 1. 
20' F. Weiss and P. de Waart. 'International Economic Law with a Human Face: 
An Introductory View. ' in Weiss 
(1998) P. 9. 
201 Human Development Report (1990) p. I 
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member or members concerned. Only econornic considerations hall be relevant to 
their decisions, and these considerations hall be weighted impartially... 
. 
"' 
The Bank recognises that a strict interpretation of what constitutes the economic sphere is not 
viable, which explains its concern with good governance, but it must be remembered that 
governance has not become the Bank's primary purpose. "' The Managing Director of the IMF 
has equally expressed support for issues of good governance, but as with the Bank, only to the 
extent to which good governance is related to strategies for sustained growth and development 
and allow for a state to carry out agreed adjustment programmes. "' 
There is nothing in the practice of either the IMF or World Bank precluding either 
organisation from taking into account issues related to human rights and democracy. They 
cannot, however, be expected to make these issues their overriding concerns as their principles 
and purposes are not based upon them. "' In carrying out their specific functions they should 
take into account concerns for human rights and democracy since these are integral to social and 
economic development and the lack of respect for human rights and democracy Will prove 
detrimental to development programmes. "' The problem these organisations face in tying to 
utilise criteria based on respect for democracy and human rights is that those states which rely 
most heavily on the support of the Bank or ME are usually states which have poor records for 
respecting democracy and human rights. By placing requirements of democracy and human 
rights upon states as a condition for assistance many may be disqualified from receiving support, 
a move likely to have a detrimental impact on long-term development and respect for 
democracy and hurnan rights. "' It would be difficult from an economic perspective to rely upon 
stringent criteria of democracy and human rights in determining whether or not a state is eligible 
for financial assistance. At the same time it is necessary to have institutional structures in place 
and functioning appropriately to allow for the successful implementation of economic 
programmes. Undoubtedly, the ability of economic restructuring programmes and support to be 
successful in the long-term depends upon the relevant institutions working within a framework 
that looks to achieve respect for democracy and human rights even if that is not the purpose of 
'06ATticle 3. Articles of Agreement (as amended 16 February 1989). International Bank of Reconstruction and 
Development. (Washington: J`he Bank, 1993). 
'0' N. Moller. 'The World Bank: Human Rights, Democracy and Governance. ' 15 Netherlands Quarterly of Human 
Rights (1997) pp. 22-23,27-28. 
'0' J. Gold. Interpretation: The IMF and International Law. (London: Kluwer Law International, 1996) pp. 503 -504. 
209 An exception is European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, see their Annual Report 199 7, p. 3. 
2'0 E. Denters. Law and Policy ofthe IMF Conditionality. (The Hague: Kluwer, 1996) pp. 175-176. 
211 See Denters (1996) 176-177; Moller (1997) pp. 4445. 
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212 the institutions themselves. 
'M it stands , the activities of these institutions are directly related 
to human rights concerns, democratic participation and the overall structure of a government but 
within a certain econorrk context that has priority. "' 
Ideas of good governance have also been included in the development of global 
environniental agreements and social programmes. The 1992 Rio Declaration2" on the 
environment includes measures for good governance through recognising that '[d]evelopment is 
a comprehensive economic, social, cultural and political process, which aims at the constant 
improvement and well-being of the entire population and of all individuals on the basis of their 
active, free and meaningful participation'. 215 Principle 10 of the Declaration expresses that 
environmental issues are best handled with participation of all concerned at all levels which 
includes wide access to information, the opportunity to participate in decision making, effective 
judicial and administrative proceedings provided. Principle 22 makes explicit that these 
practices are to be applied to indigenous people and other local communities to ensure their 
211 active participation. 
The Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development' " expresses a conunitment to social 
development based on hurnan. dignity, human rights and democracy. In the Framework for 
Action, principle f calls on governments to '[p]romote democracy, human dignity, social justice 
and solidarity at the national, regional and international levels; ensure tolerance, non-violence, 
pluralism and non-discrimination, with full respect for diversity within and among societies. ' 
The Framework also stresses the need for 'transparent and accountable governance' in all areas 
of society"' to which the signatories declare their commitment and promise to implement these 
practices into their societies. "' 
Due to the relatively recent emergence of good governance as a guiding principle of 
intemational activity adherence to its principles remain primarily at the rhetorical level. 
Emphasis on good governance has been criticised as a new form of imperialism as all 
... Shihata (vol. 2,1995) p. 54 
213 See Shihata (vol. 1,1991) who sees areas such as the civil service, the legal system, and public spending as direct 
concerns for the Bank's mandate, pp. 85-93, and human rights such as development, freedom from poverty, health, 
education, women, and refugees as directly part of the mandate, pp. 97-134. 
214 Reprinted in 31 ILM (1992) 818. 
215 Preamble. 
216 On the importance of wide based participation in environment issues B. Boer. 'Implementation of international 
Sustainability Imperatives at a National Level. ' in Ginther (1995) pp. 124-125. A Pinto. 'The Legal Context: Concepts, 
Principles, Standards and Institutions. ' in Weiss (1998) p. 15. 
217 UN Doc. A/CONF. /66/9, reprinted in 2 IHRR (1995) p. 736. 
"' Paragraph n. 
219 Commitment 1. 
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encompassing theories and singular practices are applied without taking into account the 
individual circumstances of societies. "' in some cases this criticism is well levied and 
evidenced by the use of sanctions and conditionality M relation to development aid as states and 
organisations, impose punishments on receivers for not meeting certain criteria. "' Instead of 
good governance being used to further common concerns, it is may also be used to impose 
specific forms of behaviour on a government and society Without full consideration being given 
to the individual circumstances those states and societies face. "' Shihata warns of the negative 
impact often caused by 'external experts syndrome', as organisations, will try to apply ideas and 
practice from outside upon a society. "' He further stresses the need to incorporate, as far as 
114 possible, local knowledge and participation in projects and programmes. The UNDP rightly 
notes that when it comes to development '[d]emocracy is a native plant 
- 
it may wilt under 
foreign pressure. 225 
Ensuring that those who are most affected by development projects are able to participate 
will help to alleviate cliticisms of imperiafism as well as be beneficial in the long term. "' The 
SG has observed that a smgle model will not work 
but, broadly speaking, and making due allowance for cultural differences, good 
governance comprises the rule of law, effective state institutions, transparency and 
accountability in the management of public affairs, respect for human fights, and the 
meaningful participation of all citizens in the political processes of their countries 
and in decisions affecting their lives. "' 
Effective and sustainable development relies upon a political system that allows for proper 
decision making and the inclusion of society. 
228 The World Bank's report on sub-Saharan 
Affica, in 1989 identified the problem clearly: 
"0 P. Blunt. 'Cultural Relativism, "Good" Governance and Sustainable Human Development. ' 15 Public 
Administration and Development (1995) pp. 1-9.1 Cahn. 'Challenging the New Imperial Authority: The World Bank 
and the Democratization of Development. 6 Harvard Human Rights Journal (1993) p. 164. Sorenson notes that 'the 
debate on democracy in the Third World is both one-dimensional and based on Western concept. ' G. Sorenson. 
'Conditionality, Democracy and Development. ' in 0. Stoke, ed. From Aid to Political Conditionality. CLondon: Frank 
Cass, 1995) p. 392. 
221 P. Nberere. 'Conditionality, Human Rights and Good Governance: a Dialogue of Unequal Partners. ' in Ginther 
0 995) P. 290-29 1. 
122 Ginther in Ginther (1995) p. 157. 
223 Shihata (vol. 1,199 1) p. 60. 
224 Shihata (vol 2,1995) p. 60. Also UNDP. Human Development Report (1991) pp. 71-72 
225 UNDP. Human Development Report (1992) p. 25. 
226 See Moller (1997) pp. 34-35. 
22' Report ofthe SG 52nd Session, paragraph 22. 
22' K. Hosslan. 'Evolving Principles of Sustainable Development and Good Governance. I in Ginther (1995) p. 20. In 
turn this requires changes to the constitutional structures of society to be conducive to the 
furtherance of these issues see 
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Underlying the litany of Africa's development problems is a crisis of governance. 
By governance is meant the exercise of political power to manage a nation's affairs. 
Because countervailing power has been lacking, state officials in many countries 
have served their own interests without fear of being called to account. "' 
The principles underlining good governance are welcomed so long as the negative side of using 
good intentions for self-interested gains are minimised. "' Issues of good governance should not 
be seen as being exclusive to developing countries, but as guidelines which should direct 
developed democracies as well as good governance 'assures that due consideration will be given 
to public values when decisions are made. "" 
IV. INTERNATIONAL HumAN RIGHTs LAW AND DEMOCRACY 
The idea of good governance incorporates a view of democracy discussed in Chapter 2 
as it stresses the need to look beyond political activity to incorporate other areas of society 
encouraging wide based and active participation by individuals in matters important to them. "' 
Good governance works on the idea that there exists bad governance detrimental to individuals, 
society and the international system as a whole. Bad governance encompasses the denial of 
human rights, both civil and political as well as economic and social, inefficiency and corruption 
in the administration of government, lack of legal protection, political repression and, in general, 
tyranny and authoritarianism which inhibits self-deterniination for the individual and society. "' 
An indicator of good or bad governance is the extent to which individuals are able to participate 
in the development of society. "' The large amount of textual support for participation regarding 
good governance has not clarified the issue leaving any 'right to participation' indeterminate and 
possessing only 'the appearance of legal protectioni. 235 Participation is closely linked to the 
issue of information and knowledge which allows individuals to be active and effective 
236 participants in society for '[p]eople are the best advocates of their own interests' 
. 
Ginther in Ginther (1995) pp. 150,154-157, and 'Development Partnerships and Development Research: From 
Advocacy to Action/Reflections on Method. ' In Weiss (1998) pp. 133-157. 
"9 World Bank. Sub-Saharan Aftica, 
-ftom Crisis to Sustainable Growth. (1989) pp. 60-6 1. 
230 UNDP. Human Development Report (1991) pp. 75-76. 
23 ' Tolentino in Ginther (1995) p. 141. See OECD. Ofientations on ParticipatoryDevelopment, paragraphs 2-3. 
232 UNDP. Human Development Report (1992) p. 27; Moller (1997) p. 27. 
233 K. Ginther. 'Sustainable Development and Good Governance: Development and Evolution of Constitutional Order. '
in Ginther (1995) p. 157. 
234 C. Taylor. 'The Right to Participation in Development Projects. ' in Ginther (1995) p. 228. 
235 See Taylor in Ginther (1995) p. 209-222. 
236 LTNDP. Human Development Report (1991) p. 7 1. See Tolentino in Ginther (1995) p. 141-145, also P. Sands and J. 
Werksman. 'Procedural Aspects of International Law in the Field of Sustainable Development: Citizens' Rights. ' in 
Ginther(1995)p. 178-204. 
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Concerning the issue of participation, international human rights law provides a strong basis 
for an international law of democracy covering the political, socio-economic and cultural 
spheres of society and the individual. "' It is through human rights law that international law has 
begun to question how governments are organised and the basis upon which societies are 
ordered. "' International human rights law provides the legal framework for the autonomy of 
individuals and groups by limiting the arbitrary use and abuse of power. It also provides a 
strong basis for participation in governance and society. "' Participation is an essential issue as it 
goes to the core of the exercise of political and economic power in a state, it is a direct challenge 
to the exclusive position of a government. "' More so than other human rights, participation is 
dependent upon a government for its validity but for it to be effective it needs to have a legal 
source outside and above the state. "' 
In examining the right to participation it is imperative that there is no arbitrary 
discrimination in this area, or in the application of other rights, as tl-ýs would undermine their 
purposes completely. 242 The LJDHR expounds that '[e]veryone is entitled to all of the rights and 
freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind. '24' Discrimination in 
regards to the practice of democracy and human rights is a reality of society and at the same time 
the most difficult obstacle to overcome. 244 If democracy and human rights are to be effective 
there can exist no reason for excluding individuals or groups based on arbitrary determinations 
'which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or 
exercise, on an equal footing, of hwnan rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, 
lif 
. 
-)245 economic, social, cultural or any other field of public e 
A. PR o TEcTiNG PAR ncipA TioN 
- 
THE UDHR AND ICCPR 
In laying the foundation for democratic participation the UDHR sets forth in Article 21 that 
"' This allows international law's position on democracy to be more substantive rather than procedural, see G. Fox and 
G. Nolte. 'Intolerant Democracies. ' 36 Harvard International Law Journal (1995) p. 38. 
"' See T. Farer. 'Collectively Defending Democracy in a World of Sovereign States. ' 15 Human Rights Quarterly 
(1993) p. 717. 
23' H. Hannum. 'Rethinking Self-Determination. ' 34 Virginia Journal ofInternational Law (1993) pp. 57-58. 
240 Steiner (1988) pp. 84-85. 
24 ' Asante (1994) pp. 2834. 
242 M. Banton. Discrimination. (Buckingham: Open University, 1994), 5. Kuwait's reservation to Article 25 of the 
ICCPR is an example, it reads 'Article 25 (b) The provisions of this paragraph conflict with Kuwaiti electoral law, 
which restricts the right to stand and vote in elections to males. It further declares that the provisions of the article shall 
not apply to members of the an-ned forces or police. ' Multilateral Treaties (199 7) p. 126 
243 Article 2, UDHR. 
24' Banton (1994) notes that 'discriminatory acts do not occur in isolation; they are parts of patterns of behaviour 
towards women, blacks, disabled people, etc., and they vary greatly from one culture to another. 
' p. 8. 
245 ICERD, Article 1 (1), 660 UNTS 195. 
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1) Everyone has the right to take part in the goveniment of his country, directly or 
through freely chosen representatives. 
2) Everyone has the right to equal access to public service in his country. 
3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government: this shall be 
expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal 
suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or equivalent free voting procedures. 246 
Rosas sees this Article as setting the 'minimum requirements for the structure and fimctioning' 
of the state in that government must be based on will of the people and there must be democratic 
participation in public life. 247 Reisman views Article 21 as moving popular sovereignty from an 
aspiration to setting specific criteria for determining if governments conform with what he 
perceives as accepted international standards of democracy. 24' Robertson feels that Article 21 
sets out 'the basic or minimum political rights that have to be protected in any democratic 
order', which implies the pre-existence of a democratic order. 249 
Undoubtedly Article 21 aspires to set out basic standards to be achieved for an international 
law of democracy by placing the basis of authority with the people. It ftirther establishes that 
those who are entrusted to manage and control the affairs of a society must be accountable and 
not able to act on their own personal needs and desires, that representation is effective and 
participation by individuals is not limited to the vote. "O The weakness of Article 21 is that it is 
an aspiration, one of great moral worth but with little substantive legal force in establishing 
democracy as a requirement of international law. Cema believes that from the moment the 
UDHR was accepted as a resolution a right to democracy existed. Her own observation that it 
has been honoured more in breach than adherence demonstrates the extent to which it has not 
been accepted as a legally binding norm. 251 
The ICCPF, as a legally binding document, contains numerous rights normally associated 
With 
, 
and essential to, democracy. 252 Concerning participation Article 1 (common with the 
ICESCR) and Article 25 are starting points. Article 1 reads (M part) 
2" For discussion of the travaux. prepartoires, see A. Rosas. 'Article 21. ' in A. Eide at a], eds. The Universal 
Declaration ofHuman Rights. - A Commentary. (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1992) pp. 301-305. 
24' Rosas in Ei de (1992) p. 299. 
24' Reisman (1990) pp. 867-869. 
2111 M. Robertson, ed. Human Rightsfor South Afiicans. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 199 1) p. 149. 
250 Robertson (199 1) p. 146. 
251 Cema (1995) p. 289. 
252 Nowak (1993) pp. 43 6-43 7. 
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All peoples have the tight to self-deten-nination. By virtue of the right they freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development. 
The HRC has linked the requirements of participation in Article 25 and self-determination i  
Article 1. In the General Comment on Article 1 self determination is said to be 'of particular 
importance because its realisation. is an essential condition for the effective guarantee and 
observance of individual human rights and for the promotion and strengthening of those 
rights. 
253 The tights contained in Article 25 are described as being 'related to, but distinct from' 
Article 1.25' The HRC has held that the realisation of Article I depends upon the participation of 
all citizens in public life which in turn means that Article 25 rights must be ensured and 
guaranteed. 
255 
Article 25 specifically deals with the issue of participation, it requires that 
Every citiZen shall have the right and opportunity 
... 
without any unreasonable 
restrictions: 
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen 
representatives; 
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic election which shall be by 
universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free 
expression of the will of the electors; 
(c) To have access, on general tenns of equality, to public service in his country. 
Article 25 has the appearance of a watered down version of Article 21 of the UDHR by 
excluding the clause that the authority of government lies with the individuals of a society. The 
reasons behind this were examined in Chapter 1 as states will be very reluctant to recognise such 
a significant statement in a legally binding document. However, Nowak expresses the view that 
paragraph a of Article 25 does place the legitimacy of governmental authority with the 
6 sovereignty of the people'. 25' The UK has expressed the opinion that UDHR Article 21 and 
ICCPR Article 25 combine to charactefise what is considered 'free and democratic processes' 
which entails that 
... HRC. General Comment No. 12. GAOR 39" Sess., Supp. 40, paragraph 1. 
254 HRC. General Comment No. 25. UN Doc. CCPR/C/2 I //Rev. I /Add. 7, paragraph 2. 
255 Report of the HRC. GAOR 45" Sess., Supp. 40, comments on Cameroon, p. 102, paragraph 4. Also Rosas in Eide 
(1992) p. 3 08; Higgins (1994) pp. 120-121. 
256 Nowak (1993) p. 411. 
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every citizen has the right to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or 
through freely chosen representatives. The basis of the authority of government is 
the will of the people, expressed through -periodic and genuine elections, by 
universal suffrage and held by secret ballot. "' 
In the opinion of at least one state Article 25 carries as much normative force in support of 
democracy as Article 21 of the UDHR 
. 
25' However it is difficult to conclude categorically that 
Article 25 carTies the same meaning for democracy as Article 21. It would appear possible for a 
state to allow for the participation necessary to meet the obligations of Article 25 without going 
as far as Article 21 and placing the authority of government with society. 259 
In the reporting procedure under the ICCPR, the HRC has requested states to include 
information concerning the constitutional and political processes allowing for the exercise of 
self-determination. It has not specified a particular form of government that states must 
possess. "' in its comment on Article 25 the HRC leaves it open for states to choose whatever 
form of government they wish so long as there exists legislation which allows for the exercise of 
the rights in the ICCPR. In a seemingly contradictory way, the Comment places Article 25 'at 
the core of democratic govenunent based on the consent of the people and in confom-lity with 
the principles of the Covenant' 
. 
26' The HRC has backed this position in a state report: 'The 
Committee recommends that the State party revise the former legislation as soon as possible in 
order to introduce a democratic system more in keeping with the requirements of the 
Covenant. Q62 This implies that democracy is an important ingredient for meeting obligations of 
the ICCPR but democracy itself is not an obligation for adherence to the treaty. 
The HRC has sketched some necessary aspects of ensuring the exercise of Article 25 which 
include an effective rights regime, a similarly effective system of voting, 263 a multi-party 
political system, 264 and the separation of powers in the governmenf " to guarantee the protection 
... Quoted in K. Hossain. 'Emerging State Practice of Democratic Government with Special Reference to the 
Commonwealth and South Asia. ' in Weiss (1998) p. 69. 
258 It is worth noting that at the time of draifting the UDHR the UK was opposed to the inclusion of government being 
based on the authority of the people due to its colonial possessions, see Rosas in Eide (1992) p. 302. 
259 Ilie most obvious examples are with monarchical systems that allow for active participation such as in Morocco, but 
in the end the king remains the final authority, see Report of the HRC v. 1. GAOR 50' Sess., Supp. No. 40, paragraph 
114. 
260 General Comment No. 12, paragraph 4. 
26 'General Comment No. 25, paragraphs 1-2. 
262 Report of the HRC v. I GAOR 49hSess., Supp. No. 40 comments on Azerbaijan, paragraph 304. 
16' Report of the HRC v. I GAOR 49th Sess., Supp. No. 40 comments on Jordan, paragraph 229. 
264 Report of the HRC v. I GAOR 49' Sess., Supp. No. 40 comments on Cameroon, paragraph 187, also comments on 
Jordan, paragraph 236 and Azerbaijan, paragraph 303. On the positive nature of multi-party system, Report of the 
HRC v. 1. GAOR 52' Sess., Supp. No. 40, comments on Gabon paragraphs 120,122. 
Also the HRC's decision in 
Peter Chiko Bwalya v Zambia. Communication No. 314/1988 UN Doc. CCPFJC/48/I)/314/1988, reprinted in 1 (2) 
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of rights and to ensure a more effective system of governance. "' Concerning an effective rights 
regime they have emphasised the importance of freedom of expression, assembly and 
associationý` along with the need for freedom of the press and media for informing public 
opinion. "' Denials of these rights have been deemed to violate Article 25 as they not only 
prevent political participation but also deny the ability to criticise and oppose the government, 
a normal and essential part of a functioning democracy'. 269 
The ability to participate in the conduct of public affairs is seen by the HRC to include all 
areas involved with public administration as well as the formulation and implementation of 
policy at all levels of governance. "' The HRC's position is that participation in public affairs 
includes being a member of a legislative body, the holding of executive office, the deciding of 
public issues ftough referendum or electoral process, participation in popular assemblies, and 
representative consultation bodies. "' The forms of participation envisaged by the HRC include 
direct actions, such as elections and referendum and indirect which entail the choosing of 
representatives. "' In the choosing of representatives the HRC stresses it is necessary that 'those 
representatives do in fact exercise governmental. power and that they are accountable through the 
electoral process for their exercise of that power. 273 
The HRC's view on elections is that they act as a means for society to express needs and 
desires, and are also essential in ensuring the accountability of representatives and that 
IHRR (1994) p. 84, it was held that Zambia's one-party state which declared the applicant's party illegal violated his 
ability to participate in political affairs. 
26' Report of the HRC GAOR 53' Sess., Supp. No. 40, comments on Belarus, paragraph 150, stressing the 
independence of the judiciary and legal profession as essential for the administration of justice, maintenance of 
democracy and the rule of law. 
266 The HRC's comments on Iceland view the total separation of the judiciary and the executive as necessary for 
effectively guaranteeing the protection of rights, see Report of the HRC v. I GAOR 49" Sess., Supp. No. 40, paragraph 
72, also comments on Romania, paragraph 143. See further Report of the HRC v. 1. GAOR 50" Sess., Supp. No. 40, 
comments on Morocco, paragraph 114 where the wide scope of executive power held by the King 'has implications for 
the effective independence of the judiciary and the democratic processes of Parliament. '
26' General Comment No. 25, paragraph 12. Report of the HRC GAOR 53dSess., Supp. No. 40 comments on Sudan 
emphasising that Article 25 depends upon full recognition of freedom of expression and the right to impart and receive 
ideas of all kinds, including those in opposition to the Government' paragraph 135. 
26' General Comment No. 25, paragraph 25. Report of the HRC GAOR 49" Sess., Supp. No. 40, comments on Jordan, 
paragraph 236. 
169Report of the HRC GAOR 49hSess., Supp. 40 comments on Cyprus, paragraph 322; Report of the HRC GAOR 50'h 
Sess., Supp. No. 40) comments on Libya, paragraph 132. 
DO General Comment No. 25, paragraph 5. Also Fox (1992) p. 555, note 67. 
27' General Comment No. 25, paragraph 6, also paragraph 8 where taking part in public affairs also includes public 
debate, dialogue with representatives or through organising themselves. 
272 Mikmaq People v Canada. Communication. No. 205/1986 in Report of the HRC. GAOR 
47" Sess., Supp. No. 40, p. 
205, paragraph 5.5. 
27' General Comment No. 25, paragraph 7. 
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government continues to be based on the universal and free expression of the electors. "' For the 
undertaking of elections it is left to states to determine what type of electoral systern is to be 
utilised for determining representation. "' There are, however, a number of conditions which 
must be met to ensure that the right to vote may be effectively exercised without any undue 
complications or restrictions and the rule of 'one person, one vote' must apply. "' Restrictions 
on the right to vote must be reasonable with restrictions based on physical disability, literacy, 
education, property or party membership deemed to be unreasonable, but age being an 
acceptable restriction. 277 In general the HRC believes that the environment in which an election 
occurs needs to be peaceful and free from Violence and intimidation. 278 
In spite of the HRC's position, that can be seen as imbuing Article 25 with a wide-based and 
active participatory nature, Nowak feels the meaning of Article 25 does not include the actual 
governance of society. Instead, he understands it as being 'intentionally vague in order to allow 
the States Parties to structure the basic right to democratic participation in a manner consistent 
with the various models of democracy. Q` The position of the HRC may also be seen as 
providing a state-centric interpretation of Article 25 as it has expressed that it is not up to citizens 
themselves to ultimately decide whether or not to take part directly or through representatives in 
the conduct of government affairs, but that it was for the legal and constitutional system of a 
state to determine such participation. 280 These conclusions contribute to the indeterminate 
nature of the Article 25 as they allow for opposing views as to the nature of the Article 25 
obligations to be adopted as legally valid. 
274 General Comment No. 25, paragraph 9. Report of the HRC GAOR 53" Sess., Supp. No. 40 comments on Iraq, 
paragraph 107 'The CoMMIttee is concerned that under article 38 (c) of the Constitution, the members of the 
Revolutionary Command Council are not elected by universal and equal suffrage. This is incompatible with the right of 
citizens to take part in the conduct of public affairs, under article 25 (a) and (b) of the Covenant. Therefore: The 
Committee recommends that steps be taken with a view to ensuring citizens the right and the opportunity to take part in 
the conduct of public affairs, either directly or through freely chosen representatives. ' 
... Steiner (1988) p. 90. 
276 General Comment No. 25, paragraphs 11 
-22. 
277 General Comment No. 25, paragraph 10. In Joszef Bebreczeny v The Netherlands. Communication No. 500/1992 
UN Doc. CCPR/C/53/D/500/1992, reprinted in 2 IHRR 1995, p. 561. paragraph 9.2 'The Committee notes that the 
right provided for by article 25 [referring to article 25 (b)] is not an absolute right and that restrictions of this night are 
allowed as long as they are not discriminatory or unreasonable. ' The HRC has decided in a number of cases against 
Uruguay that restrictions upon Article 25 cannot be based on the political opinion held by the individual and any 
restrictions must be proportional to the limitation envisaged, see Communication No. 32/1978 Tour6n v 
Uruguay, 
Communication No. 34/1978 Landinelli Silva et al v Uruguay, Communication No. 44/1979 Pietraroia v Uruguay, 
and Communication No. 28/1978 Weinberger v Uruguay in Selected Decisions of the Human Rights 
Committee under 
the Optional Protocol, v. 1. UN Doc CCPR/C/OP/1 
- 
27' Report of the HRC v. I GAOR 49" Sess., Supp. No. 40, comments on Mexico, paragraphs 
170,176,180. 
"9 Nowak (1993) p. 15. 
211 Mikmaq People v Canada, paragraph 5.4. 
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The obligations of Article 25 only extend to citizens of a state in contrast to the other rights 
that are applicable to any individual within a state. Neither the ICCPR nor the HRC has 
provided any definition or guidance in determining citizenship. The establishment of concise 
definitions for citizenship might not be welcomed as it may allow a state to utilise very 
restrictive practices to prevent political participation but in accordance with legally understood 
standards 
. 
28 1 Limitations upon participation are necessary for practical purposes but at the same 
time they must be based on objective and reasonable criteria. 282 The ambiguity of citizenship 
and restrictions upon participation correspond to the overall nebulous nature of Article 25. It has 
been suggested that a more proactive approach by the HRC is needed with regards to this area of 
the ICCPR, but at the same time is not possible due to resource considerations, making the HRC 
more inclined to concentrate on other fights. On the other hand, it is felt that if the HRC was to 
become more proactive in this area it would lead to protracted debates over standards and 
content, in turn slowing down its work even fiu7dier 
. 
2" The overall textual ambiguity of Article 
25 is due, in the opinion of some, to the fact that the Article articulates a political ideal inspiring 
a certain fight. 284 
B. OTHER INsTRumEmTsFoR PARTicipAnoN 
The right of all individuals to participate without discrimination is emphasised through legal 
instruments dealing with discrimination against women and racial discrimination. Concerning 
women, the Convention on the Political Rights of Women.. was an early attempt to ensure 
participation as the document called for the right of women to vote, to be elected and to exercise 
public ftinctions on ternis, equal to men. "' The Convention recognised that everyone 'has the 
right to take part in the government of his country'. "' Despite its early entry into force and 
nurnerous signatures it has not had a significant impact on the participation fights of women. 
A slightly stronger basis exists In the UN Convention for the Elimination of All fornis of 
Discrimination against Women. Under Article 7 
See Fox (1992) p. 553, note 59. 
282 General Comment No. 25, paragraphs 3-4. See also CERD General Recommendation XX paragraph 3, reprinted in 
5 lHRR (1998) p. 18. 
283 Ebersole (1992) pp. II 1- 112. 
281 Steiner (1988) pp. 85-86,93 Steiner (1988) notes another example of the vague nature of the Article is the lack of 
reservations concerning it, p. 93, note 60. 
281 193 UNTS 135. 
286 Articles 1-3. 
281 Preamble. The fact that the Convention uses gender bias language in such a contradictory fashion truly raises 
questions concerning the real intentions of states. 
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States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against 
women in the political and public life of the country and, in particular, shall ensure, 
on equal terms with men, the right 
a. to vote in all elections and public referenda and to be eligible for election to all 
publicly elected bodies; 
b. to participate in the formulation of government policy and the implementation 
thereof and to hold public office and perform all public functions at all levels of 
government; 
c. to participate in non-governmental organizations and associations concerned with 
the public and political life of the country. 
The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) has expressed 
the position that '[p]olicies developed and decisions made by men alone reflect only part of 
human experience and potential. The just and effective organi'sation of society demands the 
inclusion and participation of all its members. "" It has ftu-ther elaborated that '[t]he concept of 
democracy will have real and dynamic meaning and lasting effect only when political decision- 
making is shared by women and men and takes equal account of the interests of both. "" 
CEDAW has taken a broad interpretation of what constitutes involvement in the workings 
of government and public affairs to include a wide variety of societal processes. "O in a similar 
fashion to the HRC, CEDAW has specified various components necessary for elections such as 
secret ballots and universal suffrage and no unreasonable restrictions on the right to vote. "' 
They suggest a proactive approach to ensuring women are part of the democratic process 
through the use of preferential treatment and/or quotas to ensure women are integrated into the 
decision-making processes. "' in its discussion of the state reports, CEDAW continually raises 
the issue as to how the domestic framework hinders or allows for the participation of women in 
all areas of society and its suggestions and recommendations emphasise the need for 
governments to ensure that women are more adequately integrated in the decision making 
process. "' 
... General Recommendation No. 23 (1997) reprinted in 5 IHRR (1998) p. 7, paragraph 13. 
2'9 General Recommendation No. 23, paragraph 14. 
290 General Recommendation No. 23, paragraph 5. 
29 'General Recommendation No. 23, paragraphs 6,23. 
292 General Recommendation No. 5 (1988) UN Doc. A/43/38, reprinted in 1 (1) HIRR (1994) p. 16. 
293 See the discussion of state reports in Report of the Committee on the Elin-fination of Discrimination against 
Women 
(Sixteenth session). GAOR 52n' Sess., Supp. No. 38. 
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Article 5 of the UN Convention on the Elimination of all fonns of Racial Discrimination 
reads that 
States Parties undertake to prohibit and to eliminate racial discrimination in all its 
forms and to guarantee the right of everyone 
... 
in the enjoyment of the following 
rights: 
... 
c. Political rights, in particular the rights to participate in elections, to vote and to 
stand for election 
- 
on the basis of universal and equal suffrage, to take part M the 
Government as well as in the conduct of public affairs at any level and to have equal 
access to public service; 
... . 
The Committee for the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) has an 
important task in ensuring compliance with Article 5 as discrimination acts as the basis for 
denying the exercise of participation rights, an important consideration for CERD. "' In a 
General Recommendation regarding self-determination CERD defined self-determination as 
consisting of an internal aspect which consists of 
the right of all peoples to pursue freely their economic, social and cultural 
development without outside interference. In that respect there exists a link with the 
right of every citizen to take part in the conduct of public affairs at any level, as 
referred to in Article 5 (c) of the ICERD. In consequence, Governments are to 
represent the whole population without distinction... 
. 
The understanding of participation put forth in Article 5 includes a wide spectrum of electoral 
rights that may not be denied for any arbitrary reason. "' CERD has finther elaborated that 
governments are to be sensitive to the rights of ethnic groups allowing them to take part in their 
own development and in the government of the state in which they live. "' The position of both 
CEDAW and CERD corresponds to the necessary elements of democracy as discussed in 
Chapter 2 as they emphasise the importance of individuals being able to participate in the 
processes that iirnpact upon their lives. 
While support for democracy may be found in these international instruments it has been 
expressed that the International Covenants are ideologically neutral and do not promote any 
294 Report of CERD (1993) corriments on Croatia. UN Doc. A/48/18, paragraph 483. Also comments, on Belarus 
(1995) UN Doc. A/50/18, paragraph 348, where CERD demands further information on the ability of minorities to 
participate in society. 
29' N. Lemer. The UN. Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination. (Alphen: Sijthoff and 
Noordhoff, 1980) p. 57. 
29' General Recommendation YOU (1996) UN Doc. A/51/18, reprinted in 5 lHRR (1998) p. 19, paragraphs 9-10. 
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particular form of government. "' In the absence in any expressed statements to the contrary it 
can be assumed that CEDAW and CERD hold similar positions in relation to their respective 
instruments. The belief that the documents are ideological neutral has been a reflection of the 
ideological differences that have marked the international system since the creation of the UN 
and the efforts of the UN to be a universal body. The idea that international human rights 
instruments are ideologically neutral is weakening as both the HRC and the UN Comnýiittee 
have shown an inclination towards democracy as the most effective form of government for 
ensuring states meet their obligations. "' 
The acceptance of the monitoring bodies that democracy is an important element in human 
rights protection does demonstrate a shift in the international system towards the creation of an 
international law of democracy. The monitoring bodies have only recently been actively 
engaged in the rhetoric of democracy slowing encroaching upon the exclusive control of states 
over the texts in support of democracy. These efforts are a positive start but will now rely upon 
more active action in holding states responsible for upholding their obligations under the 
respective treaties and in the maintenance of a democratic society as the most effective way of 
ensuring those obligations are met. 
V. CONSTRUCTING AN INTERNATIONAL LAw OF DEMOCRACY 
Fox believes that if democracy is to have any meaning as an intemationally enforceable idea 
then 'the community of states must be empowered to prescribe standards detailing how 
participation is to occur and to insist that parties to the major treaties adopt these standards as 
law. "" If fi7eedom, justice and peace are to be realised in the world then it is imperative that 
individuals are able to participate in the processes which impact their lives - to participate in 
their own self-detern-fination. "' As with Franck's democratic entitlement an international law of 
democracy Will have self-detenriination for its core principle as an essential precondition for the 
'9' UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. General Comment No. 3 (1990) UN Doc. E/1991/23, 
reprinted in 1 (1) IHRR (1994) p. 7. Also Steiner, pp. 87-88. But see Nowak (1993) who suggests that even though the 
ICCPR may be ideologically neutral anything not based on democratic governance would be in violation, p. 441. A 
difficult point to support in light of state practice regarding the ICCPR. 
29' The HRC has established a link between totalitarian government and serious violations of human Tights making a 
transition to democracy favourable for the protection of rights. Report of the HRC v. I GAOR 49" Sess., Supp. No. 40, 
comments on Mynamar. The LN Committee noted in a report on the Dominican Republic that the slow movement to 
democracy 'Inhibited the strengthening of democratic institutions, the modernisation of the machinery of government 
and, consequently, the effective implementation of the Covenant. ' UN Doc. E/I 996/22. 
'99 Fox (1992) p. 595. 
'00 Higgins (1994) p. 43. 
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recognition and exercise of other rights. "' Self-determination is important for it allows both 
individuals and groups to prosper while fully participating in the political, social and economic 
processes around them. 'O' The indeterminate nature of self-detenytination makes it is necessary 
to devise accepted ways of recognising and preserving the continual process of self- 
determination in line with the goals of an international law of democracy. 
A. DEMOCRA TIC SELF-DETERMNA TION 
- 
ONCE IS NOT GOOD ENOUGH 
The dominant conception of self-detennination in international law continues to concentrate 
on the external exercise of the right, consisting of a singular act of a society In determining the 
status of a territory. 303 This conception is proving to be inadequate, being unable to deal with the 
various forms of self-determination which have evolved from a nurnber of distinct groups in the 
international system. As Cassese observes 'the current legal regime is 'blind to the demands of 
etlink groups, and national, religious, cultural, or linguistic minorities. 304 It has become 
necessary to reconceive self-determination so that it corresponds to the changing needs of the 
international system and the emergence of an international law of democracy. International law 
has become confused and anachronistic in its treatment of claims to self-determination with 
events M Africa and Asia demonstrating how self-determination in the traditional sense has 
easily led to a suppression of democracy and human rights. "' Any act of self-detennination 
must involve the traditionally understood external dimension as well as internal factors to truly 
take account of the wishes and desires of a population in determining how society is to be 
ordered and governance carried out. 'O' This will undoubtedly entail a great deal of controversy 
over meaning and appropriate procedures, for as Cassese notes, a re-conception of self- 
"' Cassese (1979) p. 142. 
112 R. McCorquodale. 'Self-Determination: A Human Rights Approach. ' 43 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly (1994) p. 859. 
'0' See Salmon in Tomuschat (1993) pp. 257-259. Orentlicher (1998) feels that post-war self-determination has 
accomplished what it can and it is now necessary to move on to internal considerations, p. 44. 
'04Cassese (1995) p. 238; Simpson (1996) pp. 255-56. It is within the area of the tights of minorities and indigenous 
peoples that the understanding of self-determination is being expanded. See the Draft Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (1994) UN Doc. E/CN. 4/SUB. 2/1994/2/Add. 1, especially Articles 3,4,19,20 and 31; Declaration 
on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic Minorities (1993). GA Res. 47/135, 
GAOR 47' Sess., Supp. 49, p. 2 10, especially Article 2, paragraphs 2 and 3. 
'0' Simpson (1996) p. 257; Salmon in Tomuschat (1993) pp. 256-257. 
'06 'Indeed it is undoubtedly a paradox and a fundamental contradiction to recognize the right of peoples to self- 
determination without contemplating the situation of inside interference', Salmon in Tomuschat (1993) p. 265. 
Orentlicher (1998) raises the interesting point that if democracy is to be a principle of international law then this will 
include the ability of individuals to change the political boundaries of society as well, p. 
3. A point refuted by M. 
Shaw. 'Peoples, Territonalism and Boundanes. '3 European Journal ofInternational Law (1997) p. 489. 
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determination 'has set in motion a restructuring and redefinition of the world community's basic 
, 307 
'rules of the game'. 
The most basic rule undergoing change is that self-determination can no longer be a right 
exclusive to states. Self-determination must now be viewed as containing a continual internal 
process. The difference between the external exercise of self-detenriination and its internal 
manifestation is that the internal exercise of the right involves a continual and dynamic process 
that focuses upon individuals. "' Internal self-determination involves the belief that the 
individuals of a state have the right to determine how society is ordered and managed, including 
adherence to non-discrimination and effective representation in government and, in general, 
respect for principles of good governance throughout society. "' Internal self-detenTiination 
allows individuals to freely choose their own government, representative institutions, and 
choose those representatives at reasonable intervals. "O It ensures that the changing of 
government and ordering of society is not be carried out by a few select individuals but a task 
for the entire population. "' Internal self-determination extends beyond political participation to 
include the continuing process of refining the social, economic and cultural development of a 
society. "' 
International law has primarily allowed for the singular exercise of self-determination 
concerning a territory, and even then not in a coherent fashion responding to the needs and 
desires of individuals. If self-determination is the basis for the exercise of all other rights"' then 
it cannot be exercised once and discarded. A representative of the UK before the UN Third 
Committee described the continual nature of internal self-detennination: 
self-determination is not a one-off exercise. It cannot be achieved for any people by 
one revolution or one election. It is a continuous process. It requires that peoples be 
given continuing opportunities to choose their governments and social systems, and 
to change them when they so choose... 
. 
314 
'0' Cassese (1995) p. 1. 
"' Cassese (1995) 10 1. 
'09 For the various views on internal self-determination see Cassese (1995) p. 10 1; McCorquodale (1994) p. 864; Rosas 
in Tomuschat (1993) p. 232; Simpson (1996) p. 270; Higgins (1994) p. 120. 
"0 A. Eide. 'Minority Situations: In Search of Peaceful and Constructive Solutions. ' 66 Notre Dame Law Review 
(1991) pp. 1336-1337. Also Rosas in Tomuschat (1993) p. 232. 
311 See statement by P. Jessop in United States Information Service. Daily Wireless Bulletin, No. 1183, (19 January 
1950) reprinted in Chen, 1951,112. 
"' J. Collins. 'Self-detern-unation in International Law: the Palestinians. ' 12 Case Western Reserve Journal of 
International Law (1980) p. 153 
313 HRC General Recommendation 12, paragraph I 
"' The representative continued; 'Many peoples today are deprived of their right of self-determination, 
by elites of their 
own countrymen and women; through the concentration of power in a particular political party, in a particular ethnic or 
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In the continual process of self-determination there must exist the opportunity for individuals not 
only to participate in determining the external status of a state, but also the ability to have a say 
in the development of the constitutive framework of society and regular participation in those 
areas of society which impact upon them. "' 
The present doctrine of self-detem-lination in international aw remains beyond the reach of 
individuals. Extending the scope of self-determination to internal factors Will undoubtedly 
increase the contentious nature of the light leading to more disagreement over its application. 
For those who hold that it would be impractical, if not impossible, for international law to 
extend self-determination to include an internal dimension are forced to justify why such an 
essential right is to remain a singular occurrence dependant upon the actions of states. If 
democracy is to be accepted as a principle of international law, existing rules must be 
transformed to accommodate this new idea. International human rights law provides a 
beginning for this transformation as its principles are based on ideas of tolerance and co- 
operation. An acceptance of democratic principles in the international system is an acceptance 
of the internaL continual nature of self-deterrriýination. "' The issue now becomes how to 
minimise the indeterminacy and ensure the effective exercise of self-determination on a 
continual basis. 
B. Recognising Democratic Se6(-determination 
For intemal self-detennination to occur a state must possess a particular fortu of 
government, for which democracy provides the most acceptable possibilities. It was discussed 
above how international law confines itself with the idea of effectiveness concerning the nature 
and structure of a government. Regionally the idea of effectiveness is losing ground to 
democratic legitimacy in the recognition of governments but this has not precipitated a change 
in the general international legal position. "' Progress in this direction has occurred at the level 
religious group, or in a certain social class. ' Statement by UK representative to the UN Tbird Committee (12 October 
1984) 55 British Yearbook of International Law (1984) p. 432. Also McCorquodale (1995) as to how the UK in 
general has supported internal self-determination in its colonies with the prominent exception of Hong Kong, pp. 315- 
317 
3" Rosas in Tomuschat (1993) pp. 248-249 
316 See C. Tomuschat. 'Self-Determination in a Post-Colonial World. ' in Tomuschat (1993) as to how international law 
has been reluctant to recognise this move, pp. 4-5. 
317 The end of the USSR and Yugoslavia provided the space for instituting democratic criteria for the purpose of 
recognition. This occurred at the initiative of the European Union and OSCE, see 'Declaration on the Guidelines on the 
Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union' (16 December 199 1) reprinted in 31 ELM (1992) p. 
1486. However, since the member states of the EU did not follow their own guidelines for recognition, with 
Germany 
unilaterally recognising Slovenia and Croatia the initiative lost a great deal of credibility as evidence of state practice, 
see Orentlicher (1998) pp. 67-68. Furthermore, this is an event that is exclusively confined to Europe and cannot be 
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of international human rights law where it has become acceptable to pass judgment on the 
behaviour of a government based on the human rights standards they have agreed to, including 
participation rights and others related to democracy. "' An international law of democracy 
guiding international practice concerning the recognition of governments would be based on 
core ideas as to what constitutes legitimate governance whereby individuals are able to be pall 
of the processes which impact their lives. 
The use of recognition to support an international aw of democracy runs counter to the 
accepted principle of non-intervention in domestic affairs and has been described as a denial of 
self-detem-lination. "' Common Article I of the International Covenants, which is often used as 
the basis for self-deternýiination, contains no detail as to the fonn of government to be established 
by a signatory state. The ICJ confirmed this point at the level of general international law 
expressing that '[e]very State possesses a fundamental right to choose and implement its own 
political, economic and social systems. "'O By establishing obligations of democracy, it is 
argued that there is a denial of the dynamic process of change that occurs in society. "' However 
one of the requirements which has come to be accepted as part of the idea of effectiveness is that 
a government must possess 'a reasonable prospect of permanence'. 322 Authoritarian rule 
demonstrates a relation between permanence and effectiveness as it often carries the assumption 
that current rulers are there forever. VvUle democracy is a single forni of governance it does 
allow for change in the process of governance as structures may be modified to fit society. 
Democracy in practice allows for more dynamism and is more capable of corresponding to the 
changes in society, authoritarian rule is conservative and does not usually respond positively to 
changes in society. 323 
in using democratic criteria for the recognition of governments it must be determined as to 
how the criteria be evaluated and judged, and by whom. 324 Lauterpacht provided guidance on 
regarded as a global norrn, but see C. Hillgruber. 'The Admission of New States to the International Community. ' 9 
European Journal ofInternational Law (1998) p. 491. 
"' Chen (1951) has pointed out that recognition is not limited to the emergence of new states or overthrows of 
government but something which has a day to day affect upon individuals, p. 13. 
"' Chen (195 1) pp. II 1- 112. N. Mugerwa. 'Subjects of International Law. ' in M. Sorenson, ed. Manual of Public 
International Law. (London: MacTrUllan, 1968) p. 27 1. Salmon in Tomuschat (1993) p. 259. 
"0 Nicaragua Case. I. C. J. Reports (1986) pp. 130-13 1. 
321 Chen(1951)p. 112. 
322 Mugerwain Sorenson (1968)p. 272. See Sen (1988) who describes pen-nanence as 'evidenced by passage of time 
showing that all resistance to the control of the authority had ceased, and that the people of the country 
by tolerating the 
government over a period of time had acquiesced in its control', p. 523. 
123 Under authoritarian rule individuals are often compelled by fear to accept whatever government is 
there so long as 
life continues S. Patel. Recognition in the Law of Nations. (Bombay: Tripathi, 1959) p. 76. See BliX 
(1970) on the 
short-terrn stability of authoritarian rule, pp. 642-643. 
32' Recognition of governments can be used to disguise other self-interested goals, see 
Menon (1994) p. 64. 
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tlýiis issue through a combination of hope tempered with caution. He firstly expressed that there 
could be the use of democratic criteria for recognition but only 'when accompanied by 
appropriate international safeguards'. "' The international system could engage in the process of 
non-recognition of government regarded as not meeting specified democratic criteria only 'if at 
the same time it provided methods guaranteeing and ensuring individual rights and government 
by consent within the territories of all States. "" As discussed above international human rights 
law, while confined to the statist nature of the international egal argument, has provided the 
possibility to achieve the type of system envisaged by Lauterpacht. Dugard and others point out 
that with a requirement for recognition based on an international aw of democracy most states 
would fail to meet the accepted criteria. "' If democracy is thought to be a good for the 
international system, as demonstrated by the level of global rhetoric which exists, then the fact 
that many states will not meet the entirety of the obligations associated with it cannot be a bar to 
its development. Full adherence to a law is not a condition for its existence or development. At 
present there is no established machinery for democratic recognition at the global level but it 
does exist at the regional level. In the European and Inter-American systems the machinery is in 
place and seen as legitimate by the states of the region. 
What the regional systems demonstrate is that for recognition of what constitutes a 
legitimate government based on democratic criteria it is necessary to follow a collective 
institutional approach, as opposed to unilateral pronunciations of states. "' Institutionahsed 
collective recognition would help to remove the individual subjectivity of bilateral actions of 
states which has plagued democratic recognition in the past. "' An international law of 
democracy depends upon removing the issue of determining what constitutes a legitimate 
... Lauterpacht (1947) p. 139. 
3" Lauterpacht (1947) p. 106. 
327 Dugard (1987) p. 128. Schachter feels that when it comes to government being based on democratic principles; 
'Many, probably most, states do not met the standard; they are nonetheless recognized as having legitimate 
governments. ' Schachter in Chamey (1997) p. 24. See McCourquadale (1995) who discusses how the UK does not 
necessarily meet the requirements of internal self-determination, pp. 317-318. Concerning membership of the UN there 
is a marked difference of opinion. Franck (1995) claims that most are democratic saying that in 1994 around 130 states 
were 'legally conUrUtted' to democracy. He does concede a few may only be democratic in form, pp. 85-86. Higgins 
(1994) is of the opinion that eighty five percent of the governments represented in the UN are 'dictatorships of one sort 
or another. ' p. 43. A final view says of the 185 member states, 50 could be described as undemocratic, 
M. Glennon. 
'Sovereignty and Community After Haiti: Rethinking the Collective Use of Force. ' 89 American 
Journal of 
International Law (1995) p. 71 
... Lauterpacht (1947) notes that this does depend upon a high degree of political integration which has occurred in the 
regional systems but not in the global, p. 67. 
"9 M. Peterson. Recognition of Goivi-nments: Legal Doctrine and State Practice, 1815-1995. (Basingstoke: Macrruillan, 
1997) p. 121-122; Chen (195 1) p. 115. Koskenniemi (1994) pp. 242-244, and how the act of collective recognition 
violates the basic principle of international law that states are allowed to decide their own course, p. 
243. 
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government from the exclusive control of states . 
330 Lauterpacht saw the unilateral ability of 
states to engage in recognition as 'disturbing' since it is possible to use 'the weapon of 
recognition for the purpose of achieving political advantages. 
33 
' Kennedy has remarked that the 
unilateral act of '[r]ecognition seems unsustainable as a purely discretionary sovereign 
Power 
. 
5332 
A collective process of recognition opens the issues involved to wider public scrutiny 
allowing discussions as to the nature of norms and principles involved. It acts as a more 
effective indicator of non-compliance and provides the necessary tools for ensuring 
compliance. "' Lauterpacht felt that constructing some fonn of collective recognition is not an 
insurmountable problem. He implied that an international institution offers the best possibilities 
to establish the machinery to ensure the process is undertaken properly. "' The largest obstacle 
to creating a system of recognition through a collective body is that governments are unlikely to 
give up their sovereign rights in this area to a multilateral body. "' Furthermore, using collective 
recognition through a multilateral body provides no guarantee of coherence, as international 
organisations naturally have a strong concern to maintain continuity and the smooth ftinctioning 
of the organisation. "' 
The UN is the most obvious for recognising the legitimacy of governments based upon 
democratic criteria with its capacity as a forum for debate combined with its procedures for 
determining the credentials of member states and the activities of the subsidiary bodies 
concerned with human rights, social, economic, and cultural issues. "' Membership to the UN is 
open to all peace-loving states that accept the obligations of the Charter and are deemed by the 
UN as capable of meeting these obligations. "' There is nothing in the Charter requiring 
"' Menon (1994) p. 5 1. 
... Lauterpacht (1947) p. 67. 
... D. Kennedy. International Legal Structures. (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1987) p. 135. 
... Higgins (1963) pp. 133-134. 
334 Lauterpacht (1947) p. 172. 
13' Lauterpacht (1947) pp. 401-402.; Peterson (1997) p. 130. Menon (1994) p. 5 1. Authors have also concluded that the 
practice of the UN demonstrates it is not to be a forum for collective recognition, see van der Vyver (1991) pp. 23-24. 
336 Peterson (1997) p. 132-136; S. Rosenne. 'Recognition of States by the United Nations. ' 26 British Yearbook of 
International Law (1949) pp. 437-447. Blix (1970) feels that the UN cannot act as a forum for recognition since the 
obligations of the Charter demand certain relations among states within the organisation, p. 693. 
337 Concerning the views of authors and the UN as a body for collective recognition see van 
der Vyver (199 1) pp. 22- 
28. For any body to act as a forum of collective recognition it will need to possess the 
legitimacy to do so in the eyes of 
its members, see D. Caron. 'Governance and Collective Legitimation in the New 
World Order. ' 6 Hague Yearbook of 
International Law (1993) pp. 3 0-32. 
338 UN Charter, Article 4. The Charter does not define the meaning or criteria of a 'peace-loving state', see 
H-J. Schdtz. 
'Membership. ' in R. Wolfrum, ed. United Nations: Law, Policies and Practice. 
(Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1995) 
pp. 877-878. 
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member states to adhere to any particular fon-n of social or political ordering. "' Practice has 
shown that universality has been the goal allowing all states a place in the organisation 
regardless of their social/political system. 140 The UN's involvement with recognition has also 
been as a forum for the playing out of ideological disagreements between powerful states. "' 
At an early stage of the organisation a proposal was put forth for representation in the UN to 
be based on the criteria of 
- 
effective authority over a territory, general consent of the population, 
ability and willing to achieve purposes of the Charter and respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. This proposal was quickly dismissed as it was felt that the UN was not 
the appropriate place for determining the legitimacy of governments and that regardless of the 
UN's view on the issue it would not affect inter-state relations on recognition. "' The 
accreditation process for allowing member states to take their place in the UN only looks at 
effective control over a territory, the ability to five up to the purposes and principles of the 
Charter and the ability to carry out the obligations of membership. "' This raises a problem in 
that non-democratic governments are able to carry out many of the obligations of membership 
obligations but not necessarily any human rights obligations. "' 
The GA has stated that membership of the UN 'should be considered in the light of the 
Purposes and Principles of the Charter and the circumstances of each case'. "' If the purposes 
and principles of the Charter are deemed to include respect for self-determination and human 
... During the drafting of the Charter views on criteria for membership varied from the Netherlands wanting an 
obligation of political institutions which ensure a state is the servant of its citizens, to the UK who called for flexible 
criteria of membership with no precise requirements. The view of the drafting committee recognised the difficulties in 
using political institutions for criteria of membership and felt that it might breach the principle of non-intervention, but 
that it would not be impossible to implement, UNCIO v. 7, pp. 18,326. It is worth noting that the entry requirements 
of the Charter are no longer applicable once a state is a member, see M. Lachs. 'Recognition and Modem Methods of 
International Co-operation. ' 35 British Yearbook ofInternational Law (1959) p. 255. 
340 D. Nincic. The Problem of Sovereignty in the Charter and in the Practice of the United Nations. (The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1970) p. 191. Wright notes that admission to the UN is recognition of a state and approval of 
credentials is recognition of a specific government. However, he points out how this is only a general fonn of 
recognition and does not impact bi-lateral relations among states. Q. Wright. 'Some Thoughts about Recognition. ' 44 
American Journal ofInternational Law (1950) p. 550-552. 
341 See Menon (1994) pp. 54-57; J. D. van der Vyver. 'Statehood in International Law. ' 5 Emory International Law 
Review (199 1) pp. 22-28; Q. Wright. 'Toward a Universal Law for Manldnd. " 63 Columbia Law Review (1963) p. 
449. 
342 Higgins (1963) pp. 146-149; H. Aufficht. 'Principles and Practices of Recognition by International Organizations. ' 
43 American Journal ofInternational Law (1949) p. 703. 
343 Trygve Lie described the UN as an organisation of 'varying and even conflicting ideologies' which requires an 
ideological neutral position on behalf of the organisation, see statements in Fox (1992) p. 602. 
344 Fox (1992) sees the UN as loosing credibility if it recognises governments who violate human rights obligations 
but 
are able to meet other obligations, p. 605. 
345 'Recognition by the United Nations of the Representation of a Member States. ' GA Res. 396 (V) in Key Resolutions, 
p. 572. 
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rights then requirements of democracy may be utilised for determining membership. "' in the 
ICJ advisory opinion on LN membership it was expressed that the ability of an entity to meet 
the principles and purposes of the UN are a necessary condition for membership. 
Denials of membership have been explicitly linked to the illegal use of force, denials of self- 
determination and the imposition of racist regime. "' Examples where the rejection of 
membership in the UN was due to the nature of a government were linked to wide-scale human 
rights abuses as occurred with Rhodesia and South Africa. "' These denials were linked to the 
internal structure and practice of a government and its treatment of the society within the 
territory it claimed to represent. "' The unilateral declaration of independence of the white racist 
regime of Rhodesia was declared illegitimate and illegal since the majority of the population 
was excluded from the process of govemance. "O Higgins notes that UN action in these cases 
shows a slight tendency to favour democratic criteria for recognising governments, but only 
when it involves a racist regime. "' However, some commentators have been quick to claim that 
even though democratic criteria were a consideration with the non-recognition of Rhodesia other 
factors were equally if not more important. "' Overall, the UN as an institution has had to rely 
on the idea of effectiveness in allowing government representation to the body as it has seen 
itself as an organisation of universal membership. "' 
Protests are raised by members concerning the nature of a regime and whether or not is 
should hold a seat in the UN but these protests are commonly based on political differences 
between individual states and rarely demonstrate a communal. view on the legitimacy of a 
government. The credibility of the process of collective recognition may be derived from the 
346 Resolution 396 (V) has not been applied in this way as demonstrated by the recognition of the communist 
government of the People's Republic of China, see GA Res. 2758 (XXVI) in Key Resolutions, p. 572. 
347 For a review of these situations see van der Vyver (199 1) pp. 34-74. 
348 See B. Roth. 'Popular Sovereignty: The Elusive Norm. ' 91 ASIL Proceedings (1997) pp. 497-499. 
349For a discussion of the South Aftican situation see D. Ciobanu. 'Credentials of Delegations and Representation of 
Member States at the United Nations. ' 25 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1976) p. 351, especially p. 
366-368 where Ciobanu feels the South African situation confirins the competence of the UN to look at how a 
government represents a society. 
310 See J. Fawcett. 'Security Council Resolutions on Rhodesia. ' 41 British Yearbook ofInternational Law (1965-66) p. 
112. For a rejection of Fawcett's View, which is seen as 'superfluous' and 'undesirable', see Devine (1971) pp. 410- 
417. 
... Higgins (1994) p. 44. Concerning Rhodesia see SC Res. 277 (1970). Concerning the Bantustans of South Affica 
see GA Res 2775E (XXVI) in Key Resolutions, p. 125, and GA Res 3411 D (XXX) GAOR 30thSess., Supp. 34, p. 36. 
3" Binavince in Macdonald (1974) claims that for Canada there were 'a number of stronger considerations aside from 
popular legitimacy which have influenced the Canadian position. ', p. 168. A similar situation exists today concerning 
Afghanistan where the Taliban hold control over most of the country but are not recognised as the rightful government 
due to issue of human rights and 'other considerations'. See 'The Taliban's Strategy 
for Recognition. ' Economist (6 
February 1999) p. 7 1. 
311 Menon (1994) states '... the widely held view is that admission to the United Nations is not equivalent to 
recognition though it has analogous effect to recognition. ' p. 57. Also Salmon in 
Tomuschat (1993) p. 262. 
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general acceptance of the members of the GA of certain broad principles of international law 
- 
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non-use of force, the right to self-determination and non-discrimination. These principles do 
not have a clear consensus or a great deal of coherence in actual practice but they do represent an 
area of broad agreement established through debate and discussion concerning the principles 
and purposes of the UN. As democracy receives greater acceptance at the international evel 
and is supported by the UN as a favourable good for the pursuit of international peace and 
security, making it part of the organisation's principles and purposes, then it could be used in 
issues of membership and accreditation. Its effective use as a criterion will be linked directly to 
issues of human rights protection that is another accepted area of concern for the GA and will 
depend on continual discussion and debate as to the nature and practice of democracy in 
domestic systems. The GA is also able to call on the expertise of other UN organs that report to 
it annually to ensure the discussion is far-reaching, incorporating all aspects of good governance. 
This process would by no means be perfect for detenninations of membership to any 
international organisation consists of an 'interplay between law, politics and ideology'. 355 
Furthermore, under the present Charter arrangement action taken against a member government 
involves action by both the SC and the GA ensuring that the political considerations of the 
permanent members of the SC will dominate any action 
. 
3" There is also the issue of the ICJ's 
opinion concerning membership criteria where it was stated that the requirement of Article 4 
that all states be 'peace-loving' is 'an exhaustive enumeration' and that 'the terms of the 
paragraph preclude the idea that considerations extraneous to these principles' may be 
351 utilised. The Court itself explained in the same opinion that the exhaustive character of 
Article 4 'does not forbid the taking into account any factor which it is possible reasonably and 
in good faith to connect with the conditions laid down in that Arficle. 351 it was examined in 
... Violation of the UDHR was also a reason, see GA Res 3207 (X-NIX) GAOR 29' Sess., Supp. 3 1, p. 2. 
... E. Osieke. 'Admission to Membership in International Organisations: The Case of Namibia. ' 51 British Yearbook of 
International Law (1980) p. 189. Ciobanu (1976) feels that the political nature of the GA precludes its ability to be an 
effective forum for determining the proper nature of government in the absence of the involvement of a legal body such 
as the 10, p. 371. 
356 As occurred throughout the Cold War, see L. Goodrich. The United Nations. (London: Stevens, 1960) pp. 88-96; D. 
Lloyd. 'Succession, Secession, and State Membership in the United Nations. ' 26 New York University Journal of 
Intemational Law and Politics (1994) pp. 768-769. The ICJ has confin-ned that any action under Articles 3-6 of the 
Charter must involve the SC, see Competence of Assembly Regarding Admissions to the United Nations (Advisory 
Opinion 3 March 1950). iCi Reports (1950) p. 4. Also H. Kelsen. The Law of the United Nations. (London: Stevens, 
1964) p. 711. This raises the issue that if the UN is to act as a forum for an international law of democracy it will need 
to address the lack of democracy of its own institutional structure, on this point see D. Archibugi. 'The Reforrn of the 
UN and Cosmopolitan Democracy: A Critical Review. ' 30 Journal of Peach Research (1993) p. 301; N. White. 
'Accountability and Democracy within the United Nations: A Legal Perspective. ' 13 International Relations 
(1997) p. 
I. 
... Conditions ofAdmission of a State to Membership in the United Nations (Article 4) ICJ Reports (1948) p. 63. 
358 Condition ofAdmission, p. 63. 
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Chapter I how the Charter does not give rise to concrete obligations of human rights or 
democracy. If the overall view of the UN is shifting so that respect for democracy and hurnan 
rights are becoming concerns for the organisation then its ability to examine the internal 
structure of a state would be legitimate. 
C ENsuRflvG DEmom Tic SELF-DETERmwA TioN 
Institutionalised. collective recognition of a government based on democratic criteria would 
demonstrate the acceptance and existence of an international aw of democracy making it then 
necessary to ensure compliance with the obligations it creates. To ensure the existence and 
continual process of democratic self-determination international efforts of election involvement 
and emphasis upon human rights obligations will provide the necessary framework for good 
governance in a democratic society. The issues raised above concerning the use of force or 
sanctions to ftuther an international aw of democracy will not be entertained as these means 
have proven unsatisfactory and there appears little hope in separating action from self-interest. 
Furthermore the use of coercive measures runs contrary to many of the principles upon which 
democracy and human rights are based. Involvement in elections and emphasising human 
rights obligations are two areas where there presently exists acceptable international practice 
upon which to build. Election involvement provides the necessary procedural elements to 
ensure democracy, with human rights obligations underlying the substantive nature of 
democracy. In pursuing greater involvement in elections and attention to human rights 
obligations there will be the residual benefit of fostering tolerance and the recognition of 
diversity among states, a necessary element of democracy. "' 
Involvement in elections by international institutions has been described as a guarantee of 
'self-detennination as a fundamental right that transcends domesticity to become an issue of 
intemational concem'. "' Election involvement is easily cnticised as a fonn of intervention into 
the domestic affairs of a state. It is suggested that if there exists an obligation to guarantee 
participation rights which specify the holding of elections, involvement by outside bodies cannot 
be illegitimate for it will be giving effect to substantive nghts, which already exist in law. 
"' The 
UN has the possibility of increasing its involvement in elections based on past activities and 
... Salmon in Tornuschat (1993) p. 278. 
3" Evans and Olidge (1992) pp. 1728-9. 
Asante (1994) p. 279; Fox (1992) pp. 5 87-94. 
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existing treaty obligations dealing with the rights of political participation. "' In expanding its 
involvement in elections the UN will have to appear as a neutral body if it is to be credible and 
effective in overcoming disputes which arise over the process of elections. "' This problem 
provides its own solution, as UN involvement will naturally include representatives from a 
number of different states and political systems overcoming accusations of bias. "' 
A ftuther issue to be addressed is how to decide when to become involved in elections and 
to what degree. "' If the decision to become involved is left to the members of the SC then 
involvement would appear to be based on the interests of the superpowers and seen as an 
interventionist tool. The decision not to get Involved in recent elections in Liberia demonstrates 
the reluctance of the SC to become involved in 'nations not deemed strategically important. "" 
This makes it necessary for the SG, the GA and SC to develop clear and proactive principles and 
167 
procedures on the issue. Decisions to become involved need to be made on the basis of clear 
and accepted terms of involvement with the fall understanding of all the parties involved. 16' By 
establishing clearly the terms and purpose of the involvement it will not be possible for 
governments to exploit the presence of the UN to show that their system of governance has the 
approval of the international body thereby bestowing legitimacy. "' 
For the UN to take on a greater role in election involvement it will be necessary for it to 
establish a clearer position with regards to democracy and elections. The existence of 
resolutions in support of elections qualified by statements regarding respect for state sovereignty 
will keep the position of the organisation vague and it will create difficulties in establishing 
acceptable criteria for what constitutes free and fair elections. "' Some argue that the UN should 
limit itself to only providing technical assistance as requested by a state or when elections are 
attached to peacekeeping missions. "' This limited role of the UN in elections would not be 
362 Fox (1992) p. 57 1, on how the UN has not brought the two different regimes together, p. 589. 
161 Stoelting (1992) p. 406. In the recent elections in Cambodia international observers were quick to declare the 
wi tj I ti ar fr elections free and fair in the face of obvious irregularities th the domes c popu a on f om convinced that 
democracy in practice had actually occurred, see TU Loses Face for Cambodia Poll Verdict. ' The Guardian (5 August 
1998) p. 10; 'Hun Sen Victory Fails to Silence Critics. ' 7he Guardian (6 August 1998) p. 13. 
364 Beigbeder (1994) 34; N. Nevitte and S. Canton. 'The Role of Domestic Observers. ' 8 Journal ofDemocracy (1997) 
p. 50. 
365 In the forTner-Yugoslavia the OSCE was under pressure to ensure elections were held as soon as possible in an 
environment no conducive to the democratic process creating the difficulty of giving legitimacy to 
leaders who are 
equally non conducive to democracy, see Orentlicher (1998) pp. 70-72. 
366 Stoelting (1992) pp. 418-419. 
367 See Stoelting (1992) pp. 3 82,3 89. 
36' Hodgson (1992) pp. 161-162. 
369Hodgson (1992) p. 15 8; Evans and Olidge (1992) pp. 1751-55. 
370 Hodgson (1992) pp. 146-7. 
37 ' Hodgson (1992) p. 173. Stoelting (1992) appears to claim that 'UN-monitored elections occur only in crisis- 
embroiled nations'p. 406 which does not appearto include 
humanitarian crisis, pp. 388-389. 
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beneficial for the development of democracy in the international system. UN GA Resolution 
668 sees the role of the organisation in elections as diminishing, emphasising a shift to focusing 
on post-election developments. This implies the belief that once a democratic electoral system 
is established it will continue to fimction effectively. Election involvement on a continual basis 
is important, as there is no guarantee that one election assures democracy for the future and that 
sitting governments will not try to manipulate the domestic electoral laws to their advantage. "' 
Chapter 2 discussed how democracy means much more then just holding elections. That 
has been the past practice concerning self-determination where the single determination of a 
territorial unit was seen as the exercising of the right. Active protection of the participatory 
process after and between elections is crucial to the continuance of democracy. International 
human rights law has a crucial role in this regard as a safeguard for active participation and the 
protection of individual autonomy. Chapter I discussed the difficulties faced by individuals in 
accessing and utilising international legal instruments for the purpose of protecting their 
autonomy and participation. The beneficial aspects of the reporting procedures connected with a 
number of international instruments will provide a means by which the international system is 
able to assist in bringing individuals closer to these documents. The reporting procedures 
provide a forurn for discussion concerning compliance with obligations, facilitating the 
realisation of rights, reviews national legislation, administrative rules, and procedures and 
practices to ensure conformity with obligations, the monitoring of the actual situation in a state 
on a regular basis, to facilitate public scrutiny of government policies, to evaluate the extent to 
which obligations have been realised. "' The procedures remain statecentric in nature in that 
governments are free to disregard the proposals or suggestions of the monitoring body or refuse 
to participate all together. The importance of the reporting procedures for an international law of 
democracy is that they provide details of the day to day existence of democracy and infort-nation 
concerning the structures of governance which support a democratic society. For the reporting 
procedures to become more effective the monitoring bodies will have to take a clear stand on 
democracy instead of adhering to the position of ideological neutrality. 
... As demonstrated by the ruling party of the government of Mexico, the PRI who for years was able to portray the 
illusion of democracy while using the law to ensure its own position is not compromised. See the Inter-Amencan 
Commission on Human Rights. Repon On The Situation Of Human Rights in Mexico, 1998 Chapter VI 'Political 
Rights. ' which provides a review of the legal framework and recent refon-ns. Also see Nevitte and Canton 
(1997) p. 5 1; 
G. Hen-net, et al., eds. Elections without Choice. (London: Macmillan, 1978) p. viii. 
373 Commiittee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. General Comment No. I (1989) UN Doc. E/I 989/22 in 1 (1) 
IHRR (1994) p. 1, paragraphs 1-6. Also HRC General Comment No. 2 (1981) GAOR 36d' Sess., Supp No. 40, 
reprinted in 1 (2) IHRR (1994) p. 2. Reporting obligations include not only providing information about domestic 
laws 
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V1. CONCLUSION 
If international law is to move from a matter exclusively between states and become an 
effective factor in the lives of individuals it will need to promote and protect the view that a 
legitimate government is one that is representative of and accountable to those individuals in its 
territory. This is to be determined by the existence of effective lights which are accessible by 
individuals, the scope and nature of participation in the process of governance and whether or 
not individuals or groups are marginalised due to their socio-economic onditions. The power 
and attraction of the democratic process 
lies M its logic, which flows from the individual human person, the one irreducible 
entity in world affairs and the logical source of all human rights. At the same time 
that democratization will rely upon individual commitment to flourish, 
374 democratization will foster the conditions necessary for the individual to flourish. 
171 In the international system democracy is accepted, in rhetoric at least, as a desirable good. 
The global rhetoric in support of democracy and human rights provides moral force to these 
ideas and require opponents to come up with a better solution, something that has yet to occur. 
However, rhetoric alone is not enough. Democracy is not a natural progression for the 
development of society, the existence of democracy in one region does not automatically signal 
its growth elsewhere and once established democracy is not guaranteed for infinity. "' If the 
international system is to voice support for democracy than international law will have to adapt 
so that words become reality. The work of the UN will act as the framework for an international 
law of democracy due to its global scope and the fact that efforts in support of democracy come 
from significant cross-sections of differing societies. The diverse nature of the UN may inhibit 
establishing a definite agreement over the nature and content of an international law of 
democracy. At the same time the debate and discussion which occurs will establish a minimum 
threshold for the formulation and workings of an international law of democracy which Will 
and other norms but also practices and decisions of courts and other state organs and further relevant facts which show 
the degree of actual implementation and enjoyment of rights. 
"' Report by the Secretary General. Support by the United Nations System of the Efforts of Governments to Promote 
and Consolidate New or Restored Democracies. UN Doc. A/51/761 (20 December 1996) paragraph 128. 
... Taking the existence of wide scale rhetoric as proof of the desirability of democracy does lack a certain degree of 
concreteness necessary for a legal principle. However it does provide evidence of the emergence of a principle and a 
firmer basis than that established by T8on who believes that there should be an international law of democracy 'simply 
because it is the right thing to do', see F. T8on. 'Changing Perceptions of Domestic Junsdicfion and Intervention. ' in 
T. Farer, ed. Beyond Sovereignty. - Collectively Defending Democracy in the Americas. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1996) p. 35. 
376 See G. Sartori. 'How Far Can Free Government Travel' 6 Journal ofDemocracy (1995) p. 107. Hobsbawrn (1987) 
has shown this to be proven in history. The halt of the second democratic 'ývave' of the turn of this century 
demonstrates the lack of universal or inevitable process of democracy, p. I 10. 
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contribute to the enhancement and protection of the dignity and physical survival of the 
individual. 
Due to the diversity of and lack of agreement within the UN, measures in support of 
democracy remain weak. The situation is exacerbated by the fact that democracy is only 
recently being discussed in a substantive manner, by the indeterminacy of the international legal 
argument which allows for the existence of opposable but equally valid principles and the ability 
of states to manipulate the law to finther their own interests. Warnings have been expressed 
against elevating democracy to a higher norrn of international relations as it may 'ground the 
new world order on totalitarianism and subjectivity with the mask of democracy'. "' This is a 
very real fear as direct action in support of democracy has often had more detrimental impacts 
upon the individual and society. At the regional level the use of democratic recognition, election 
involvement, and enhancing human rights enforcement have been utilised to ensure an 
international law of democracy regionally. These possibilities exist in principle in the 
international system but have not attained the level of agreement necessary for action. The 
effectiveness of regional systems in support of a regional international law of democracy will 
provide guidance for finther global development. "' If states are collectively willing to advance 
democracy as a necessary good within a smaller grouping there can be no perceivable reason 
why democracy is not a good worth pursing on a larger scale. As expressed in the Vienna 
Declaration; 'The international community should support the strengthening and promotion of 
democracy, development and respect for human rights and ftmdamental freedoms in the entire 
world'. 379 
... Salmon in Tomuschat (1993) p. 278. 
378 See Salmon in Tomuschat (1993) p. 279. 
379 Part 1, paragraph 8. 
CHAPTER4 
EXPANDING THE PROTECTION AND PROMOTION OF 
DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Europe has been successful in advancing the protection and promotion of democracy and 
human rights through an international legal framework. Europe has seen a great deal of 
development in the areas of democracy and human rights, especially in the past 10 years, but 
these developments remain confined to Europe and do not stand alone as evidence of a global 
non-n. These developments demonstrate the potential and possibilities that exist for an 
international law of democracy and the contribution of regional arrangements to the 
international protection and promotion of democracy and human rights. The experiences of 
Europe provide insight concerning the ability of international institutions to effectively support 
democracy and human rights and to have a significant impact upon the lives of individuals. 
Recent developments make the co-operative pursuit of common goals of democracy and 
human rights among the regional institutions of Europe an important condition of their 
development. On the one hand there exists the states formerly under communist rule that are 
developing systems of democracy and human nghts protection. On the other, there are the 
established democracies that are facing low levels of participation, apathy, problems With 
minority groups, govemment centralisation, and other circumstances that have created the 
need for a resurgence of democracy and human rights within these societies. ' The continual 
development of democracy and human rights needs to be inclusive of all of society, an 
important issue on a region wide scale, as the question of minonties and their place in the 
societies ot Europe is an area of conflict, both conceptually and in very real physical ten-ns. A 
related point is the present questioning of the idea of European identity - who is European and 
what does it mean to be European? Issues of identity are a major factor in the institutional co- 
operation in the region as it will be necessary to develop a single Europe and not varied levels 
of 'Europeaness'. 
This chapter will look at the work of 3 regional organisations in Europe who take 
democracy and human rights as essential or primary concerns - the Council of Europe (COE), 
the European Union (EU) and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(OSCE, formerly the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe CSCE). Each of 
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these bodies was set up to address a specific issue facing Europe and all have largely followed 
their own development. Now with the changes occurring in Europe the purposes and activities 
of the three are becoming closely related in pursuit of common goals related to democracy and 
human rights. 
11. Tim COUNCIL OF EUROPE 
The COE has placed the protection and promotion of democracy and human rights as its 
primary task and as the key for building European unity. The organisation serves three basic 
functions: to protect and reinforce democratic pluralism and human rights; to seek common 
solutions to major societal problems of the member states; and to encourage a heightened 
sense of Europe's multi-cultural identity! Regarding democracy and human rights the COE 
has not forced any particular model upon members or prospective members, preferring to 
recognise the uriique situation each state faces and provide assistance within that context? 
A. STA TuTE oF THE COE AND SummiTDECLARA TIONS 
The aims of the COE are to achieve greater unity between members for the purpose of 
safeguarding and realising the ideals and principles that create a common heritage and to 
facilitate economic and social progress. ' The member states reaffirm their devotion to the 
spiritual and moral values that are the common heritage of their peoples and the true source of 
individual freedom, political liberty and the rule of law, principles that form the basis of 
genuine democracy. ' Article 3 of the Statute establishes the criteria for membership stating 
that all members 'must accept the principles of the rule of law and the enjoyment of all person 
within its jurisdiction of human rights and fundamental freedoms'. ' Article 8 stipulates that 
any member which has seriously violated the terms of Article 3 may be suspended from the 
' See generally COE. Disillusionment with Democracy. - Political Parties, Participation and Non-Participation in 
Democratic Institutions ofEurope. (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 1994). 
' COE. 7he Challenges of a Greater Europe. - 77ze Council of Europe and Democratic Security. (COE: Strasbourg, 
1996) p. 29. 
'A necessary position due to the recent expansion to 41 members. 
4 Statute of the COE (ETS No. 1) Article 1. 
' The Consultative Assembly felt that democracy, individual freedoms, and the rule of law are three aspects of one 
reality and that they were inseparable, see COE. Collected Edition of the Travaux Preparatoires' of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, vol. 5, hereinafter Collected Edition (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1979) p. 288. 
' This has been interpreted to included elections at reasonable intervals with secret ballot and universal suffrage, 
sovereign parliaments and free political parties, Parliamentary Assembly Resolution (800) 'Principles of Democracy. ' 
(1983). 
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work of the organisation until it complies with Article 3 or it may have its membership 
revoked! 
In 1993, the Heads of State and Governments of the COE held their first ever summit in 
Vienna where they recognised the importance of democracy, human rights and the rule of law 
for the security and stability of Europe. ' The assembled leaders saw the end of the Cold War 
as ca historic opportunity' for peace and stability on the continent due to the widespread 
existence of democracy, human rights, the rule of law and a common cultural heritage. ' The 
Summit marked a new purpose for the COE to create 'a Europe of democracy security' 
through refomiing the ECHR, establishing legal commitments for the protection of minorities, 
combating racism, xenophobia, anti-semitism and intolerance and by improving local and 
regional representation. In 1997 the COE held its second summit in Strasbourg adopting a 
Final Declaration and Action Plan" targeting the strengthening of human rights and pluralist 
democracy, emphasising social cohesion and the essential role of education and culture. The 
Action Plan provided guidelines for the pursuit of democratic security through ratifying 
Protocol 11 of the European Convention on Hw-nan Rights (ECHR) for a single Court of 
human rights (see below), creating a Commissioner for Human Rights, enforcing compliance 
with commitments, combating racism and intolerance, and protecting minorities, promoting 
social rights and encouraging social cohesion. They also agreed to develop a programme on 
education for democratic citizenship 'with a view to promoting citizensý awareness of their 
rights and responsibilities in a democratic society. ' 
The institutional work of the COE is conducted through three bodies. The Committee of 
Ministers (the Committee) is the decision making body for the COE and the supervisor of the 
ECHR. " The Parliamentary Assembly (COE PA) is made up of representatives chosen from 
the parliaments/legislatures of each member state who adopt their own decisions and 
resolutions and make recommendations to the Committee dealing with policies corresponding 
to the aims of the COE. The COE PA is seen as a guardian of democracy and human rights 
and as a foram for reviewing the condition of rights in freedoms in all member states. 
" The 
7 Greece withdrew from the organisation in 1970 in the wake of a report by the European Commission on 
Human 
Rights regarding the civil disturbances at the time and rejoined in 1974. More recently UTaine has come under 
criticism for failing to meet its obligations leading to calls for its suspension, see 'The Monitoring 
CorrMttee in 
Favour of Withdrawing the Ukraine Delegation's Credentials. ' COE Press Release (20 May 1999). 
' Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (1993) reprinted in 1 (1) HIRR (1994) p. 240. 
'Vienna Declaration, paragraph 2. 
'0 Reprinted in 18 Human Rights Law Journal (1997) p. 29 1. 
" ECHR, Article 54. 
12 Deputy SG of COE in Democracy and Human tights: Proceedings of the Colloquy 
Organised by the Government 
of Greece and the Council ofEurope, (24-26 September, 1987) hereinafter COE Colloquy. (Kehl: Engel, 
1990) p. 2. 
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third body is the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe (CLRAE) which 
works to strengthen democracy and human rights at the local and regional level within states. 
1. Committee ofMinisters 
The Committee of Miiýiisters acts as the executive of the COE. In 1994 the Committee 
declared that it has the power to ensure member states conform to their cornmitments to 
democracy, human rights and the rule of law as agreed to in the COE Statute, the ECHR and 
other legal instruments. " Under the Declaration the Committee is able to take up the issue of 
compliance with commitments in situations referred to it by a member state, the Secretary- 
General or the COE PA. Once a situation is before the Committee it will receive information 
on the matter and issue an opinion, recommendation or 'take any other decision within its 
statutory powers'. The consultations by the Committee under the Declaration are held in 
private with the proceedings kept secret in order to ensure an environment of 'dialogue, co- 
operation and mutual assistance'. This point that has come under criticism from the COE PA 
due to the lack of democratic transparency In dealing with issues directly related to democracy 
and human rights. " 
The Committee's main activity is the adoption of an Intergovernmental Programme of 
Action that guides the activities of the COE. The present programme" focuses on assisting 
central and eastern European states in their transitions to democracy, improving the role of 
hut-nan rights and law and addressing the issues of minorities, racism, and intolerance. The 
programmes are based on the importance and essential nature of democracy and hutnan rights 
with regards to social cohesion, quality of life and cultural pluralism. At the Strasbourg 
Summit the Committee was given the responsibility of undertaking reform of the COE in 
order to implement the idea of European democratic security and address those changes 
'Declaration on Compliance with Commitments Accepted by Member States of the Council of Europe. ' 95" 
Session of the Committee of Ministers (10 November 1994) reprinted in 2 HJRR (1995) p. 250; 'Procedure for 
Implementing the Declaration of 10 November 1994 on Compliance with Con-irruitments Accepted by Member States 
of the Council of Europe. ' (20 April 1995) reprinted in 4 IHRR (1997) p. 244. 
14 The COE PA conducts its own monitoring activities on compliance with commitments and appears to be resentful 
of the Committee's procedures due to their confidential nature, which the Committee stresses is necessary to ensure a 
frank and constructive dialogue, see the questions of the COE PA and responses from the Committee of Ministers, 
reprinted in 4 IHRR (1997) pp. 246-255. Admittedly the CoMrrUttee does not provide much infon-nation in their 
statements concerning the situation in particular member states, see Honouring Of Obligations And Commitments By 
Estonia, reply to Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation 1313 (1997) (CM/Del/Dec/Act(97)586/2.5, 
GREL(97)11,14); Honouring of obligations and commitments by Albania, draft reply to Parliamentary Assembly 
Recommendation 1312 (1997) (GR-EDS(98)31 and 32). 
15 'A Programme Equal to the Challenges of the New Europe', may be found at [http: //www. coe. fi7/eng/act- 
e/epgrmact. htm]. 
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brought on by enlargement. 16 The increased membership will bring new and diverse demands 
upon the COE naturally necessitating changes structurally and conceptually to the organisation 
as the idea of a common heritage among members is expanded. 
2. Parliamentary Assembly 
The COE PA has the primary task of discussing the issues facing the COE as well as 
monitoring the commitments of existing members, along with providing suggestions to the 
Committee and issuing its own resolutions. The COE PA plays a major role in the admission 
process to the COE by conducting enquiries and studies as to whether a candidate fulfils all the 
necessary requirements of membership before giving approval to the Committee to invite a 
state to become a full member. As the states of central and eastern Europe expressed interest 
in membership the COE PA introduced in 1989 a special guest status allowing a state to 
participate in COE activities at a limited level. The purpose of the special status was to assist 
these states in their transitions to democracy and improve their structures for the protection and 
promotion of human rights. " 
The COE PA has recently shown concern over the poor rates of participation in elections 
in Europe with a 1997 resolution on 'Instruments of Citizen Participation in Representative 
Democracy'. " The resolution is based on the need to ensure the 'active contribution of all 
citizens' and the concern over the currently poor rate of participation and to find means for 
allowing society to express their needs and stimulate democratic debate. It sees a system of 
representative parliamentary debate as essential and that 'the use of direct democracy must be 
regarded as a complement. The COE PA has also emphasised the need for human rights 
education" as there exists 'a certain lack of human rights culture and a failure to understand 
the true meaning of human rights and their implications in everyday life. ' It recommends that 
substantive efforts be taken to enhance an understanding of human rights and tolerance as 
'human rights are not only a matter of government policies but also depend on the attitudes of 
ordinary citizens in everyday life. ' The COE PA has also recently offered recommendations 
on the protection of refugees and asylw-n-seekers, " and concerning human rights protection in 
* Strasbourg Action Plan Part V. 'Structures and Working Methods. '
a. Belarus * The following states presently hold special guest status: Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Bosnia-Her-zegovin 
was granted guest status in 1992 but was suspended in 1997. 
" Resolution 1121 (1997). 
'9 'On Human Rights Education. ' Recommendation 1346 (1997) 
'0 'Protection and Reinforcement of the Human Rights of Refugees and Asylum-seekers 
in Europe Recommendation 
1327(1997). 
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the fonner-Yugoslavia. " The ability of the COE PA to take any substantive action upon its 
resolutions and decisions is limited by the power vested in the Committee (as demonstrated by 
the Framework Convention on Minorities, see below). The COE PA does contribute by 
bringing the discourse of democracy and human rights into a wider public forum raising 
important issues and areas for action. 
3. Congress OfLocal And Regional Authorities OfEurope (CLRAE) 
The COE has stated that the best way of ensuring the principles of democracy and human 
rights is to develop democracy at the local level, for this is where individuals most directly 
participate in democratic life. " CLRAE has the purpose of bringing democracy closer to 
individuals by applying the European Charter of Local Self-Government. " In the Charter, 
local authorities are described as 'one of the main foundations of any democratic regime' and 
that it is at the local level where the bulk of political participation occurs. Article 4 provides 
that '[p]ublic responsibilities shall generally be exercised, in preference, by those authorities 
which are closest to the citizen. ' Debates by CLRAE have shown this idea to represent a 
24 general organisational principle for all aspects of society in the member states. CLRAE has 
taken fiirther efforts with the European Convention on the Participation of Foreigners in Public 
Life at Local Level 2' dealing with the civil and political rights for foreign residents, including 
the right to vote, freedom of expression, assembly and association. There is also the LODE 
programme that promotes the ideas and practice of local democracy at the inter-governmental 
level with emphasis on the communities of central and eastern Europe, with which CLRAE is 
21 actively involved. 
The idea that decisions and powers which impact the individual should be as close as 
possible to the individual not only represents a certain degree of common sense but also 
enhances the democratic legitimacy of a society as individuals are more able to be part of the 
decision-making process. The work of CLRAE is complemented by the EU's Conumittee of 
the Regions, with both bodies striving to develop responsibility and empowerment closer to 
the day to day lives of individuals. 
" Tunctioning of the institutions for the Protection of Human Rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
' Recommendation 
1337 (1997) calling for pressure to be placed on governments to adhere to the General Framework Agreement. 
COE. Huinan Rights: A Continuing Challenge for the Council of Europe, hereinafter Continuing Challenge 
(Strasbourg: COE, 1995) p. I 11. 
1985 ETS No. 122. Entered into force I September 1988,34 signatories 31 ratifications. 
Continuing Challenge pp. 112-113. 
ETS No. 144.1992 Entered into force I May 1997,8 signatories, 4 ratifications. 
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The primary legal framework for the protection and promotion of democracy and human 
rights rests with the European Convention on Hwnan Rights. The ECHR was adopted with 
the purpose of protecting against the revival of aggressive and repressive dictatorships by 
ensuring the enforcement of rights contained in the UDHR. " The signatories to the ECHR 
recognise the overall aim of the COE in creating unity among its members and that one way 
towards this unity is through the 'maintenance and ftu-ther realisation of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms. "' 
In the Preamble states reafEm their belief in human rights which are seen as a foundation 
for peace and justice and 'are best maintained 
... 
by an effective political democracy and 
... 
a 
common understanding and observance of the Human Rights upon which they depend'. The 
rights and freedoms contained in the ECHR and its Protocols deal primarily with civil and 
political rights with some social rights included. " Article I of the ECHR obligates the states to 
secure the rights of all individuals within their jurisdiction. " Interpretation of the ECHR takes 
into account the UDHR, the aims of the COE, the need for effective representative democracy, 
and the acknowledgement of a common heritage among members with respect for the rule of 
law. " The basis of the ECHR is not the reciprocal relations of states in the field of hurnan 
rights but 'to establish a common public order of the free democracies of Europe with the 
object of safeguarding their common heritage of political traditions, ideas, freedom and the 
rule of law. 33 
The ECHR framework assumes the existence of democracy in a signatory state through 
the membership criteria of the COE. The ECHR itself contains no provision directly dealing 
with participation or democracy, with obligations regarding voting being a later inclusion in 
Protocol No. 1. During the drafting of the ECHR there was disagreement as to whether there 
should be explicit protection of democratic institutions. " Some states favoured such an 
26 The efforts of the LODE programme also assist in preparing a state for membership to the COE, for details see 
[http: //www. coe. fr/cplre/den-dr/eng/elode/index. htrn]. 
2' ETS No. 5 as amended by Protocol No. II ETS No. 15 5. 
" A. Robertson and J. Merrils. Human Rights in the World, 3rd ed. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1989) 
p. 82. 
29ECHR, Preamble, paragraph 3. 
'0 For a review of the rights in the ECHR see D. Harris, et a]. Law of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
(London: Butterworths, 1995) 
ECHR, Article 1. Also Austria v Italy European Commission, No. 788/60 (11 January 196 1) paragraph 58. 
Kjelasen, Bush Madsen and Pedersen v Denmark Series A No. 23 (1976), paragraph 53. Also COE Colloquy pp. 
18-19. 
Austria v Italy, paragraph 5 8. 
For more on the drafting history see S. Marks 'The European Convention on Human Rights and Its "Democratic 
Society. "' 66 British Yearbook ofInternational Lmi, (1996) pp. 221-224. 
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inclusion, " while others, like the UK, felt that it would be 'inappropriate' to include provisions 
concerned with democratic institutions. " The Consultative Assembly, which was charged 
with drafting the ECHR, felt strongly about including provisions on democracy as a necesswy 
means to give practical effect to the protection of rights, as the only way to ensure rights are 
truly protected is through a democratic regime and democratic institutions. 37 In the end, the 
Assembly's proposals were rejected by the Comnlittee of Ministers. This rejection may be 
explained by the fact that COE criteria for membership depends upon a state being democratic, 
making ffirther guarantees frivolous. But such an explanation does not hold up to the strong 
stance taken by the Consultative Assembly during the drafting stages of the necessity of such 
provisions. A more feasible explanation is likely to be in the reluctance of any government in 
1950 to accept obligations concerning political participation, either in their own states or the 
implications this may have had for overseas possessions. 
The position of democracy In. the ECHR occurs along much more subtle Imes as it is held 
that the ECHR and its Protocols exist within the context of a 'democratic society' as expressed 
in the Preamble. In establishing the context of a 'democratic society' the European Court of 
Human Rights (the Court) has usually taken the member states of the COE as examples but 
has also allowed for the possibility of examining the situations and practices of other 
democratic societies. " The meaning and content of a 'democratic society' is not elaborated 
upon concerning its inclusion in Articles 8-11. Resulting in the view of some commentators as 
Ia phrase heavy with uncertainty,. 39 The approach to the idea of a democratic society by the 
organs of the ECHR demonstrates the difficulty of giving a political concept legal elaboration 
for even if the members of the COE possess a common heritage the intricacies of their 
democratic systems do differ. 'o 
To accommodate the essential differences of the democratic societies of the members 
states there has developed the concept of 'margin of appreciation' used by the Court to 
See the remarks by Ireland in Collected Edition, p. 60. 
Collected Edition, P. 70. 
Collected Edition, p. 290. 
See L. Loucaidis. 'Restrictions or Limitations on the Rights Guaranteed by the European Convention on Human 
Rights. ' 4 Finnish Yearbook ofInternational Law (1993) p. 3 50. YOurOw observes rightly that as the case law of the 
system develops there will be less recourse to comparisons outside Europe. This is to be expected as a 
'regional 
system' develops. H. Yourow. The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine the Dynamics of European 
Human Rights 
Jurisprudence. (The Hague: Kluwer, 1996) p. 30. 
'9 Harris et al. (1995) p, 291. One author has come up with a non-exhaustive list of the elements of a democratic 
society based on the statements of the Court, it includes participation, accountability, representation, pluralisn-i, 
tolerance, broadn-findedness, freedom of expression for public discussion and the protection of minorities. 
A. 
Clapham. Human Rights in the Private Sphere. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993) p. 147. 
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acknowledge the variations M the implementation of rights. " The Court has deten-nined that 
in certain situations the government is in a better position to determine the necessity and 
appropriateness of action. Therefore the Court should give way to this margin and leave it to 
the government to decide the limits placed upon rights within its own domestic setting as 
societies differ and no one model will work at all times. " The Court's use and development of 
the margin of appreciation has been inconsistent and vague leading to questions over its proper 
place within the ECHR framework. " One trend that has emerged is that in issues of public 
importance the margin of appreciation allowed by the Court will be lower as opposed to 
matters of a more private nature where the Court will allow a wider margin to the 
government. 44 
In utilising the margin of appreciation the existence of a 'democratic society' creates the 
basis by which the actions of governments are judged 
. 
4' To a certain extent the margin of 
appreciation is a necessary element of the ECHR framework due to the level of human rights 
protection it has developed and the context in which violations occur. With democratic 
governments there is the assumption that human rights are generally adhered to and any action 
taken to limit rights, as with assembly, expression, etc., is justified since the elected 
representatives imposing the limitations possess a legitimate mandate from society. Within the 
ECHR framework there is the need to balance the popular mandate upon which government 
action is based, while at the same time ensuring that power is not arbitrarily abused or sectors 
of society are disadvantaged by the tyranny of the majority. " The margin of appreciation 
provides the Court with a legal tool allowing it to agree that the limitations upon certain hurnan 
rights as defined by the government are necessary. The doctrine of margin of appreciation also 
allows governments to utilise acceptable legal language before the Court to say that restrictions 
upon rights are acceptable and not contrary to the democratic mandate they have been given. 
40 The Court recognised this in Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v Belgium Series A No. 113 (1987) 'any electoral system 
must be assessed in the light of the political evolution of the country concerned; features that would be unacceptable 
in the context of one system may accordingly be justified in the context of another', paragraph 54. 
41 See generally 'The Doctrine of the Margin of Appreciation under the European Convention on Human Rights: Its 
Legitimacy in Theory and Application in Practice. ' 19 Human Rights Law Journal (1998). 
42 Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v Belgium, paragraph 54. Also P. Mahoney. 'Universality versus Subsidiarity in the 
Strasbourg Case Law on Free Speech: Explaining some Recent Judgments. ' 2 European Human Rights Law Review 
(1997)p. 364. 
" For a review of the opinions on the margin of appreciation see N. Lavender. 'The Problem of the Margin of 
Appreciation. ' 2 European Human Rights Law Review (1997) p. 3 80. 
44 Handyside v UK Series A No. 24 (1979/80) paragraph 48. Also Mahoney (1997) p. 379, and where he points out 
that the recognition of cultural difference in not a retreat into relativism, 'Marvellous Richness of Diversity or 
Invidious Cultural Relativism. ' 19 Human Rights Law Journal (1998) p. 3. 
45 P. van Dijk and G. van Hoof Theory and Practice ofthe European Convention on Human Rights, 3rd ed. 
(Tbe Hague: Kluwer, 1998) pp. 
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The margin of appreciation acts as a rhetorical tool for democratic goven-unents to justify their 
behaviour, it is left to the Court to deten-nine whether the behaviour in question is appropriate 
for a 'democratic society'. 
47 
The margin of appreciation is a necessarily element due to the character of the ECHR but 
the expanded application of the Convention will require the Court to remain in firm control of 
its application preventing governments from manipulating its existence to the detriment of 
individuals. " At the same time the use of the margin of appreciation allows for the diversity of 
democratic systems to be expressed within the established ECHR framework. Again this will 
be an important issue concerning expansion as the differences among the societies of the 
member states increases. A point the Court must recognise while maintaining that all activity 
does not fall below acceptable standards. 
1. ECHR Protection 
- 
Commission and Court into Permanent Court 
The protection of rights under the ECHR was previously the work of both the European 
Commission of Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights. Under the terms of 
Protocol No. II the separate Conm-lission and Court have been replaced by a Permanent Court 
of Human Rights. " The move to a single court was necessitated by the large case-load that 
has developed under the ECHR demonstrating the success of individuals being able to access 
and utilise the ECHR. 
The Court is able to hear inter-state cases and individual applications, which includes 
any individual, NGO or group of individuals 'claiming to be the victim of a violation'. " The 
taking of a case to the Court was dependent upon whether or not a state has agreed to the 
jurisdiction of the Court for individual complaints. " During the drafting of the ECHR the 
decision to have an extra declaration by state accepting the competence of the court came from 
the Committee of Ministers over the suggestions of the Consultative Assembly. The 
Assembly felt it was necessary to make the jurisdiction of the court mandatory, as it would be 
" See the Court's opinion in Young, James and Webster Series A No. 44 (198 1), paragraph 63. For discussion see 
Marks (1996) p. 218; Mahoney (1997) p. 369; Merrils pp. 144-149. 
47 Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium, paragraph 52. Also Harris et al. (1993) pp. 295-296. 
4' Dudgeon v UK Series A No. 45 (1982) 'Notwithstanding the margin of appreciation left to the national authorities, 
it is for the Court to make the final evaluation as to whether the reasons it has found to be relevant were sufficient in 
the circumstances, in particular whether the interference complained of was proportionate to the social need claimed 
for it', paragraph 59. 
'9 On the status of the past work of the Commission under the new system see N. 
Bratza and M. O'Boyle. 'The 
Legacy of the Commission to the New Court under the Eleventh Protocol. ' 2 European 
Human Rights Law Review 
(1997)p. 211. 
'0 ECHR, Article 34, which also stipulates that states will not take any action to 'hinder in any way the effective 
exercise of this right. ' 
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absurd for governments to accept the ECHR but not accept the controls it established. The 
Assembly had to accept the Committee's position saying '[w]e must give way, so far as the 
Court is concerned, and accept its optional character. We recognise that this is the only chance 
of obtaining adherence of certain governments. "' This situation no longer holds as any new 
signatories automatically recognise the Court's competence to hear individual complaints. " 
The final judgment of the Court is binding and the Committee has the responsibility of 
supervising its execution. " The Court is also able to provide advisory opinions, however since 
'such opinions shall not deal with any question relating to the content or scope of the rights or 
freedoms defined' in the ECHR or the protocols" this function has not been utilised and is 
unlikely to be used in the future. 
The Court has established that the ECHR is 'an instrument designed to maintain and 
promote the ideals and values of a democratic society. "' However the Convention contains 
only one direct mention of what the democratic process consists of in Article 3 of Protocol No. 
I, which reads 
The High Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections at reasonable 
intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which will ensure the free expression 
of opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature. 
The belief of democracy underwriting the entire ECHR system was expressed by the 
Commission who stated that Article 3 of Protocol No. I 'presupposes the existence of a 
representative legislature, elected at reasonable intervals, as the basis of a democratic 
society. "' The Court's treatment of Article 3 raises a larger point that '[a]ccording to the 
Preamble to the Convention, finidamental human rights and freedoms are best maintained by 
66 an effective political democracy", ' which in turn makes Article 3 an important aspect of the 
ECHR system as indicative of the existing democratic framework. " 
The Court's view to political democracy is that a right to participate, while fundamental, is 
not absolute allowing for a wide margin of appreciation leaving much of the content of the 
" Prior to the adoption of Protocol No. 11, ECHR Articles 25 (for the Commission) and 46 (for the Court). 
52 Collected Edition, p. 294. One of those governments was the UK who viewed the inclusion of an automatic 
petition system for individuals as a 'grave danger', Collected Edition, p. 68. For a review of the 
UK's position 
against a human rights court, see G. Marston. "I'lie United Kingdom's Part in the Preparation of the 
European 
Convention on Human Rights, 1950. ' 42 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1993) p. 796. 
ECHR, Article 34. 
ECHR, Article 46. 
ECHR, Article 47. 
56 Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v Denmark, paragraph 53. 'Me Court's translation of the original French text 
is found in Soering v UK Series A No. 161 (1989) paragraph 87. 
57 The Greek Case Commission Report (1969) paragraph 416. 
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right to be determined by the government, as established in Mathieu-Mohin. '9 ne Court did 
feel that the Article 3 does create an obligation 'of adoption by the states of positive measures 
to "hold7 democratic elections. -)60 The Court has expressed that the European Parliament of the 
EU falls under the scope of Article 3 as a means of ensuring that 'effective political 
democracy' exists 
. 
6' The obligation of elections only applies to the national legislature of a 
state with elections at lower levels of government to be determined by the constitutional 
62 structure of the state. The Court takes the stance that participation at the local level is not 
necessary for 'effective political democracy' which dismisses the work done by CLRAE. 
Considering the stance of CLRAE on the importance of regional democracy within states it 
appears unfortunate the Court has chosen not to apply Article 3 at the local level when it has 
been able to apply it to the EU. 63 
The application of Article 3 is to occur in 'conditions which will ensure the free expression 
of opinion'. The Court has declared this to include 'the principle of equality of treatment of all 
citizens in the exercise of their right to vote and their right to stand for election. "' But this 
does not mean 'that all votes must necessarily have equal weight as regards the outcome of the 
election or that all candidates must have equal chances of victory. "' Furthermore, under 
Article 3 favourable legislation may be enacted which allows for minority groups to be 
represented in government. " The Court has expressed that regardless of variations upon the 
right to vote the 'free expression of the people' remains the core concept of democracy17 as 
well as 'one of the essential foundations' of a democratic society. " 
" Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v Belgium, paragraph 47. For a greater treatment of democracy under the ECHR see 
Marks (1996). 
Mathieu-Mohin and Cler fayt v Belgium, paragraph 52. The Commission has expressed that voting is not the only 
means of political participation available to a society but did not elaborate further, Movement for Democratic 
Kingdom v Bulgaria No. 27608/95 (1995). 
60 Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v Belgium, paragraph 50. 
61 Matthews v UK European Commission No. 24833/94 (1997) paragraph 43. 
62 A similar position had been developed by the Commission, see Gornien et al. (1996) pp. 331-332. 
6' The Commission had been equally dismissive of the importance of local democracy and the applicability of Article 
3, see Mobin Ahmed, Dennis Perrin, Ray Bentley and David John Brough v UK No. 22954/93 (1997) paragraph 98 
and Booth-Clibborn and Others v UK No. 11391/85 (1985). 
64 See the Court's statements in Bowman v UK European Court Reports 1998- 1, paragraph 42. 
65 Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v Belgium, paragraph 54. 
66 Liberal Party v UK European Commission No. 8765/79 (1982); Lindsay and Others v UK European Comrrnssion 
No. 8364/78. 
67 See Merrils (1993 ) p. 127-128. 
68 Handyside v UK, paragraph 49. Freedom of expression is also essential for each individual's self-fulfilment, Vogt v 
Germany Series A No. 323 (1995) paragraph 52. 
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The Court has made it clear that a democratic society does not mean that the will of the 
majority will prevail over the minofity. 6' During its existence the Commission contributed to 
this idea by declaring the need for government to be accountable to society7o and that the 
'democratic process is dependent on the interplay of a wide variety of group interests. '7' The 
Court has expressed the need to take into account 'pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness 
without which there is no 'democratic society'. 72 This was in the context of freedom of 
expression with the same idea being applied to the freedoms of association and assembly' and 
religious freedom7' demonstrating its nature as a general principle of democracy for Europe. 
The Court has described further aspects of a democratic society as consisting of the rule of 
law as a fundamental principle, the need for appropriate limits to be placed upon security and 
police forces, and the independence of the judiciary to allow an individual recourse in cases of 
a violation. " Furthermore, access to, and the impartiality of the courts" are essential for a 
democratic society. " The press has a vital role to play in the democratic society as a 'means of 
discovering and forrning an opinion of the ideas and attitudes of political leaders. "' And 
political parties constitute an 'essential role in ensuring pluralism and the proper functioning of 
democracy"' as they make 'an irreplaceable contribution to political debate'. "
The ECHR's approach to democracy, through the single inclusion of a right to vote, has 
been criticised as a 'soft' institutional approach with no expressed movement beyond elections 
at national levels of government. " In the absence of direct protection for democracy the Court 
has made it clear in its case law that the actions of government are to be judged on the basis of 
a democratic society as to be detenTiined by the Court. It has stated that democracy is Ca 
" Johnston and Others v Ireland Series A No. 112 (1986) In the Separate Opinion of Judge De Meyer - 'democracy 
does not simply mean that the views of the majority must always prevail: a balance must be achieved which ensures 
the fair and proper treatment of minorities and avoids any abuse of the dorninant position', paragraph 5. 
" Barfod v Denmark Series A No. 149 (1989) paragraph 64. 
71 Markt Intern and Deerman v Germany Series A No. 165 (1990) paragraph 203. 
7' Handyside v UK, paragraph 49. Young, James and Webster paragraph 63; Dudgeon v UK, paragraph 53; dersild v 
Denmark Series A No. 298 (1994) paragraph 37. The Court has also expressed that the state is the ultimate guarantor 
of pluralism (Informationsverein Lentia and Others v Austria Series A No. 276 (1993) paragraph 38) which admits 
the paradox of human rights discussed in Chapter I- 
73 Platýfrom 'Arzte_ffir das Leben' Series A No. 139 (1988) paragraph 32. 
74 Kokkinakis v Greece Series A No. 260-A (1993) paragraph 3 1. Buscarini and Others v San Marino No. 24645/94, 
Oudgement of the Court 18 February 1999) paragraph 34. 
7' Klass and Others v Germany Series A No 
. 
28 (1978) paragraphs 42,55. 
76 Castillo Algar v Spain No. 28194/95 Oudgment of the Court 28 October 1998) paragraph 45. 
77 Airey v Ireland Series A No. 32 (1979) paragraph 24. Proceedings before the judiciary should also be in the 
presence of the accused and in public Klass and Others v Germany, paragraph 59. 
7'Lingens v Austria Series A No. 103 (1986) paragraph 42; Sunday Times v UK Series A No. 30 (1979/80) paragraph 
65. 
79 United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v Turkey European Court Reports 1998- l, paragraph 43. 
'0 Lingens v Austria, paragraph 42; Castells v Spain Series A No. 23 6 (1992) paragraph 43. 
" Marks (1996) p. 234. See also COE Colloquy pp. 19-20 as to how the provisions go beyond procedure to 
incorporate the political philosophy of the ECHR. 
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fundamental feature of the European public order"' and the ECHR generally has the purpose 
of upholding democracy. " Therefore the Court has emphasised that the rights of the ECHR 
are not be 'theoretical or illusory, but practical and effective'. 84 It has gone on to say that the 
ECHR is a living instrument that must be interpreted in the fight of present-day conditions 
recognising the dynamic nature of democracy. " 
The Court's approach to democracy is not necessarily soft as it has explained that 
'[d]emocracy 
... 
appears to be the only political model contemplated by the Convention and, 
accordingly, the only one compatible with it. "' The Court has perhaps not been as expressive 
as its Inter-American counterpart in defining the basic structures and procedures of a 
democracy. Greater elaboration as to how a democracy is to work could prove useful with the 
expanded membership of the COE. Such an endeavour is unlikely due to the lack of use of the 
advisory opinion machinery leaving the Court to continue defining specific elements of 
democracy under question in a case before it. Also the Court may feel that such an elaboration 
is unnecessary as it 'considers one of the principal characteristics of democracy to be the 
possibility it offers of resolving a country's problems through dialogue, without recourse to 
violence'. " This implies that European societies have a wide 'margin' to establish the 
democratic structures best fitting for their circumstances with the role of the Court making 
determinations regarding conflict over the exercise or limitations of rights within a democracy 
society. 
C. EUROPEANSOCUL CHARTER 
It has been remarked that Europe has made less progress in the realisation of social 
democracy than it has with political democracy. " The protection of socio-economic rights is 
primarily dealt with under the European Social Charter (ESC)89 which consists of a 
supervisory mechanism based on state reports and petition procedures. From 1991-1995 the 
ESC underwent a large revision process updating its provisions and improving upon the 
Loizidou v Turkey Series A No. 310 (1995) pargraph 75. 
Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v Denmark, paragraph 5 3. 
United Communist Party v Turkey, paragraph 33. 
Loizidou v Turkey, paragraph 7 1. 
United Communist Party v Turkey, paragraph 45. 
87 United Communist Party v Turkey, paragraph 57. 
" P. Leurecht in The Social Charterfor the 21st Century. - Colloquy organised 
by the Secretariat of the Council of 
Europe (14-16 May 1997) hereinafter Social Charterfor the 21st Century (Strasbourg: COE, 1998) p. 20. 
'9 ETS No. 35. Entered into force 26 February 1965,31 signatories, 22 ratifications. 
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supervisory mechanisms. " The rights protected under the ESC cover a wide array of issues 
related to employment, unions, social security and welfare, health, the family and marginal 
sectors of society. Governments accept the ESC framework as a declaration of aims which are 
to be pursued by all appropriate means and are to submit regular reports on their compliance 
with the provisions agreed to in the ESC. " These reports are then assessed and 
recommendations are provided to the state based on the infon-nation provided. " 
The protection rights in the ESC, as with the ECHR shall not be subject to any limitations 
except for inter alia, those 'necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the rights 
and freedoms of others'. " The meaning of 'democratic society' for the purposes of the ESC 
has not been defined and receives no other mention in the ESC or its Protocols. By way of 
interpretation, contributions to a democratic society can be found in Article 30 of the ESC 
(Revised) as it covers '[t]he right to protection against poverty and social exclusion' 
emphasises the need to ensure that all individuals in society have access 'to employment, 
housing, training, education, culture and social and medical assistance'. " This recognises the 
detrimental aspects inequalities have upon society and the possible impact for the effective 
functioning of democracy. The inclusion of the Additional Protocol (1988) which addresses 
the rights of workers to participate in the decision making process in the workplace is a 
recognition of the importance of democratic structures and process beyond national political 
institutions. 
The ESC framework has been described as a necessary element for the 'democratic 
security' in Europe being pursued by the COE. " Europe does not face the severe problems as 
do other parts of the world with starvation, shortages in housing, health care and other areas of 
economic and social rights, but that does not make these rights any less important. Despite 
this there is reluctance in Europe to recognise socio-economic rights as an area of direct 
" The original ESC and subsequent changes will be referred to as the ESC framework. The Charter revisions include 
the Additional Protocol to the European Social Charter (1988). ETS No. 128, entered into force 4 September 1992,21 
signatories, 8 ratifications. Protocol amending the European Social Charter (199 1) ETS No. 142, not yet in force, 23 
signatures, 14 ratifications (9 necessary ratifications still needed) Additional Protocol to the European Social Charter 
Providing for a System of Collective Complaints (1995) ETS No. 158, entered into force I July 1998,11 signatories, 
7 ratifications. European Social Charter (Revised, 1996) ETS No. 163, not yet in force, 19 signatories, I ratification. 
On the reforrn of the ESC see generally Social Charterfor the 21st Century. 
9' The ESC's uniqueness lies in the fact that it is 'a political instrument for social development' and equally 'a 
binding 
legal instrument'. Statement by A. Coudrec in Charterfor the 21st Century, p. 7. 
9' ESC Part IV. 
93 ESC (Revised) Article G. 
" See A. Heringa. 'Social Rights and the Rule of Law. ' in Social Charterfor the 21st Century, p. 245. 
9' M. Leitao in Social Charterfor the 21st Centurv, p. 34. On the enforcement mechanisms available within the ESC 
framework see 'The Implementation of the Collective Complaints Procedure. ' in Social 
Charterfor the 21st Centurv, 
p. 97; Hennga in Social Charterfor the 21st Century, pp. 209-220. 
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concern for a democratic society. 96 This reluctance is most likely based in political and policy 
arguments over resources but there remains the need to ensure that an individual's right to 
food, shelter, health, work, and related aspects are protected. The existence of a stable 
democracy, or an effective system for human rights, depends upon the protection of vulnerable 
groups and the protection of those rights which are in many cases most closely associated to 
the individual's day to day existence, such as employment, health and education. " If it is 
implicitly understood that democracy underlies the ESC as it does the ECHR, then it is 
necessary for the supervisory bodies to elaborate upon this implicitness so a more explicit 
understanding of the ESC as part of democratic society may be understood. 
D. FURTHER SUPPORTFoRDEmocRAcYANDHum, 4NRiGHTs 
Minorities has always been an issue for Europe but has now taken on a new meaning with 
the end of communism and the inclusion of central and eastern European states in European 
institutions like the COE. " In 1993 the COE PA suggested that the Committee draw up an 
additional Protocol to the ECHR with the specific role of protecting the rights of minorities. 99 
The COE PA believed it would be more appropriate to integrate minority protection into the 
existing human rights system rather than creating a new and separate legal docw-nent. The 
Committee disagreed and took its own action to draft the Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities. `0 The Framework Convention considers 
that a pluralist and genuinely democratic society should not only respect the 
ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of each person belonging to a 
national minority, but also create appropriate conditions enabling them to express, 
preserve and develop this identity. 101 
The Framework Convention calls for action to be taken so that minorities are not 
disadvantaged and for states 'to promote, in all areas of economic, social, political and cultural 
" Heringa in Social Charterfor the 21st Century, pp. 192-193. 
9' See Heringa in Social Charterfor the 21st Century, p. 200. 
9' On developments see F. BenoYt-Rohmer. The Minority Question in Europe: Text and Commentary. (Strasbourg: 
COE, 1996) pp. 36-39; CO. 'Framework Convention for the Protection of Minorities and Explanatory Report. '
November 1994 H (94) 10, pp. II- 12, hereinafter Explanatory Report. 
99 Recommendation 1201 (1993). 
'00 ETS. 157. Entered into force I February 1998,24 ratifications (one of which is Armenia a non-COE state). The 
Assembly's Recommendation, while lacking any legal force, remains a reference document for the consideration of 
requests for accession to the COE. There is also an earlier European Charter for Regional or 
Minority Languages 
1992 (ETS No. 148) for discussion see S. Aken-nark. Justifications of Minority Protection in International Law. 
(London: Kluwer, 1997) pp. 233-238. 
'0' Preamble, paragraphs 6-7. 
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life, full and effective equality between persons. 102 Article 15 calls on states create the 
necessary conditions allowing minorities to participate in all aspects of society, especially 
those most important to them. 
The Framework Convention contains no definition as to what or who constitutes a 
gnational minority' since there is no agreement as to a more detailed definition. Instead it is 
left to governments to define who falls under the provisions of the Framework Convention. "' 
The Framework Convention only contains objectives and programmes for implementation by 
signatory governments giving it a flexible and less binding nature. "' Governments were 
reluctant to accept a draft protocol to the ECHR with its existing supervision choosing instead 
to adopt a plan of action with no right of individual petition. This manoeuvre has been 
described as governments taking 'refuge behind their sovereignty, which stands in the way of 
direct access by their subjects to an international body. In addition, they fear becoming 
systematic Victims of accusations originating from groups of opponents. "O' The Framework 
Convention also emphasises that the exercise of any right therein does not imply 'any right to 
engage in any activity or perforrn any act contrary to the fiindamental principles of 
international law and in particular sovereign equality, territorial integrity and political 
independence'. "' It is for this reason that there is no granting of collective rights for minorities 
in order to avoid secessionist claims. "' The weakness of the Framework Convention 
demonstrates 'the highest level of commitment which the states were able to make in the field 
of the protection of minorities. "' The document demonstrates the reluctance of states to grant 
rights to minorities that are seen as an infringement upon their sovereignty. Therefore they 
have chosen to keep the enforcement aspect of the instrument strictly within their exclusive 
sphere. 109 
"' Article 4 (2). For a fuller discussion of the rights contained in the Framework Convention see G. Gilbert. 'Tbe 
Council of Europe and Minority Rights. ' 18 Human Rights Quarterly (1996) pp. 174-18 8. 
'0' Explanatory Report, paragraph 12. BenoYt-Rohmer (1996) p. 41. At present all reservations or declarations 
concerning the Framework convention explain what 'national minority' means in the individual state. The 
Explanatory Report asserts that the provisions of Article 'specify that the protection of national minorities ... does not 
fall within the reserved domain of states' but offers no concrete evidence to prove the complete truth of this assertion, 
paragraph 30. 
'04Aken-nark (1997) further observes that it contains more limitation clauses than comparable documents, p. 23 1. 
Supervision of the provisions of the Framework Convention is given to the Committee of Ministers who, with 
assistance of an advisory committee, receives and requests infon-nation from states party to the 
Convention on 
measures being taken to give effect to the provisions. 
'0' BenoYt-Rohmer (1996) p. 44. 
'0' Framework Convention, Article 21. 
'0' BenoYt-Rohmer (1996) p. 42. 
'0' BenoYt-Rohmer (1996) pp. 3 9-40. 
'0' Benoit-Rohmer (1996) pp 42-43; Gilbert (1996) p. 188-189. Pejic describes the Framework convention as 'a step 
backward'. J. Pejic. 'Minority Rights in International Law. ' 19 Human Rights Quarterly (1997) p. 683. Despite this 
Akermark (1997) feels its importance should not be overlooked, p. 23 3. 
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Related to the issues of minorities the Vienna Summit created the European Commission 
against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI). The ECRI consists of independent experts who have ID 
the purpose of examining 'the effectiveness of the range of measures (legal, policy and other) 
taken by member States to combat racism, xenophobia, anti-semitism and intolerance and 
propose ftu-ther action in this field' through a country-by-country approach. The ECRI has 
found that discrimination continues to persist throughout Europe at multiple levels of society, a 
situation exacerbated by the lack of anti-discrimination legislation at the domestic level. The 
ECRI places a great deal of importance upon legal measures for combating racism and 
intolerance as a means of offering the individual a remedy and shaping the attitudes of a 
society to see that racism is wrong. ' 10 
E DEmocRA cyAND Humw RiGHTs flv THE COE 
The work of the COE in support of democracy and human rights has been beneficial to all 
member states and has proven significant for the states of central and eastern Europe. "' The 
COE presents an ambiguous, but at the same time very clear picture concerning democracy. 
This is a result of its approach of not demanding a single form of democracy but allowing 
societies to develop within their own particular context. It is clear that to be a member a state 
must be a democracy and respect the rule of law and human rights. The European Court has 
clarified a number of the more subtle requirements of democracy, which arise from the ECHR, 
but even here there remains a gap In the overt protection of democratic institutions and 
procedures. When it comes to socio-economic aspects and minorities the COE's commitment 
to democracy is less clear demonstrating a lack of resolve by governments in these areas. "' It 
has been remarked that the development of Europe with difficult economic conditions facing 
all members means the purposes and protection of the ESC system needs to be placed at the 
same level of the ECHR to ensure the existence of effective democracy. "' The protection of 
minorities and greater efforts to combat racism also deserve to be placed on a higher level than 
presently exists. 
The lack of support given to the explicit protection of democratic institutions and process 
by the legal bodies, the ambiguity of socio-economic rights in a democratic society and the 
"o ECRI General Recommendation No. I (1997) 'Combating Racism, Xenophobia, Anfi-Semitism and Intolerence. ' 
... See generally A. Drzmczewski. 'The Council of Europe's Co-operation and Assistance Programmes With Central 
and Eastern European Countries in the Human Rights Field. ' 14 Human Rights Law Journal (1993) p. 229. 
'' 2Regarding the same issue in the EU context see L. Betten and N. Grief EU Law and Human Rights. (London: 
Longman, 1998) p. 123. 
113 Statements by A. Gusenbauer member COE PA in Social Charterfor the 21st Century, p. 15. 
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lack of effective protection for minorities could prove problematic with the expansion of the 
COE. The Court's assumption of democracy as a self-evident and pre-existing feature of the 
member states making it necessary only to determine to what extent the restrictions on rights 
are appropriate to a democratic society will soon come under fire as a mistaken assumption to 
make. This point has been confirmed by the SG of the COE in a speech were he stated that 
membership to the COE does not confirrn the existence of democracy within a state, only an 
intention and commitment to achieving democracy. "' The establishment of the details of a 
democratic society as set out by the Court will be useful but will be ineffective in situations 
where the basic structures of a democratic society are not in place. "' The warnings of the 
Consultative Assembly during the drafting of the ECHR concerning the lack of explicit 
protection for democracy might soon ring true as '[i]ndividual freedom, in our democratic 
countries, is protected by democratic institutions. Consequently, the safeguards required, too, 
are inseparable from these institutions. "' The consequence of excluding explicit protection for 
democracy would be that the'Convention would fail M its aim, at least in part, and upon an 
essential point. "" Throughout Europe the institutional aspects of democracy will not always 
be enough for all individuals to protect and preserve their dignity and survival making socio- 
economic concerns, and explicit protection for those who are most vulnerable, equally 
essential issues. 
111. TIIE EUROPEAN UNION 
The membership of the (EU) presently comprises only 15 states of Europe but it is seen as 
the premier organisation of the region for states to join, and is itself keen on expansion-' " The 
EU is unique as it extends beyond intergovernmental relationships to have a degree of direct 
involvement in the day to day lives of individuals of the member states and a growing indirect 
involvement in the lives of individuals beyond the member states. The nature and the structure 
... Quoted in L. Leszczyski. 'A General Look at the Redefinition of the Protection of Human Rights in Eastern and 
Central Europe. ' I East European Human Rights Review (1995) pp. 6-7. 
"' Russia continues to be the biggest worry, see B. Bowring. 'Russia's Accession to the Council of 
Europe and 
Human Rights: Compliance or Cross-PurposesT 2 European Human Rights Law Review (1997) p. 628. 
Collected Edition, p. 292. 
Collected Edition, p. 292. 
Observers often wrongly equate the EU with 'Europe' as a totality, see comments 
by M. Martinez in Social 
Chatter for the 21st Century, pp. 37-38. Central and eastern European states that are closest to obtaining 
EU 
membership include the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia. 
Bulgaria Latvia, Lithuania, 
Romania and Slovakia remain distant possibilities With the states of the 
former-Soviet Union, including Russia and 
the fonner-Yugoslavia being remote possibilities for membership in the foreseeable future. 
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of the EU"' has the positive effect of providing various channels of participation for 
individuals and providing another means by which standards of human rights may be created 
and enforced. At the same time the goals and purposes of the EU are primarily determined on 
an intergovernmental basis without any necessary structures of transparency or accountability 
meaning its relationship with individuals is sometimes confused. 
Concerning the impact of the EU upon individuals the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
determined in Van Gend en Loos"' that Community law irnpinged directly on the rights of 
individuals. The case also recognised that democratic legitimacy depends upon the right of the 
people to participate in the law making process through representatives. Furthermore, 
individuals should able to vindicate their rights through judicial proceedings. "' Inpracticethe 
EU has impacted upon the lives individuals but has not been able to provide many possibilities 
for participation in the law making process or always being able to vindicate rights. To date, 
the ability of individuals to participate in the processes of the EU, either directly or through 
representatives remains questionable. The EU has itself not established clear guidelines 
concerning the extent to which democracy and human rights are applicable to the work of the 
organisation and the functioning of its individual institutions. 112 Due to its primarily econornic 
nature the EU works more on the basis of achieving objectives with concern for policy being 
only to the extent it meets the objective. 121 
If the EU is to have a direct part in the lives of individuals then it is necessary to establish a 
greater degree of clarity concerning its connection to the individual. The Treaty on European 
Union (TEU) was supposed to mark 'a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer 
union' where 'decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen". 124 Part of this process is 
the development of subsidiafity as defined in the EC Treaty to ensure decisions are made as 
close as possible to the individual. '21 The commitment to subsidiarity has remained primarily 
"' The EU consists of three different legal 'pillars' which have their own distinct institutional arrangement - the 
European Community, common foreign and security policy and justice and home affairs, see P. Craig and G. de 
Burca. EU Law, Cases, Texts and Materials, 2n ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 199 8) pp. 3 4. 
120 Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen [ 1963] ECR, 1. 
"' Van Gend en Loos, page 12. 
122 For the relation between the EU and national courts in areas of rights see S. O'Leary. 'Aspects of the Relationship 
between Community Law and National Law. ' in N. Neuwahl and A. Rosas, eds. 7he European Union and Human 
Rights. (ne Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1995) p. 23. 
12' B. de Witte. 'Surviving in Babel? Language Rights and European Integration. ' in Y. Dinstein and M. Tabory, eds. 
The Protection ofMinorities and Human Rights. (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1992) p. 289. 
12' Article I (TEU). The Treaty of Amsterdam entered into force May 1999 and has consolidated all changes to the 
European Treaties in a simplified form. For further infori-nation and a table of equivalence 
for the older forins of the 
treaties see Craig and de Burca (1998) pp. clxv-clxxii. 
12' Article 5 EEC reads 'In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall stake action, 
in accordance with the principle of subsidianty, only if and insofar as the objectives of the proposed action cannot 
be 
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rhetorical as the actual manifestation of the principle remains difficult to determine with 
arguments caught up over whether decisions are better made at the EU or member state level 
and not actually looking at how those decisions are made. "' Defining subsidiarity clearly and 
making it part of the EU policy will be an important development in clariýg the relationship 
between the EU and individuals. "' As the EU becomes a larger factor in the domestic societies 
of the member states there is Increasing pressure to overcome the 'democratic deficit' of its 
institutions and clai* the status of democracy and human rights within the organisation's 
framework. 
A. DEmocRA cY AND HumAN RiGHTs iiv THE EU TWEA TiEs 
The beginnings of the EU are found in the Treaty of Paris (195 1) and the Treaty of Rome 
(1957) where it was believed the rule of law would be upheld by the ECJ and that democracy 
would be secured through the eventual creation of a Parliamentary Assembly. "' These treaties 
did not contain any specifics concerning democracy or human rights, primarily due to their 
purpose of being economic agreements. "9 At the 1972 Paris Summit, the member states 
reaff-irmed 'their resolve to base their Community's development on democracy, freedom of 
opinion, free movement of men and ideas and participation by the people through their freely 
elected representatives. "" In 1977, the European Commission, Council and Parliament came 
together to issue a (brieD Joint Declaration on Human Rights. "' The Declaration recognised 
the EC as being based on the rule of law, comprising of 'general principles of law among the 
member states 
, 
including fimdamental rights confirmed in the early rulings of the Court. ' It 
ftirther declared one of the aims of the EC was to respect human rights and fundamental 
freedoms as derived from the constitutions of member states and the ECHR. It also expressed 
sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the propsed actions, 
be better achieved by the Community. ' 
126 A. Toth. 'A Legal Analysis of Subsidiarity. ' in D. O'Keefe and P. Twomey, eds. Legal Issues of the Maastricht 
Treaty. (London: Chancery, 1994) p. 38. Also J. Steiner. 'Subsidianty under the Maastricht Treaty. ' and N. Emilou. 
'Subsidiarity: Panacea or Fig Leaf? ' in O'Keefe and Twomey (1994). 
121 The governments of the EU have been accused of having a selective perception and collective arrinesia concerning 
human rights and the origins of the union, see M. Macey. 'Greater Europe: Integration or Ethnic Exclusion? ' in C. 
Crouch and D. Maquand, eds. Towards Greater Europe? (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992) p. 14 1. 
128 C. Duparc. The European Community and Human Rights. (Luxembourg: COE, 1993) pp. II- 12. 
12' Reasons put forth for the exclusion of rights guarantees include a failure to recognise the impact of the EC on 
individuals, the belief that rights would be protected by the ECHR, the lack of agreement between states and worries 
over the fact that including rights would be an interference with sovereignty, see S. O'Leary. Accession by the 
European Community to the European Convention on Human Rights 
- 
The Opinion of the ECJ. ' I European Human 
Rights Law Review (1996) p. 363. Prior to the Treaty of Rome rights and freedoms were included on failed attempts 
at creating a defence community and political community, for this historical development see A. Clapharn. Human 
Rights and the European Communio,. - A Critical Oveniew. (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 199 1) pp. 92-93. 
"o EC Bulletin 10- 1972, p. 15. 
"' [ 1977] OJ C 103/ 1. 
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the commitment of the EC bodies to be equally bound by human rights considerations. "' in 
1978 the leaders of the member states issued the Declaration on Democracy at the 
Copenhagen Summit"' which stated that the application of the principles of representative 
democracy, social justice, the rule of law, and respect for human rights implies a political 
system of pluralist democracy guaranteeing freedom of expression and opinions within the 
constitutional organisation of powers and the procedures necessary to protect hurnan rights. 
They firthermore declared that the respect and maintenance of representative democracy and 
human nghts, are essential elements of membership to the EC, a point only recently 
institutionalised in a binding treaty provision. 
The European Single Act (1987) expressed ideas of democracy and human rights in a 
treaty-based document for the first time. The signatories declared, in the Preamble, their 
detenTiffiation towards the promotion of democracy on the basis of fundamental rights, 
freedom, equality and social justice and confirined the European Parliament (EP) as an 
indispensable means of expression for the democratic wishes of the individuals of member 
states. Commentators on the Single Act see this inclusion, even though only occurring in the 
Preamble, as endorsing democracy and human rights as guiding principles of the EC and its 
institutions. "' 
The Treaty of European Union (TEU), signed in 1992, marked a continuing commitrnent 
to the ideas of democracy and human rights as guiding principles. This commitment is finther 
demonstrated in the changes brought about to both the TEU and EC Treaty by the Treaty of 
Amsterdam signed in 1997. "' In the TEU member states confirm an 'attachment' to liberty, 
democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law, and to fundamental social rights as 
defined by the ESC. They also express a desire to enhance the democratic and efficient 
fimctioning of the EU's institutions and to bring the EU closer to the individual through greater 
participation in the decision-making process. "' The TEU expresses the objectives of the EU 
as the promotion of economic and social progress, strengthening the protection of the rights 
and interests of nationals of the EU and developing 'the Union as an area of freedom, security 
"' The status of the Declaration is primarily seen as being political and moral even though some 
legal significance 
can be attributed to it. See L. Krogsgaard. 'Fundamental Rights in the European 
Community After Maastricht. '
Legal Issues ofEuropean Integration (1993) pp. 103 -104. 
133 EC Bulletin 3-1978, p. 5. 
134 Krogsgaard (1993) p. 104; N. Neuwahl. 'The Treaty on European Union: A Step Forward in the Protection of 
Human RightsT in Neuwahl and Rosas (1995) p. 14. 
... [1997] OJ C340/1. 
D'Article I TEU. 
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and justice'. 137 These objective are reinforced by the statement that the EU is 'founded on the 
principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fimdamental freedoms, and the 
rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States. "" The Council is entrusted 
with the task of ensuring members meet these objectives and may suspend members if they 
fail to do so. "' 
The EC Treaty adds to the these commitments by working towards balanced and 
sustainable development, social protection, equality, raising the standard of living and quality 
of life and combating exclusion. 140 The TEU also amended the EC Treaty to introduce the 
idea of a European citizenship that in turn would act as the basis for, among other things, 
greater attention to issues of democracy and human rights. 141 Part Two of the EC Treaty 
establishes that citizenship in a member state will create citizenship of the EU, not as a 
replacement of national citizenship but complementary thereto. 14' The content of what 
citizenship entails as expressed in Part Two is sparse with references limited to free movement, 
opportunities to participate in local elections and for the EP, as well as the ability of individuals 
to petition the EP and the Ombudsman. "' 
B. RoLE oF CommumTYINsTiTunom 
The decision-making powers of the EU lie solidly with the Council consisting of the heads 
of government of the member states and the European Commission that consists of 
representatives appointed by the member governments. "' The Commiission consists of 
individuals who have loyalty first and foremost to the Community and have the responsibility 
of ensuring the observance of Community commitments. Since power fies with these two 
exclusive bodies the democratic nature of the EU is continually brought into question. "' EU 
institutions that do provide for democratic possibilities include the European Parliament (EP), 
the European Ombudsman and the Committee of the Regions. The EP is made up of 
individuals elected fi7om constituents of the member states to a forum that is able to discuss a 
Article 2 TEU. 
Article 6 (1) TEU. 
"9 Article 7 TEU. 
... Articles 2 and 136 EC. 
"' K. Bradley. 'Fundamental Rights and the European Union: A Selective Overview. ' 21 Polish Yearbook of 
International Law (1994) p. 208. 
142 Article 17 EC. 
14'Arficle 18-21 EC. 
144 Articles 202 and 211 EC. Also S. Weatherill. Law and Integration in the European Union. 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 
1995) p. 6 1. 
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wide range of issues concerning the EU. The EP is able to issue its own declarations and 
resolutions and has slowly become more involved in the decision-making process of the EU. 
However since the Council and Commission remain fim-fly in control of the decision-making 
process, the EU possesses what is termed a 'democratic deficit. "' 
The existence of a democratic deficit implies there is a democratic ideal for international 
organisations by which to measure. 14' Due to the unique situation of the EU it is difficult to 
determine at what level and to what extent democracy is to exist. The democratic nature of the 
EU comes under fire from a number of different angles. 148 There are elections to a 
representative body with legislative functions but these functions do not extend to substantive 
decision making and the body is unable to exercise control over the executive decision making 
bodies. The executive bodies of the EU are not directly elected by the people of Europe 
raising questions over their mandate for action. A great deal of the EU work and decision 
making lacks transparency or clarity with few means of accountability and it all occurs at a 
'distance' from the individuals upon whom it impacts. The debate over the democratic 
legitimacy of the EU is based on the argw-nent that decisions are made which impact upon 
individuals and society who have no direct impact upon or control over the decision making 
process, either directly or through representatives with little by way of principles guiding the 
behaviour of decision-making structures. 
Those who disagree with this assessment offer a number of explanations upporting the 
democratic nature of the EU. The EP is a directly elected body which purports to represent 
European societies"and it has developed a greater role in the decision making process over 
time. Furthermore the EP is able to exercise some degree of control over the Council and 
Commission through questions and reports and by approving all appointments to the 
Commission. The Council's democratic nature is justified by the common argument at the 
international level that if a democratic government is acting on behalf of its society the body 
14' D. Beetham and C. Lord. Legitimacy and the EU. (London: Longman, 1998) observe that even though 
governments select Commissioners and the EP approves them, the Commission is able to create its own forin of 
autonomy avoiding accountability, p. 14. 
146 See JUSTICE. The Democratic Deficit: Democratic Accountability and the European Union. (London, 1996) 
Raworth (1994) 
147 B. van Roermund. 'Jurisprudential Dilemmas of European Law. ' 16 Law and Philosophy (1997) pp. 365-366. See 
See G. Mancini and D. Keeling. 'Democracy and the European Court of Justice. ' 57 Modern Law Review (1994) who 
discuss how the idea of democracy had no role at all in the early fon-nation of the Union. 
14' This review of the democratic deficit debate relies upon the work of Craig and De Burca (1998) who provide a 
concise account complete with references to the volurrunous literature, pp. 155-162. 
149 It is difficult at present to see the EP as 'representative' of the interests of the EU. See V. Bogdanor. 
'Direct 
Elections, Representative Democracy and European Integration. ' 8 Electoral Studies (1989) p. 205. 
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within which it is acting has an 'indirect mandate' which legitimises action. "' The EU then 
possesses a twofold legitimacy where representatives to the EU executive are democratically 
elected and there are elections to the EP, and the bodies participate in a co-operative decision 
making process. "' The lack of transparency in the decision making process is not seen as 
problematic since a similar situation exists at the national level which is not usually brought 
into question. Finally those who argue against the negative consequences of the 'democratic 
deficit' raise points related to the idea that the EU is not a state and should not be judged for 
legitimacy by similar criteria. "' 
Regardless of the nature and purpose of the EU it continues to exercise a good deal of 
control, direct and indirect, over the lives of individuals. "' Individuals do possess some ability 
for recourse when an institution or policy of the EU wrongs them (see below) but it remains 
that the real power and decision making of the EU is well distanced from individuals. The 
primary obstacle to resolving the democratic deficit is that the purpose and goals of the EU 
remain unclear. It began as an economic union among states and has developed into a socio- 
economic framework for the societies of its members raising the important issue as to where 
the power over society is being exercised, at the national level, with the EU, or through a 
combination? The changes and developments as to the goals and purpose of the EU brought 
in by the Treaty of Amsterdam have not solved the issue of the democratic deficit and related 
problems. "' 
The issue of the democratic deficit will remain a major point of contention in the 
development of the EU with attention focusing on improving the existing democratic 
structures. The EP has been in existence since 1979 as a forum for public discussion of EU 
policy and actions. Individuals have long written to the EP with comments or questions 
regarding the behaviour of Community institutions and in the Maastricht Treaty the provisions 
for citizenship included the right of citizens (as well as non-EU residents) to petition the EP. "' 
Commentators have dismissed the efficacy of the petition procedure as little substantive action 
is rarely taken with regard to individual petitions in order to avoid creating unnecessary 
"0 Craig and de Burca (1998) p. 159; Beetham and Lord (1998) pp. II- 15. 
"' 'Scope of the Co-decision Procedure. ' SEC(96) 1225/4 (1996) Part UA, paragraph 1. 
152 See generally the essays in J. Hayward, ed. The Crisis ofRepresentation in Europe. 
(London: Frank Cass, 1995). 
"' See Beetham and Lord (1998) that intergovernmental organisations are not as distanced from individuals as is 
often made out, as demonstrated by human rights, environmental issues and structural adjustment policies, p. 
12. 
154 L. Betten. 'The Democratic Deficit of Participatory Democracy in Community Social Policy. ' 23 European 
Law 
Review (1998) p. 20. 
155 The Commission describes this as 'a wide means of recourse' COM(97) 230, paragraph 3.3.1. 
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tensions between the EP and other EU institutions. "' This has been shown by the EP 
Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizen's Rights (CLACR) which monitors various areas of 
human rights and develops reports on human rights issues for the entire Community. The 
Committee is able to discuss all matters relating to human rights but has been reluctant to 
discuss human rights matters of individual member states. ' 57 
The TEU brought the creation of the European Ombudsman through the EP"' to whom 
both EU citizens and non-citizen residents may petition concerning maladministration in the 
activities of Community institutions. "' The ombudsman acts in the general interest of the 
Communities and of the citizens of the Union ensuring that all parties have confidence in the 
fairness and impartiality of his work. "' The ombudsman has no enforcement powers but does 
possess the ability for a wide range of inquiries. "' Commentators see two possibilities to the 
ombudsman's effectiveness as individuals will be able to use the office as a check on the 
Conmiission's ability to effectively and properly act as guardian of the Treaties, but equally 
the result could be the Commission and other institutions having their actions legitimised 
through the ombudsman. "' 
The TEU marked a step toward clarifying the idea of subsidiarity with the inclusion of the 
Committee of Regions (COR) as a body with advisory status. "' The COR sees itself as the 
'guardian' of subsidiarity in ensuring that the principle is properly applied and contributes to 
firther integration by allowing the maximurn level of participation by individuals. "' The 
work of COR is of questionable importance to the executive of the EU as the recent Summit in 
Cardiff left the President of COR 'disappointed' but the lack of substantive action taken by the 
Council concerning this issue of subsidiarity. "' The role of COR deserves greater attention 
from the leaders of the EU as COR is closer to the actual lives of individuals within the EU. 
As the EU grows the perception of 'decisional distance' will increase, necessitating efforts 
"' See E. Bournans and M. Norbart. 'The European Parliament and Human Rights. ' 7 Netherlands 
Quarterly of 
Human Rights (1989) pp. 47-49. 
157 Boumans and Norbart (1989) pp. 46-47. 
"' Article 195 EC. 
' 5' Statute of the Ombudsman [ 1994] OJL 113/15. 
"0 Annual Report ofthe Ombudsman (1995) Section 1.2.2. 
... Annual Report ofthe Ombudsman (1995) Section 1.2.3. 
162 Heede (1997) pp. 604-605. 
163 Article 262 EC. 
164 'The Contribution of the Committee of the Regions to the construction of Europe. 
' section 11.2. 
165 'Manfred Dammeyer Disappointed by the Conclusions of the Cardiff Summit. 
' [http: //wý,,, w. cor. 
eu. int/Archive/arkiv/danuneyeý_cardiff/md_cardiff eng. htm]]. 
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along the lines of COR of ensuring that development occurs at all levels of society. "' The 
COR has been active in establishing the importance of its role in the EU but. has been given 
little in e way of support of an extended mandate allowing it to increase its effectiveness. 167 
C THEECJDEmocRAcy, HumANRiGHTsANDEcoNomic UmoN 
The ECJ has the broad task of ensuring 'the law is observed' m the application and 
interpretation of the EC Treaty. "' The lack of human rights provisions in the early treaties led 
the ECJ to refuse early attempts to invoke human rights as legally enforceable in the context of 
Community law. In the cases of Stork169 and Geitling"O the ECJ dismissed the petitioners' 
claims that the exercise of Community law was contrary to the fundamental rights provisions 
in the Gen-nan constitutional order. The Court went as far to say that Conimunity law could 
not offer any protection for human rights. "' These decisions were followed with another 
rejection of the use of fundamental rights as a means to override EC treaty provisions, even if 
the principles were common to the member states. 172 The ECJ's view on human rights in 
relation to Community law raised serious difficulties at this early stage. As already mentioned, 
Van Gend en Loos"' created the direct effect of Community law with Costa V ENEL174 
confirming the supremacy of Community over domestic law and more critically, superiority to 
domestic constitutional law was established in Simmenthal. 17' This raised the issue that if 
Community law was to be superior to domestic laws, and the EC treaties did not provide for 
the protection of rights, how were the rights of individuals to be protected when they conflicted 
with Community policy and practice? 
The ECJ became cognisant of this issue in 1969 with the case of Stauder' 76 where it 
declared that Community provisions could not prejudice Rindamental human rights as general 
... COR has recently taken on the issue of cultural diversity within the EU and the promotion of tolerance between 
cultures, see 'Committee of the Regions brings Cultural Diversity to the European Debate. ' DCP/99330en (15 
January 1999). 
167 See J. Jones. 'The Committee of the Regions, Subsidianty, and a Warning. ' 22 European Law Review (1997) pp. 
312 
16' Article 164 [220] EC. Concerning the ECJ's jurisdiction see A, Albors-Llogens. 'Changes in the Jurisdiction of 
the European Court of Justice under the Treaty of Amsterdam. ' 35 Common Market Law Review (1998) p. 1273. 
'69Case 1/58 Stork v High Authority [1959] ECR 17. 
"0 Cases 36,37,38 and 40/59 Geitling v High Authority [1960] ECR 423. 
"' Geitling, p. 438. 
... Case 40/64 Sgarlata and others v Commission [ 1965] ECR 215. 
Case 26/62 [1963] ECR 1. 
Case 6/64 [1964] ECR 585. On the issue of supremacy see Weatherill (1995) pp. 102-107. 
Case 92/78 Simmenthal v Commission [ 1979] ECR 777. 
176 Case 26/69 Stauder v Lflm [ 1969] ECR 419. 
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principles of Community law. 177 Once the ECJ recognised the existence of human rights as a 
consideration in the application of Community law the idea of fundamental fights began a 
slow evolutionary process as a principle of the Community legal order. ' 78 In Intemationale 
Handelsgesellschaft, 179 the ECJ qualified its position in Simmenthal by placing the primary 
source for human rights issues M the EC with the common constitutional provisions of the 
member states. "0 Nold"' confin-ned a second source for human rights protection coming from 
international human rights treaties to which member states have become party. 18' The ECJ 
then began referring directly to the ECHR concerning the obligations of member states in 
recognising ftindamental rights in the irnplementation of Community measures. "' The use of 
the ECHR by the ECJ only exists in areas of Community law and the ECJ is not able to apply 
provisions of the ECHR in the absence of any relation to Community provisions. 18' The scope 
of Community law is continually changing and the ECJ has taken the responsibility of 
determining whether or not an alleged violation of fundamental fights is related to Community 
iaW. 185 
Fundamental rights have become part of the Community order for the purpose of 
supporting the greater integration of the Community and to facilitate the ftinctioning of the 
common market. ' 16 Fundamental rights are not necessarily essential in themselves as their 
iniportance is linked to the advancement of the further integration of the member states. "' The 
ECJ's position on this is demonstrated in their opinion in Hauer... where it was recogrused 
that a right to property, as contained in the ECHR and in the domestic systems of member 
... Stauder, paragraph 7. See Krogsgaard (1993) p. 101 note 16, who mentions the Court's decision in Cases 18 & 
3 5/65 Gutmann [ 1967] ECR 61 as a decision protecting fundamental human rights, in this case the principle of non 
bis in idem. 
178 See Neuwahl in Neuwahl and Rosas (1995) pp. 6-13; Duparc (1993) pp. 12-14. 
179 Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgeselischaft v Einfuhr-und Vorraisstelle Getreide [ 1970] ECR 1125. 
180 Internationale Handelsgeselischaft, paragraph 4. 
"' Case 4/73 Nold v Commission [ 1974] ECR 49 1. 
182 Nold, paragraph 12. But see O'Leary (1995) as to how human rights in the EU legal order suffer from 
indeterminacy due to a fragmentation of sources, p. 519. 
"' For examples see Neuwahl in Neuwahl and Rosas (1995) pp. 8-9. 
184 Case 12/86 Demirel v Stadt Schwdbisch Gmund [1987] ECR 3719, paragraph 28 'The Court has no power to 
examine the compatibility with the ECHR of national legislation lying outside the scope of Community law. ' 
... See Case 299/95 Kremzaw vA ustria [ 1997] ECR 1-2629, paragraph 15. 
186 There exist conflicting views on the treatment of rights by the ECJ With J. Coppel and A. O'Neil. 'The European 
Court of Justice: Taking Rights Seriously? ' 29 Common Market Law Review (1992) p. 669 claiming the Court 
considers rights secondary to the furthering of the Community order and the Court manipulates the 
language of lights 
for this same purpose, 29 Common Market Law Review (1992) p. 669. H. Weiler and N. Lockhart. ' "Taking Rights 
Seriously": The European Court and its Fundamental Rights Jurisprudence. ' 32 Common Market Law Review (1995) 
pp. 54 and 579 provide an extensive critique to the position of Coppel and O'Neil in an effort to 
discredit their claim 
concerning the Court's use of rights. 
187 Weatherwill comments that the ECJ has had to recognise the importance of fundamental rights of the 
domestic 
orders of the member states to ensure the legitimacy of Community law, S. Weatherwill. 
Cases and Materials on EC 
Law, 4' ed. (London: Blackstone, 1998) p. 64. 
118 Case 44/79 Hauer v Land Rheinland-Pfalz [ 1979] ECR 3727. 
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states, existed. However the ECJ dismissed the applicant's claim that this right had been 
violated due to the legitimate restrictions upon the right through the application of Community 
provisions. Rights in the Community are protected and guaranteed only to the extent that they 
do not impede with the objectives of ftuther integration. 181 
On the positive side, the development of the common market has brought a degree of 
determinacy to a number of rights in the Community order ranging from access to social 
security, non-discrin-fination, freedom of movement, the fight to property and others. "' In this 
regard the ECJ has made a significant contribution by seeing the equal importance of the civil 
and political rights of the ECHR and the rights contained in the ESC. "' To date no effort has 
been made to codify the rights the ECJ has determined to be fundamental and part of the 
general principles of the Community order. "' The disadvantage of this development is that it 
keeps In place a great deal of indeterminacy and uncertainty as to the position applicability of 
human rights in the EU. The expansion of the EU in both depth and breadth is making some 
form of codification necessary to ensure that the negative effects of integration upon 
individuals are not overridden by the positive aspects of the common market. "' 
The use of the ECHR as a guiding principle for fundamental rights by the ECJ is far from 
clear, for even though the ECHR receives direct mention other sources have been used as 
well. '9' The ECJ has added to the confusion by stating that the determination of ftuidamental 
rights may be derived from the common constitutional provisions of member states, but that in 
determining the content of a specific right recourse cannot be made the national legislation of a 
member state since that would undennine the Community order. "' Therefore the question 
exists as to what extent are fundamental rights and democratic principles detennined to be 
common to the members and not just specific provisions in the constitutional framework of a 
"9 Hauer, paragraph 16. Also Weatherill (1995) 105; Krogsgaard (1993) p. 100. 
'9' See E. Guild and G. Lesieur. The European Court ofJustice on the European Convention on Human Rights, no 
Said "at, When? (London: Kluwer, 1998) for the use of the ECHR by the ECJ. 
'9' See Daftenne v Sabena (No. 3) Case 149/77 [1978] ECR 1365 and Case 24/86 Blaizot v University of Liýge 
[1988] ECR 379. 
192 But see de Burca (1993) who attempts to create the position that the promotion of basic human tights will always 
be compatible with Community aims since the Community has the purpose of also creating a fairer more peaceful 
and democracy society, pp. 298-299. This aspiration does not have any solid basis in the EC treaties and so the 
position of Phelan (D. Phelan. 'Right to Life and the Unbom v Promotion of Trade in Services: The European Court of 
Justice and the Normative Shaping of the European Union. ' 55 Modem Law Review (1992) p. 684) and Coppel and 
O'Neill (1992) feel that there is no attempt to distinguish between fundamental rights and those rights specific to the 
Community, pp. 689-690. 
'9' Clapharn (199 1) p. 103. 
194 Case 44/79 Hauer v Land Rheinland Pfalz [1979] ECR 3737. Deftenne v Sabena and Blaizot v University of 
Liýge. 
'9' Intemationale Handelsgesellschafl, paragraphs 3 
-4. 
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specific member state and by what procedures is the ECJ to make such a determination? "' All 
member states of the EU have accepted the rights incorporated into the ECHR as well as the 
provisions of the ICCPR and ICESCR that would also provide guidance as to which rights are 
common to the member states. "' With the creation of European citizenship (see below) the 
issue of applicability of rights becomes crucial for determining who is able to benefit from the 
protection of Community procedures. "' As it stands the ECJ has not established a 
comprehensive legal framework concerning the lights of EU I citizens,. 199 
Concerning democracy, the ECJ has proclaimed the importance of democracy as part of 
the Community order since that order has a direct impact upon the fives of individuals. '00 The 
importance of democratic procedures was expressed in Roquette Freres"' where it was held 
that when procedures of consultation by the Council with the EP are called for they must be 
followed in realistic terms. "' Commentators have expressed that in a similar fashion as the 
ECHR, the ECJ understands democracy as existing as part of the Community legal order 
based on the common constitutional provisions of the members and their shared legal 
heritage. "' In discussing the legitimate restrictions that may be placed upon rights the ECJ 
followed the practice of the ECHR emphasising that any restriction must be 'necessary in a 
democratic society', without elaborating finther as to the content and nature of a democratic 
society. "' The ability of the ECJ to effectively protect democracy and human rights is tied 
with the larger necessity of the EU clarifying its own purposes and principles and how 
individuals will fit in with them. Until that time the position remains that 'although the legal 
196 In Case 159/90 SPUC v Grogan and Others [ 199 1] ECR 14685 the ECJ held the constitutional tradition of one 
member state to be indicative of fundamental rights at the Community level. This is apparently in contradiction to its 
statement in Nold, paragraph 13 where it stated the 'constitutions of member states' determine the existence of 
fundamental rights. In Case 7n6 1CRA v Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato [ 1976] ECR 1213 the AG stated 
that a right under a single constitutional tradition of a member state should be upheld. How traditions of rights are to 
be identified as Community principles will become an important issue as the EU expands and more diverse 
constitutional provisions become part of the legal order. Weatherwill (1995) feels the ECJ Will have to pragmatic 
when looking to national provisions to deten-nine common traditions, pp. 105-107. Krogsgaard (1993) feels that there 
need not be a numerical majority to deten-nine which rights are fundamental to the Community, p. 107. 
'9' An area member states would be reluctant to enter, see B. Brandtner and A. Rosas. 'Human Rights and the 
External Relations of the European Community: An Analysis of Doctrince and Practice. ' 9 European Journal of 
International Law (1998) pp. 472-473. 
'9' See P. Twomey. 'The European Union: Three Pillars Without a Human Rights Foundation. ' in O'Keefe and 
Twomey (1995) pp. 122-123. 
'99 'Fundamental Rights. ' IGC Briefing No. 22 (9 October 1995) section II. A. 2., at [http: //www. europarl. eu. int/ 
dg7/fiches/en/fiche22. htm]. 
200 Van Gend en Loos, page 12. Also Mancini and Keeling (1994) pp. 183-184. 
201 Case 13 8/79 Roquette Freres v Council [ 1980] ECR 3333, paragraph 33. 
202 Roquette Freres, paragraphs 33-34. 
203 Mancini and Keeling (1994) p. 5. 
204 Case 36/75 Rutili v Minister for the Interior [1975] ECR 1219, paragraph 32. Also Case 136n9 National 
Panasonic v Commission [1980] ECR 2033. In Case 294/83 Parti Ecologiste 'Les Ve? ls'v European Parliament 
[ 1986] ECR 13 39 the Court stated the Community was based on the rule of law, paragraph 23. 
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rhetoric and formal provisions may have changed, the European Union's primary focus 
5 205 
remains an economic one 
. 
D. DEmocRwy, HumANRiGHTsAND THEEU 
Discussion and debate on democracy and human rights and the EU will continue to attract 
controversy on two fronts. The first has already been discussed concerning the indeterminate 
position of these principles in the legal framework of the EU as applied by the ECJ. The 
second deals with the EU's external relations and its stance on democracy and hurnan rights 
regarding third states, including potential new members. 
Within the organisation the lack of clarity concerning the position of human rights and 
lack of democratic legitimacy at the executive and legislative levels will continue to be a point 
of discussion. "' With regard to the issue of human rights it is felt by many that the easiest 
option would be for the EC to accede to the ECHR . 
2" Even though every member state is 
bound by the provisions of the ECHR if the EC as a body became party then its institutions 
would also be bound by its obligations and the ECJ would be able to apply the provisions of 
201 the ECHR directly. The proposal of accession to the ECHR has been rejected by the ECJ 
due to the current institutional arrangements of the EU treaties . 2" The ECJ stated that '[n]o 
Treaty provision confers on the Community institutions any general power to enact rules on 
hurnan rights or to conclude international conventions in this field. '2" Following the opinion 
of the ECJ, the EP called on the 1996 IGC to make the necessary arrangements to allow for 
211 212 
accession to the ECHR with little action coming to date. 
... Craig and de Burca (1998) p. 296. Recent judgments from the ECJ which support this are Case 168/91 Christos 
Konstantinidis v Stadt Altensteig [ 1993] ECR 1- 119 1; Case 84/95 Bosphorus Hara Yollari Turizm v Minist7Y of 
Transport, Ireland [1996] ECR 1-3953. It is also reflective of the opinion of member states, de Burca (1993) p. 284. 
206 P. Raworth. 'A Timid Step Forwards: Maastricht and the Democratisation of the European Commuriity. ' 19 
European Law Review (1994) p. 17. It has been expressed that the ECHR has been a fundamental paft of EC law 
since 1981, see S. Ghandi. 'Interaction between the Protection of Fundamental Rights in the European Economic 
Community under the ECHR. ' Legal Issues ofEuropean Integration (19 81/2) p. 1. 
'0' Continuing Challenge, p. 175. 
'0' Craig and de Burca (1998) express that the ECJ's development of fundamental rights as a principle of Community 
law applies only to the actions of the member states and has no basis for application to EU institutions, p. 
331. But 
see Hoechst v Commission Case 46/87 [1989] ECR 2859 where the Court held that the Commission must respect the 
right to privacy when enforcing EC competition law, paragraph 19. 
209 Opinion 2/94 'Accession by the Community to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms. ' 28 March 1996. The idea of accession appears not to appeal to members as the UK, 
Denmark and Sweden all lodged complaints that the opinion was inadmissible or 'premature 
210 Opinion 2/94, paragraph 27. 
211 'Observance of Human Rights in the European Union. ' [1996] OJ C319/12. 
212 Governments, not surprisingly, have shown reluctance towards explicit inclusion of rights in 
the EU framework 
IGC Briefing No. 22, sections I. A. 4 and I. B. Also Betten and Grief (1998) pp. 124-125. The UK has expressed the 
position that accession of the EU to the ECHR 'would serve no useful purpose'. 
A Partnership of Nations. Cm. 318 1. 
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The issue of accession raises a number of complex issues concerning human rights 
protection in Europe. "' Presently the workings of the EU impinge directly upon individuals 
and Community law is expressly paramount to national law making clarification of rights in 
the EU framework a formidable step towards effectiveness. "' Since the activity of the EU is 
very much part of the day-to-day fives of individuals the act of accession offers the possibility 
of making the EU more democratic by bringing accountability to the 'institutions and assisting 
in closing the decisional distance between individuals of the EU and the institutions. 215 
However, much of the EU's work is in the socio-economic sphere which immediately raises 
the issue as to whether the ESC would be a more appropriate instrument to include into the EU 
framework. "' The choice of becoming party to either treaty with their own pre-existing 
supervision framework will raise the practical issue of overlap and confficts in jurisdiction. "' 
Accession may provide increased opportunities for the individual to achieve a remedy for 
violations however the law may become more indeterminate and confused if the practical 
issues are not addressed. 
An issue related to accession and the directly tied to democratic legitimacy and the role of 
human rights in the EU is the creation of European citizenship. "' The creation of a European 
citizenship is seen as a means of clarifying the position of the individual in the EU legal order. 
Article 8 EC, which establishes citiZenship, does not provide much substance as to what this 
classification contains as it only specifies that citizens may be elected to the EP and that they 
possess the ability to complain to the EP or ombudsman. "' Weiler comments that Article 8 
EC is 'little more than a cynical exercise in public relations 
... 
noteworthy by what is does not 
do than what it does'. "' Shaw describes the benefits of European citizenship as lying beyond 
Article 8 (EQ including various political and socio-economic rights established within the 
Community order. It is hard to see the tangible benefits of citizenship in this regard as many of 
these rights are pre-existing, either in the form of the ECHR as binding upon all members 
"' For more on the EU and accession to the ECHR see A. Toth. 'The European Union and Human Rights: The Way 
Forward. ' 34 Common Market Law Review (1997) p. 491. 
214 Bournans and Norbart (1989) p. 50. 
"' Continuing Challenge, p. 175. 
216 O'Leary (1996) p. 370. O'Leary (1997) discusses how the arrangements under the Amsterdam Treaty do not 
remedy the distance between individuals and social policy decision making, p. 36. Also Betten and Grief (1998) pp. 
121-123. 
217 See O'Leary (1996) pp. 3 64-3 66. 
218 Citizenship of the EU is obtained by being a citizen of a member state, Article 8 [17 (1)] EC. Citizenship is not a 
new category but supplementary to national provisions which raises difficulties With those states that 
have restrictive 
citizenship provisions, see J. Bhabha. "'Get Back to Where You Once Belonged": Identity, Citizenship and 
Exclusion 
in Europe. ' 20 Human Rights Quarterly (1998) p. 604. 
2 '9 The right to complain applies to non-nationals as well, Article 13 8e [ 195] EC. 
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states who are obligated to ensure rights to all individuals within their territory, or the four 
221 freedom rights of the EC Treaty which have existed long before citizenship was discussed. 
The actual purpose and role of European citizenship remains unclear but it does mark a 
necessary step M the evolution of the EU as its growth makes it imperative to create some 
sense of belonging among the individuals within its sphere. 222 In the eyes of some the creation 
of European citizenship actually perpetuates the democratic deficit as those who do not fit the 
definition of 'European' are categorically excluded fi7om the processes of the EU. 223 
Unfortunately the creation of a 'European' citizenship contributes to the process of exclusion 
already underway in the EU raising issue with the EU's position concerning the human rights 
of its most immediate neighbours. 224 
The position of the EU concerning democracy and human fights in non-member states, 
both close to its borders and those finther a field has come under criticism for being 
hypocritical. The institutions of the EU have not taken a strong stance concerning the human 
rights situation in member states but have been open and vocal about states outside the EU, 
which bring into question the credibility of the organisation. "' Hoon makes the point that in 
the EU 'institutions are quick to comment on the state of hurnan rights in other parts of the 
world, without any specific human rights yardstick against which their own action can be 
tested. "" This contradictory behaviour will impede the international credibility of the EU and 
create tensions within its foreign relations. "' Alston and Weiler express the point that the 
"0 J. Weiler. 'European Citizenship 
- 
Identity and Differentity. ' in M. La Torre, ed. European Citizenship: An 
Institutional Challenge. (The Hague: Kluwer, 1998) p. 10. 
"' See Weiler in La Torre (1998) pp. 13-14. 
... The Commission views citizenship as able to close the 'perceived distance between the Union and its citizens'. 
'Commission Publishes its Communication "Agenda 2000: For a Stronger and Wider Europe". ' Press Release 
IP/97/66- Doc 97/9 (16 July 1997). P. Alston and J. Weiler. 'An 'Ever Closer Union' in Need of a Human Rights 
Policy. ' 9 European Journal of International Law (1998) wam that citizenship should not be used as an easy fix to 
the real question of diversity in the EU p. 672. But see J. Shaw. 'The Interpretation of European Union Citizenship. ' 
61 Modern Law Review (1998) who stresses its necessity to create a sense of belonging, p. 294. The difficulty faced 
in creating a sense of communal belonging is exacerbated by the numerous classifications the EU gives to 
individuals, see Bhabha (1998) p. 596. A point O'Leary takes to demonstrate how citizenship is confined to the 
economic status of an individual within the EU, S. O'Leary. 'The Relationship between Community Citizenship and 
the Protection of Fundamental Rights in Community Law. ' 32 Common Market Law Raview (1995) p. 540. 
22' Bhabha (1998) p. 605. 
224 See J. Sorenson. The Exclusive European Citizenship: The Case for Refugees and Immigrants. (Aldershot: 
Avebury, 1996). 
22' Bournans and Norbart (1989) p. 52. 
226 G. Hoon. 'The Restatement of Fundamental Rights by the European Parliament. ' in R Beiber et al, eds. Au nom 
des Peuples Eurqpýens-]h the Name ofthe People ofEurope (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1996) p. 24. 
22' Alston and Weiler (1998) p. 658 where they discuss the use of human rights clauses in trade agreements set 
unilateral conditions upon states in the less dominant position and allows the dominant party (the EU) to use the 
agreement o their benefit. 
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growth of importance of the EU as a global player means it must lead by example in placing 
demands of democracy and human rights upon third states. "' 
In the conducting of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) the objectives of the 
member states include the development and consolidation of democracy and the rule of law 
and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. "' The TEU also creates provisions 
for a Community policy on development that looks to contribute to 'the general objective of 
developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law and to that of respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms. "'0 It has been pointed out that the uneven record of the EU 
in these matters is due largely to the fact that many of its institutions are not properly equipped 
within their specific competence to deal with matters of democracy and human rightS. 231 
Problems relating to conditionality and democracy and human rights were discussed in 
Chapter 3 and the EU is no exception to the detrimental impact these measures often have. "' 
The EU includes human rights in trade agreements not only as a means of furthering human 
rights in the world but also as a self-interested means of ensuring an unequal power relation in 
its dealings with other states. "' As discussed above, the EU is itself not bound by any 
conditions of democracy or human rights that it imposes upon others. The credibility of the 
EU as an influential international actor will be severely questioned if this situation continues. 
The hypocritical stance of the EU on the importance of democracy and human rights for other 
but not for itself has come into focus with the conditions of membership for those who wish to 
join the EU. 
The expansion of the EU into central and eastern Europe is based on expanding the 
economic union that exists and this includes other objectives as well, notably the existence of 
134 democracy and respect for human rights. The expansion of the EU is discussed in Agenda 
... Alston and Weiler (1998) p. 663. 
... Article J. I [I I] TEU. 
"0 Article 130u [ 177] EC. In 1991 the Council issued a resolution on 'Human Rights, Democracy and Development' 
(28 November 1991) which stressed the need for good governance which includes democratic decision making, 
transparency and accountability. For more on the EU's activities in this area see M. Zwambom. 'Human Rights 
Promotion and Protection through the External Relations of the European Community and the Twelve. 
' 7 
Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights (1989) p. 11; European Commission. 'The European Union and Human 
Rights in the World. ' Bulletin of the European Union Supplement 3/95. Clapharn (199 1) pp. 72-84. 
"' Alston and Weiler (1998) p. 667. The EU came under criticism for its role in election monitoring in Cambodia in 
1998 by declaring the elections free and fair when they did not adequately undertake their observer role only visiting 
a small percentage of polling stations and only for a short period of time, see 'EU Loses 
Face for Cambodia Poll 
Verdict. ' The Guardian (5 August 1998) p. 10. 
232 The EU has been described as 'encapsulating' the entire problem of linking econorruc agreements and aid to 
conditions of human rights and democracy, see K. Tom8evski. Between Sanctions and 
Elections: Aid Donors and 
their Human Rights Perfiormance. (London: Pinter, 1997) pp. 41-6 1. 
233 Brandtner and Rosas. (1998) p. 474. On the use of ambiguous rhetoric in EU trade agreements see 
H. SMI'th- 
'Putting Ethics at the Heart of Europe. ' 54 World Today (1998) p. 76. 
131 See Brandtner and Rosas (1998) p. 472. 
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2006P where the Commission lays out the requirements, conditions and obstacles related to 
increasing membership. Of the conditions considered, political requirements are just one, with 
others covering an applicant's ability to meet the economic requirements of participation. " 
The political requirements include adherence to Article F (TEU) but the Commission makes it 
clear that prospective members 'are expected not just to subscribe to the principles of 
democracy and the rule of law but actually to put them into practice in daily life. "" In 
pointing to the realities of some applicants the Commission brings up the existence of 
weakness in the rule of law and lack of autonomy of local government as hindering the 
possibility for membership. The Commission also gives attention to the place of hurnan rights 
and the treatment of and legal framework available to minorities. 
Primary consideration concerning the expansion will be the continued and efficient 
economic union. This could mean long periods of time before new members are fully 
accepted. "' Prospective members have to undergo serious changes in coming up with 
economic systems that will fit in with the goals of the EU. It is discussed below how the 
demand for free-markets, and in this case, free-markets that fit in with the EU framework, does 
not always correspond well with democracy and respect for fights, especially socio-economic 
rights. "' Importantly the applications look at the position of all rights with scrutiny given to 
socio-econornic fights- does raise the issue of current members and these rights. Prospective 
members Will be caught between receiving democratic credibility by joining the EU24' but 
their ability to achieve democracy is under pressure by economic demands. 241 Within the EU, 
expansion will require institutional reform, as the current structure will not be able to 
accommodate a larger number of members and their diversity, adding to the already existing 
... Communication of the Commission, DOC 97/6 (15 July 1997). Bulletin of the EU Supplement 5/97. 
... The Copenhagen IGC (1993) set out the requirements of a market economy, democratic political system, and 
acceptance of the acquis communataire. Also M. Maresceau. 'Association, Partnership, Pre-Accession and 
Accession. ' in Maresceau, ed. Enlarging the European Union. (London: Longman, 1997) pp. 14-18. 
Agenda 2000, p. 40 
M. Jovanovic. 'Does Eastern Enlargement Mean the End of the European UnionT 14 International Relations 
(1998)p. 34. 
"9 The application assessments of the CoMrnission look beyond merely the existence of procedural and institutional 
democracy to ensure some substance is there. See Commission Opinion on Slovakia's Application 
for Membership 
of the EU. Bulletin of the EU Supplement 9/97, p. 20. 
240 See C. Preston. Enlargement and Integration in the European Union. (London: Routledge, 1997) p. 205. The 
demands of democracy and rights placed on new members does not include a strong place 
for socio-econorruic rights, 
see Brandtner and Rosas (1998) p. 487. 
24 ' But see Pinder who feels that if the states of central and eastern Europe 
do not adopt effective market economies 
they Will remain beset by poverty and unable to create democracy. J. Pinder. 
The European Community and Eastern 
Europe. (London: Pinter, 199 1) p. 3. 
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pressures on the EU meaning political considerations between governments based on 
economic needs will be the primary factor in decisions. "' 
The place of the individual in the growth of the EU is bound to be uneven. "' The EU will 
continue to pursue its primary economic objective but as discussed above it trying to place 
concerns such as fundamental rights and democracy as objectives as well. "' However this 
only applies to those individuals presently within the EU as those 'outside' the organisation 
will be subjected to discrimination and exclusion as 'part of the process of constructing 
Europe'. 245 
IV. ORGANISATION FOR SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE 
The OSCE246 (formerly the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(CSCE) ... ) includes members from outside of Europe but its primary focus is on security in 
Europe 
. 
24' The OSCE evolved in the Cold War context with its development reflecting 
changes in the political climate. Recently the OSCE has moved to take a larger role in the area 
of security and conflict prevention in Europe based on the idea that preventing hurnan rights 
abuses and ensuring democracy are essential to peace and security in the region. 249 The 
process of the OSCE, from its first meeting in Helsinki (1975), has had a concern with what is 
termed the human dimension of security issues, which includes concern for individuals and 
... Jovanovic (1998) pp. 34-39. 
"' It has been recently expressed that the obligations of the members states and institutions of the EU are toward the 
creation of rights for individuals, Cases 46/93 and 48/93 Brasserie du P&heur v Germany and Rv Secretary of State 
for Transport, ex parte Factortame [ 1996] ECR 1- 1029, paragraph 39 of the AG's opinion. On what basis this lights 
creation occurs will ultimately detem-iine the nature and effectiveness of the rights for the individual. 
2" For the time being the position will remain that 'where a human right and an economic objective conflict, it is the 
right and not the objective which is modified to complement fundamental economic principles. ' See Phelan (1992) p. 
686. 
24' Bhabha (1998) p. 599. A positive step in the regard has been taken by the Treaty of Amsterdam endowing the EP 
with the responsibility of combating racism and xenophobia, Article 6a [ 13] EC. 
24' For the basic documents of the OSCE from its beginnings as the CSCE see A. Bloed, ed. From Helsinki to 
Vienna: Basic Documents of the Helsinki Process, hereinafter Basic Documents I. (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijoff, 
1990); A. Bloed, ed. The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Analysis And Basic Documents, 
1972-1993, hereinafter Basic Documents II. (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1993); A. Bloed, ed. The Conference On Security 
and Co-operation In Europe: Basic Documents 1993-1995, hereinafter Basic Documents Iff. (The Hague: Kluwer, 
1997). 
24' The change in name came at the Budapest Summit (1994) to reflect the change in the structure of the organisation, 
see M. Shapiro. 'Changing the CSCE into the OSCE: Legal Aspects of a Political Transformation. ' 89 American 
Journal of International Law (1995) pp. 631-633. Bloed refers to the name change as a waste of time see 'Human 
Rights News. ' 15 Netherlands Quarterly ofHuman Rights (1997) p. 182. 
24' 55 states are members of the OSCE with Canada and the United States involved since the beginning. 
Yugoslav, ia 
has been suspended from participation since 1992, OSCE Handbook, 1997. 
249 This move has caused some to remark that human rights issues no longer play a major role in the workings of the 
OSCE. See T. Buchsbaum. "Me Human Dimension of Helsinki-H. ' in A. Bloed, ed. The Challenges of Change: The 
Helsinki Summit and Its Afiermath. (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1994) p. 317. Others view human rights as always 
being the foundation, T. Buergenthal. 'The CSCE Rights System. ' 25 George Washington Journal of 
International 
Law and Economy (199 1) p. 340. 
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groups, their rights and the processes which impact upon their fives. "' While the OSCE is 
loosing its significance today its history of rhetoric with concern for the individual has been 
beneficial to the struggle to bring substance to the rhetoric of democracy and human rights. "' 
A. CoNFERENcEs To OR GANisA TioN 
- 
THE DE vEL opmENT oF THE OSCE 
The OSCE started as a series of conferences adopting agreements and concluding 
documents setting out areas of concern and co-operation among the participants along with 
pledges to adhere to certain principles and behaviour. The first of these, the Helsinki Final Act 
(HFA) 252 set the initial framework for the development of the organisation. The I-IFA was a 
political agreement setting out a number of indeterminate and sometimes contradictory 
commitments, not binding legal obligations. It has been generally agreed that even though the 
HFA did not create legally binding obligations it does possess a good deal of legal 
significance 
. 
25' As to the legal significance of the HFA this is a point primarily for 
international lawyers as no individual would be able to invoke the principles of the HFA in 
legal proceedings. The moral and political significance of the HFA was significant as it 
brought human rights into the public discussion between the superpowers. It also gave a great 
deal of hope to individuals in many of the participating states as they called upon their 
governments to uphold the commitments they had agreed to. 2" The indeterminacy of the 
HFA is increased by the reliance upon the principle non-intervention in domestic affairs 
providing states with an argument to refuse any discussion of human rights or related issues in 
their territory, a point that has persisted throughout the OSCE existence. 255 The issue of 
human rights in the HFA is present in Principle VII including respect for rights and freedoms, 
with specific mention given to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, as well as 
reaffirn-iing commitments to the UDHR and the International Covenants. Principle VII also 
confirmed 'the right of the individual to know and act upon his lights and duties in this field. 5 
"0 The human dimension was originally Basket III of the Helsinki Final Act. The Basket did not address human 
rights specifically but dealt with nurnerous issues related to human contacts. Over time the human dimension was 
used to describe aspects of the organisation which deal with democracy and human rights. See R. Brett. 'Human 
Rights and the OSCE. ' 18 Human Rights Quarterly (1996) p. 677; A. Glover. 'The Human Dimension of the OSCE: 
From Standard Setting to Implementation. ' 3 Helsinki Monitor (1995) p. 1. 
"' See N. Kritz. 'The CSCE in the New Era. ' 4 Journal ofDemocracy (1993) p. 18: A. Bloed and P. van Dijk, eds. 
Essays on Human Rights in the Helsinki Process. (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijoff, 1985). 
252 See T. Buergenthal. ed. Human Rights, International Law and the Helsinki Accord. (Montclair: Allanheld, 1977). 
253 On the legal status of the Helsinki Final Act see 0. Schachter 'The Twilight Existence of Non-Binding Legal 
Instruments. ' 71 American Journal ofInternational Law (1977) p. 296; Buergenthal (199 1) pp. 375-38 1. 
214 OSCE Handbook, 199 7, p. 12. 
255 Principle VI of the Final Act, in Basic Documents It, p. 146. Added to this is inclusion in Principle I on sovereign 
equality that each state shall respect the right of others to determine their own laws and regulations, see 
Buergenthal 
(1977)p. 45. 
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This is a significantly early recognition of the importance of the participation of individuals in 
the process of law and rights. "' 
The progress of the OSCE has passed through many difficult phases based on ideological 
differences and Cold War politics. Follow-up meetings to the original Helsinki summit were 
held in Belgrade (1978) 
'257 Madrid (1983)258 and Vienna (1986) . 2'9 The Vienna Concluding 
marked the communist bloc's acceptance that human rights were a matter for international 
discussion and action . 
2" The Vienna document also expressed the importance of participation 
by individuals including the right of individuals to observe and promote the implementation of 
CSCE provisions and to associate with others for this purpose . 
261 The Vienna Conference 
agreed to a standing commitment to the human dimension with three specific conferences in 
Paris (1989)262 Copenhagen (1990) and Moscow (1991) which would set the stage for major 
changes for the protection and promotion of democracy and human rights In the CSCE 
context. 
The Copenhagen Concluding Docwnent was the first recognition in an international 
instrument of the importance of democracy. "' Participants committed themselves to multi- 
party democracy based on free, periodic and genuine elections, the rule of law and equal 
protection under the law for all based on respect for human rights and effective, accessible and 
just legal systems. 264 The Document states that (. pluralistic democracy and the rule of law are 
... Basic Documents I, pp. 10- 11 
- 
See E. Schlager. "Ibe Procedural Framework of the CSCE: From the Helsinki 
Consultations to the Paris Charter, 1972-1990. ' 12 Human Rights Law Journal (199 1) pp. 222-223. 
25' Belgrade Concluding Document in Basic Documents I, p. 219. 
... See J. Sizoo and R. Junjens. CSCE Decision-Making: The Madrid Experience. (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1984). The 
Madrid Concluding Document did call for the first ever meeting devoted solely to human rights issues to be held in 
Ottawa which was unsuccessful, see H. Hazewinkel. 'Ottawa 1985: The Half-Way Meeting. ' 3 ODIHR Bulletin 
(1995)p. 46. 
"9 For the Concluding Document of Vierma see Basic Documents II, p. 327. On the Vienna Meeting see A. Bloed 
and P. van Dijk, eds. The Human Dimension of the Helsinki Process: The Vienna Follow-Up Meeting and Its 
Aftermath. (Dordrecht: Martinus Nij off, 199 1). 
260 H. Tretter. 'Human Rights in the Concluding Document of the Vienna Follow-Up Meeting. ' 10 Human Rights 
Law Journal (1989) pp. 259-260. Vienna saw the adoption of a supervisory mechanism to ensure compliance with 
human dimension commitments starting the process of institutionalising the CSCE, see Basic Documents 11 (1993) 
pp. 367-369. For a study of the supervisory mechanism see A. Bloed and P. van Dijk. 'Supervisory Mechanism for 
the Human Dimension of the CSCE. ' and F. Coomans and L. Lijnzaad. 'Initiating the CSCE Supervisory Process. ' in 
Bloed and van Dijk (1991) pp. 74,109. For the development of the mechanism through the Human Dimension 
Follow up meetings see R. Brett. 'The Human Dimension of the CSCE and the CSCE Response to Minorities. 
' in M. 
Lucas, ed. The CSCE in the 1990s: Constructing European Security and Cooperation. (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1993) 
pp. 143-160. For examples of the Mechanism being used, see D. McGoldrick. 'Human Rights Developments in the 
Helsinki Process. ' 39 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1990) pp. 925-926. 
161 Vienna Concluding Document in Basic Documents II, pp. 332-334,339. 
262 See H. Hazewinkel. 'Pans, Copenhagen and Moscow. ' in Bloed and van Dijk (199 1) pp. 129-132. 
16' T. Buergenthal. 'The Copenhagen CSCE Meeting: A New Public Order for Europe. ' II Human Rights Law 
Journal (1990) p. 221; M. Halberstarn. 'Tbe Copenhagen Document: Intervention in Support of Democracy. ' 34 
Harvard International Law Journal (1993) p. 164. 
2' For the Copenhagen Concluding Document see Basic Document II, p. 439. Buergenthal 
(1990) p. 217; 
Halberstarn (1993) p. 163; Kritz (1993), p. 19. 
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essential for ensuring respect for all human rights and fundamental freedoms' and recognises 
the need for the active involvement of all persons, groups, organisation arid institutions to 
ensure the continual progress of the democratisation process 
. 
26' The Concluding Document 
outlines a number of specific ingredients that are necessary for a society based on democracy 
and the rule of law" with the underlying belief that the protection and promotion of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms is a basic purpose of government. 267 
The coMMItments of the Copenhagen Document were strengthened at the Paris Summit 
(1990) with the adoption of the Charter of Paris for a New Europe marking the end of 
communism Mi the region . 
16' The long held idea that states are free to choose their political, 
social, economic and cultural systems remained part of the rhetoric of the process, but now 
161 
participants have expressed a commitment to the democratic ideas and structures. The Paris 
Charter was seen as transforming the OSCE from 'an obscure and amorphous system' to one 
that had definite structures and institutional shape. "' The new shape of the OSCE and its 
commitment to democracy and human rights in Europe were ftuther refined and improved 
upon at the Moscow Conference on the Human Dimension in 1991"' and the Helsinki 
Summit of 1992.272 After the second Helsinki Summit the OSCE began moving from its 
position as a catalyst for change to reacting to events in Europe and trying to ensure that 
previous commitments were adhered to 
. 
273 
B. OSCE INST=IONS 
The OSCE consists of a number of bodies entrusted with various aspects of security and 
administration. For the purposes here only three will be mentioned, the Parliamentary 
Assembly (OSCE PA), "' the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rigbts (OD1HR) 
and the f1igh Cornniissioner for National Minorities. 
... Basic Documents II, P. 440. 
... Copenhagaen Concluding Document, paragrapns 5-15. 
26' Basic Documents II, p. 44 1. 
26' Basic Documents II, p. 536; Buergenthal (199 1) p. 361. 
269 Buergenthal (1990) cautions that such structures will develop over time, p. 231. Charter of Paris in Basic 
Documents II, p. 537. 
270 Schlager (1991) p. 221. Also A. Heraclides. Helsinki - II and Its Aftermath: 7he Making of the CSCE into an 
International Organisation. (London: Pinter, 1993) pp. 13-19. 
27 'Basic Documents II, p. 605. 
272 See Heraclides (1993); A. Bloed, ed. The Challenges of Change: The Helsinki Summit of the CSCE and Its 
Aftermath. (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijoff, 1994). 
27' E. Schlager. 'The Challenges of Change: An Introduction on Helsinki-H. ' in Bloed (1994) p. 5. 
274 See R. Spencer Oliver. 'The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly: A Unique OSCE Institution. ' 4 ODIHR 
Bulletin 
(1995/6) p. 26. 
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The OSCE PA was created in 1990 with the purpose of increasing the role played by state 
parliaments and parliamentarians in the activities of the OSCE. The primary activity of the 
OSCE PA is the monitoring of elections. The use of election monitoring was first included in 
the Copenhagen Document with a weak commitment to allow only 'appropriate' groups to 
observe and only to the extent permitted by domestic law allowing states to exclude or limit 
the presence of observers. The commitrnent to use election observers is limited to only 
national elections with sub-national involvement described as only an endeavour. "' The 
OSCE PA also engages in sending special missions to areas of conflict where OSCE 
commitments are under threat. Recent missions to the former Yugoslavia, Turkey and 
Abkhazia demonstrate the Assembly's ability to pursue dialogue and confront problems even 
under the most difficult circumstances. While the special missions may not have any major 
impact in some situations it is generally believed that their presence will help to prevent human 
rights abuses from occurring. "' This position has recently been severely discredited in the 
situation in Kosovo where members of the special observer mission (KVM) were completely 
powerless in even providing a contribution to a resolution to the situation there. "' 
The primary work of the OSCE for the promotion and protection of democracy and 
human rights rests with the ODEHR. 278 The focus of the ODIHR is to assist the participating 
states of the OSCE in building and strengthening democratic institutions and the 
implementation of human dimension commitments. The prionties for the ODM are the 
promotion of elections based on OSCE commitments and the building of civil society and 
democratic institutions. In their work of strengthening civil society and democratic institutions 
the ODMR works closely with the media and NGOs, for the free flow of information is seen 
as an essential element to the democratic process. 279 They also provide a programme of co- 
ordinated legal support dealing with various aspects of the judiciary, the rule of law and the 
creation of legislation. The creation of the ODIEHR has been greeted with mixed responses. It 
has been criticised as diverging from the purpose and overall process by placing too much 
... See A. Bloed. 'A New CSCE Human Rights Catalogue. ' in Bloed and van Dijk (199 1) pp. 60-6 1. 
... See Brett (1996) pp. 687-689. 
277 The OSCE, naturally, claims it was making a significant impact in Kosovo, see 'KVM is Making a Difference. 
' 6 
OSCE Newsletter (1999). While the presence of the mission undoubtedly acted as a deterent it was not able to sustain 
itself in the face of hostility from the Yugoslav authorities and ultimately the OSCE had to Withdraw the mission, see 
'OSCE Chain-nan-in-Office Pulls out OSCE Personnel out of Kosovo. ' OSCE Secretariat, Press Release No. 24/99; 
'Serbs Push Nato to the Brink. ' The Guardian (19 January 1999) p. 1. 
278 On the activities of the ODM see A. Glover. 'The Human Dimension of the Organisation on 
Security and Co- 
operation in Europe 
- 
The ODIHR in Warsaw. ' 2 European Human Rights Law Review (1997) p. 553. 
279For the role of NGOs in the Helsinki Process see R. Brett. 'A New Role for NGOs in the 
CSCE. ' in Bloed (1994) 
p. 359. There also exists an OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media to ensure compliance with 
OSCE 
principles and commitments in respect of freedom of expression and media. 
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emphasis on the human dimension. The result is that issues of democracy and human rights 
have been relegated to a small group in Warsaw freeing up the other (more important) organs 
for 'more pressing' issues. "' 
The High Commissioner for National Minorities is the only OSCE official with executive 
functions in recognition of the importance of this area for European security and human rights 
situation. "' The High Conu-nissioner's responsibility is to identify, and seek early resolution 
of, ethnic tensions that might endanger peace, stability or ffiendly relations between the 
participating states of the OSCE. The High Commissioner operates independently of all 
parties concerned conducting on-site missions, engaging in preventive diplomacy and 
providing reports and recommendations. The primary goal of the High Commissioner is to 
promote dialogue, confidence and co-operation between conflicting parties. 
The advances of the OSCE in the area of minoiities have been significant as it has 
established political frameworks for protection which are stronger than most international legal 
instruments. "' The addressing of minority issues is not from a purely human rights 
perspective but from the issue of security, recognising the importance of democracy and 
human rights are to society in terms of inclusion and participation for long-term security. The 
ability of the High Comniissioner and the OSCE to have an impact in the area of minority 
protection is down to the political nature of the agreements of the organisation and the volatile 
nature of establishing legal safeguards for minority protection. "' The 'success' of the role 
depends wholly upon the ability of the individual who fills the post to be pro-active in 
pursuing the mandate and able to create workable relations with governments. 
C DEmocRA cyAND Hum, 4N R iGHTs j7v THE OSCE 
The OSCE, due to its own growth and the changes in Europe, has had trouble finding a 
place for itself in the region, especially with regard to democracy and human rights. The 
priorities for the OSCE have shifted to the security context that does include concerns for 
"0 Kritz (1993) p. 23. The present development of the OSCE as a too] to ensure Russia goes along with the expansion 
of NATO gives backing to this, see E. Mlyn. 'OSCE - Now More than Ever. ' II Cambridge Review ofInternational 
Affairs (1998) p. 227. 
The position of the High Commissioner was created by the Helsinki Concluding Document, paragraph 
23, and 
annex 11. See R. Zaagman and H. Zaal. 'The CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities: Prehistory and 
Negotiations. ' and R. Zaagman. 'The CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities: An Analysis of the 
Mandate and the Institutional Context. ' in Bloed (1994) pp. 95,113. 
... Brett (1996) p. 685. On the role of minority protection in the development of the OSCE see J. Wright. 'The OSCE 
and the Protection of Minority Rights. ' 18 Human Rights Quarterly (1996) p. 190. 
283 See E. Schlager. 'Does CSCE Spell "Stability" for EuropeT 24 Comell International Law Journal (199 1) pp. 504- 
505. 
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184 democracy and hurnan rights but as a secondary element of a wider purpose. The 
organisation remains limited in its influence over the actions of states as governments have 
refused the presence of a mission or observer group and there was no possible action for the 
OSCE to oppose such a move. Examples include Kosovo (see above), as well as Belarus 
where the president was establishing greater authoritarian control in contravention of OSCE 
commitments but denied such a thing was occurring and refused the presence of a fact findmig 
mission of the OSCE. "' When this occurs the most the OSCE can do is provide limited 
information concerning the situation on the ground and provide suggestions for future action. 
But with the reluctance of participating states to become more involved III crisis situations the 
impact of the OSCE's proclamations are likely to be minimal. "' 
The rhetoric of democracy and human rights has been advanced in Europe through the 
OSCE but it has not been able to translate the rhetoric into effective standards with participants 
proving more reluctant to finther the OSCE's activities in this area. "' The ideological 
separation of Europe during the Cold War created fertile ground for accusations that 
governments were not meeting their commitments. With the end of the ideological divide 
governments are reluctant to strengthen ftirther the human dimension for fear of it being used 
against them. "' The development of the OSCE into a more 'legal' institution means finding a 
place in between the growth and activities of the COE and EU. The OSCE's efforts in this 
regard have not been wholly successful resulting in a body characterised by a complex 
structure and nomenclature with the use of obscure terminology and a tendency to produce 
elaborate and bureaucratic procedures which are not always used. "' 
V. DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE ExPANSION OF EUROPE 
The end of the communist regimes in Europe and recent developments in the Balkans are 
provmg to be formidable obstacles to the promotion and protection of democracy and human 
rights in the region. The complete restructuring of societies in central and eastern Europe, both 
politically and economically, has not always produced favourable results and has hindered the 
284 Kritz (1993) points out how this all depends on money, pp. 23-25. 
181 See 'Human Rights News. ' 15 Netherlands Quarterly on Human Rights 1997,91. 
286 When the OSCE was in Kosovo and began making efforts to increase its presence, participating states were 
reluctant to commit personnel due to the instability of the area, see 'Observers Put at Risk in Kosovo War. ' The 
Guardian (28 December 1998) p. I 11. 
287 Glover (1995) p. 3. 
21' T. Buchsbaum. 'The Human Dimension after Helsinki-IU in Bloed (1994) p. 311. Since the end of communism 
the Human Dimension Mechanism has not been used very often, see Brett (1996) p. 680; Zaagman in Bloed (1994) 
pp. 232-246. 
2'9 Brett (1996) p. 668. 
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consolidation of the democratisation process in some states as well as demonstrating the 
fragility of democratic transitions. 290 The unsettled condition of many societies of Europe 
along with the end of the ideological divide of the region has led to a re-examination of what 
Europe is or where it is located or who is part of it. Does the expansion of the membership of 
the regional organisations bring the common identity and heritage of its members under 
question, or does it enhance the understanding of democracy and human rights in the region? 
Related to the issues of instability and identity is the position of minorities throughout Europe 
and how they are able to benefit from the protection and promotion of democracy and human 
rights. The combination of these issues is forcing the three regional institutions to consider 
their roles and inter-relations in ftirthering democracy and human fights in the region. The 
COE, EU and OSCE all have a common vision as to how Europe should be, how this is 
accomplished differs according to the purposes of each organisation hindering effective co- 
operation toward common goals effective for the individual. For the future of democracy and 
hutnan rights in the region the three organisations will need to concentrate their co-operative 
efforts for the benefit of the individual and not in the pursuit of disparate programmes 
supposedly for the 'good' of Europe. 
A. Commumm To CApmum 
The end of communism in central and eastem Europe did not automatically herald the 
existence of democracy with human rights protection and respect for the rule of law. The pace 
of change in the area has varied considerably between states with differing results. '9' The 
impact of the past continues to influence both the institutional and psychological change to 
democracy in these societies. "' Dealing with the past is an issue for all emerging democracies 
and the states of Europe are no exception. It is necessary to address the impact of the past in 
order to build new effective structures in government, economy, and society and, most 
importantly, to educate individuals about the positive possibilities of democracy. "' This final 
"' In the process of change in the area all sectors of society are impacted, even i 
children, see UNICEF. Children at 
Risk in Central and Eastern Europe: Perils and Promises. (Florence: Econorrues in Transition Studies Number 4, 
1997). 
"' P. Lewis. 'Democratization in Eastern Europe. ' in D. Potter, et al, eds. Democratization. (Cambridge: Polity, 1997) 
pp. 405409. 
... The communist past is not the sole problem as difficulties exist independent of the communist system, 
R. 
Milllerson. International Law, Rights and Politics: Developments in Eastern Europe and the CIS. (London: 
Routledge, 1994) p. 95. 
293 The past has created a certain political psychology which has made the people sceptical of terms currently 
being 
used to describe the states such as pluralism, democracy, etc., ten-ns they have all heard 
before 
, 
see G. Ionescu. 'The 
Painful Return to Normality. ' in G. Parry and A Moran, eds. Democracy and Democratization. (London: Routledge, 
1994) pp. 121-124. 
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point is perhaps the most difficult to achieve when the socio-economic situation of most 
societies is dire and individuals find it difficult to find anything positive about the changes that 
have occurred. 
294 Regardless of the specific problems facing central and eastern Europe, 
211 
change will not be immediate and what is important is patience, as it takes time for a society 
to develop an effective system of democracy and human rights 
. 
21' Establishing a democratic 
society requires fostering a culture or mind-set M favour of democracy" as '[flaws can impose 
change on political and economic systems, but you cannot legislate new attitudes. Q98 
Dealing with the past means dealing with the individuals who were part of it. Societies of 
central and eastern Europe have approached this issue from a number of perspectives... with 
the use of 'lustration' being favoured with less than perfect results. "' Lustration involves 
ensuring individuals associated with the past regimes are excluded from the political process 
and therefore not able to interrupt the transition to democracy 
-a form of 'political 
cleansing'. "' Lustration has primarily involved making public the files of the former security 
services to discover who was involved with the regime and in what way. "' A number of 
difficulties arise in the use of lustration due to the extent to which the communist party 
'9' A. Illaiionov. 'The Roots of the Economic Crisis. ' 10 Journal of Democracy (1999) pp. 68-69. In Russia it has 
been observed that people find it useless to protest against the government much less become actively involved in the 
democratic process, see J. Shapiro. 'Bleak Winter. ' 54 World Today (1998) pp. 303-304. 
'9' See R. Rose and W. Mishler. Political Patience in Regime Transformation: A Comparative Analysis of Post- 
Communist Citizens. (Studies In Public Policy, no. 274. Glasgow: University of Strathclyde, 1996). In the legal 
sphere it is considered necessary for a 'complete and immediate overhaul' of the legal systems, see M. Ellis. 'The 
Democratisation of Central and Eastern Europe: An Afterword. ' 7 American University Journal ofInternational Law 
and Policy (1992) p. 743. 
296 A point recognised by the COE, see COE. Bridging the Gap: Ae Social Dimension of the New Democracies. 
hereinafter Bridging the Gap (Stasbourg: COE, 1995) pp 3349. See also V. Dimitrijevic. 'Political Pluralism in the 
Aften-nath of the Eastern European Upheavals. ' in A. Rosas and J. Helgesen, eds. The Strength of Diversity: Human 
Rights and Pluralist Democracy. (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1992) p. 5. 
297 S. White et al. The Politics of Transition: Shaping a Post-Soviet Future. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1993) pp. 225-229. 
298 V. Cep] and M. Gillis. 'Making Amends after Communism. ' 7 Journal ofDemocracy (1996) p. 119. 
299 See L. Hayse. 'Justice after Transition: On the Choices Successor Elites Make in Dealing with the Past, ' 20 Law 
and Social Inquiry (1995) p. 5 1. 
" Lustration raises a number of difficult issues such as how the past is recounted as truth, moral debates over 
accountability for acts that were 'legal', jurisprudential issues of due process and retrospective justiciability and 
enforcement and the scope of international law, see S. Cohen. 'State Crimes of Previous Regimes: Knowledge, 
Accountability and the Policing of the Past. ' 20 Law and Social Inquiry (1995) p. 9. 
'0' C. Bertshci. 'Lustration and the Transition to Democracy: The Cases of Poland and Bulgaria. ' 28 East European 
Quarterly (1995) p. 436. Cep] and Gillis (1996) p. 123. 
'0' M. Ellis. 'Purging the Past: The Current State of Lustration Laws in the Former Communist Bloc. ' 59 Law and 
Contemporary Problems (1996) p. 181. This may give rise to violations of privacy under the ECHR, see D. 
Feldman. 'The Developing Scope of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. ' 2 European Human 
Rights Law Review (1997) pp. 272-273. In Hungary lustration has been extended to the private sphere to those who 
were involved in shaping public opinion, see G. Halmai. 'Confronting the Past: The Hungarian 
Constitutional Court's 
Lustration Decision of 1994. ' 1 East European Human Rights Review (1995) p. 126. The use of information 
from 
the fort-ner security services creates a number of problems concerning the creation of truth, see 
M. Los. 'Lustration 
and Truth Claims: Unfinished Revolutions in Central Europe. ' 20 Law and Social 
Inquiry (1995) p. 117. 
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permeated all aspects of society making the process of cleansing next to impossible. "' 
Throughout eastern and central Europe individuals who were part of the former communist 
regimes have remained active in political life and many have attained high positions in the new 
democratic governments. 304 The impact of the continued presence of former communists has 
been uneven, slowing progress to democracy, as M Russia, or sometimes contributing to 
311 democracy as in Poland. When lustration has occurred, the various motives behind the use 
of lustration has resulted in ordinary individuals being seen as associated with former regimes 
and excluded from the new system, resulting in a lack of human resources that has an impact 
301 
on the transition to democracy. 
Since the communist party pen-neated all aspects of society and governance... transitions 
to democracy involve creating institutional and procedural structures that establish 
responsibility and accountability concerning those in power, mechanisms for peaceful change 
and the creation of public space allowing individuals to freely pursue participation in the 
processes of society. "' This raises the problem of governments attempting to completely 
remake the socio-political system without themselves falling into chaos which will in turn 
impact the general condition of society and how individuals view the impact of change. 'O' e 
primary targets for change are the legislature and judiciary. For both bodies there is the need 
to establish themselves as effective government organs and not merely rubber stamps for the 
executive. 
The role of the legislature in a new democracy is important for the public's perception of 
the legitimacy and ability of the government to rule. In newly democratised states the role of 
the legislature is commonly seen in two ways, either as a body able to represent the diversity 
and differences of opinions in society or as an obstacle to goverriment action due to the very 
same reasons of diversity and difference. "' Legislatures have an important symbolic 
... For a review of the various lustration laws see Ellis (1996). 
'04This does not include the individuals who are in positions of power outside of government who owe their place to 
the fon-ner communist systemý see Bertshei (1995) p. 43 5. 
'0' See J. Higley et al. 'The Persistence of Postcommunist Elites. ' 7 Journal ofDemocracy (1996) pp. 133-147. 
'0' Ellis (1996) p. 196; J. Linz and A. Stepan. Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern 
Europe, South America, and Post-communist Europe. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996) pp. 249- 
251; M. Butora. 'The Delayed Return of Prodigal Sons: Reflecfions on the Emerging Democracies in Central and 
Eastern Europe. ' 7 American University Journal ofInternational Law and Policy (1992) p. 445. 
'0' Mifflerson (1994) p. 160. 
'0' White et al. (1993) p. 213. 
309 White et al. (1993) p. 222-224. 
3 '0 There is also the massive proliferation of parties all competing for a small piece of 
the political prize which 
sometimes make a mockery of the process and creates confuse and fi7ustration 
for the voters, Dirru"evic in Rosas 
and Helgesen (1992) pp. 10- 11 
- 
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importance as representative of society and a forum for deliberation. "' If legislatures are seen 
as ineffective or non-representative of society many will lose confidence in the ability of 
government to govern and ultimately reject the political system. "' Ineffective legislatures, 
either real or perceived, allow powerful individuals in the executive to manipulate the situation 
and blame the lack of reforrn on an obstructing legislature allowing for greater centralisation of 
power, sometimes with popular support. "' 
The centralising tendency of the national governments makes it difficult for national 
legislatures to act as effective representatives and also hinders the ability of local government 
to operate and develop. The overall political climate of the area sees national events being 
more important than what is happening locally as local needs are ignored. "' The economic 
difficulties of society will keep the attention on 'national' issues to the detriment of local 
development causing leaders at all levels to disagree over the direction of policy and 
priorities. "' Enhancement of local and regional forms of participation will prove difficult to 
develop for such practices did not exist previously due to the strict hierarchy of the communist 
party. "' Participation at all levels of society, and in all aspects, would assist the transition 
process as individuals would feel part of the system around them. However, with possibilities 
limited at both the national and local level it will difficult for individuals to perceive any 
beneficial aspects of the democratic process as power and decision-making remains tied to a 
small exclusive group. 
The judiciary in the new regimes face problems, as under communism the idea of law was 
subordinate to the doctrine of the party, completely marginalising the law from the structures 
of society. "' This gives a low impression of the law and does not fill it with any concept of 
effectiveness. Judges, lawyers, scholars, etc. never had the opportunity to see the law in other 
contexts or in a different form and will have difficulty coping with the idea that political 
consequences Will no longer be a major factor in their decisions. "' The efforts of the regional 
organisations, especially the COE, concentrate on establishing effective judicial systems in 
"' W. Mishler and R. Rose. 'Support for Parliaments and Regimes in the Transition Toward Democracy in Eastern 
Europe. ' 19 Legislative Studies Quarterly (1994) pp. 8-10. 
J. Dunn. East Central Europe: 7he Challenges ofFreedom. (Wilton Park Papers, N. 50. London: HMSO, 1992). 
Belarus stands as an example as the president has changed the constitution providing himself with more centrallsed 
and authoritarian powers. Belarus was suspended from the COE in 1992 because of this but the government remains 
popular, see 'Referendum on Constitutional Change. ' Keesings Contemporary Archives (November 1996) p. 413 8 1. 
"' M. Kaldor. and 1. Vej'voda. 'Democratization in Central and East European Countries. ' 73 International Affairs 
(1997)p. 75. 
"' Butora (1992) p. 440. 
316 T. Clark. 'Local Democracy and Innovation in Eastern Europe. ' II Environment and Planning: Government and 
Policy (1993) p. 183. 
317 Linz and Stepan, 248-249; MCillerson (1994) p. 179.. 
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recognition of the essential role of the rule of law in an effective democracy. "' The new 
constitutions of the states in central and eastern Europe include international standards for the 
protection of human rights adding to the rhetorical importance of the existence of effective 
legal measures. "O It is up to the domestic judiciaries to ensure that these international 
standards are accessible to individuals through a credible process and not merely words on 
paper as they have been in the past. 321 
With political change has come economic change and the lack of economic success in 
many societies of the area places democracy under threat. As societies have moved away from 
the communist system the previous social guarantees were shown to have little substance and 
the existence of civil and political rights did little to alleviate the very real problems individuals 
faced. "' The economic problems of the area have been worse than expected 'undermining 
both popular and political support for firther change"" as leaders try to provide for demands 
from within and outwith society. The transitions to democracy in Europe have been equated 
with the need to establish free market capitalist economies. "' The creation of a market 
economy, as with a democratic society, is not spontaneous and cannot be created from outside 
within a short period of time. "' Market economies are social constructs that are the result of 
socie norms, government policies, and state sanctioned regulations, none of which existed 
under communist rule. "' Events in Russia have demonstrated the difficulties of implementing 
free market capitalist economic systems and the detrimental and disillusioning effects on the 
population. "' Disillusionment and a general loss of hope... are not based on selfish responses 
to unfulfilled unrealistic expectations but are due to a very real economic crisis as basic goods 
"' R. Aldrich. 'Judicial Independence in a Democratic Society. ' I The Advocate (1995) pp. 26-27. 
"9 See Drzmczewski (1993) p. 229. 
320 For a review of the new constitutions see, V. Vereshchetin. 'New Constitutions and the Old Problem of the 
Relationship between International Law and National Law. ' 7 European Journal ofInternational Law (1996) pp. 29- 
41. 
32 ' To date the judiciary in Russia has been unable to exert any such influence becoming almost completely 
marginallsed from the system of governance, see M. McFaul. 'The Perils of a Protracted Transition. ' 10 Journal of 
Democracy (1999) p. 15 
322 See H. Suchocka. 'The Social Charter and the States of central and eastern Europe. ' in Social Charterfor the 21st 
Century, pp. 249-250. 323 Bridging the Gap, p. 10. 
32' The transitions to democracy in eastern and central Europe are unique by occurring in a non-capitalist economy. 
But the context of the transition whereby communism was the antithesis of capitalist democracies made it almost 
inevitable that communism was to be replaced with capitalism. See D. McSweeney and C. Tempest. 'The Political 
Science of Democrati c Tran siti on in Eastern Europe. ' 41 Political Studies (1993) pp. 417-418. 
32' R. Bideleux. 'In Lieu of a Conclusion: East meets WestT in R. Bideleux and R. Taylor, eds. European Integration 
and Disintegration: East and West. (London: Routledge, 1996) p. 283. 
326 Linz and Stepan, 253-3 
32' Butora (1992) pp. 442-443. 
328 See E. Gellner 'An identity crisis in the east. ' Independent (29 April 1996) p. 13. Also Dirrutrijevic in Rosas and 
Helgesen, (1992) p. 8. 
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and services cannot be provided and those that do exist remain well out of the reach of many. 
The lack of resources and widespread corruption resulting in conflicts over resources eriously 
hampers the development of democracy and human rights in society. When the economy is 
weak and large sectors of society suffer the easiest target for blame is the government in power 
who is expected to improve the situation, for that is why they were elected. The poor 
economic conditions and hardship that exists leads to the question as to whether democracy is 
the right way to go if it means a worsening situation for individuals. "' In the societies of 
central and eastern Europe there is the definitive need to achieve social and economic equality 
for political equality to succeed. "' 
Many of the current problems facing states central and eastern Europe make the future of 
democratic and human rights fragile at best. The desire for the stability of the 'good old days' 
has allowed the emergence of leaders with authoritarian tendencies. "' It is unlikely that 
authoritarian rule similar to communism will return as progress towards some form of 
democracy and human rights protection is the only acceptable alternative which is available to 
these states. "' The instability of the democratic transition in central and eastern Europe has 
benefited from the existence of regional arrangements who are willing and able to assist in the 
transitions to democracy. "' The existence of these arrangements has helped to ensure efforts 
aimed at the promotion and protection of democracy and human rights as states desire 
membership in these organisation who require democratic governments and respect for human 
rights. In the early period of the transitions to democracy (and still today) the greater emphasis 
of the regional organisations has been on the civil and political reforms of these states with less 
concern given to socio-economic areas that impact directly upon individuals. 334 As societies 
struggle to come to terms with the new political systems and the socio-economic difficulties 
they face it is necessary to ensure that vulnerable groups do not suffer disproportionately so 
that all sectors of society are able to benefit from the transition to democracy. "' 
"9 G. Kardos. 'The Market, Human Rights and Pluralism. ' in Rosas and Helgesen (1992) pp. 125-126. The response 
to changes brought about by the transitions to democracy have been uneven, see A. Grodeland et al. ' 'In Theory 
Correct, but in Practice' 
... 
Public Attitudes to Really Existing Democracy in Ukraine, Bulgaria, Slovakia and the 
Czech Republic. ' 14 Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics (1998) p. 1. 
"0 K. Klare. 'Legal Theory and Democratic Reconstruction: Reflections on 1989. ' 25 University ofBritish Columbia 
Law Review (199 1) p. 94. 
... In Russia Yeltsin's rule has become very centralised and personalised in nature being called a hybrid system of 
liberalisation and authoritarianism, see L. Shevtsova. 'The Two Sides of the New Russia. ' 6 Journal of 
Democracy 
(1995) p. 6 1. 
... See G. Nodia. 'How Different are Postcommunist TransitionsT 7 Journal ofDemocracy (1996) p. 15. 
A. Rosas and J. Helgesen. 'Introduction: The Challenges of Change. ' in Rosas and Helgesen 
(1992) p. 2. 
M. Martinez, former President of the COE Parliamentary Assembly in Social Charterfor the 21st Century, p. 
40. 
... Din-iitrijevic in Rosas and Helgesen (1992) pp. 20-23 
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Socio-economic reform is based primarily on integrating these states into the global and/or 
regional economic systems. Efforts concentrate at the macro level with international priorities 
taking dominance over local concerns. This is demonstrated by the EU who has focused its 
programme for democratic reform in central and eastern Europe on fostering free markets with 
the idea that as markets become more developed, or more like the West, governments will 
become more dernocratic-'16 The EU's idea that markets make democracy is based on the 
belief that economic development encourages democracy and that economic improvement is 
necessary to legitimate and sustain a new democracy. "' While the EU's membership criteria 
includes establishing a democratic framework, scant attention is paid to its overall position and 
foundation in a society. The desire for integration and expansion should not overlook efforts 
of ensuring individuals are able to participate in the processes around them and that the whole 
spectrum of rights, including most importantly economic and social rights, will be ensured. "' 
B. MTNOPJTIES 
A possible 'positive' characteristic of communist rule in Europe was that it tended to 
contain minority tensions since all individuals were oppressed and not just certain groups. "' 
The development of democracy has uncovered these differences in society as described in the 
case of Poland. 
Democratisation at the turn of the decade meant practical recognition of the facts 
that Polish society was not totally homogeneous, and that members of various 
minority groups were also citizens and in the capacity they had the right to 
formulate their own preferences, to express themselves on political and cultural 
matters without fear of government reprisal 
... . 
340 
Mucha goes on to explain how this recognition of the rights of minorities automatically raises 
341 
the problem of having to publicly create and define differences between groups in society. 
This immediately creates a paradox for democracy as provisions for special treatment for 
... L. Diamond Promoting DemocracY in the 1990s: Actors and Instruments, Issues and Imperatives. (Report to the 
Carnegie Commission, New York, 1995) p. 33. 
33' Diamond (1995) p. 3 9. 
ti tr sitions, pp. 127-131. 338 See Kardos in Rosas and Helgesen (1992) for rights in rela on to market an 1 
339 MUllerson (1994) pp. 95-98. 
340 j. Mucha. 'Democratisation and Cultural Minorities: The Polish Case of the 1980s/90s. ' 25 East European 
Quarterly (1992) p. 472. 
"' Mucha (1992) p. 472. Macey remarks 'the new spirit of openness' in Europe has not been universally applied'. in 
Crouch and Maquand (1992) p. 139. 
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certain groups conflict with ideas of equality and non-discrimination. "' The delineation of 
society along defined attributes of the person too often gives rise to conflict and controversy 
over the meaning of difference, a point that was explicitly demonstrated in the former- 
Yugoslavia. 343 
Minorities raise numerous conceptual and practical difficulties for the legal protection of 
democracy and human rights in any society. 344 Minority issues in Europe have a chequered 
past as a highly political and emotive topic short on agreement as to how 'to reinforce the 
image of Europe as a collection of pluralist, multicultural states'. "' The issue of minofities is 
not exclusive to the states of central and eastern Europe as the established democracies of 
western Europe face significant minority issues in the functioning of their democratic 
societies. "' Each of the three regional organisations has faced difficulty in coming to 
agreement upon either a political or legal framework needed to address minority issues. "' In 
the states of central and Eastern Europe the problem is Ruther intensified by the long tradition 
nationalism which has not always corresponded to the multi-dimensional realities of society. "' 
Efforts at minority protection in Europe have not always been successful primarily due to 
the difficulty in acl-iieving agreement between governments as to future action. There is the 
added difficulty that no one solution will apply to all minorities in all states as groups have 
342 N. Rodley. 'Conceptual Problems in the Protection of Minorities: International and Legal Developments. ' 17 
Human Rights Quarterly (1995) p. 48. 
343 J. Bugajshi. 'The Fate of Minorities in Eastern Europe. ' 4 Journal ofDemocracy (1993) pp. 85-86. Fora detailed 
study of minority issues surrounding the Yugoslavia situation see T. VArady. 'Minorities, Majorities, Law, and 
Ethnicity: Reflections on the Yugoslav Case. ' 19 Human Rights Quarterly (1997) p. 9. 
344 First and foremost is the definitional aspect as to who or what constitutes a minority, see J. Packer. 'On the 
Definition of Minorities. ' In J. Packer and K. Myntti, eds. The Protection of Ethnic and Linguistic Minorities in 
Europe. (Abo: Abo Akaderru University, 1993) pp. 23-66. Gilbert (1996) observes that with legal instruments 
definitions are necessary as 'one cannot accord rights to wholly nebulous concepts', p. 162. Political agreements 
through the OSCE have also failed to establish a definition and the ability of the High Commissioner to 'know a 
national minority when he sees one' does not make the situation any clearer, see Wright (1996) p. 202. 
34' Gilbert (1996) p. 16 1. Also J. Mayall. Nationalism and International Society. (Cambridge, 1990) p. 55. 
3" The UK stands as the perfect example as the state which has one of the longest traditions of democratic structures 
in society in Europe but to date 'there is in Britain no forum, language or even belief in the necessity for the 
recognition of minorities and their rights. ' T. Hervey. 'Which Rights, Whose Rights? The Identification and 
Protection of Minorities in British Law. ' in Packer and Myntti (1993) p. 123. For individual studies of a number of 
European states, see B. Baumgartl and A. Favell, eds. New Xenophobia in Europe. (London: Kluwer, 1995). The 
threat of violence among groups is a real threat to Western European societies as well, see M. Benton. 'National 
Integration and Ethnic Violence in Western Europe. ' 25 Journal ofEthnic and Migration studies (1999) p. 5. 
34' Even in the OSCE after it began to take on institutional shape participants became reluctant to come to agreements 
on minority issues, see F. Ermacora. 'Rights of Minorities and Self-Determination in the Framework of the CSCE. ' in 
Bloed and van Dijk (199 1) p. 197. 
348 See S. Griffiths. Ethnicity and Nationalism: Threats to European Security. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1993). The term 'ethnic conflict' has been understood to include social, political or econon*uc onflict along distinct 
ethnic lines, leading to confusion as to the meaning of the term, see L. Walker. 'Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in 
the Post-Soviet Transition. ' in L. Drobizheva, ed. Ethnic Conflict in the Post-Soviet World: Case Studies and 
Analysis. (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1996) pp. 126. 
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widely differing goals and means of achieving them. "' Combined, these factors make it 
difficult for the regional organisations of Europe to move beyond a rhetorical stance of 
adopting principles and action plans without achieving consensus on ftuther substantive 
action. "' The COE has only been able to achieve the Framework Convention and all of its 
weaknesses. There exists no explicit minority protection under the ECHR with possibilities 
existing under Article 14 concerning non-discrimination but this is far from clear or 
effective. "' The Framework Convention is significant, as legal instruments for the protection 
of minorities are rare in the international scene. At the same time one must question the 
efficacy of providing watered-down documents just for the sake of agreement instead of 
working toward more effective measures. The EU has recognised, in the context of its 
expanded membership, that minority issues could easily place strain on the ability of the 
organisation, making it necessary to deal with any problems prior to membership. "' 
The inability of the EU to effectively deal with minority situations in non-member states 
was demonstrated by its political failures with the former Yugoslavia showing the organisation 
still only has limited ability and influence outside the economic sphere. "' For those states who 
the EU is in association agreements there is a reliance upon the OSCE structures for ensuring 
compliance and problem solving concerning minorities. "' The developed nature of minority 
protection within the OSCE is limited as the High Commissioner is only mandated to deal 
with minority issues that impact security between states and is not able directly address the 
minority situation within a state. "' From the position of the individual, this limitation is 
another example of the reluctance of states to establish effective procedures for dealing with 
democracy and human fights as minority issues demonstrate the need to deal with potential 
problems pro-actively and directly instead of waiting for violations to occur. "' While 
democracy provides the potential for greater conflict in society it also creates space for 
discussion and resolution by openly addressing the necessary issues. "' 
The position and treatment of minorities throughout Europe creates a number of difficult 
issues for the region, whether it is by keeping certain individuals out (EU), avoiding conflict 
... Bugajshi (1993) pp. 88-98; Mallerson (1994) p. 107. 
"' BenoYt-Rhomer (1996) pp. II- 12. 
"' For the use of Article 14 and other provisions of the ECHR for minorities see G. Gilbert. 'The 
Legal Protection 
Accorded to Minority Groups in Europe. ' 23 Netherlands Yearbook ofInternational Law (1992) pp - 81-93. 
112 Agenda 2000. The Effects on the Union's Policies of Enlargement to the Applicant Countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe. Impact Study, Part 11 Analysis I-The External Dimension section 1.1 
353 Jovanovic (1998) p. 37. 
31, Stability Pacts. 
311 Of course minority tensions within a state could easily lead to regional 
instability, see Wright (1996) p. 202. 
356 See Bugaj shi (1993) p. 99. 
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(OSCE) or ensuring rights of all are maintained (COE), democracy comes under strain when 
minorities are treated poorly. "' Resolving conflicts that arise due to minority issues has 
proven difficult as the method of resolution, legal or political, has proven controversial. 359 
Legal efforts at minority protection within Europe have so far been extremely weak as 
govemments have not been co-operatiVe in this regard and have refused to give any authority 
to an impartial body for ensuring obligations are met. 360 VArady feels that legal rules alone 
will not solve the situations minorities face without the existence of 'a culture that accepts that 
minorities cannot be equal without the right to be different 5- 361 
CA COMMONIDEN7YTYAND FUTURE CO-OPERATioN 
The end of communism and the increased membership of the regional organisations in 
Europe raises the question as to whether or not there continues to exist a single 'European' 
identity. The three organisations presented here all profess the belief of a shared identity 
among its members as the basis for action. "' In the Statute of the COE, the member states 
reaffirm 
their devotion to the spiritual and moral values which are the common heritage 
of their peoples and the true source of individual freedom, political liberty and 
the rule of law, principles which form the basis of all genuine democracy 
It is ftuther expressed that 'for the maintenance and fifther realisation of these ideals and in the 
interests of economic and social progress, there is a need of a closer unity between all like- 
minded countries of Europe'. "' At the EC Copenhagen Summit (1973) the member states 
issued a Document on European Identity which stated that the principles of representative 
democracy, rule of law, social justice are the ultimate goal of economic progress and respect 
for human rights and all are ftindamental elements of the 'European Identity'. The preamble 
of the Helsinki Final Act speaks of a common history of the participants of the OSCE and a 
recognition of elements 'common to their traditions and values can assist them in developing 
357 R. deNevers. 'Democratization and Ethnic Conflict. ' 35 Survival (1993)p. 38. 
15' For a general view of minorities and democracy see J. Crowley. 'Minorities and Majoritarian Democracy: the 
Nation-State and Beyond. ' in K. von Benda-Beckrnan and M. Verkuyten. Nationalism, Ethnicity and Cultural 
Identity in Europe. (Utrecht: ERCOMER, 1995) p. 154. 
... See Gilbert (1996) pp. 171-172. 
360 See above discussion of COE Framework Convention. The COE PA admits the weaknesses of the instrument 
by 
leaving enforcement to governments, see Recommendation 1255 (1995) paragraph 7. 
36 ' He feels that 'legal rules grounded on empathy' is a good start, Vdrady (1997) p. 54. This point is important as the 
break up of the USSR and Yugoslavia did not create less multi-ethnic states with the potential 
for conflict remaining, 
see Mifflerson (1994) p. 99. 
362 See B. Weston et al. 'Regional Human Rights Regimes: A Companson and Appraisal. ' 20 Vanderbilt 
Journal of 
Transnational Law (1987) pp. 616-617. 
363 Preamble, paragraphs 2-3. 
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their relations'. For any co-operative arrangement there must exist some belief in a common 
goal or purpose with the existence of a common background or history not necessary but may 
prove beneficial. The future of democracy and human lights in Europe will hinge upon not 
only co-operation among states in joint endeavours but between the organisations through 
which these endeavours, are pursued. 
The idea of common traditions and values among the members of the OSCE is purely 
rhetorical, as the OSCE has always consisted of a diverse grouping of states with security 
being the only common factor bringing them together. The states of the OSCE share a 
common history based on the Cold War but this history has been marked by fundamental 
differences and disagreements, especially concerning democracy and human rights. The 
growth of the COE has raised the issue as to whether there truly exists a common heritage that 
unites all the states of Europe from Spain to Russia and even Turkey? "' Foremost in this 
discussion is whether the system of protection established by the ECHR is under threat or at 
least Will be diluted by the inclusion of states from central and eastern Europe. Some 
commentators feel that the ECHR was originally adopted by a set of states sharing common 
social, political, and psychological attitudes and positions that are particular and unique to this 
group giving the ECHR a special character. "' They believe that by expanding the ECHR 
outside its original area of application its effectiveness will be weakened as a more diverse 
grouping of individuals will apply the ECHR with different understandings as to the meaning 
of rights. This difference will give rise to greater distrust among parties, the politicisation of 
human rights issues, "' the authority of the Court's judgments will be questioned, "' and there 
is the possibility of governments abusing the inter-state complaint system. "' There is 
substance to the idea that states that were not involved with the drafting or development of the 
ECHR may be reluctant to accept its principles or that MCreased COE membership will slow 
down an already overloaded system. "' However these are issues which international human 
rights law In general must face and, in the case of Europe, early observations show that instead 
... The inclusion of Turkey as a European state makes the definition of Europe even more difficult as its inclusion 
is 
based on political rather than geographical considerations. On the defining of Europe in the EU context see van 
Roen-nund (1997) pp. 357-359. 
36' R. Kay. 'The ECHR and the Authority of Law. ' 8 Connecticut Journal ofInternational Law (1993) pp. 219-20; D. 
Seymour. 'The Extension of the European Convention on Human Rights to Central and Eastern Europe: Prospects 
and Risks. ' 8 Connecticut Journal ofInternational Law (1993) p. 244. 
366 Kay (1993) 220-222. 
367 H. Schermers. 'International Human Rights Law in the European Community and in the Nations of Central and 
Eastern Europe. ' 8 Connecticut Journal ofInternational Law (1993) pp. 316-318. 
368 Seymour (1993) p. 250. 
369 Seymour (1993) p. 247. 
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of a weakening of the system there has been an increase in the rhetoric of democracy and 
hwnan rights which individuals have utilised. "' 
The idea of a common heritage or identity seems less important for the EU as a primarily 
economic organisation but its recent expansion has seen increased rhetoric concerning 
common identity. The growth of the EU and the commandeering of what it means to be 
'European' bring the issue of a single identity into focus. The COE, with its 41 members, is 
more representative of the region of Europe than the EU with its 15 members. Academics and 
professionals may be fully aware that Europe as a region extends beyond the EU, however 
they have contributed to a common understanding of what it means to be European that looks 
first and foremost to the EU. The process of integration of the EU and the move to a more 
political union has resulted in the defining of a 'European' citizenship, a term that is 
unfortunately defined through a process of exclusion and discrimination. "' Those societies 
who are unable to meet the criteria for membership are deemed not to be 'European' and left 
outside the borders until they are able to reach an acceptable level of 'Europeariess'. Within 
the EU commentators have provided the assessment that in reality there is not a great deal of 
common heritage between the member states regardless of the attempts to create a shared 
identity. "' This contributes to the confusion as to the position of rights in the EU as the ECJ 
speaks of fundamental rights common to the constitutions and traditions of its members. It 
often appears that it is the Court itself who is creating common principles of law among the 
members to fit with the objectives of the union. "' Further expansion will make the common 
constitutional traditions of the members more diverse, a point recognised by the EIY 74 but one 
that could prove problematic for the ECJ. 
Future co-operation for the protection and promotion of democracy and human rights will 
not necessarily be based on an inherent common heritage but will be the result of the pursuit of 
common goals, of an imagined community, not one of a natural common development. 171 
Democracy and human rights are desired as goods across Europe and are used as symbols of 
"0 See M. O'Boyle. 'Right to Speak and Associate Under Strasbourg Case-Law with Reference to Eastern and 
Central Europe. ' 8 Connecticut Journal of International Law 1993, p. 267. Attempts by individuals to utilise the 
ECHR in states that have only recently ratified the document is extremely high even though in most of the early cases 
the ECHR does not apply, see A. Gross. 'Reinforcing the New Democracies: The European Convention on Human 
Rights and the Fortner Communist Countries -A Study of the Case Law. ' 7 European Journal ofInternational 
Law 
(1996) p. 89. 
37' Bhabha (199 8) pp. 600-60 1. 
372 See J. Lodge. Crisis or Opportunity? Justice and Home Affairs. (Hull: Centre for European Studies, 1996) p. 56. J. 
Gibson and Caldeira. 'The Legal Cultures of Europe. 30 Law and Society Review (1996) p. 79. 
373 M. Chiti. 'Are there Universal Principles of Good Governance? ' I European Public Law (1995) p. 246. Also 
Betten and Grief (1998) p. 124. 
374 Agenda 2000, p. 103. 
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what it is to be European, as is demonstrated by the membership requirements of the COE and 
EU. "' The creation of common identity is reinforced by the regional organisations through 
177 the use of common symbols such as a flag or name. The issue of a single European identity 
will remain contested as the COE takes an inclusive view to what Europe is and the EU creates 
a more exclusionary view. Despite the rhetoric that is expressed both views demonstrate that 
there is no single definition of what Europe is. Instead it would be more practical to view 
Europe as possessing an 'open identity which is learning to learn from others 
. 
'37' Democracy 
and human rights throughout Europe (taking the COE membership) will differ in perception 
and practice meaning no single European identity will create a single set of beliefs or pracfices. 
What is called European democracy is not a singular model, but an instance of a type of 
politics which can exist in other forms both in Europe and beyond 
. 
37' No one section or 
individual state of Europe has a monopoly on the proper form of democracy, and all have 
much to learn from the diverse societies which exist within Europe. 380 
In the midst of the diversity of Europe the regional organisations will play a large role in 
ensuring practices and standards do not fall below acceptable limits. "' For any organisation to 
be effective the commitments undertaken and the various methods of Implementation need to 
be applied to all members in an equal fashion. This will be an issue for all European 
organisations as the established democracies have maintained a belief that democracy and 
human rights only apply to the eastem states and not themselves. "' The development of 
democracy and expressions of rights can create cleavages within organisations and eliminate 
common ground as expressions of difference are allowed. "' 
A 1995 report by the COE stated that 'The upheavals in central and eastern Europe have 
tnggered both political/military and economic/social reorganisation which has not yet 
... See B. Anderson. Imagined Communities. (London: Verso, 199 1). 
376 At the same time this does not mean that the states of eastern and central Europe do not differ fundamentally in 
their ability to implement democracy and human rights, see Seymour (1993) p. 244. 
377 K. von Benda-Beckmann and M. Verkuyten. 'Introduction: Cultural Identity and Development of Europe. ' in von 
Benda-Beckmann and Verkuyten (1995) pp. 18-20. 
37' R. Eatwell. 'Reflections on Nationalism and the Future of Europe. ' in Eatwell, ed. European Political Cultures. - 
Conflict or Convergence? (London: Routledge, 1997) p. 259. 
379A-M. Rieu and G. Duprat. 'Introduction. ' in Rieu and Duprat, eds. European Democratic Culture. (London: 
Routledge, 1993) p. 9. 
"0 Often Europe is seen as being the model of democracy but see van Roermund (1997) who puts forth the idea that 
democracy is not a natural part of European culture but an artificial construct, p. 367. 381 Schermers (1993) p. 318. 
181 See M. Estebanez. 'Tbe OSCE Implementation Meeting on Human Dimension Issues 1995. ' 7 Helsinki Monitor 
(1996) p. 2 for the reluctance of Western European states to report on their domestic situations in relation to OSCE 
commitments. 
3" L Hagendoom. 'The Mechanism of Fragmentation after the Cold War. ' in von Benda-Beckman and Verkuyten 
(1995) p. 114. 
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produced new, clearly defined structures. 1384 This reorganisation is not confmed to the 
domestic systems of a number of states of Europe but equally applies to the regional 
organisations of Europe. The existence of three regional organisations in Europe with a 
common concern for democracy and human rights is obviously a positive development but at 
the same time one that carries with it disadvantages. Wide scale co-operation between the 
three was not practical before 1990 as the EU and COE mandated against the membership of 
communist states which the OSCE included 
. 
18' Also before this decade each organisation had 
a relatively clear position in the structure of Europe with minimal overlap. There exists a 
number of common areas of activity between the organisations making co-operation and not 
competition the key to future action as attempts should be made to pool resources in areas of 
381 common activity. 
In the COE Vienna Declaration the changed structure of Europe is recognised along with 
the need for 
fuller co-ordination of the Council of Europe's activities with those of other 
organisations involved in the construction of a democratic and secure Europe, thus 
satisfying the need for complementary and better use of resources. 
Greater co-operation and use of resources appears especially pertinent in the field of human 
rights as three organisations, are developing a great deal of overlap in this area. The ECHR 
system is undoubtedly the foundation for human rights protection in Europe bringing into 
question the appropriateness of the OSCE continually pursuing its human dimension. The 
idea of merging the human dimension of the OSCE with the ECHR framework has been 
discussed on different occasions but appears unlikely in the near future due to the political 
considerations of the OSCE's non-European members, notably the US. "' Along functional 
lines there is little difference between the possibilities now offered by the OSCE and COE in 
the areas of human rights and democracy as the COE engages in political persuasion in 
finthering human rights protection, a task previously associated solely with the OSCE. If the 
states of Europe are truly serious about their commitments to democracy and human rights 
384 Bridging the Gap, p. 9. 
385 See T. Buchsbaum. "The CSCE and International Organisations: Expanding Co-operation with the Council of 
Europe. ' in Lucas (1993) p. 134. 
386 Buchsbaum in Lucas (1993) p. 141. 
387 Kritz (1993) p. 26. Bloed feels that the COE and OSCE are complimentary since they have different approaches 
and ways of implementing human rights standards as the use of political persuasion by the 
OSCE as opposed to the 
COE's judicial methods has proven to be more effective in certain contexts, A. Bloed. The Human Dimension of the 
OSCE: More Words than DeedsT 6 Helsink Monitor (1995) p. 2. 
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they should have no objections to moving from political persuasion to more judicial methods 
in ensuring compliance. 
Relations between the EU and COE are slightly more peculiar as there exists a declared 
determination to work together they still tend to treat each other with suspicion and act 
individually. "' This tension is most noticeable in the area of human rights protection where 
the ECJ is increasing its competence but without any clear direction as to the place of the 
ECHR in legal framework of the EU. One obvious area is co-operation between the two 
courts in a complementary way so that a common j unsprudence develops and the individual is 
able to enjoy the most effective possibilities for ensuring rights obligations are met. "' At 
present the two Courts do refer to each other's rulings but within differing contexts. Greater 
harmony will be difficult to achieve as each court has a different overall purpose within which 
is applies the rights of the ECHR. "O The fact that the ECHR Court is the delegated 
enforcement body of that docurnent but the ECJ uses the same document concerning the direct 
impact of EU law upon individuals creates a clear need for co-operation with clearly defined 
roles and mandates. "' Establishing the roles of the courts along more clearly defined lines will 
also assist in eliminating the confusion created for the individual as to which organisation does 
what and in what way. "' 
The COE and EU possess similar structures for regional government with CLRAE for the 
COE and the EU's the Conunittee of Regions. Both hold the same belief that popular 
participation is heaviest at those levels closest to the individual's existence.. and both carry 
out similar tasks to promote this practice. The existence of both of these bodies demonstrates a 
rhetorical recognition of the importance attached to ensuring that the decision-making 
processes are kept close to those who are impacted the most. "' As decision and policy making 
processes becomes more complex there is the belief that local authorities will be in a better 
position to meet the different needs which exist, thereby enhancing public participation at the 
local level. "' At the same time neither body is being integrated into the work of either 
... Clapham (199 1) pp. 84-86. 
"9 L. Hefler and A-M Slaughter. 'Toward a Theory of Supranational Adjudication. ' 107 Yale Law Journal (1997) p. 
323-326; de Burca (1993) p. 319. 
'90 Clapham (199 1) pp. 59-60. 
'9' See JUSTICE. Judging the European Union. (London, 1996) pp. 8,13-15. 
392 For a perspective from the individual on the street see Hoon in Belber (1996) pp. 23-24. 
'9' J. Goodman. 'The European Union: Reconstituting Democracy Beyond the Nation-State. ' in A. McGrew, ed. 
The 
Transformation ofDemocracy? (Cambridge: Polity) 1997, p. 181. 
394 One author states that a separation and division of powers both horizontally and vertically is part 
of the rule of law 
in democratic societies, Errifliou in O'Keefe and Twomey (1994) p. 8 1. 
'9' S. Villadsen. 'Another Century for Local Democracy? DecentraliZation, Deregulation and 
Participation in 
Scandinavia and European Integration. ' 17 International Journal of Urban and 
Regional Research (1993) p. 53. 
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organisation at a substantive level demonstrating the emptiness of the rhetoric when it comes 
to issues close to the individual. 
The EU relies upon the work of both the COE and OSCE in its membership criteria for 
new applicants. The Helsinki Final Act and Paris Charter as explicitly mentioned as to be 
adhered to for membership to occur. The specific mention of these two documents appears 
peculiar since they embody much of the same principles enshrined legally in the ECHR 
framework, to which perspective members adhere. This magnifies the peculiar relationship 
between the EU and COE for if applicants to the EU are members of the COE then they have 
to meet the COE membership requirement of democracy. If it is so, then why rely on political 
documents from an organisation characterised by rhetoric with no established enforcement or 
supervisory mechanism? 
Questions over co-operation will remain tied up in political battles as each organisation 
will compete for the support of governments and the public spotlight. The selective 
membership of the EU means that it is unlikely its reach will cover all of the Europe, or it will 
be many years before it comes close. The COE's membership does extend to all of Europe 
making its provisions on democracy and human rights and the support it gives essential to the 
future of Europe. The COE is not competent in the area of security giving rise to the necessity 
of the OSCE to continue in this area as the EU is having difficulty developing a common 
foreign and security policy. Other security arrangements, such as NATO, could possibly take 
on the competence of the OSCE in the area but no other organisation possesses the wide 
membership of the OSCE. "' In many ways having three organisations, in the same region all 
taking an active role in democracy and human rights appears a waste and inefficient use of 
resources. However each of the organisations approaches democracy and human rights from a 
particular angle which does lead to conflict and competition between them but also ensures a 
wide range of situations are met effectively. Therefore it is important to mobilise all the 
available resources and energies of all of Europe's players and harness them in relation to 
shared objective such as democracy and human rights. "' 
V1. CONCLUSION 
It is Widely held that democracy and human rights are well protected in Europe, this 
assessment stands usually regardless of events in the former-Yugoslavia or parts of eastem 
396 See Myn (1998) p. 227; F. Cameron. 'The European Community and the CSCE. ' In Lucas (1993) p. 265. 
397 Bulletin of the European Union, Supp. 3/95, p. 28. 
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Europe. The failure of the regional organisations in the fonner-Yugoslavia is attributed to the 
unique character of the problem and the context in which it occurred as no one had any real 
idea as to what action should be taken and how. "' This demonstrates the absolute need for co- 
operation between the organisations of Europe and co-operation with global organisations in 
addressing the problems of the region. The position of the EU concerning the recognition of 
the emergent states of Yugoslavia was a rhetorical advance for the position of democracy in 
international ordering but fell short of substance as individual members chose not to follow 
their own established guidelines. '99 The suspension of the Yugoslavia from the COE has also 
shown the possibility of collective will coming together in support of democracy and human 
rights. At the same time, events in Yugoslavia demonstrate the state-based nature of 
international law and the extent to which concerns for democracy and human rights lose out to 
other interests. 
The 'expansion' of Europe" will test the limits of regionalism in fon-nulating effective 
systems for the protection and promotion of democracy and human rights as many of the ex- 
communist states remain 'fragile' several years on. "' As stated above events in Europe cannot 
by themselves stand as evidence of an international norm or practice. Europe can stand as a 
guide for the future development of an intemational law of democracy. The ability of 
intergovernmental organisations to co-operate for ftirthering the promotion and protection of 
democracy and human rights will be essential for the international system. The lack of explicit 
protection for democracy in the legal texts could prove to be a substantial weakness for the 
European system. The European Court of Human Rights has established that democracy is the 
only acceptable system and the actions of governments will all be judged on that basis. This 
has greatly strengthened the system of human rights protection but does not necessarily 
provide the individual with a strong basis for claims in favour of democracy. The EU's 
backing of democracy as the only acceptable system for member states is weakened by the 
inability of the ECJ to enforce this aspect of the treaties. 101 The Consultative Assembly of the 
COE was very strongly in favour of explicit legal protection of democracy and democratic 
... Bideleux in Bideleux. and Taylor (1996) p. 281. Orentlicher describes it as an example of what happens when 
democracy is poorly applied, D. OrentlIcher. 'Separation Anxiety: international Response to 
Ethno-Separatist 
Claims. ' 23 Yale Journal ofInternational Law (1998) pp. 61-62. 
'99 Orentlicher (1998) pp. 66-68. 
'0' There remains the question as to how far east Europe extends. Huntington offers that 
'Europe ends where Western 
Christianity ends and Islarn and Orthodoxy begin. ' S. Huntington. Clash of 
Civilizations. (London: Simon & 
Schuster, 1997)p. 158. 
401 The terrn fi7agile democracies was used in 1992 and is equally applicable today, see Butora 
(1992) p. 439. 
40' Article 6 (1) TEU states the EU is founded upon democracy and the rule of law, but the ECJ has no 
jurisdiction 
over this aspect of the Treaty. 
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institutions in Europe. To date their fears have not been realised. To be sure, it is unlikely that 
Europe will descend back into authoritarianism, but as Europe grows the limits of democracy 
will be tested and its ability to provide for the needs and development of individuals brought 
under scrutiny. 
CHAPTER 5 
THE PROTECTION AND PROMOTION OF DEMOCRACY AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The inter-American system for the protection and promotion of democracy and human 
rights consists of all 35 states of the Western Hemisphere. These states possess a great deal of 
diversity within and between themselves but also share numerous common traits, with the most 
obvious being that all are the product of European colonialism. However, in relative ternis, they 
are similar through a close geographical proximity and similarity in political institutions, along 
with the all too common economic difficulties and social inequalities in society combined with 
the presence of a selfish and over zealous superpower. ' Institutions and mechanisms for the 
protection and promotion of democracy and human rights have long been a part for inter- 
American relations but have been unable to have a substantial impact until most recently. From 
an early stage the work of inter-American institutions for the protection and promotion of 
democracy has been based on the idea that the universal recognition of fundamental rights is a 
necessary condition for international life and the establishment of democratic societies! Based 
on the experiences of region the approach to democracy being taken by the Organisation of 
American States (OAS) is holistic in nature recognising the need to support democracy 
politically, socially and economically. ' 
111. EVOLUTION OF THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM 
Inter-American relations have developed through a complex system of institutions, treaties 
and other international agreements, both formal and informal, resulting in the organisational 
framework that exists today. 4 The beginnings of regional efforts for the promotion and 
protection of democracy and human rights can be traced back to Simon Bolivar who called for 
the First Congress of American States to be held in Panama in 1826 with the goal of creating a 
' Inter-Ameiican Institute. The Inter-Ametican System: Its Development and Strengthening. (Dobbs Ferry: New York: 
Oceana, 1966) p. xv. Farer describes the states in the region as differing 'in size, density, history, race, culture, wealth, 
development, and just about any other facet'. T. Farer. The Grand Strategy ofthe United States in Latin America. (New 
Brunswick: Transaction, 1988) p. 23. For the relevance of the differences/sirrnlanties see V. Bulmer-Thomas. The 
Economic History ofLatin America since Independence. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) p. 1. 
2 C. Bauer. 'The Observance of Human Rights and the Structure of the System for their Protection in the 
Western 
Hemisphere. ' 30 American University Law Review (1980) p. 5 
' J. Th6fien, et al. 'The Organization of American States: Restructuring Inter-Amencan 
Multi] ateralism. ' 2 Global 
Governance (1996) p. 219. 
' H. Wells. 'The Institutional Framework of Inter-Amencan Relations. ' 13 California Western International 
Law 
Journal (1983) pp. 224-225; Farer (1988) pp. 23-24. 
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states of the Americas needed 'to be free under the auspices of liberal laws, emanating from the 
most sacred spring, which is the will of the people. -)6 The Congress adopted the Treaty of 
Perpetual Union, League and Confederation which never came into force but did set precedents 
for later Inter-American relations! The initial congress was followed by three more dealing 
with issues of co-operation and closer political union. In the period from 1889 to 1928 six 
finther conferences were held establishing the institutional framework of inter-American 
relations, primarily in areas of commerce. The Seventh Inter-American Conference at 
Montevideo (193 3) adopted the Convention on the Rights and Duties of States' establishing the 
principle of non-intervention into the domestic affairs of a state as an important issue for future 
inter-American relations. Non-intervention soon developed into the guiding principle of inter- 
American relations, in both breach and respect for, and has been invoked heavily with regards 
the promotion and protection of democracy and human rights. 
The Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace (1945) laid the groundwork 
for a regional system recognising the importance of the relationship between democracy and 
hurnan rights. ' The Conference representatives endorsed their commitment to establish a 
system of protection for human rights and declared the adherence of the American republics to 
the principles of international law for the protection of essential human rights. They finiher 
requested the Inter-American Juridical Cominittee to come up with a draft declaration 
concerning hurnan rights protection. " The Ninth International Conference (1948) adopted 
several resolutions, including the Charter of the OAS, the American Declaration on the Rights 
and Duties of Marl, the hiter-American Charter of Social Guarantees, the Inter-American 
Convention on the Granting of Political Rights to Women, the Inter-American Convention on 
the Granting of Civil Rights to Women which granted equal civil tights for men and women, the 
Statute of the Inter-American Commission of Women. " The idea for the establishment of a 
court of human rights was also studied but postponed due to claims that not enough case law yet 
Inter-Ameri can Institute. (1966) p. xv 
Quoted in 'The Americas: A Community of Nations. ' An address by Vice President of the United States Al Gore to 
the Inter-American Development Bank (16 September 994) in 5 US. Department ofState Dispatch (1994) p. 650. 
See Inter-American Institute. (1966) p. xvi 
165 LNTS 19. 
See D. Shelton. 'Representative Democracy and Human Rights in the Western Hemisphere. ' 12 Human Rights Law 
Journal (1991) pp. 354-356; A. Thomas and A. Thomas. 'Human Rights in the OAS. ' in N. Rodley and C. Ronning, 
eds. International Law in the Western Hemisphere. (17he Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974) pp. 141-145. 
'0 Inter-American Institute (1966) p. 40. The Conference also discussed the 'Larreta Proposal' which called for 
Multilateral action to defend democracy and human rights but was never forinally approved, see H. Munoz. 'The OAS 
and Democratic Governance. ' 4 Journal. ofDemocracy (1993) p. 3 1. 
" Documents may be found in F. V. Garcia-Amador. The Inter-American System: Treaties, A CHR & Other Documents, 
vol. 1: Legal-political affairs. (London: Oceana, 1983). 
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existed and the establishment of a court would require drastic changes in the legal structures of 
member states. 12 The Ninth Conference also adopted the resolution 'Preservation and Defence 
of Democracy in America'. This spoke out against governments that did not respect the rights 
and freedoms of the individual through the suppression of civil and political rights. It 
committed members to take any necessary measures to ensure that the 'free and sovereign right 
of their peoples to govern themselves in accordance with their domestic aspirations. ' would not 
be disturbed. " 
The Tenth Inter-American Conference (1954) passed as resolution entitled 'Strengthening 
of the System for the Protection of Human Rights' recognising a necessary relation between a 
system based on democracy and the protection of human rights and called on states to 
strengthen their domestic spheres to accommodate both. The Conference also adopted the 
'Declaration of Caracas' which stated that an effective means of strengthening democratic 
institutions is through the respect of human fights without any discrimination. Ironically it also 
reaffirmed that states were free to choose their own political and social institutions a 
contradiction in the institutional structure of the Americas that persists today. 14 
The Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (1959) called for the 
establishment of a Convention and a Commission for the protection of human rights. The 
Meeting also adopted the 'Declaration of Santiago' considered by some to be one of the most 
important texts concerning political rights in the Americas. " The Declaration stated that 
'[h]armony among the American Republics can be effective only insofar as human rights and 
fundamental freedoms are a reality with each on to them'. It went on to assert that the lack of 
respect from democracy and human rights has been a major cause of unrest in the region. It 
claimed that anti-democratic regimes are in violation of the OAS Charter and endanger peacefal 
relations In the Hernisphere. " The Fifth Meeting of Ministers expressly recognised the relation 
between the effective protection of human rights and democratic governance attemptMg to put 
the aspirations and discussions of past conferences into practice, laying the foundations for 
future, albeit belated, action. Unfortunately these auspicious beginnings were soon dampened 
by events in the region. The occurrence of authoritarian regimes, the Cold War and behaviour of 
the US often made concerns for democracy and human rights subordinate to security 
issues, 
Inter-American Institute (1966) p. 40. 
Quoted in A Ball. 'Issue for the Americas: Non-Intervention v. Human Rights and the Preservation of 
Democratic 
Institutions. ' 17 International Organisation (1963) p. 23. 
14 Shelton (199 1) p. 355. 
Shelton (199 1) p. 355 
Resolution reprinted in Garcia-Amador (1983) pp. 21-22. 
213 
which helped to perpetuate the economic underdevelopment that was already becoming 
widespread in region. 
111. RHETORICAL SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
A. CHARTER OF THE OAS 
The Ninth International Conference established the OAS with 20 Latin American republics 
and the US and now encompasses all 35 states of the Americas. " The OAS Charter" entered 
into force in 1951 and has been amended by the Protocol of Buenos Aires (1967), the Protocol 
of Cartagena de Indias (1985) the Protocol of Washington (1992) and the Protocol of Managua 
(1993). These changes to the Charter have come in response to events occurring in the region as 
the OAS has tried to keep pace with the shifting political, social and economic environment 
attempting to ftuther consolidate democracy, hurnan rights, and economic and social progress. " 
The Preamble of the Charter articulates numerous aspirations concerning democracy including, 
the idea that 'the historic mission of the America is to offer to man a land of liberty and a 
favourable envirom-nent for the development of his personality and the realisation of his just 
aspirations'; 'that representative democracy is an indispensable condition for the stability, peace 
and development of the region'; 'that the true significance of American solidarity and good 
neighbourliness can only mean the consolidation 
... 
within the framework of democratic 
institutions, of a system of individual liberty and social justice based on respect for the essential 
rights of man'; and 'that juridical organisation is a necessary condition for security and peace 
founded on moral order and on justice'. From this beginning it has been commented by one 
OAS official that the basis of the OAS is a mandate from the people of the Americas. " If this is 
so that mandate has only been recently acknowledged or realised. 
Article 2 contains the purposes of the OAS wlýiich include the promotion and consolidation 
of representative democracy; the promotion of economic, social, and cultural development and 
the eradication of extreme poverty which is said to constitute an obstacle to the full democratic 
development. Article 3 outlines the principles to which the member states adhere, including - 
" Cuba is a member but its present government is excluded from participating, see Resolution of the Eigth Meeting of 
Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (1962) in 'Fact Sheet: Organisation of American States. ' 5 US. 
Department ofState Dispatch (1994) pp. 788-789. 
OAS Treaty Series No. I 
-E, OEA/Ser. A/2, Rev-5. 
S. Davidson. The Inter-American Human Rights System. (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1997) pp. 3-4. On these changes 
see J. Arrighi. 'Les Refori-nes a ]a Charte de L'Organisation des Etats Americains: Problemes de Droit des Traites. ' 43 
Annuaire Francais de Droit International (1997) p. 93. 
'0 V. McComie. 'Practical Considerations on Human Rights within the OAS Context. ' 4 American Universii), Journal 
ofInternational Law and Policy (1989) p. 276. Vaky and Munoz believe the goals of the Charter require the exercise of 
effective representative democracy, see Ae Future of the Organisation of American 
States. (New York: Twentieth 
Century Fund Press, 1993) pp. 22-23. 
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international law as the standard of conduct for states, the faithful fialfilment of obligations; the 
requirement that the political organisation of member states is on the basis of the effective 
exercise of representative democracy; that every state has the right to choose, without external 
interference, its political, economic, and social system in the way best suited to it, along with the 
duty to abstain from intervening in the affairs of another state; the elimination of extreme 
poverty as an essential part of the promotion and consolidation of representative democracy and 
as the common and shared responsibility of the American states; that social justice and social 
security are bases of lasting peace; economic co-operation is essential to the common welfare 
and prosperity of the peoples of the continent; the recognition of the fundamental rights of the 
individual without distinction as to race, nationality, creed, or sex; and that the education of 
peoples should be directed toward justice, freedom, and peace. 
Article 9, a recent addition to the Charter, 21 places an obligation for democracy as '[a] 
Member of the Organisation whose democratically constituted government has been 
overthrown by force may be suspended from the exercise of the right to participate' in the 
workings of the OAS. The Article specifies action to be taken including diplomatic measures 
and possibly exclusion from the organisation. Exclusion is seen as a last resort for continued 
efforts will be made by the OAS to ensure the suspended state fulfils its obligations. Any state 
that is suspended will continue to be bound by commitments agreed to with decisions 
surrounding the suspension taken by the General Assembly. 
The provisions of Article 9 and their legal force are disputed. Mexico declared at time of 
signing that 'democracy is a process which comes from the sovereign will of the people, and 
cannot be imposed from outside. ' The government expressed the belief that 'it is unacceptable 
to give to regional organisations, supranational. powers and instruments for intervening in the 
internal affairs of our states. "' The requirements for democracy set by Article 9 do conflict with 
Article 17 of the Charter which reads; 
" Articles 2,3 and 9 were introduced by the Protocol of Washington of 1992. At the time of 
drafting the original 
Charter Brazil proposed making democracy a requirement of membership In the OAS. 
The failed proposal defined 
democracy as consisting of the plurality of political parties, freedom in voting, opportunity 
for private enterprises, and 
human rights guarantees, see Thomas and Thomas in Rodley and RonnIng 
(1974) p. 145. The OAS did exclude Cuba 
from membership in 1962 for being non-democratic due primarily to the pressure of the 
US. The exclusion of Cuba 
was not a precedent for action as the principle was not applied to subsequent authoritarian regimes, 
many of whom had 
the support of the US. Prior to Article 9 there was no obligation to 
democracy, A. Thomas and A. Thomas. The 
Organization ofAmerican States. (Dallas: SMU Press, 1963) p. 221. 
" OEA Ser. A/2 Add. 3. General Information of the Treaty A-56. 
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Each State has the right to develop its cultural, political, and economic life freely 
and naturally. In this free development, the State shall respect the rights of the 
individual and the principles of universal morality. " 
The hiter-American Court of Human Rights has established that a 'democratic society' is the 
standard by which all states In the region must organise themselves (see below). In its opinion 
in the Nicaragua case, the International Court of Justice belittled the democratic obligations of 
the OAS Charter by implying that the comn-ýitments to democracy in the Charter mean very 
little and are certainly dismissable due to Article 12 and 17 statements, concerning the freedom 
of a state to choose how it is to be organised 
. 
2' The opinion of the ICJ is perhaps reflective of 
general international aw but in the regional sphere the opinion of the Inter-American Court 
must be taken as the authoritative word concerning obligations of democracy. 
Given the economic problems that face the region, econorMc and social issues are a matter 
of concern for the OAS in undertaking efforts for the promotion and protection of democracy 
and human fights. Chapter VU of the Charter is entitled 'Integral Development' and includes 
provisions covering the economic, social, educational, scientific and technological fields of 
society with the agreement that 'equality of opportunity, the elimination of extreme poverty, 
equitable distribution of wealth and income and the full participation of 
... 
peoples in decisions 
relating to their own development are, 
... 
basic objectives to integral development'. " Co- 
operation in development is to take place 'within the framework of democratic principles' and 
constitutes 'an integral and continuous process for the establishment of a more just economic 
and social order that will make possible and contribute to the fulfilinent of the individual. "' The 
importance of development is stated in Article 47 as 'the overall improvement of the individual, 
and as a foundation for democracy, social justice and progress. ' 
" Mexico's declaration to the Protocol of Cartagena de Indias reaffirms this point suggesting that democracy cannot be 
enforced, OAS Treaty Series No. 66, General Information of the Treaty A-50, paragraph 2. See below the discussion of 
Mexico's view of the Commission's efforts to enforce particular aspects of the democratic process. Hams 
feels the 
wording of Article 17 does set a legal limit on state sovereignty, but is not explicit as to what limit, D. Harris. 'Regional 
Protection of Human Rights: The Inter-American Achievement. ' in D. Hams and S. Livingstone, eds. 
77ze Inter- 
American System ofHuman Rights. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1998) p. 5. 
2' Article 12 of the Charter reads 'The fundamental rights of States may not be impaired in any manner whatsoever. 
' 
See ICJ Reports 1986 at 13 1. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights gives a much different interpretation to the 
requirements of democracy in the Charter demonstrating a distinct difference between global and regional international 
law in support of democracy, see The Word "Laws " in Article 30 of the American Convention on 
Human Rights. 
Advisory Opinion OC-6/86 (9 May 1986) Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (Ser. A) No. 6 (1986). 
" OAS Charter, Articles 30 and 34. See also Article 45 on the participation of marginal sectors of the population 
in the 
process of development. 
" OAS Charter Article 33. Article 31 contains the statement on democratic principles which is unclear as to whether 
this refers to co-operation among states in development or that development is to occur 
in the context of a democratic 
society. 
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While the OAS Charter creates a clear obligation to democracy it does not necessarily give 
rise to human rights obligations in an independent fashion. The adoption of the Charter was 
accompanied by the adoption of the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man (the 
Declaration) meaning human rights provisions are largely absent from the Charter. To what 
degree the Charter creates binding obligations of human rights is a subject of debate with a wide 
range of arguments. " The inclusion of provisions giving rise to a range of socio-econornic 
rights raises questions as to whether these create obligations upon states. That question has more 
or less been settled as it is felt that the economic and social rights provisions of the Charter are 
based more on national goals to be achieved rather than creating individual fights. " That being 
so it does not remove the fact that if states are obligated to possess a democratic society then it 
will be necessary to ensure a full range of rights that will include socio-economic rights. 
B. THEAmEpicANDEcLARA TioN oN THE RiGHTsAND Dums OFM4N 
The American Declaration, adopted at the Ninth International Conference (1948) states that 
the Inter-American system is a 'system of individual liberty and social justice based on respect 
for the essential rights of man. ' The resolution adopting the Declaration recognised that the 
rights contained within are specific to the context of the Americas at the time and that the system 
for protection should increasingly strengthen as conditions become more favourable. The 
American Declaration contains 27 articles covering a wide array of civil and political fights, 
alongside with socio-economic rights and provisions concerning duties to society, duties toward 
children and parents, duties with respect to social security and welfare, duty to receive 
instruction, to vote, to obey the law, to serve the community and nation, to pay taxes, to work, to 
refrain from political activities in a foreign country. The rights in the Declaration are subject to 
limitation due to the rights of others, by the security of all, and by the just demands of the 
general welfare and the advancement of democracy. These limitations recognise the existence 
of the individual within the wider community and the need to balance interests issues significant 
to the functioning of a democratic society. This recognition is important for democracy so long 
as selective definitions of general welfare or the advancement of democracy are not abused to 
the detriment of certain groups or individuals. 
Article XX of the Declaration deals with participation rights and reads 
" On the debate over the legal character of the Charter provisions see L. Scheman. 'The OAS and the 
Quest for 
International Co-operation: American Vision or Mirage. ' 13 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 
(198 1) p. 84. 
2'L4CHR Annual Report (1983/4) p. 138. Also M. Craven. 'The Protection of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
under the Inter-American System of Human Rights. ' in Hams and Livingstone (1998) pp. 290-29 1. 
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Every person having legal capacity is entitled to participate in the government of his 
country, directly or through his representatives, and to take part in popular elections, 
which shall be by secret ballot, and shall be honest, periodic and fi7ee. 
Article XXXIH on duties reinforces the importance of political participation by saying '[i]t is the 
duty of every person to vote in the popular elections of the country of which he is a national, 
when he is legally capable of doing so. ' 
The Inter-American Commission, as a Charter body, " is able to apply the Declaration to all 
OAS members by virtue of obligations created through the Charter. " The efforts of the 
Commission in applying the Declaration has created controversy as attempts have been made to 
bring the US before the Commission for violation of human rights obligations under the 
Declaration. The US reiterates its position that the Declaration only dealt with moral principles 
and not binding legal obligations. " While the US refuses to act upon the Cornmission's 
decisions, 32 it does participate in proceedings and engages in the rhetoric of human rights 
protection in the public forum. The Commission can not force the US, or any other state, to act 
based upon the Declaration obligations but the attempt to apply its principles is a significant 
aspect in ftu-thering the protection and promotion of human rights. 
The principles set down in the American Declaration are applicable to all members of the 
OAS, through their signing of the OAS Charter as a legally binding instrument. The Declaration 
was considered non-binding at adoption but has been declared by the Court to be an 
authoritative interpretation of the Charter in the field of human rights giving it a binding status. " 
The opinions of member states on this issue show a wide level of disagreement. Costa Rica 
feels that the Declaration is not a treaty in the strict sense of creating binding obligations but the 
Court could use it as an interpretation of custom. " The US recognises the Declaration as 
possessMg a certain normative value as a good intention to ftu-ther human rights, but in the 
" OAS Charter, Article 106. 
'0 Article 51 of Regulations of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (hereinafter Regulations) reprinted in 
Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser. L. V/H. 82, doc. 6, rev. 1 at 
103(1992). On the application of Article 51 see D. Forsythe. 'Human Rights, The United States, and The Organisation 
of American States. ' 13 Human Rights Quarterly (199 1) p. 69. 
" The Commission has taken action against the US use of the death penalty being the first time a monitoring 
body has 
found the US to be in violation of human rights obligations, see C. Cema. 'US Death Penalty Tested 
Before the Inter- 
American Commission on Human Rights. ' 10 Netherlands Quarterly on Human Rights (1992) p. 155. More recently 
in another case concerning the death penalty the US has been found in violation of Articles 
I (right to life), 11 (equality 
before the law) and XXVI (right to impartial hearing and freedom from cruel and unusual punishment), 
Report No. 
57/96 (United States) L4 CHR Annual Report (1997) p. 570. 
MCHR AnnualReport (1997) pp. 572,618. 
Interpretation of the American Declaration of the Rights ofMan within the Framework ofArticle 
64 of the American 
ACHR on Human Rights. Advisory Opinion OC-10/89 (14 July 1989) Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. 
(Ser. A) No. 10 (1989). Also 
Davidson (1997) pp. 12-13, and Hams in Harris and Livingstone (1998) pp. 5-9. 
34 Advisory Opinion OC- 10/89, paragraph II- 
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government's opinion 'good intentions do not make law, therefore no obligations arise. 35 
36 Venezuela made it clear that declarations in general do not create juridical norrns. Peru takes a 
vague position seeing the Declaration as similar to the American Convention on Human Rights 
in 'contributing to the promotion of human rights 37 and Uruguay states the Declaration has a 
strong binding character 
'38 with neither state elaborating ftu-ther. The Court places the 
Declaration as part of the evolving inter-American law on human rights, " as the authoritative 
interpretation of the Charter of the OAS meaning states have obligations arising from it. The 
Court's position is clear '[t]hat the Declaration is not a treaty does not, then, lead to the 
conclusion that it does not have legal effect, nor that the Court lacks the power to interpret it'. 'o 
C THEAMER[CANCoNvENTioNoNHumANRIGHT, ý" 
The indeterminate nature of the Declaration was overcome with the adoption of the 
American Convention on Human Rights (1969) which came into force in 1978. The ACHR 
explicitly places the needs and desires of individuals before the interests of states. " In Article I 
governments agree to respect and ensure that all persons in their jurisdiction will be able to 
en oy the full and fi7ee exercising of the rights in the ACHR, a point the Court views as a positive 
duty upon states. The Preamble of the ACHR makes it clear that 'the essential rights of man are 
not derived fi7om one's being a national of a certain state, but are based on attributes of the 
human personality'. " The ACHR creates protection for 23 rights including a general clause on 
the progressive development of the realisation of economic, social and cultural rights. " For the 
most part the rights in the ACHR contain greater detail as to the content of the right then the 
" Advisory Opinion OC- 10/89, paragraph 12. 
36 Advisory Opinion OC- 10/89, paragraph 15. 
3' Advisory Opinion OC- 10/89, paragraph 13. 
" Advisory Opinion OC- 10/89, paragraph 14. 
39Advisory Opinion OC-10/89, paragraphs 37-38. The Court also emphasised how this is part of regional development 
of human rights law as opposed to general international law, paragraph 38. 
4'Advisory Opinion OC-10/89, paragraph 47. 
41 OAS, Treaty Series, No. 36,26 signatories and 25 ratifications. El Salvador has entered a reservation which has the 
potential of negating much of the impact of the ACHR - 'ratification is understood without prejudice to those 
provisions of the ACHR that might be in conflict with express precepts of the Political Constitution of the 
Republic. '
LI CHR Annual Repon (1997). 
42 McComie (1989) p. 276. 
4' The Additional Protocol of San Salvador on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has a sirnilar inclusion. 
44 For an analysis of the civil and political rights in the ACHR see S. Davidson. 
'The Civil and Political Rights 
Protected in the Inter-American Human Rights System. ' in Ham's and Livingstone (1998) p. 213. 
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American Declarationý' with the exception of economic and social rights that receive less 
attention under the ACHR. " 
The ACHR provides for limitations on the exercise of certain rights. Article 7 on the right 
to personal liberty allows for a derogation if there exists 'conditions established beforehand by 
the constitution of the State Party concerned or by a law pursuant thereto., Article 13 limits 
freedom of thought and expression to ensure the 'respect for the lights or reputations of others, ' 
and 'the protection of national security, public order, or public health or morals. ' Rights of 
assembly guaranteed in Article 15 and freedom of association in Article 16 can be restricted if 
C... necessary in a democratic society, in the interest of national security, public safety or public 
order, or to protect public health or morals or the rights or freedoms of others. ' Article 27 
provides for circumstances when derogation from obligations in the ACHR may be allowed 
under the general statement of situations which 'threatens the independence or security' of a 
state. This is a fairly wide allowance considering the capricious behaviour of often paranoid 
authoritarian rulers which have been common in the region can easily result in constructed 
threats to the security of the state. 47 Even though derogation appears to be relatively easy to 
invoke the Commission has a wide scope for action being able to review the existence of 
derogations sua sponte 
. 
4' Furthermore there exists a long Est of non-derogable rights with some 
unique inclusions due to the legacy of violations which exist in the region. The non-derogable 
rights include the right to juridical personality, light to life, to humane treatment, freedom from 
slavery, from ex post facto laws, freedom of conscience and religion, the rights of the family, 
right to a name, rights of the child, right to nationality and important to democracy - the right to 
participate in government. Article 29 limits the extent of derogations stating that nothing in the 
ACHR shall be interpreted as 'precluding other rights or guarantees that are inherent in the 
human personality or derived from representative democracy'. 49 
Included in the list of non-derogable tights is Article 23" on participation providing; 
Every citizen shall enjoy the following rights and opportunities: 
" See Davidson in Harris and Livingstone (1998) pp. 213-214. 
46 Craven in Harris and Livingstone (1998) p. 295. Early drafts contained extensive provisions of economic and social 
rights but the Commission felt it was only practical to include rights that states would actually be willing to protect, p. 
297. 
4' Derogation in other international human rights instruments is limited only in times where the 
life of the state is 
threatened a more stringent qualification then the security of the state, see ICCPR, Article 4 and 
ECHR, Article 15. 
4' The Commission has noted that any state with a state of emergency merits its special attention in the creation of an 
individual state report. MCHR Annual Report (1997) p. 650. Also Buergenthal et al. (1986)p. 218. 
4'Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations, paragraph 20. Also Davidson (1997) pp. 49-57. 
'0 There exists one reservation to this article submitted by Mexico 'The 
Government of Mexico makes express 
reservation to Article 23, paragraph 2, since the Mexican Constitution provides, in 
Article 130, that rruinisters of 
denominations shall not have an active or passive vote, nor the right to associate 
for political purposes. ' MCHR 
. 
4nnual 
Report (1997) p. 542. 
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(a) to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen 
representatives; 
(b) to vote and to be elected in genuine periodic elections, which shall be by 
universal and equal suffiage and by secret ballot that guarantees the free expression 
of the will of the voters; and 
(c) to have access, under general conditions of equality, to the public service of his 
country. 
In formulating a right to participation both the ACHR and Declaration articles follow a standard 
pattern in describing participation as mainly electing representatives or being elected and how 
elections hould be carried out. 
Paragraph two of Article 23 allows for Ifi-nitations, on the exercise of the above rights 'only 
on the basis of age, nationality, residence, language, education, civil and mental capacity, or 
sentencing by a competent court. "' Limits on the right to participation based on nationality, 
education and language raise some difficult issues over who is able to participate. Nationality 
and language could be easily used to limit the participation of minorities and other marginal 
groups in a society. A requirement of education is in itself arbitrary and discriminatory and 
could be used to limit participation to a small segment of the population depending upon the 
standards and level set. " The Court is wary of provisions requiring a level of knowledge and 
education as they may 'become the vehicle for subjective and arbitrary judgments as well as 
instruments for the effectuation of discriminatory policies'. 53 
D. OTHER NmumENTs 
The Charter of the OAS develops a connection between the existence of democracy and the 
need to recognise economic and social rights. Both the Declaration and the ACHR give 
credence to the importance of these rights but not in any great detail. The lack of detail in 
established human rights instruments and uncertainty of the Charter's applicability to 
Davidson (1998) remarks that the restrictions in Article 23 (2) set an exclusive list and governments cannot impose 
any other, p. 281. But the Commission has held that it is acceptable to restrict electoral rights of 
those who have 
participated in an unlawful regime which adds a further criteria not provided for in Article 
23 (2), see MCHR Annual 
Report (1993) p. 212. 
Cases from the United States have shown how the right to vote may be lirnIted on an arbitrary 
basis through 
education requirements Lassiter v Northampton Election Board 360 US 45 
(1959) and Harper v Board of Elections 
383 US 663 (1966). For discussion see A. Winkler. 'Expressive Voting. ' New York University Law Review (1993) p. 
330. 
" Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization Provisions of the Constitution of Costa Rica, 
Advisory Opinion OC- 
4/84 (19 January 1984) Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (Ser. A) No. 4 (1984) paragraph 63. 
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individuals led to the adoption of an Additional Protocol to the ACHR in the Area of Econon-ft, 
Social and Cultural Rights (1988). " 
The adoption of the Protocol signifies the importance of economic and social rights as 
governments reaffm 'their intention to consolidate in this hernisphere, within the framework of 
democratic institutions, a system of personal liberty and social justice based on respect for the 
essential rights of man. "' This reaffirmation is based upon the need for 'full respect for the 
rights of the individual, the democratic representative form of government as well as the right of 
its people to development, self-determination, and the free disposal of their wealth and natural 
resources. ' The Protocol covers rights in the areas of work, trade unions, social security, health, 
the environment, food, education, culture, the family, children, the elderly and the handicapped. 
Specifically Article 13 of the Protocol guarantees the right to education 'to enable everyone to 
participate effectively in a democratic and pluralistic society'. Article 5 allows for restrictions 
on the rights in the Protocol 'by means of laws promulgated for the purpose of preserving the 
general welfare in a democratic society' a rather broad statement open to multiple 
interpretations. 
Supervision of the Protocol" is undertaken by the Inter-American Economic and Social 
Council and the Council for education, science and culture who have the responsibility of 
examining state reports submitted in accordance with the Protocol. The Commission has a role 
in the Protocol by also receiving copies of state reports and along with the Court being able to 
exercise their protective functions in situations where Articles 8 on trade union rights and Article 
13 are alleged to be violated. " The Commission has dealt with the issue of economic, social 
and cultural rights in its Annual Report concluding that there exists a definable link between 
ensuring democracy and maintaining economic standards and social justice. " While there exists 
a strong recognition of the relation between democracy and hwnan rights, and the importance of 
just and equitable social and economic conditions, the actual practice of ensuring obligations are 
met and effective action taken has not been forthcoming. " The Protocol has received criticism 
" OAS Treaty Series No. 69,17 signatures, 8 ratifications. For draffing history see Craven in Harris and Livingstone 
(1998) pp. 307-308. 
" Protocol of San Salvador, Preamble, paragraph 2. 
Protocol of San Salvador, Article 19. 
Protocol of San Salvador, Article 19 (6). 
IACHR Annual Report (1979/80) p. 210. 
'9 For the Commission's treatment of economic, social and cultural rights see Craven in Harris and 
Livingstone (1998) 
pp. 311-320. In its reservation to the ACHR Argentina stated that its 'economic policy shall not 
be subject to review by 
an international tribunal. ' MCHR Annual Report (1997) p. 774. 
222 
by taking a very general stance on the subject and not including enough protection of rights 
common to the area such as indigenous peoples. 'O 
The ability of indigenous people to participate in their own self-deterniination is currently 
being addressed by the Proposed American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. " 
The Proposed Declaration recognises that indigenous groups face being marginalised in many 
societies which is ironic since 'some of the democratic institutions and concepts embodied in the 
constitutions of American state originate from the institutions of the indigenous peoples. "' The 
document covers respect for the human rights of indigenous individuals and groups as well as 
their right to self-government and the existence of traditional laws, institutions and customs In 
organising their sociefies. " 
IV. INSTITIJTIONAL SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
The bodies entrusted with the task of applying the rhetoric of these texts are 
- 
the General 
Assembly of the OAS (OAS GA), the Inter-American Economic and Social Council, the Inter- 
American Council for Education, Science and Culture, the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights, the Inter-American Court of Hunan Rights and the Unit for the Promotion of 
Democracy (UPD). The Inter-American Economic and Social Council deals with development 
issues in the region and is one of the monitoring bodies under the Additional Protocol. The 
Council for Education, Science and Culture is the other monitoring body of the Protocol and has 
the underlying purpose within the Charter to 'raise the cultural level of the peoples, reaffirm 
their dignity as individuals, prepare them fully for the tasks or progress, and strengthen their 
devotion to peace, democracy and social justice. 64 For the purposes here only the work of 4 of 
the bodies will be examined, the OAS GA, the Commission, the Court and the UPD, as they are 
at the forefront of the legal developments of an international law of democracy in the region. 
A. THE GENERAL A ssEmBL Y oF THE OAS 
The General Assembly being 'the supreme organ' of the OAS, has the overall responsibility 
for ensuring the obligations of the Charter are met and to co-ordinate the activities of the other 
organs, agencies and entities of the organisation 
. 
6' The increase in democratisation in the region 
'0 Craven in Hams and Livingstone (1998) p. 3 10. 
IACHR Annual Report (1996) p. 633. 
Preamble, section 1. 
Declaration, sections 4 and 5. 
"4Davidson (1997) p. 6. 
" OAS Charter, Arficle 54. 
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has been met with a more active, but limited role of the OAS GA in the democratisation process 
and ensuring members adhere to their Charter obligations. 
In 1991 the 'Santiago Commitment to Democracy 166 was adopted by the Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs leading to OAS GA Resolution 1080 on 'Representative Democracy'. 67 The 
Santiago Commitment declares the Organisation's dedication to the defence and promotion of 
democracy and human rights as a necessary advancement in the region and recognises the 
importance of consolidating democracy in the region. 68 Resolution 1080 declares that the 
interruption of legitimately elected government in the region is grounds for collective action 
taken by the OAS in order to re-establish a democratic government in line with the obligations 
of the Charter. The Resolution calls for the convocation of the Pen-nanent Council of the OAS 
in the event of a 'sudden, or irregular interruption of the democratic political institutional 
process'. Resolution 1080 has been invoked in the cases of Haiti (1991), Peru (1992), 
Guatemala (1993), and Paraguay (1996). 11 The actual application of Resolution 1080 
demonstrates the possibility of legally binding obligations of democracy being upheld and the 
effectiveness of collective action in this regard. 70 
The ability, or willingness, of the OAS GA to act as the enforcer of human rights is 
ambiguous with the body itself not making its role clear in practice. Weston feels at it 
possesses a role similar to the European Committee of Ministers partially mitigating the Court's 
inability to enforce judgements and rulings. " On the other hand, Hams and Gomez state that 
the OAS GA does not have such a role, as there exist no provisions for enforcement. " The 
OAS GA has shown a certain degree of activism relating to events in the late 1970s by 
specifically speaking out against the actions of governments in certain states and in relation to 
specific human rights issues such as disappearances. This activism was short lived and the body 
has adopted what has been tenned a 'conspiracy of silence' as states have been reluctant to raise 
" OEA/Ser. P AG/DOC. 2734/91. 
VAG/RES. 1080 ()OU-0/9 1) 
68 Vaky and Munoz (1993) p- 13. 
69 See D. Acevedo and C. Grossman. "The OAS and the Protection of Democracy. 
' in T. Farer, ed. Beyond 
Sovereigno,. 
- 
Collectively Defending Democracy in the Americas. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996) 
pp-132-149. 
70 See the statements of C. Gaiviria, OAS Secretary-General at the 
UPD Forum "Ilie 1996 Institutional Crisis in 
Paragruay. ' [http: //oas. org/EN/PROG/UPD/forum/prpancg. btm]. 
B. Weston et al. 'Regional Human Rights Regimes: A Comparison and 
Appraisal. ' 20 Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law (19 87) pp. 602-605. 
" V. Gomez. 'The Interaction between the Political Actors of the OAS, the Commission and 
the Court. ' p. 191 and 
Harris, p. 3 in D. Harris and S. Livingstone, eds. 7he 
Inter-American System of Human Rights. (Oxford: Clarendon, 
1998). 
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issues in other states for fear they may be named in the next resolution. " Most often the OAS 
GA will recognise the work of the Commission and the Court and thank them for their efforts 
without going deeper into any pressing issues or the particular situations of a specific state. 
Despite the use of Resolution 1080 the OAS GA has not actively pursued the role of 
enforcer democracy and human rights demonstrating the continumg tension between non- 
intervention and the promotion and protection of democracy and human rights m the region. " 
Governments have recently put forth a strong commitment to democracy in human rights in 
their Reaffirmation of CaracaS75 where on behalf of their people they 
reaffirm the commitment to the defense and promotion of representative democracy 
and human rights in the region, the firm will to achieve development with social 
justice, and the determination to make the Americas a land of peace and well-being. 
The Reaffirmation lists numerous areas of concerning including democracy and human rights 
along with economic and social progress, drug-trafficking, land mines, demifitarisation and 
strengthening of the institutional order through greater co-operation. Once again governments 
have expressed a commitment to the creation of a better world for individuals as they reaffinn 
past principles. As the past has shown words alone are never enough as the require substantive 
action to make them real. 
B. THE INTER-AMERICAN CommissioN oNHum4NRiGHTs 
The Commission began its formal existence as an autonomous entity of the OAS in 1960 
designed to promote and defend human rights in the OAS, with human rights being defined as 
76 
those set forth in the American Declaration. It now has a dual role as a body with competence 
under the OAS Charter 'to promote the observance and protection of human lights and to serve 
as a consultative organ of the OAS in these matters', 77 and with the Court as a supervisory body 
under the ACHR 
. 
7' At its inception the Commission had only an advisory and recommendatory 
role and was not able to take decisions upon individual complaints that it received, instead these 
See J. Lauchlan Wash, et al. 'Conference Report. The Inter-American Human Rights System: Into the 
1990s and 
Beyond. ' 3 American University Journal of International Law and Policy (1988) pp. 529-53 1; Gomez in Hams and 
Livingstone (1998) pp. 192-20 1. 
Gomez in Hams and Livingstone (1998) p. 191 
AG/DEC. 16 (XXNIII-0/98) (2 June 1998). 
Article 1 (2) Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (hereinafter Commission Statute) reprinted 
in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OAE/Ser. L. V/11.82, 
doc. 6, rev. I at 93 
(1992). See S. Davidson. The Inter-American Human Rights System. (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1997) pp. 99-122; T. 
Farer. 'The Rise of the Inter-Amencan Human Rights Regime: No Longer a 
Unicom, Not Yet an Ox. ' 19 Human 
Rights Quarterly (1997) p. 5 1. 
77 OAS Charter, Article 106. 
7'ACHR, Article 33. 
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79 
complaints could only be used in formulating general recommendations to member states. 
This changed in 1966 and the Commission established an individual petition procedure for 
seven of the rights in the Declaration. " From this modest start the Commission has been able to 
exert substantial influence in the region. Its success in this regard is surprising since it had no 
legally based institutional framework on which to stand, being only the product of political 
resolutions. Once the ACHR came into force, the Commission was institutionalised and given 
an expanded role with responsibility to uphold the provisions of two documents. " 
Article 41 of the ACHR describes the main function of the Commission as being 'to 
promote respect for and defence of human rights"' through developing an awareness of human 
rights in the Americas, dealing with governments on issues related to the ACHR, preparing 
studies and reports, and receiving communications alleging violations of the ACHR. The 
Commission carries out its functions through two petition procedures and an extensive reporting 
procedure. 
Concerning alleged violations of the ACHR both states and individuals are able to petition 
the Commission. The inter-state procedure is dependent upon states explicitly recognising the 
competence of the Commission in this area. The idea being that if states make a separate 
declaration it lessens the risk of the procedure being used for strictly political means" and to 
date the procedure has never been used. " The individual complaint procedure differs from most 
other international human rights instruments in that by agreeing to the ACHR a state 
automatically recognises the Commission's competence to receive petitions from individuals. " 
The automatic recognition of the individual's ability to present complaints is a large step in 
progressing to a truly effective international hurnan tights as the instrument becomes accessible 
for the individual immediately and does not depend on fin-ther actions by the government. 
Under the ACHR there exists an actio popularis in the reporting of hw-nan rights violations 
as those who submit the claims need not demonstrate a direct personal interest in the situation. 
Article 44 of the ACHR allows for petitions to be submitted by '[a]ny person or group of 
" For a review of the Commission's early work see Thomas and Thomas in Rodley and Ronning 
(1974) pp. 156-164. 
" American Declaration, Articles 1,2,3,4,18,25, and 26. 
For the Commission's competence for States Parties to the American Declaration, see Commission 
Statute, Article 
19, concerning member states of the OAS, see Commission Statute, Article 20. 
82 'Me Spanish text (the original draft of the ACHR) should be translated to read 'the observance and protection of 
human rights' a stronger statement then 'respect for'. Concerning the controversy which exists 
in the differences in 
translation between the English and Spanish texts of the ACHR in relation to the Commission's role see 
T. 
Buergenthal. 'The Inter-Amencan System for the Protection of Human Rights. ' in T. Meron, ed. Human 
Rights in 
International Law. 
- 
Legal and Policy Issues. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985) p. 453. 
Buergenthal in Meron (1985) pp. 454-455. 
84 See C. Cema. 'The Inter-American Comrnission on Human Rights: Its Organisation and 
Execution of Petitions and 
Communications. ' in Hams and Livingstone (1998) pp. 112-114. 
" ACHR, Article 44. 
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persons, or any non-governmental entity'. 86 The role of NGOs and others being able to present 
claims on behalf of victims is of great importance in the region. The prevalence of authoritarian 
rulers has severely limited the ability of individuals to have access to international bodies. 
Furthermore the use of disappearances by governments of Latin America would have literally 
4closed the case' on violations of human rights if strict requirements existed for the submission 
of allegations to the Commission 
. 
8' The Commission has instituted fizther procedures which, In 
the case of disagreement over the admissibility of a petition due to the non-exhaustion of 
domestic remedies, places the burden of proof directly on the respondent government to show 
that local remedies where not exhausted. " Again this procedure recognises that many societies 
were under authoritarian systems where there existed no effective remedies under domestic law 
and in the current transition many legal institutions remain weak and ineffective. The issue of 
remedies remains a problem as the newer democratic governments continually claim that by 
their very nature they offer effective remedies, which may not necessarily be true 
. 
8' Finally if a 
govemment who has been accused of a violation of the ACHR is not forthcoming Mi providing 
information or co-operating with proceedings, the CoMITUssion will adopt a presumption of 
truth based on the information contained in the complaint and proceed to act upon its. 90 
The Commission has focused much of its efforts on its state reports with the procedure for 
dealing with individual petitions suffering from neglect and inhibiting the creation of a body of 
interpretative jurisprudence. " Farer places the nature of the human rights violations in the 
region as a major cause for as he points out when 'governments were simply torturing and 
mainiing, interpretation was hardly necessary'. " The behaviour of the Commission shows it 
has often followed its own selected route and not always taking into consideration the overall 
needs of the system and its future development. However, the concentration on state reports has 
helped to ftu-ther the protection and promotion of human rights in the region. The ability and 
willingness of the Commission to openly criticise the behaviour of a government in its overall 
" It must be noted though that in the case of NGOs submitting petitions, the NGO must be 
legally recognised in a 
member state of the organisation which allows states to exclude an NGO for arbitrary reasons, ACHR, 
Article 44. 
The Court has spoken of the 'exceptional intensity' of the use of disappearances in the region, 
Velasquez Rodtiguez 
Case (Houduras) (29 July 1988) Inter-Arn. Ct. H. R. (Ser. C) No. 4 (1988) paragraph 149. 
" ACHR, Article 46 (2), Commission Regulations, Article 37. See Farer (1997) as to how most states have not 
questioned exhaustion of remedies, p. 528. Also A. Trindade. 'The Inter-Amencan 
Human Rights System at the Dawn 
of the New Century: Recommendations for Improvement of its Mechanisms of Protection. 
' in Harris and Livingstone 
(1998) pp. 401-402. 
" 'J. Miguel Vivanco and L. Bhansali. 'Procedural Shortcomings in the Defense of 
Human Rights: An Inequality of 
Arms. ' in Harris and Livingstone (1998) pp. 429-43 1. 
90 Commission Regulations, Article 42. Gomez in Hams and Livingstone (1998) pp. 178-179. 
9' Farer ( 1997) p. 544. 
92 Farer in Hams and Livingstone (1998) p. 61 and how now there is the need to concentrate 
on developing its 
jurisprudence pp. 61-62. 
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treatment of society or certain sectors can have a substantial impact as opposed to condemnation 
on a case by case basis. 9' Article 41 of the ACHR lays out the reporting functions of the 
Commission which includes general or special reports on human rights issues as determined by 
the Commission, its own Annual Report and reports on the human rights situation in a member 
state. 94 State reports are submitted to the OAS GA for discussion that usually lacks substance 
and only rarely are resolutions adopted which directly address the recommendations of the 
report. 95 
The Commission's approach to state reports has given it a power that surpasses its European 
counterpart and has had a significant impact on the behaviour of the states in the region. " 
Besides specific state reports, the Commission has continually included individual country 
studies in its Annual Report and has come under constant criticism from governments who feel 
this is something the Commission is not entitled to do. " Governments have argued that the 
Commission should keep to general topics in its Annual Report since it has not been authorised 
to carry out a study on an individual state. The OAS GA has recently suggested that the 
Commission's reporting procedure should move to cover each state each year instead of 
targeting specific individual states. " Resource issues will loom large in the ability of the 
CoMrrUssion to expand in this way. What is certain is that the growth of democracy in the 
region will not diminish the need for state reports. 99 State reports, whether individual or part of 
the Commission's Annual Report, are important for monitoring the ongoing progress of human 
rights. They provide space for some infon-nal action to be taken during the preparation of the 
reports as well as providing information on the underlying context in which democracy and 
human rights occurs and importantly information regarding economic, social and cultural 
rights. "' The rise of democracies has contributed to the criticisms levelled at the Commission 
for its report procedures. "' In a democracy the rule of law is often accepted as existing along 
with the appropriate institutions for providing redress when a violation is alleged. With the 
" Unless of course numerous cases are continually brought against a government. 
94 Commission Statute, Article 18. C. Medina. The Battle of Human Rights: Gross, Systematic Violations and the 
Inter-American System. (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1988) pp. 156-159. 
" Usually the OAS GA thanks the Commission for its work and requests the state in question to consider the 
recommendations, Medina (1988) pp. 155-156. 
Farer (1997) pp. 511-512, he also finds criticism with the reporting procedure and the failure of the Commission to 
undertake comparative studies in preparing the report, pp. 532-535. 
97 See C. Medina. 'The Role of Country Reports in the Inter-American System of Human Rights. 
' in Harris and 
Livingstone (1998) where she discusses the efforts of democratic governments in trying to get the Con=' ssion 
to stop 
this practice, pp. 127-13 1. 
" AG/Res. 1213, see Medina in Harris and Livingstone (1998) p. 119. 
99 Farer in Hams and Livingstone (1998) p. 63 
'00 Medina in Hams and Livingstone (1998) pp. 131-132. 
"' Farer (1997) pp. 543 
-546; Vaky and Munoz 
(1993) p. 20. 
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presence of authoritarian regimes it is often easy to accuse that such institutions do not exist. 
Now it is more difficult to accuse democracies even if those democracies clearly do not have 
established institutions and procedures that are able to effectively provide redress. A long ruri 
problem that is facing the region is that human rights violations on a wide scale continue in 
many parts of the Americas. 112 However since the groups most affected are lower classes unable 
to speak out, along with continual favourable attitudes to a strong executive coupled with weak 
judicial systems these violations go on. 'O' The strong stance of the Commission of making 
public the behaviour of all states is important for the effectiveness of democracy and human 
rights as it removes the state" s exclusive position. "' 
A unique attribute of the Corninission is the ability to conduct on-site investigations for the 
purpose of investigating allegations of human rights violations and preparing country reports. "' 
The conducting of any on-site investigation requires the consent of the state in question"' with 
Chapter IV of the Commission's Regulations detailing what is expected of the state when an 
investigation occurs. This includes ensuring the free movement and safety of the observation 
teams during the investigation and guarantees of protection for anyone who provides the 
Commission with information. "' The use of on-site investigations has become an essential 
aspect for the promotion and protection of human fights in the region. They allow the 
Commission to overcome the reluctance of governments to provide information and reach those 
whose tights have been violated but for various reasons are unable to get into contact or provide 
information to the Commission. 'O' On-site investigations and studies help to educate people 
about their rights and the systems for redress, facilitate the submission of petitions, and influence 
102 See Human Rights Watch. World Report 1998. (New York: HRW, 1998) p. 85. 
'0' Farer (1997) pp. 544-545. See C. Larkins. 'The Judiciary and Delegative Democracy in Argentina. ' 30 Comparative 
Politics (1998) on the judiciary in Argentina and how it is less effective under the system of democracy in place then 
under the authoritarian government, pp. 436-437. Also A. Cornell and K. Roberts. 'Democracy, Counterinsurgency, 
and Human Rights: the Case of Peru. ' 12 Human Rights Quarterly (1990) p. 529 where they claim Peru has seen an 
increase of human rights violations since the transition to democracy. 
'04See Farer (1987) p. 401 
"' Prior to the coming into force of the ACHR the Commission was able, and did, conduct on site investigations 
by 
virtue of Article II of its Statute which allows for the holding of meetings in the territory of any Member state. 
The 
carrying out of on-site investigations may also be initiated at the request of a Member State. See 
Medina (1988) pp. 
129-134. Davidson (1997) pp. 112-117. Article 34 (4) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court allow it to carry out on- 
site investigations as well. 
106 ACHR, Article 48 (2); Commission Regulations, Article 44 (1). Medina (1988) discusses some of the controversy 
surrounding the position of consent in the conducting of on site observations and concludes that consent 
'is an essential 
requirement' p. 132. Article 18 (g) of the Commission Statute provides 'to conduct on-site observations in a state, with 
the consent or the invitation of the government in question. ' This comes under the general 
heading of the functions of 
the Comn-ussion in relation to all members of the OAS, therefore the power of the 
Commission for on-site 
investigations is not lirmted to States Parties to the ACHR. See Medina (1988) p. 13 1. 
'0' Commission Regulations, Articles 5 8-59. 
'0' Davidson (1997) points out that the conducting of on-site investigations are not always necessary 
for the 
Commission can come up with other ways of hearing witnesses and gathering information 
without directly involving 
themselves with the state in question, p. 113. 
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the attitudes towards redress, giving individuals greater confidence in their possibilities for 
redress encouraging a greater number of applications. "' Often the mere presence of 
investigators helps to ensure a greater observance of human rights obligations. "' The on-site 
investigations allow the Commission to ascertain the human rights situation on the ground based 
on first hand information. The fact that on-site observations are conducted or even allowed 
shows an ability to overcome the state bias of hw-nan rights law and the idea of non-intervenfion 
mto domestic affairs. "' 
Throughout its work the Commission has stated that the only way to guarantee human rights 
is through an effective system of representative democracy. "' With regard to the existence of 
authoritarian regimes in the region the Commission clearly makes the point 
that representative democracy is the fundamental premise upon which the political 
and legal organisation of the American states is based. De facto govemments do 
not therefore confon-n to the requirements of the American Convention on Human 
Rights! 13 
For its is 'a democratic framework [that is the]... essential element for establishment of a 
political society where human values can be fully reahsed'. "' In seeing democracy as a means 
to realise hw-nan values the Commission is including civil and political rights as well as socio- 
economic rights. 
The Commission has expressed that democracy depends upon, and allows for, the exercise 
of rights such as freedom of association, assembly, thought and expression. "' It has stressed the 
need for freedom of information and expression as a way of not only creating a culture of human 
rights but also to ensure that the democratic process works properly. "' in the undertaking of the 
democratic process politically, the Comn-iission has shown a preference for political parties so 
that 'chaos and anarchy are not to reign'. "' Elections are to be held at a regular basis"' and 
must be undertaken in conditions that allow fairness and transparency so that no one party is 
Weston et a] (1987) pp. 618-619. 
Buergenthal in Meron (1985) pp. 481-482. 
... Surprisingly governments have been accommodating to a degree in allowing the Commission to visit, see 
Median 
(1988) p. 134. 
112 IACHR Annual Report (1985/6) pp. 192-193. 
"' Report No. 25/98 (Chile) L4 CHR Annual Report (1997) p. 523, paragraph 3 1. 
114 IACHR Annual Report (1979/80) pp. 151-153. 
"' IACHR Annual Report (1980/1) pp. 345-346. Also L4CHR Report on Paraguay (1987). 
116 IA CHR Report on Mexico (1997) paragraphs 482-485. 
17 Case 10.109 (Argentina) Inter-American Yearbook on Human Rights (1988) p. 184. 
"' No specific time fi7arne has been set by the Commission but it has stated that a ten year 
delay violated Article XX of 
the Declaration, L4CHR Annual Report (1977) p. 93. 
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able to manipulate the system for its benefit. "9 The Commission has expressed the view that 
electoral rights are 'essential if societies are to function normally' explaining the inclusion of 
Article 23 as a non-derogable right. 120 Overall the Commission takes the position that electoral 
rights would only be rhetoric if established standards of conduct do not exist which allow for the 
will of society to be freely expressed. 121 
Elections and civil and political rights are essential to democracy but so are the 
implementation of socio-economic rights to create 'conditions In which the general population is 
able 
... 
to participate actively and productively'. "' The Commission has expressed the need for 
wide-based and active participation for it 'guarantees that all social sectors participate in the 
formulation, application and revision of national programs' which leads to the greater protection 
of socio-economic rights. "' There is the need for all sectors of society to participate in the 
political and socio-economic processes with the fostering of participation starting with the group 
involved but it is up to the government to provide the necessary conditions to allow for 
participation. "' 
Farer has expressed the opinion that the impact of the Commission on the human rights 
situation in the region has probably been minimal on the lives of individuals, but at the same 
time remains significant since the Commission often has an indirect impact on the promotion 
and protection of human rights. "' Much of the reason the Commission has only had a minimal 
direct influence on the situation of individuals is the lack of binding force behind its decisions. 
The Court itself has ruled that in the region's human rights system the Court possesses the only 
binding powers and this extends to the entire scope of the Commission's work. "' While it may 
lack legal force in its work the Commission has demonstrated the power of hurnan rights 
rhetoric and the need to be pro active in the face of adversity. In undertaking its tasks the 
Commission places a large emphasis on the importance of educating about human rights and 
democracy with the purpose of creating 'a broader appreciation of the place of human rights in 
"' See Inter-American Yearbook on Human Rights (1988) p. 598; MCHR Annual Report (1990/1) p. 525. IACHR 
Report on Mexico (1997) paragraph 47 1. 
120 Case 10.596 (Mexico) L4 CHR Annual Report (1993) p. 269. 
121 See Cases 9768,9780 and 9829 (Mexico) IA CHR Annual Report (1989/90) p. 465; IA CHR Annual Report (1993) p. 
524. 
122 JA CHR Annual Report (1990/ 1) pp. 521-522. 
123 IACHR Annual Report (1993) p. 553. The law making process itself is to be done democratically L4CHR Report on 
Mexico (1997) paragraph 758 
124 IACHR Report on Mexico (1997) paragraphs 617-618. 
125T. Farer. 'The OAS at the Crossroads: Human Rights. ' 72 Iowa Law Review (1987) p. 403. 
126 Cabellero Delgado and Santana Case No. 17 (8 December 1995) Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (Ser. C) No. 17 (1995) paragraph 
67. 
12 
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the Americas', an essential feature to carry on into the future. ' Farer's assessment of the 
Commission is perhaps dated. Undoubtedly the Commission has faced numerous obstacles in 
trying to making human rights more effective for individuals, but given the environment within 
which they work their efforts have been substantial in removing the rhetoric from the control of 
states. 
C INTER-AMERICAN COURT oFHumANRiGHTs 
The Court came into existence in 1978 as 'an autonomous judicial institution whose purpose 
is the application and interpretation' of the ACHR. "' The creation of the Court created tensions 
with the Commission as disputes arose as to who is primarily responsible for human rights 
protection in the region. 129 The Court has defined its task as preserving the rights of victims of 
human rights abuses and preserving the integrity of the Inter-American system of protection. "0 
Only states party to the ACHR and the Commission are able to petition the Court directly and 
concerning contentious cases only after the Commission procedures in Articles 48 to 50 of the 
ACHR have been completed. "' 
The Court is able to exercise contentious and advisory jurisdiction with its contentious scope 
covering the whole of the ACHR and Articles 8 and 13 of the Protocol of San Salvador. Its 
advisory jurisdiction allows for any member state and various OAS organs to obtain an opinion 
concerning the ACHR or other human rights instruments. 132 In contentious cases concerning 
individuals, the Court is able to pass a judgement that may contain compensatory payments 
... Davidson (1997) p. 108. The Inter-Ametican Institute for Human Rights is working on educational aspects of 
democracy through the training of activists, rewriting of school books and curriculum which have had an authoritarian 
bias to them, changing them to a democratic bias, see Lauchlan et al (1998) p. 536. 
128 Statute of the Inter-American Court, Article reprinted in reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights 
in the Inter-American System. OEA/Ser. L. V/H. 82 doc. 6 rev. I (1992) p. 113. The Court consists of seven judges who 
may be from any member state of the OAS with high moral authority and recognised competence in human rights. The 
criteria for choosing judges of high moral authority and competence in human rights was brought into question with the 
election of Dr. Alejendro Montiel Arguello who was the spokesman for the Somoza dictatorship in Nicaragua. 
Commentators felt his appointment raised serious questions as to how seriously states consider the elections of judges 
minimising the effective of the Court in protecting human rights see D. Cassel. 'Somoza's Revenge: A New Judge 
for 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. ' 13 Human Rights Law Journal (1992) p. 13 7. 
"9 See L. Frost. 'The Evolution of the Inter-Amencan Court of Human Rights: Reflections of Present and Former 
Judges. 14 Human Rights Quarterly (1992) p. 17 1. 
"0 In the matter of Viviana Gallardo et al. (13 November 1981) Advisory Opinion No. G 101/81, Inter-Am. Ct-H. R. (Ser. A) (1984) paragraph 13. 
13 ' ACHR, Article 6 1. See In the matter of Viviana Gallardo et al., paragrapah 23. 
"' ACHR, Articles 62 and 64. In the Court's first advisory opinion on the interpretation of Article 
64, the Court 
claimed that it was able to provide an advisory opinion on any human rights provisions applicable in 
the Western 
Hemisphere. This allows the Court to utilise regional and universal provisions for protection in its attempts 
to protect 
human rights. "Other Treaties" Subject to the Consultative Jurisdiction of the Court (Art. 64 of the 
American 
Convention on Human) Advisory Opinion OC-1/82 (24 September 1982) Inter-AM. Ct. H 
. 
R. (Ser. A) No. I (I 
1 
982) 
paragraph 44. Also C. Parker. ' "Other Treaties ": The Inter-Amencan Court of Human 
Rights Defines its Advisory 
Jurisdiction. ' 33 American University Law Review (1983) p. 211. 
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made to the ViCtiM. 
133 The Court may order interim measures in situations of 'extreme gravity 
and urgency, and when necessary to avoid irreparable damage to persons' either in mattm 
directly before it or in situations brought to its attention by the Commission 
., 
31 
The Court has been slow in making its mark on the Inter-American system since states have 
proved reluctant to recognise its jurisdiction and by a lack of co-operation from the 
Commission. 111 The Court's contentious caseload is slowly growing and substantial progress 
has been made through the use of its advisory opinion. 136 Even though the Court is created by 
the ACHR it has established that it may take into consideration any human rights treaty relevant 
to the American states, giving credence to the holistic approach to human rights protection and 
recognition of the benefits of co-operation between legal systems. The Court sees the 
obligations created by the ACHR to be applicable to each individual state party, regardless of 
the position or actions of another state party. "' Human rights protection in the eyes of the Court 
is sui genefis in nature and not determined by treaty relations between states. "' 
The Court has taken the long history of rhetoric surrounding democracy in the region and 
combined with the continual references in the regional hui-nan rights instruments, has established 
that the existence of democracy is the standard by which the actions of governments are to be 
judged. The Court has described emocracy as; 
The concept of rights and freedoms as well as that of their guarantees cannot be 
divorced from the system of values and principles that inspire it. In a democratic 
society, the rights and freedoms inherent in the human person, the guarantees 
applicable to them and the rule of law form a triad. Each component thereof defines 
itself, complements and depends on the others for its meaning-' " 
The Court expressed a more succinct position where '[o]bviously, representative democracy is 
based on the Rule of Law which presupposes that human rights are protected by law". 140 The 
"' ACHR, Article 63 (1). 
134 ACHR, Article 63 (2); Rules ofProcedure, Article 24. The Commission is also able to request Provisional measures 
under Article 29 (2) of its Regulations and has expressed that the failure to adhere to requested measures is a violations 
of obligations, see IACHR Annual Report (1997) page 966, paragraph 29. 
131 Prior to 1990 the Court only has a handful of cases on its docket. Since 1990 it has passed down over 
17 judgments 
in contentious cases along with a number of provisional measures and decision on reparations. 
For infori-nation see the 
Court's intemet site [http: //corteidh-oea. nu. or. cr/ci/ HONIE_ ING. HTM]. 
136 Buergenthal considers the advisory jurisdiction of the Court 'more extensive than any intemational or regional 
tribunal'. T. Buergenthal. 'The American and European Conventions on Human Rights: Sirrularities and 
Differences. ' 
30 American University Law Review (198 1) p. 162. 
See Davidson (1997) pp. 77-80. 
Advisory Opinion OC-1/82, paragraph 24. 
"9 Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations Advisory Opinion OC-8/87 (30 January 1987) fnter-AM. Ct. H. R. (Ser. 
A) 
No. 8 (1987) paragraph 26. See also Judicial Guarantees in States of Emergency Advisory 
Opinion OC-9/87 (6 
October 1987) Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (Ser. A) No. 6 (1987) paragraph 35. 
"o Advisory Opinion OC-6/86 paragraph 8. 
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Court's definition of a democratic society is dependent upon legal procedures providing for the 
legitimacy of government and the protection of human rights, ensuring the elements of 
participation and autonomy from Chapter 2. 
The rule of law and the existence of human rights provisions are of primary importance ma 
democratic society. The Court has stated that the only legitimate law is one wl-&h is duly 
6passed by the Legislature and promulgated by the Executive' and 'enacted for reasons of 
general interest' with the main purpose of protecting the individual and creating an environment 
for self-determination. 141 Since the purpose of law is to serve the general interest or welfare of 
society it requires a specific institutional form for its creation as '[flaw in a democratic state is 
not merely a mandate of authority cloaked with necessary formal elements. ' The Court drew a 
necessary connection between the legality of rules and the legitimacy of the rule makers giving 
rise to the requirement of the 'effective exercise of representative democracy. ' 142 
The legal protection of human rights is necessary so that state power is to be restricted based 
on 'the existence of certain inviolable attributes of the individual that cannot be legitimately 
restricted through the exercise of governmental power'. 143 There must be a 'set of guarantees' to 
ensure state power does not violate the rights of individuals. The Court has said that 
[p]erhaps the most important of these guarantees is that restrictions to basic rights 
only be established by a law passed by the Legislature in accordance with the 
Constitution. Such a procedure not only clothes these acts with the assent of the 
people through its representatives, but also allows minority groups to express their 
disagreement 
... 
so as to prevent the majority from acting arbitrarily 5.144 
The Court recognised a specific regional development in this area based on the principle of 
legality found throughout the constitutions of the Americas and 'is one and the same as the idea 
and the development of law in the democratic world and results in the acceptance of the 
existence of the so-called requirement of law (reserva de ley) by which ftmdarnental rights can 
only be restricted by law, the legitimate expression of the people'. 145 The Court makes it clear 
that at no time is a government able to act in self-serving manner as the bond between the 
principle of legality, democratic institutions and the rule of law always exists. 14' The Court has 
emphasised the need for 'an independent and impartial judicial body having the power to pass 
"' Advisory Opinion OC-6/86 paragraphs 27,29-30. 
Advisory Opinion OC-6/86 paragraph 32. 
Advisory Opinion OC-6/86 paragraph 21. 
144 Advisory Opinion OC-6/86 paragraph 22. 
14' Advisory Opinion OC-6/86 paragraph 23. 
14' Advisory Opinion OC-6/86 paragraph 24. Also Godinez Cniz Case (Honduras) (20 January 1989) Inter- 
Am. Ct. H. R. (Ser. Q No. 5 (1989) paragraph 150. 
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on the lawfulness of measures adopted in a state of emergency. ý 147 This ensures that remedies 
will be effective and the rule of law maintained at times when it is most needed. "' 
The Court has also provided insight concerning two elements of a democratic society 
- 
the 
principle of non-discrimination"' and freedom of expression. "' Regarding non-discrin-driation 
the Court stated that equality is part of the essential dignity of the individual and carmot be 
reconciled with special treatment o different groups based on assumed superiority. "' However 
it was expressed that starting at the point of universal human dignity 'it is possible to identify 
circumstances In which considerations of public welfare may justify departures to a greater or 
lesser degree from the standards articulated above. "" The Court took the position that 
differential treatment may exist in society but that 'no discrimination exists if the difference in 
treatment has a legitimate purpose and if it does not lead to situations which are contrary to 
justice, to reason or to the nature of things'. 153 Differential treatment is discriminatory and not 
part of a democratic society when it is offensive to human dignity and there is 'no objective or 
reasonable justification' for the differing treatment. 154 
In its discussion of freedom of expression the Court placed the existence of the right firmly 
in the context of democracy as it 'constitutes the primary and basic element of the public order 
of a democratic society, which is not conceivable without free debate and the possibility that 
dissenting voices be fully heard. ' The Court went to say '[i]t is also in the interest of the 
democratic public order inherent in the American Convention that the right of each individual to 
express himself freely and that of society as a whole to receive information be scrupulously 
respected. "" And, finally, that '[flreedom of expression is a cornerstone upon which the very 
existence of a democratic society rests. "" Judge Gros Espiell. has finther explained that 
freedom of expression, as a necessary element of a democratic society, is bound to bring about 
... Advisory Opinion OC-6/86 paragraph 30. 
"' Advisory Opinion OC-9/87 paragraph 24 
149 is ns o the Constitution of Costa Rica, Advisory opinion OC- Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization Prov io )f 
4/84 (19 January 1984) Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (Ser. A) No. 4 (1984). 
"0 Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Lawfor the Practice ofJournalism (A Hs. 13 and 29 of the 
American Convention on Human Rights) Advisory Opinion OC-5/85 (13 November 1985) Inter-Am-Ct. H. R. 
(Ser. A) 
No. 5 (1985). 
Advisory Opinion OC-4/84 paragraph 55 
Advisory Opinion OC-4/84 paragraph 58. 
Advisory Opinion OC-4/84 paragraph 57 
154 Advisory Opinion OC-5/85 paragraph 56. See also Judge Piza's Dissenting Opinion at paragraph 
12. 
Advisory Opinion OC-5/85 paragraph 69. 
Advisory Opinion OC-5/85 paragraph 70. 
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conflict making it necessary to balance the individual's light to freedom of expression with 
respect for the reputation of others in society. "' 
In contentious proceedings the Court has reinforced the belief that the state is based on the 
consent of society declaring that 'the power of the state is not unlimited, nor may the state resort 
to any means to attain its ends as they always remain subject to law and morality. 1158 The Court 
also expressed that a state who is a signatory to the ACHR has the duty 'to organize 
governmental apparatus and, in general, all the structures through which public power is 
exercised, so that they are capable of juridically ensuring the free and full enjoyment of human 
lights. ý 15' This was affirmed in Castillo Paez"' where it was stated that 'the right to effective 
recourse to a competent national court or tribunal is one of the fundamental pillars not only of 
the American Convention, but of the very rule of law In a democratic society in the terms of the 
Convention. "" As the Court hears more contentious cases it will be able to finther develop the 
details of a democratic society as established in its advisory opinions. For now the priority 
continues to be ensuring those whose rights have been grossly violated in the past receive some 
form of redress. 
The future of the Court as an effective instrument for promotion and protection of 
democracy and human rights Will depend very much on its relations with the Commission. The 
two Will have to agree to more amicable terrns giving the individual the best possible system of 
protection. Trindade observes that if there is to be a system for human rights protection then the 
supervisory bodies need to show greater co-operation. "' Co-operation between the two bodies 
is limited as demonstrated by the Court's habit of going over the facts of the case again without 
taking the Commission's investigations as authoritative. "' The Court and the Commission each 
have a substantial contribution to make but more effort should be placed on a sharing of the 
labour and not competing for it. "' 
157 Enforceability of the Right to Reply or Correction (Arts. 14(l), I(]) and 2 of the American Convention on Human 
Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-7/86 (29 August 1986) Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (Ser. A) No. 7 (1986). Separate Opinion of 
Judge Gros Espiell, paragraph 5 
Velasquez Rodriguez, paragraph 154. 
Velasquez Rodriguez, paragraph 166. 
160 Castillo Pdez Case (Peru) (3 November 1997) Inter-AmD. H. R. (Ser. Q No. 34 (1997 
161 Castillo Paez Case, paragraph 82. 
162 Trindade in Hams and Livingstone (1998) p. 134. 
16' Gangaram Panday Case (Suriname) (21 January 1994) Inter-AmD. H. R. (Ser. Q No. 16 (1994) paragraph 
30; 
Trindade in Harris and Livingstone (1998) pp. 412. 
'64TTindade in Hams and Livingstone (1998) pp. 414-417. 
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D. UNiTFOR THE PRomoTioN oFDEmocRAcy 
In 1990 the General Assembly passed a resolution calling for the creation of the Unit for the 
Promotion of Democracy, "' the body was formally established by the Secretary-General on 15 
October 1990.166 The mandate of the UPD is to provide for democratic development by 
assisting member states in preserving and strengthening their political institutions and 
democratic procedures. The primary priorities of the UPD are to ensure elections are effective, 
to provide training to legislatures and to promote and disseminate information about the 
democratic process and democratic values. Based on these priorities the democratic vision of 
the UPD consists of fin-thering good governance, citizen participation and free and fair elections. 
The UPD sees elections as a significant part of the democratic process but meaningless unless 
set within an informed and vigilant electorate that remains active, and has reciprocal 
communication with those elected. 161 The ultimate success of democracy depends on citizens 
not leaders, a concept firmly established in the UPD's work. 161 
The UPD's activities are far-reaching dealing with the building of democratic institutions, 
assisting in all aspects of elections, acting as a centre for information and dialogue of democracy 
issues, and participating in special prograrnmes essential to democratisation but not normally 
part of traditional activities. Democracy is not a naturally occurring entity and while institutions 
alone do not ensure the existence of democracy they do provide an essential element of a 
democratic society. The UPD works with local institutions to assist the personnel involved in 
the practice of democracy through the exchange of knowledge, training, the development of 
support services, and encouraging citizens' participation through education and the existence of 
mechanisms allowing for greater participation. Electoral participataion is a major part of the 
UPD's work as the involvement of international institutions in domestic elections has become a 
common occurrence as a means of providing legitimacy to the electoral process and ensuring the 
technical framework needed to conduct elections. The UPD has observed 37 elections in over 
half of the OAS member states at all levels of governance and it all areas of the election 
process. "' It has also carried out training for electoral officials, the development of 
documentation and information centres for electoral institutions; the providing of assistance 
in 
updating voter lists and maintaining electoral information; the provision of assistance on 
16'AG/RES 106/90. 
166 Executive Order No. 90-3 (15 October 1990). 
16' Farer (1988) pp. 117-12 1. 
168 'As citizens of this democracy, you are the rulers of the ruled, the 
law-givers and lavv-abiding, the beginning and the 
end. ' Unit for the Promotion of Democracy of the OAS. 'Democracy in the Americas. 
' 45 Americas (1993) p. 55. 
"9 The UPD recently observed the electoral registration in Belize something 
done for the first time, see S. Griner. 
'Talking with the Voter. ' 2 Democracy (1998) p. 1. 
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electoral legislation reform, election administration and other fields, and the conducting of 
studies on election infrastructure needs. 
The exchange of information and construction of dialogue are key essentials to democracy, 
both established and developing, and underlies the purpose of the information function of the 
UPD. They have recently held a Democratic Forum on Paraguay where the ability of the OAS 
to respond quickly to the democratic crisis in that country demonstrates its new competence in 
the area of democracy. The special programmes of the UPD show that the success of 
democratisation goes beyond institutions and elections and sometimes involves addressing 
specific issues facing societies in the transition process. The Special Programs of the UPD come 
at the request of a member state for a specific purpose with the common characteristic that they 
subsist almost entirely on external funds and consist of significant hurnan and financial 
resources with a substantial field presence. A significant nurnber of the special programs are 
implemented in countries or regions in the wake of conflict or in transition to democracy in 
order to meet specific needs. "' It is too early to evaluate the success of the UPD in furthering 
democracy and human rights in the region. The support it has so far received and the actions it 
has undertaken demonstrate a commitment to the future and the potential for having a 
significant impact in the region. 
V. OBSTACLES To DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAS 
The Americas has a long institutional history of inter-state efforts of co-operation that have 
often addressed the protection and promotion of democracy and human rights in the region. 
Parallel to this, have been the very real assertions of the importance of non-intervention in 
domestic affairs, the widespread existence of authoritarian governments and economic crisis, 
along with weak institutional structures. The position of democracy and human rights in the 
development of the region has been primarily of rhetorical value only as demonstrated by actual 
events. Alongside the realities of the region there continually remains a strong desire for 
democracy and the protection of hw-nan rights on the ground. "' This is evidenced by the 
fact 
that the OAS Charter, a product of half of century of inter-American co-operation, contained 
few references to democracy and human rights in its original form with non-intervention clearly 
"' The programmes the UPD have been involved with include - co-operation with the 
LN for the purpose of promotion 
respect for human rights and democratic institution building in Haiti; supporting the peace negotiations 
and 
disarmament process in Suriname; providing training for dernining personnel and assisting countries 
in the clearance of 
mines; promoting peaceful resolutions to conflicts and supporting 
legislative and electoral reforrns in Guatemala. 
"I T. Farer 'Collectively Defending Democracy in the Western Hemisphere: Introduction and 
Overview. ' in Farer 
(1996) pp. 9-11. 
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present as a guiding principle. 172 However as the region has changed the Charter has been 
amended marking a progression from rhetoric to substance. The European system for the 
protection of human rights works on the assumption that there exists at the domestic level 
effective measures which intend to limit the powers of government, making the task of 
supervision bodies one of reinforcing and clarifying previously existing and generally accepted 
constraints. In the Americas domestic measures have rarely existed in an effective form 
meaning that the work of the OAS has been in creating effective measures from scratch rather 
than clarifying pre-existing structures. 173 
The fifture of democracy and human rights in the region will be determined by the ability of 
the OAS to address the low levels of economic development, ' 74 the complications created by the 
presence of the US, the persistence of strong individual leaders which often prove a threat to 
democracy, and its own inherent weaknesses. 
A. Socio-EcoNomicDEVELOPMENTAND INEQUALITY 
The Inter-American system has addressed the necessary connection between socio- 
economic conditions, human rights and democracy from an early stage. The Declaration of 
Caracas (1954) expressed the conviction of American states to effective democracy through 
respect for the individual and promoting policies of economic well-being and social justice to 
raise living standards. "' Today obligations concerning socio-economic rights exist through the 
Charter, the Declarafion as an interpretation of the Charter, through the ACHR in Article 29"' 
and generally in the Protocol of San Salvador. These coniti-litments are all expressed within the 
overall framework of an existing democratic society. It Will be important for the OAS to ensure 
follow-up and future action on these commitments, as economic difficulties remain problematic 
for the consolidation of democracy throughout the region. 117 The ability of the OAS to assist in 
socio-economic progress is limited as it relies upon the resources of member states for its own 
... Thomas and Thomas (1963) feel that the adoption of the Charter and the Declaration are part of the rhetorical 
commitment of member states and were not intended to create any binding obligations related to democracy and human 
rights, pp. 140-141. 
"' See Farer (1997) 512. Also Harris in Harris and Livingstone (1998) p. 2. 
174 Most states in the region come midway between the developed industrialised states and the poorest states of 
Affica 
and Asia. For further infon-nation see Inter-Amencan Development Bank. Aannual Report 1998. 
(Washington, D. C., 
1999); Bulmer-Thomas (1994) p. 3 and generally. 
175 C. Stoetzer. The Organisation ofAmerican States, 2nd ed. (Westport: Praeger, 1993) pp. 245-6. 
116 Davidson (1997) sees Article 29 as also bringing in obligations under the ICESCR, pp. 36-37. On the Commission's 
treatment of economic and social rights under the ACHR see Craven in Harris and Livingstone 
(1998) who concludes 
that the Commission has a wide area in which to improve its monitoring and supervision capabilities in 
this area, pp. 
297-321. 
... H. Wiarda. Latin America at the Crossroads. - Debt, Development and the Future. (Boulder: Westview, 1987) pp. 59- 
60; J. Torre. The Politics of Economic Crisis in Latin America. ' 4 Journal ofDemocracy 
(1993) p. 104. 
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existence and programmes. A vicious circle develops as the OAS is unable to assist member 
states that are unable to provide the organisation with greater resources. "' 
In the transitions to democracy many of the Latin America states went against common 
trends as the authoritarian regimes were able to achieve high economic growth Without loosing 
their grip over society and when the transitions did occur the economic situations of many 
countries worsened. "' The present economic ills of much of the region are a substantial 
influence on the future development of democracy and human rights as governments face 'the 
discontent of the people over the inability of the government to satisfy their basic needs. "" The 
economic difficulties for many states are 'deep-seated, complex, and numerous', inextricably 
tied to deep inequalities within society. "' The inequities of economic and social standing have 
origins to the colonial period and have continued through the authoritarian regimes where any 
attempt by lower classes to challenge the structure of society was met by undemocratic action 
taken by the military or elites to preserve the status quo. "' The situation continues today as 
economic policies upset one group or another making it difficult for the government to create 
wide reaching polices that appear effective to all groups and not just concessions to those with 
political clout. "' 
The current process of democratisation is 'threatened by widespread poverty, social barriers 
of caste and class, low educational levels, deteriorating public services"" which have an uneven 
impact on certain sectors of society. "' Inequalities in society are part of the Iiistorical 
development of the region and continue to create an environment of mistrust for much of the 
"' See Harris in Harris and Livingstone (1998) p. 22. The problem is heightened by the situation that many of the 
democracies in the region are far from solid and progress looks to be minimal, see T. Karl. 'The Hybrid Regimes of 
Central America. ' 6 Journal ofDemocracy (1995) pp. 72-86. 
179 S. Mattiace and R. Ai Camp. 'Democracy and Development: An Overview. ' and L. Landim. 'Nongovernmental 
Organizations in Latin America. ' in R. Ai Camp, ed. Democracy in Latin America: Patterns and Cycles. (Wilmington: 
Scholarly Resource, 1996) pp. 3,165. 
"0 C. Nino. 'The Debate over Constitutional Reform in Latin America. ' 16 Fordham International Law Journal 
(1992/3) p. 636. See also Wiarda (1987) who observes; 'Entire systems of politics and governance are being shaken 
and unden-nined. ' (emphasis in original) p. 5. 
"' See Wiarda (1987) pp. 1-2,11-38, he places a great deal of the explanation for economic problems in Latin America 
upon the impact of international factors beyond their control (the US) and the historical and present position of leaders 
and elites. 
Comell and Roberts (1990) p. 53 1. 
N. Barletta. 'Economic Policy and Democracy. ' in R. Pastor, ed. Democracy in the Americas: Stopping the 
Pendulum. (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1989) p. 107. Also L. Meyer. 'Democracy from Three Latin American 
Perspectives. ' in Pastor (1989) pp. 33-34. The need to keep the economy strong has contributed to the prevalence of 
strong central leaders, but it is recognised that measures for economic growth should not 
be at the price of democratic 
safeguards. The president of Venezuela has recently achieved the power to implement econorruc reforms without 
the 
approval of the legislature, see 'A New Broom in Venezuela. ' Economist (6 February 1999) p. 61. 
"' R. Millett, 'Beyond Sovereignty: International Efforts to Support Latin American Democracy. 
' 36 Journal of 
Interamerican Studies and World Affairs (1994) pp. 9-10. 
.s under threat if 
... Diamond observes that even if regular elections and changes in government occur 
democracy remain 
socio-economic issues are not dealt with, L. Diamond. 'Democracy in 
Latin America: Degrees, Illusions, and 
Direcfions for Consolidation. ' in Farer (1996) pp. 76-77. 
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system which will slow democratic development. "' The inequalities of the region impact the 
position of many indigenous communities who either do not benefit from the full protection of 
rights offered or who have not been included into the democratic process. "' 
The Commission has stated that democracy 
should be translated into substantive improvements in the quality of life of the great 
majority, if not all, of the population. Work, health, education, suitable housing and 
the like would flow necessarily and naturally as a result of the preservation of 
certain individual guarantees and of the rule of democratic institutions. 118 
This will prove to be complex in practice as many states face wide social inequality and are 
characterised by the lack of attention given to the needs of the poorest and marginal groups of 
society. 181 
Inequalities within societies are ffirther troubled by the socio-economic inequalities that exist 
among the states of the region. As the richest state in the region and of the OAS, the US plays 
an important role Mi the economic development provisions of the Charter. When the Protocol of 
Cartagena de Indias... introduced into the Charter provisions for action in this area the US was 
quick to make its opinion clear on the binding nature of the provisions. At the time of signature 
the US stated that Articles 29,30, and 31 of the Charter 'do not create enforceable legal 
obligations and do not affect the sovereign fights and discretion of donor and recipient states 
with respect to the provision and receipt of assistance'. "' The position of the US impedes the 
co-operative efforts needed to effectively address the situation from the perspective of the 
individual as co-operation and efforts at all levels, regional, sub-regional and international are 
necessary to overcome the economic difficulties of the region. 192 The Declaration of Managua 
calls for action to be taken against factors which impede democracy but adopting the declaration 
Karl (1995) pp. 83-84. 
D. Yashar. 'Indigenous Protest and Democracy in Latin America. ' in J. Dominguez and A. Lowenthal, eds. 
Constructing Democratic Governance 
.- 
Latin America and the Caribbean in the 1990s. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1996) pp. 87-105; X. Gorostiaga. 'Problems and Chances of Democracy in Central America. ' in J. 
Hippler, ed. The Democratisation of Disempowerment. - 77ze Problem of Democracy in the Aird World. 
(London: 
Pluto, 1995) p. 93 who describes indigenous people as 'not recognised as authentic citizens'. The Proposed American 
Declaration on indigenous Rights will address these issues but is has yet to receive approval from governments, see 
IACHR Annual Report (1996) p. 625. 
"' IACHR Annual Report (1983/4) p. 137. 
"9 Barletta in Pastor, ed. (1989) pp. 108-109. The Commission has pointed out the need for states to address these 
issues and how it will not produce a great strain on national economies, see L4 CHR Reporl on Brazil 
(1998) Chapter 11, 
paragraph 15. 
"0 OAS Treaty Series No. 66. 
... The US went on in even more emphatic and ideologically charged terms to say 
it 'will continue to help Member 
States fulfil their goals of social justice through assistance it considers appropriate to support democracy, 
human rights 
and the poor of the region', OAS Treaty Series No. 66, General Information A-50/2. 
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has 'Proved much easier than translating its principles into action" 9' and will continue to be the 
case in the socio-economic field with the attitude of the US. 
B. ROLE OF THE US 
The position of the US with regard to economic conditions is part of the larger situation 
whereby the region has been described as 'America's backyard' making the US a contributor to 
both the stability and instability of the area. 194 The US is the chief contributor of funds to the 
OAS allowing for much of the Organisation's activities to be canied out and gives one country a 
disproportionate amount of influence over its activities. The US has continually held the attitude 
that it possesses a free reign in determining the affairs of the region. This has resulted in the 
situation where it is sometimes conceived that inter-American relations does not mean relations 
among American states but relations among the US and other countries of the region. 19' This 
relationship has passed through stages from where the US claimed an almost absolute right of 
intervention into the affairs of other American countries, to a recognition of non-intervention, to 
co-operation in the region to fight off communism and deal with socio-econornic problems. '9' 
The OAS has been a tool for both sides in tlýiis struggle with Latin American states seeing the 
OAS as a way to hedge against the power of the US who in turn has seen the organisation as a 
way to ftu-ther its own domestic policy goals. "' 
The behaviour of the US has hindered the work of the OAS as resistance to US policies 
within the OAS reinforces claims of national sovereignty and non-intervention which has 
sometimes lead to actual US intervention, worsening the situation and discrediting the OAS 
system. "' The recent attention given to issues concerning socio-economic development has led 
to controversy as to the extent to which the US is legally bound to provide assistance to less- 
developed states in the region weakening the ability of the OAS for institutional co-operation. 
"' 
The role of the US is essential in all areas of the work of the OAS but there needs to be found a 
way to continue with the US's physical contribution to the organisation while limiting its 
'9' Barletta in Pastor (1989) pp. 104-105. For more information concerning the impact of the recent global econormic 
troubles on the region see World Bank. Weathering the Storm: Latin America and the International 
Financial Crisis. 
(Washington: The Bank, 1999). 
'9' Millett (1994) p. 10. 
'94The US has publicly admitted it has used the region for its own security priorities, see 
C. Medina. 'Human Rights 
News 
- 
Inter-American System. ' 9 Netherlands Quarterly on Human Rights (199 1) p. 325. 
'9' Wells (1983) p. 225; Arrighi. (1997) p. 95. 
... For the historical development see Wells (1983) pp. 225-234. For discussion on the various interventions 
by the US 
in the region see Farer (1988). 
197 See Th6rien et al (1996) pp. 232-234; Farer (1988) pp. 25-3 1. 
'9' Forsythe ( 199 1)p. 74. 
199 See Wells (1983) pp. 241-243. 
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ideological pressure. This will allow space for the OAS to develop an autonomous role III the 
region and not be tied to the superpower of the region 
. 
200 The position of the US as an 
obstruction to the goals of the OAS is not absolute, as Forsythe has shown the development of 
support for democracy and human rights (at a highly abstract level) has occurred independently 
of the US. 201 
As the OAS, in its own right, becomes a higher profile factor in ftu-thering democracy and 
human rights in the region the US appears to be channelling its efforts into other areas of 
regional co-operation through, most notably, the Summit of the Americas. 'O' The work of the 
Summit consists of a number of similar areas of concern for the OAS and therefore proceeds 
parallel to the organisation in its own undertakings. hnportantly the OAS only works 'in areas 
delegated to it by the Summit and as a general information source. The Summit's work in 
democracy and human fights, which are stated as a high priority, have not been so delegated. 
The existence of dual procedures for strengthening democracy and human rights would 
non-nally be welcomed but considering the US is not bound by the bulk of the legal procedures 
of the OAS, and considering the minimal resources of the region, the US efforts to boost a 
political process appear as the continuance of traditional politics for the region. 
C STRoNGAumoRimmmsm 
The historical development of the region demonstrates a tendency for strong centralised 
authoritarian forrns of rule that have contributed to the poor economic situation and inequalities 
in society, the recurring authoritarianism which has plagued the region and an overall lack of 
confidence in government. "' Colonialism has had a direct impact on the presence of 
authoritarian regimes enhanced by aspects of the Iberian heritage that accepted disparity in 
society and the strong Catholic influence which reinforced hierarchy and responsibilities. "' 
Independence from colonial rule did not create any true change in societies, with elites merely 
replacing the colonial rulers with the same methods of control. 'O' The development of 
democracy in many states has followed a similar pattern as autocrats are replaced by elected 
'00 Millett (1994) p. 19. 
'0' Forsythe (199 1) pp. 75-89. d at [http: //www. s "' Information about the Sunin-iit process may be foun umnut-americas. orM. 
'0' M. Crahan, ed. Human Rights and Basic Needs in the Americas. (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 
1982) 
pp. 26-33. 
204 Crahan (1982) 36,40. 
'0' J. Black. Latin America, Its Problems and Promise: A Multidisciplinary Approach. (Boulder: Westview, 1984) p. 
64; Crahan (1982) pp. 35-36. 
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presidents who in turn exercise a great deal of personal control within the democratic 
fi raMework. 206 
The role of the military as a political institution also has a history in the region as the 
military has taken advantage of the belief in strong leaders seeing itself as the only proper 
guardian of the state and protector of national security. 207 This was often accompanied by 
211 human rights abuses, the suppression of democracy and dampening any social progress. In 
some cases mifitary/authoritarian rule brought about improved economic situation leading 
Chile's former ruler, General Pinochet, to say that government should not be judged based on 
211 legitimacy from the people but from the economic accomplishments it achieves. 
Unfortunately these accomplishments come at a high price in human suffering as the presence of 
military rule creates instability within society and beyond .2 
10 The military has not been 
completely discredited as a study of Venezuela has shown that those in favour of democracy are 
also in favour of military intervention in politics if it means saving or moving the democratic 
211 process along, demonstrating a strong paradox of Latin American democracy. Transitions to 
democracy in Chile and Argentina have shown the ability of the military to exert influence over 
212 
society after it has given up power. This has led to a response by democratically elected 
leaders who attempt to overcome the negative influences of the military by concentrating power 
211 in their own hands which in itself raises a threat to democracy. 
Hyper-presidentialism, the situation where there is support for a strong individual leader 
214 
regardless of the system of governance, is common to the region. The prime example of the 
region is President Fujimori in Peru who carried out his own coup d'etat, dissolved parliament 
'06See Larkins (1998) pp. 424-427. 
207 In Latin America the military considers itself an important institution of the nation, full of pride and demanding of 
respect, therefore it very often feels that its behaviour was somehow justified by the situation, see Crahan (1982) p. 50; 
Crawford (1990) p. 26. 
20' Farer (1987) pp. 403-405; B. Loveman. 'Protected Democracies and Military Guardianship: Political Transitions in 
Latin America, 1978-199Y 36 Journal ofInteramerican Studies and World Affairs (1994) pp. 109-110 
209 Quoted in Crahan (1982) p. 108. 
210 See the position of Hurrell who feels that democratisation in Argentina and Brazil led to greater co-operation in the 
region based on a harmony that could not come about with military governments, A. Hurrell 'Regionalism in the 
Americas. ' in L. Fawcett, and A. Hurrell, eds. Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organization and 
International 
Order. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995) pp. 256-258. 
211 See D. Myers and R. O'Connor. 'Support for Coups in Democratic Political Culture: A Venezuelan 
Exploration. ' 30 
Comparative Politics (1998) p. 193. VVbile the evidence in support of this exists history has shown that mi'litary 
regimes rarely act With such noble causes. 
212 See D. Pion-Berlin and C. Arceneaux. 'Tipping the Civil-Military Balance: Institutions and 
Human Rights Policy in 
Democratic Argentina and Chile. ' 31 Comparative Political Studies (1998) p. 633-635. 
213 Pion-Berlin and Arceneaux. (1998) p. 657. 
214 Nino (1993) pp. 640-644. 
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and suspended the constitution, but with apparent wide support for his actions 
. 
215 In Argentina, 
President Menem 'has governed the country "as he sees fit, " without significant political 
impediments, checks and balances or other regulatory supervision-). 216 The conditions of many 
societies in the region have provided the excuses for individual leaders to exercise a good deal of 
control and authority over the policy-making machinery. 2 " At the same time, for the long-term 
success of democracy these individuals will have to cede their personal control over the power 
of the government to avoid the detrimental effects of authoritarian rule. 218 The continuance of 
strong leader without appropriate domestic checks on power will prove dangerous to the process 
of consolidating democracy and human rights in the region if an individual is allowed to openly 
abuse the democratic system 
.2" The position of strong central authorities has caused both the 
legislature and judiciary to be weak checks on power. Legislatures are often powerless in 
checking the exercise of the power of the president through the terms of the constitution or due 
to the practical realities of the political situation 
. 
22' The judiciary is often not independent being 
linked to the executive either constitutionally or personally, either way, limiting its ability to 
independently promote and protect democracy and human rightS. 22 The consolidation of 
democracy along with the protection of hurnan rights and social and economic development in 
the region requires each branch of government to be independent, reliable and efficient an area 
where much of the region is weak. 222 
A firther complication facing the future of democracy is that a number of societies face the 
dilemma of what to do about the human rights violations of past regimes. The use of amnesty 
"' See C. McClintoch 'Peru's Fujimori: A Caudillo Derails Democracy. ' 92 World Affairs (1993) pp. 112-119; M. 
Cameron. 'Latin American A utogolpes: Dangerous Undertows in the Third Wave of Democratisation. ' 19 Third World 
Quarterly (1998) p. 219. 
216 See Larkins (1998) 'Today, political power in Argentina is not so much exercised in a representative fashion as it is 
wholly delegated to the president, to be wielded as he deems most appropriate', p. 423. 
217 A. Valenzuela. 'Latin America: Presidentialism in Crisis. ' 4 Journal ofDemocracy (1993) p. 4. Pastor links this to 
poor econorrUes as leaders negotiate with other interests. R. Pastor. 'Introduction: The Swing of the Pendulum. ' in 
Pastor, ed. (1989) p. 9. In dealing with the various interests of society see L. Whitehead. 'The Consolidation of Fragile 
Democracies: A Discussion with Illustrations. ' in Pastor, ed. (1989) pp. 76-95. 
"' Valenzuela (1993) p. 5. The impact of authoritarianism may also be constituted through the democratic process as is 
occuring in Venezuela. President Chavez is holding elections in order to institute changes in the constitutions 
that 
many feel will give him complete power over the government, 'Venezuelans OK Plans to Rewrite 
Constitution. ' CNN 
Report (25 April 1999) [http: //www. cnn. com/WORLD/americas/9904/25/venezuala. refer/ index. htn-fl] - 
"9 M. Cameron. 'Self-Coups: Peru, Guatemala and Russia. ' 9 Journal ofDemocracy (1998) pp. 125-139. 
Iq 220 See R. Penna. 'Strengthening the Legislative Branch. ' 2 (3) Democracy (1998) p. 4. In Mexico the leg slature has 
been powerless due to the control exercised by the individuals who run the dominant party the 
PRI, see D. Wallis. 
'Executive-Legislative Relations & the Consolidation of Democracy in Mexico. ' Paper presented March 1999 Political 
Studies Association Annual Conference, Nottingham. 
221 Valenzuela (1993) p. 7. 
222 In Peru, President Fujimori has dismissed members of the Constitutional Court who oppose any of his proposed 
changes to the constitution, subsequently negating any impact the Court Might 
have, see Human Rights Watch (1998) 
P. 133. In Loayza Tamayo Case (Peru) (17 September 1997) Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (Ser. Q 
No. 33 (1997) the joint 
concurring opinions of Cancado Trindade and Jackman express 
dissatisfaction with military tribunals in Peru as they 
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laws, which waive past violations of human rights and other criminal activity no longer 
possessing victims with a right of redress 
'22' has been common in the region in order to secure 
and facilitate the transfer of power to civilian rule. Amnesties are often justified as a 
compromise to stabilise society and necessary to allow society to move on. The ability of an 
amnesty to act as a fair compromise allowing all of society to move on is not guaranteed as the 
military has often manipulated the use of amnesties to preserve their own place before 
relinquishing power. 224 It is a difficult area for new democratic governments trying to find a 
balance between addressing the past and working for the future for it sets the stage for all future 
action in the areas of democracy and human rights. 225 It is suggested that it is good for a new 
government to fully investigate past abuses of human rights and to punish those responsible in 
order to show that it is not associated with the past regime, improving its credibility in domestic 
226 society and beyond 
. 
The Commission has dealt with the issue of amnesties with its position on the issue 
inconsistent to a degree. "' It has been held that the use of arrinesty and continued adherence by 
a democratic government to their provisions can be considered a violation of Articles I (non- 
discrimination in respect of rights), 2 (domestic effect), 8 (right to a fair trial) and 25 (right to 
judicial protection) of the ACHR 
. 
228 The Comn-fission is clear that self-amnesties, such as those 
passed by Chile, are not valid since they were not 'laws' created through the legitimate 
democratic process. 229 On the other hand the Commission stated that it recognised that 
lack impartiality required under Article 8 of the ACHR. A point the full court did not wholly address. See generally I. 
Stotzky, ed. Transition to Democracy in Latin America: The Role ofthe Judiciary. (Boulder: Westview, 1993). 
223 On the use of amnesty for past human rights violations see D. Orentichler. 'Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute 
Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime. ' 100 Yale Law Journal (199 1) p. 2537; N. Roht-Arriaza, ed. Impunity and 
Human Rights in International Law and Practice. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). 
224 J. Pasqualucci. 'The Whole Truth and Nothing but the Truth: Truth Comn-flssions, Impunity and the INter-American 
Human Rights Systern. ' 12 Boston University International Law Journal (1994) pp. 344-345. For an empirical 
analysis of the impact of arrinesty laws see A. de Brito. Human Rights and Democratization in Latin America: Uruguay 
and Chile. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997). 
22' D. Pion-Berlin. 'To Prosecute of Pardon? Human Rights Decisions in the Latin American Southern Cone. ' 16 
Human Rights Quarterly (1994) p. 106. For information on Truth Commissions in the region see P. Hayner. 'Fifteen 
Truth Commissions- 1974-1994: A Comparative Study. ' 16 Human Rights Quarterly (1994) pp. 597-655. Also R. 
Sleder. Impunity in Latin America. (London: Institute of Latin American Studies, 1995) pp. 1-3 and where it is stated 
that the issue of impunity for the past is not peripheral to the democratic transition but fundamental to the entire 
democratic process, p. 53. 
116 Kokott (1993) p. 159. Sieder (1995) feels that a characteristic of good government regardless of ideology is 
accountability, which means that those responsible for violations need to be held accountable since governments inheret 
the actions of past governments, p. 7. 
227 See Lutz in Hams and Livingstone (1998) pp. 348-361. For a review of the Commission's position regarding 
amnesties see D. Cassel. 'Lessons fi7orn the Americas: Guidelines for International Response to Amnesties 
for 
Atrocities. ' 59 Law and Contemporary Problems (1996) p. 197. 
22' For a recent treatment of amnesty laws see Report 25/98 (Chile) MCHR Annual Report (1997) pp. 512-540. 
Concerning how amnesties may be a violation of obligations under the ACHR see the Court's 
discussion in the 
Velasquez Rodriguez Case from paragraph 160. Also Lauchlan Wash et al. (1988) p. 556; Kokott (1993) p. 156. 
229 IACHR Annual Report (1985/6) p. 193. The Conmission's View is based on the Court's reasoning in Advisory 
Opinion OC-6/86. 
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transitions to democracy often meant dealing with past violations of human rights and that this 
was a delicate area where national bodies are the most appropriate forum to deal with it. The 
Commission concluded that 'only the appropriate democratic institutions 
- 
usually the 
legislature 
- 
with the participation of all the representative sectors, are the only ones called upon 
to determine whether or not to decree an amnesty and of the scope thereof. In the case of 
Uruguay, a referendum was held by the democratic government to determine whether or not the 
amnesty laws could stand. The entire process was fraught with irregularities and severe 
questions concerning the fairness of the vote but the end result showed the population voting in 
favour of the amnesty laW. 230 Yet before the Commission it was held that the action taken in 
Uruguay regarding amnesties violated the ACHR. 231 
The Court has declared the CoMMIssion competent to express an opinion on the legality of 
domestic laws but it is unable to express an opinion on the law-making process. "' This 
limitation does not appear to fit in with the Court and Commission's belief of the necessity and 
underlying framework of a democratic society. If the only valid amnesties are those that are 
properly created through a legitimate democratic process then moruitoring bodies should be 
entitled to address the process as well as the resultant law. As a solution to the amnesty issue it 
has been suggested that requests for advisory opinions from the Court submitted by either 
governments or the Commission would help to clarify the position of amnesties in the Inter- 
American human rights framework establishing a legal precedent. "' In turn this would 
strengthen the position of civilian governments trying to cope with the past and enhance their 
credibility. "' As it stands the role of the Commission on amnesties is heavily tempered by 
political considerations for in situations when it has found amnesties to violate the ACHR it has 
stopped short of direct condemnation or requiring action or sending it to the Court. "' 
"' Concerning events in Uruguay see de Bnto (1997) pp. 125-151 
23 1 Lutz comments that in the conducting of the referendum the military exerted pressure on the populace in 
Hams and 
Livingstone (1998) p. 358 which would contradict the Commission's own standards for the conducting of genuine 
elections. In the cases of Argentina and Uruguay the ACHR was applied retroactively raising some questions 
but it was 
felt that similar obligations applied through the Charter and American Declaration and that there exists a customary 
requirement o punish crimes against humanity, see Kokott (1993) p. 159. 
232 See Certain Attributes of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion 
OC- 13/93 (16 July 
1993) Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (Ser. A) No. 13 (1993) paragraph 29. 
233 Pasqualuccl (1994) p. 366. 
234 Suggestions of Prof. Goldman in Lauchlan et al. (1988) pp. 537-538. It is commonly held that the use of amnesty is 
a show of weakness of the government and an inability to initiate a proper and strong 
transition to democracy since 
ftom the outset, democracy and human rights principles are not applied. 
This in turn takes away credibility from the 
government and does not bode well for the future. See Crawford (1990) pp. 91-92. 
2" Lutz in Harris and Livingstone (1998) pp. 359-36 1. Pasqualucci (1994) p. 367. 
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D. NON-flVTER VENHON AND WEAKNEss oF THE OAS 
The ability of the OAS and any of its institutions to act on matters concerning democracy 
and human rights is severely curtailed by 'the most sacrosanct principle of the Americas 
- 
the 
doctrine of non-intervention". 236 When Mexico ratified the Protocol of Cartagena de Indias, 
which revised the OAS Charter giving the OAS a greater degree of operational competence, it 
entered a statement to the effect that the OAS has no independent power and that there is no 
legal possibility for a dynamic reinterpretation of the Charter allowing the organisation to act of 
its own initiative. 237 Mexico's position exemplifies the general attitude of governments in the 
region who are willing to express support for the OAS and its principles but at the same time 
ensure that no practical measures may be taken without their expressed consent. The idea of 
non-intervention first emerged among the American states in their attempts to exert 
independence from colonial rule and was soon directed towards resisting US domination of the 
region and has since been utilised to avoid obligations of democracy and human rights. 
The inter-American system has shown that there exists at least a belief in democracy as the 
standard for the region, a belief that lacks substantive action and demonstrates the need for 
procedural and substantive reforrn on the behalf of the OAS. "' The euphoria of the success of 
democracy that began this decade has been lessened by 'a recent drought of creative initiatives 
... 
and a sense of drift' In the organs of the OAS. "' Domestically there no longer exists state 
sponsored programmes of human rights Violations and repression but Widespread violations of 
rights continue in a more obscure way with few remedies available in the new democratic 
structures to provide redress. "' The Commission and the Court obviously have an important 
role in this regard but face the new challenge of dealing with violations concerning democratic 
governments who vehemently deny responsibility for wrong doing and offer little co-operation 
under the belief that their democratic mandate means they can do no wrong. 241 
The OAS needs to engage in institutional consolidation so the obligations of member states 
are clearly understood. The changes to the Charter have been necessary to respond to the 
"' Thomas and Thomas in Rodley and Ronning (1974) p. 138. Governments continue to take a hostile stance towards 
human tights monitors, see Human Rights Watch (1998) pp. 88-89. 
... OAS Treaty Series No. 66, General Information of the Treaty A-50/4. Panama has stated that Article I of the Charter 
empowers no organ of the OAS to take any action 'that implies any derogation fon-n the sovereignty' of a 
Member 
State. 
D. Acevedo. 'The Haitian Cnsis and the OAS Response: A Test of Effectiveness in Protecting Democracy. 
' in L. 
Damrosch, ed. Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts. 
(New York: Council on Foreign 
Relations, 1993) pp. 141-144 
239 Dosman, 1997. 
240 Th&rien et a] (1996) p. 229; M. Poppovic and P. Pinheiro. 'How to Consolidate Democracy9 
A Human Rights 
Approach. ' 47 International Social Science Journal (1995) p. 75. 
24 ' Farer in Hams and Livingstone (1998) p. 64. 
changing needs of the region and help ftuther the progress of democracy and human 
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rights. 
They have also been criticised for creating an unequal legal framework with multiple layers of 
obligation weakening the effectiveness of the organisation. 242 The differing status of the various 
amendments leads to confusion as to where the basis for action by the OAS originates 
. 
243 
-MS 
has been demonstrated by the lack of universal support in the region for actions demonstrating 
there is no single vision within the OAS on the ideas behind the consolidation of democracy for 
the region or how ideas should be put into action. 244 States have been fully supportive of action 
taken in support of democracy on some occasion and less enthusiastic at others 
. 
24' The end 
result is the sometimes protection and promotion of democracy and human rights but not always 
with the whole hearted practical support of the Organisation and its members 
. 
24' Despite the 
advances in democracy and human rights in the region values such as democracy and hw-nan 
rights are often relegated to a lower priority for state action. 247 
Currently there is discussion about reform of the Inter-American hw-nan rights system. 248 
The Commission has produced a report on the 'Inter-American Program for the Promotion of 
Hw-nan Rights' outlining the ideas behind refonn and action to be taken. The programme has 
three objectives which are to reinforce the defensive mechanisms of the human rights system 
through disseminating information about its operation, strengthen national institutions and 
educate the entire population of the region about human rights, especially vulnerable groups. 
Many of the efforts are welcomed but there appears to be funding problems preventing all 
aspects of the programme from being implemented which combined with the less than co- 
operative attitude of governments will inhibit the effectiveness of the reforms. 249 
This underlies the problem facing all of the efforts of the OAS 
- 
it may be able to obtain 
rhetorical agreement but getting substantive support is another issue altogether and one which 
will influence the future of democracy and human rights in the region. There is a real possibility 
then while the rhetoric of reform will be voiced loudly substantive action will not necessarily be 
... Arrighi (1997) pp. 96-98; H. Jim&nez. 'Introductory Note. ' 33 International Legal Materials (1994) p. 98 1. 
243 See Arrighi (1997) pp. 10 1- 102. This is crucial concerning the obligations of democracy established by the Protocol 
of Washington which II member states have yet to ratify. The Protocol of Cartegana de Indias lacks 3 ratifications and 
the Protocol of Managua lacks 4 ratifications. 
244 See D. Acevedo and C. Grossman. 'The Organization of American States and the Protection of Democracy. ' in Farer (1996) pp. 132-149. 
245T'h6rien et al. (1996) pp. 228-229. The application of Resolution 1080 is an example of an effective mechanism that 
is used inefficiently, see A. Valenzuela. 'Paraguay: The Coup that Didn't Happen. ' 8 Journal of Democracy (1997) p. 
54. 
246 Millett (1994) p. 17 
247T'h&6en et al 
. 
(1996) p. 228; Vaky and Munoz (1993) pp. 39-40. Human Rights Watch (1998) observes that even 
though governments may be willing to accept criticism concerning abuses they continue to fail to make programmes 
and efforts for the eradication of violations a priority, p. 85. 
"' AG/RES. 1488(XXVII-0/97) and AG/RES. 1546 (XXVIII-0/98). Also 1ACHR Annual Report 1997, pp. 891-926. 
24' Gomez in Harris and Livingstone (1998) pp. 182-189. 
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forthcoming. This has been demonstrated this decade by the fact that just about every state m 
the region has declared support for democracy. But the lack of democratic reality facing the 
considerable majority of individuals in the region2'0 exemplifies the need for continual action 
and that words alone do not create democracy or adherence to human rights. Furthermore, there 
is the need to overcome the reluctance of states to empower a regional organisation. to actively 
protection and promote democracy. Governments may express their dedication to democracy 
but they alone should not be left with determining the existence of democracy. 251 
V1. CONCLUSION 
Buergenthal, in providing a comparative study of the Inter-American and European human 
rights systems, offers an anecdote where one of his colleagues, commenting on the European 
Court's dealing with a case of corporal punishment in schools, says that if these were the only 
problems to worry about in the Inter-American system the human rights problem would be 
solved. "' Buergenthal's point in relating Us story is that one must take into consideration the 
environment in which a human rights system exists before passing judgment on its 
effectiveness. "' Harris observes that the Inter-American human rights system has not yet had 
the opportunity to develop a specifically American view to human rights due to the nature of the 
violations before the Court and Commission. 114 To a large degree Us is true as the severity of 
violations dealt with has not given the opportunity for elaboration on the more intricate 
subtleties of human rights protection. What the Court has made clear, which is significant, is 
that democracy is the standard by which all states and govenurients, must base themselves, as a 
necessary condition for effective human rights protection. The Commission has stressed the 
need for socio-economic conditions to be met alongside civil and political rights in a holistic 
approach. "' While these ideas may been assumed to exist in Europe they are in their infancy 
for much of the Americas, their legal elaboration at fl-lis early stage is a significant development 
for an international law of democracy in the region. 
The existence of the OAS as a regional organisation with universal membership has only 
just been achieved with the recent decisions of Canada and the Caribbean states to join. 
"0 See Diamond in Farer (1996) p. 53. 
t mmitment' to democracy but ... Mexico has entered a reservation to the Protocol of Washing on expressing its 'deep co 
finds it 'unacceptable to give to regional organizations supranational power and Instruments' for ýNhat it considers 
interventions into the internal affairs of states, OEA Ser. A/2 Add. 3, General Information of the Treaty 
A-56. If a deep 
cominitment truly exists then there should be no bar to openness of the ability of others to scrutinise actual practices. 
252 Buergenthal (1987) p. 304. 
25' Buegentthal (1987) p. 305. 
254 Harris in Harris and Livingstone (1998) p. 12. 
255 Vaky and Munoz (1993) p. 70; Th6rien et al 
- 
(1996) p. 219. 
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Currently all states in the region, with the exception of Cuba, have democratically elected 
governments. To a certain degree this may be attributed to the efforts and success of the OAS in 
promoting and protecting democracy and human rights in the region. The OAS has progressed 
from an 'inert' body to an effective institutional force in the region 
. 
211 Institutional co-operation 
among states is on the rise in the region as demonstrated by the recent Summits of the Americas 
that are becoming a common occurrence. The summits have fortified the position of the OAS 
on democracy with numerous declarations of intent which fully support the efforts of the OAS. 
In the 1994 Miami Summit Plan of Action democracy is placed as the 'central pnority of the 
Americas' with the OAS seen as the principal body for promoting and consolidating democracy 
the region 
. 
21' The value of the Summit Plans of Action are yet to be seen, as much of the 
211 rhetoric has yet to be formulated into actual implementation. 
The Inter-American system for the protection and promotion of democracy and human 
rights still has a great deal of growth and development to undergo before it becomes a truly 
effective system for the region. The system's ability to grow and develop is very encouraging, 
as it has proven in the past that it is able to overcome opposition and hostility towards its 
existence and work to have an impact upon the lives of individuals. Further encouragement 
comes from the great deal of textual rhetoric in the region in support of democracy and human 
rights. These texts are slowing becoming closer to the individuals of the region as the visibility 
of the OAS and its organs continues to grow. As individuals appeal to these organs and are able 
to utilise the texts then effectiveness grows. Democracy and hurnan rights must become an 
overarching priority for the region if full effectiveness is to be achieved. A great deal of regional 
activity is still conducted from the priorities of states with individual concerns addressed only 
when necessary or convenient. The OAS has a solid basis from which to grow and plenty of 
fertile texts upon which to support its position and work. The largest task facing the OAS 
is its 
ability to become a truly independent force in furthering an international law of democracy 
for 
the Americas, turning the words of the past into a realistic future for the individuals of the 
region. 
"' UPD (1996). 
... OAS Summit Documents. 1998. 
nine paragraphs reiterating or recalling past "' AG/RES. 1551 (XXVIII-0/98) The preamble of the resolution runs five action. 
statements in support of democracy the six substantive paragraphs 
do not call for any substan 
CHAPTER 6 
THE PROTECTION AND PROMOTION OF DEMOCRACY AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Africa' 
is today the most marginal, the most oppressed, the most exploited, the most 
poverty-stricken, the most debt-ridden, the most unstable, and the most denigrated 
continent in the world. What Africa needs, [is] 
... 
democratisation of the political, 
social, and economic landscape of Africa 
... 
there must be a new spirit of and 
enthusiasm for democracy, empowerment, accountability, social justice, equality, 
respect for human lights, popular participation and the guarantee of freedoms and 
liberties! 
These words by an African scholar show the difficulties that Africa faces in creating an 
effective system to promote and protect democracy and human rights in the region. Extremely 
low levels of economic development, the continual existence of authoritarian governments, the 
prevalence of ethnic unrest, the disintegration of the state and state structures on a growing 
scale, natural disasters, and the general loss of hope both within and outwith the region have 
combined to create a general sense of unrest and instability throughout Africa. This prevailing 
climate of unrest and instability has considerably hindered efforts to develop democracy and 
human rights at both the local and regional levels? 
The creation and development of effective institutional mechanisms for the protection and 
promotion of democracy and human fights in Africa faces numerous obstacles. The great 
amount of diversity throughout the Continent must be recognised as a significant factor as 
there are no common political or social traditions that may act as a basis for regional co- 
' This chapter takes into consideration Affica as a whole but it must be noted that the states of northern Afhca are 
mainly Arabic/Islamic nations and when it comes to issues of democracy and human rights these states are heavily 
influenced by events in the Arab world, see E. Quashigah. 'Protection of Human Rights in the Changing International 
Scene: Prospects for Sub-Saharan Affica. ' 6 Aftan Journal of International and Comparative Law (hereinafter 
R, 4DIC) (1994) p. 93. 
' Statement by J. fhonvbere. 'Pan-Africanism: Agenda for African Unity in the 1990s. ' Keynote address at the All- 
Affican Student's Conference, University of Guelph, Ontario, Canada, 27 May 1994. In a recent report of the UNDP, 
of the 48 states classified as 'Least Developed Countries' 31 are from Africa. In ratings of GNP Per Capita, the 
middle income layer (GNP above $766) only 13 states qualify and all are near the low-side. In the Human 
Development Index of the 44 states classified as 'Low Human Development' 33 are Affican, UNDP. 
Human 
Development Report, 1998. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) pp. 224-226. 
3 See 'The Challenges of Domesticating Rights in Africa. ' in R. Cohen et al., eds. Human Rights and Governance 
in 
Afiica. (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1993) p. 256, and R. Sklar and M. Strege. 'Finding Peace Through 
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operation. What does exist is a common experience of oppression, poverty and under- 
development whereby the needs and aspirations of the individuals of the Continent are not 5 being met 
. 
The furthering of democracy and human rights in Africa will not necessarily fulfil 
these needs and aspirations but it will be able to provide a start and a degree of hope for the 
future. 6 
The utilisation of international law for the protection and promotion of democracy and 
human rights In Africa brings with it a number of difficulties. International law was first used 
in Aftica as a tool of oppression for colonialism, it then became a tool of liberation for the self- 
deterrriination of Africans! It is now used in both capacities. Authoritarian leaders of Africa 
rely on claims of sovereignty and non-intervention to repel any criticisms of how they treat 
their societies and oppressed individuals invoke the rhetorical force of international law as a 
tool of liberation against the behaviour of leaders. The state-centric nature of international law 
has allowed authoritarian leaders to prevail with political opponents and ordinary citizens alike 
being denied participation in governance and the protection of basic rights! In several states 
this has become a vicious spiral as authoritarian regimes fail to achieve progress in the 
economic and social spheres leading to ever increasing authoritarianism. ' The last decade has 
presented some possibility for hope with the end of apartheid in South Africa and the end of 
military rule in Nigeria. Naturally these developments are welcomed as they provide an 
example for the rest of Aftica. to follow, but in themselves democracy and human rights are far 
from ensured and events in two states cannot speak for an entire continent, especially when 
both societies still face a long and difficult task of consolidation. 
Democracy in Sahelian Affica. ' 91 Current HistorY (1992) p. 224 who feel that greater concern for democracy and 
human rights has helped to stabilise the Sahel 
- 4 See J. Wiseman. 'The Rise and Fall and Rise (and Fall? ) of Democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa. ' in D. Potter et al, 
eds. Democratization. (Cambridge: Polity, 1997) pp. 272-273. On how this diversity affects attempts at regional co- 
operation see E. Bello. 'The Dark Continent: A Difficult Road to Unity. ' in E. Bello and B. Ajibola, eds. Essays in 
Honour ofJudge Tasim Olawale Elias, vol. 2 (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijoff, 1992) p. 789. This diversity also applies to 
the political culture of Africa, see J. Yoyder. 'Good Government, Democratisation and Traditional Affican Political 
Philosophy: The Example of the Kanyok of the Congo. ' 36 Journal ofModern Afilcan Studies (1998) p. 484. 
' I. Nguema. 'Human Rights Perspectives in Affica: The Roots of a Constant Challenge. ' II Human Rights Law 
Journal (1990) p. 26 1. 
'A. Aidoo. 'Affica: Democracy without Human RightsT 15 Human Rights Quarterly (1993) p. 704. 
' P. Kunig. 'Regional Protection of Human Rights: A Comparative Introduction. ' in P. Kunig, ed. Regional 
Protection of Human Rights by International Law. - The Emerging Afiican System. (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1985) p. 
36. For a review of the application of international law during the colonial period of Afiica see M. wa Mutua. 'Why 
Redraw the Map of Aftica: A Moral and Legal Inquiry. ' 16 Michigan Journal of International Law (I 995a) pp. 
1120-1142. 
'Kannyo in Y. El-Ayouty and 1. Zartman, eds. The OAU After Twenty Years. (New York: Praeger, 1984) pp. 157- 
158. 
' Kannyo in El-Ayouty and Zartman (1984) p. 169. 
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11. THE OAU: DICTATORS AND DEMOCRACY 
A. EARLYRELucTANcE 
In 1963 leaders of the independent African states signed the Chaxter of the Organisation of 
African Unity (OAU)" creating a regional organisation open to all members of the Continent 
and its surrounding islands. The OAU1 1 developed out of the pan-Afticanism movement 
dating back to the rrud-nineteenth century and a desire of the new states to protect their 
independence through regional unity. " The leaders at the time were 'determined to safeguard 
and consolidate the hard-won independence as well as the sovereignty and territorial integrity 
of our States, and to fight against neo-colonialism in all its forms. '13 
The purposes of the OAU as laid out in Article 2 (1) of the Charter include 
- 
the promotion 
of unity, efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa, the defence of state 
sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence, the eradication of colonialism and 
international co-operation with regard for the UN Charter and the UDHR. To achieve these 
purposes members agree in Article 2 (2) to co-ordinate and harmonise policies in the fields of 
politics, diplomacy, economics, transport, communications, education, culture, health, 
sanitation, nutrition, science, technology, defence and security. In pursuing these purposes 
members ftirther agree in Article 3 to adhere to the principles of sovereign equality of all 
members, the non-interference in internal affairs, respect for state sovereignty and territorial 
integrity, the right to an independent existence for states, the peaceful settlement of disputes, 
condemnation of political assassinations and subversive activities, the total emancipation of 
African territories which are still dependent, and a commitment to the non-aligned movement 
in international relations. The OAU Charter exemplifies the context of the period in which it 
was adopted mirroring the Primary concerns for Affica in the 1960s. The concerns included 
issues of internal security, the maintenance of economic assistance from the West, the desire 
for African unity, the defence of state sovereignty and the desire of African leaders to solidify 
their own personal positions of power. " The OAU was established on a purely interstate basis 
'0 479 UNTS 39. Entered into force 13 September 1963. 
" On the OAU see S. O. Agbi. The OA U and Afiican Diplomacy, 1963-19 79. (Ibadan: Impact, 1986); Z. Servenka- 
The Unfinished Questfor Unity Africa and the OAU. (London: Friedmann, 1977); El-Ayouty and Zartman, e s, 
1984; Y. El-Ayouty, ed. The OA U after Thirty Years. (Westport: Praeger, 1994); M. Karnto, J. Pondi and 
L. Zang. 
L'O. UA.. 
- 
R&ropective et Perspectives Aftaines. (Pans: Econonlica, 1990); K. Kranfona. Organisation of 
Aftan 
Unity. 
- 
Twenty-Five Years On. Essays in Honour of Kwame Nkrumah. (London: Afroworld, 1988); G. Naldi. The 
Organization ofAfiican Unity An Analysis of its Role. (London: Mansell, 1989). 
" On the Pan-African movement see 1. Geiss. The Pan-African Movement. trans. A. Keep. 
(London: Methuen, 1974); 
V. 'Ibompson. Africa and Unity The Evolution ofPan-Afiicanism. (Harlow: Longmans, 1969). 
Quoted in 1. Wallerstein. Afiica: The Politics of Unity. (London: Pall Mall Press, 1968) pp. 
64-65. 
See C. Welch. 'The OAU and Human Rights: Regional Promotion of Human Rights. 
' in El-Ayouty, ed. (1994) pp. 
53-54; 0. Ojo and A. Sesay. 'The OAU and Human Rights: Prospects for the 1990s and 
Beyond. ' 8 Human Rights 
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with no real intention to develop autonomous institutional structures or finther integration as 
the importance of state sovereignty outweighs institutional development. The emptiness of the 
commitments and contradictory nature of the purposes and principles of the Charter are a 
reflection of the domestic situation of its members and has influenced the institutional 
development of the OAU. " 
The attitudes of the founding members are reflected in the absence of democracy and 
human rights as an original pait of the organisation. It also explains the gap of 20 years before 
these ideas were included in the organisation's activities. 16 The Preamble of the OAU Charter 
contains vague references to ideas such as 'the inalienable right of all people to control their 
own destiny' and 'that fi7eedom, equality, justice and dignity are essential objectives to the 
legitimate aspirations of the African peoples. ' There is also mention to the UDHR in Article 2 
as a guideline for international co-operation and co-operation between states, but not in relation 
to obligations concerning the treatment of individuals. " The work of the OAU in the context 
of decolonisation and the ending of apartheid has been put forth as examples of the 
organisation providing support for the rights of peoples. " The activities of the OAU toward 
apartheid have been termed 'hypocritical' as the organisation seemed motivated more by 
political considerations than human suffering as some African states maintained relations with 
South Affica and/or possessed deplorable human rights records themselves. " The support 
shown for self-detennination in colonial situations does not place the OAU firrnly in support 
of democracy and human rights. In the process and context of decolonisation the OAU and 
the member states gave only limited support for democracy and human rights to the extent 
necessary to harness support for independence and condemn the colonial powerS. 20 Consistent 
with the prevailing practice of international aw, self-determination was seen as an act of 
removing foreign control but was not extended to the subsequent organisation of the new 
states as no consideration was given to ability or right of the individuals in society to determine 
Quarterly (1986) pp. 91-92. Mulei considers the strong adherence to non-intervention as a 'pathological obsession 
that has greatly contributed to the disturbing ineffectiveness of the OAU'. C. Mulei. 'The Role of the OAU in the 
Democratisation Process 
-A Case of Lack of Clear-Cut Policies and Political Will Towards an Open Society. ' 6 Proceedings ofthe American Society ofInternational Law (1994) p. 62. 
" Agbi (1986) p. 3. 
16 See Kannyo in EI-Ayouty and Zartman (1984) pp. 159-60. Hyden in Cohen et al, eds. (1993) sees the OAU's non 
acceptance of human rights as laying 'the foundation for authoritarian rule in post-independence Aftica', p. 262. 
" But see B. Andemicael. The OAU and the UN. - Relations Between the Organization of African Unity and the 
United Nations. (New York: Afficana, 1976) who feels that human rights obligations do exist through the mentions 
of the UN Charter, pp. 229-230 
" Umozurike feels '[d]espite the paucity of references to human rights, the practice of the OAU was distinctly anti- 
colonialist and anti-apartheid' U. 0. Umozurike. 7he Aftan Charter on Human and Peoples Rights. (The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1997) pp. 25-26. Also Andemicael (1976) p. 230. 
'9 B. Ambrose. Democratization and the Protection ofHuman Rights in Afta. (Westport: Praeger, 1995) pp. 10- 11 
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their lives in a continual process. Once the majority of the continent had obtained 
independence concerns for democracy and human rights were put on hold in relation to OAU 
affairs with the overall attitude of the organisation towards the subject bordering on stoicism 
.2, 
The OAU has shown a lack of concern for issues of democracy and human rights by 
interpreting any relevant provisions narrowly and with full regard to state interests. The 
principle of non-intervention has remained strong and the organisation's position has attracted 
criticisms ftom its own members. When Tanzania invaded Uganda bringing the downfall of 
Idi Amin and ending his wave of terror it was Tanzania who was condemned by the OAU for 
violating the principle of non-interference while Amin's actions were ignored. Julius Nyerere 
spoke out against this criticism by saying that the OAU was discredited when under the pretext 
of non-interference it allowed leaders to commit atrocities and take no action. " Nyerere stood 
alone on the issue, as the OAU has long remained reluctant to act in direct support of hunian 
rights or democracy. 23 
Calls for the regional protection of democracy and human rights in Africa began with the 
Law of Lagos Conference (1969)" that stressed the need to link the newly found 
independence of the Affican states to the principles and practice of democracy and human 
rights. The proposals put forth at the conference included the creation of a system of human 
rights protection. The idea was favoured by some OAU members, but the Assembly as a 
whole decided that the most pressing issue for the region was ending colonial rule in areas 
where it still existed in Affica. " The OAU later declared support for the Lusaka Manifesto 
(1969) a document declaring an acceptance of 'the belief that all men are equal and have equal 
rights to human dignity and respect' and that there is a 'right and duty to participate as equal 
members of the society, in their government. 16 These statements remained rhetoric as the 
OAU took no action upon them. From the start the OAU followed the principle of non- 
intervention and did not question the structure and ideology of member governments and their 
" Welch in El-Ayouty (1994) p. 55; wa Mutua (I 995a) p. 1141. 
gb ofInternational Law " V. Mani. 'Regional Approaches to the Implementation of Human Ri ts. '21 Indian Journal 
(198 1) pp. 107-108. 
22 See W. Tordoff. Government and Politics in Afiica. (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1984) p. 247. 
For examples see Kannyo, in El-Ayouty and Zartman (1984) pp. 162-163. 
The Lagos Conference was not an inter-state affair, a point that would explain the strong rhetoric but lack of action 
concerning its conclusions. For a review of the conference see Journal of the International Commission of 
Jurists 
(196 1) pp. 2-28. 
Commentators feel the lack of action taken on the conference recommendations was detrimental to the 
human 
rights protection and further regional integration, see R. D'Sa. 'The African Charter on Human and 
Peoples' Rights: 
Problems and Prospects for Regional Action. ' 10 Australian Yearbook ofInternational Law 
(1987) p. 104; Kannyo 
InC. Welch and R. Meltzer. Tfuman Rights and Development in Afta. (Albany: SUNY Press, 1984) p. 128. 
" Umozunke (1997) p. 25. 
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societies with all forms accepted as equally valid. The only duty placed upon members is to 
'observe scrupulously the principles enumerated in Article IV, the first three of which deal 
with the preservation of sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs severely limiting 
the OAU's possibilities for protecting and promoting democracy and human rights. 
B. THE ADvENT OFHUAIANRiGHTs 
The process of overcoming the sanctity of non-interference in domestic affairs within the 
OAU has begun with the development and acceptance of the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples' Rights (ACBPR). 28 Much of the impetus leading up to the drafting of the ACHPR 
did not come from the member governments of the OAU but from interested parties within 
and outwith Africa 
. 
2' The process leading to the ACI-IPR. began with the aforementioned Law 
of Lagos Conference that was followed by a number of other meetings on the subject of 
human rights in Africa involving the UN and a nw-nber of international and regional NGOs. " 
In 1979 the Secretary-General of the OAU was instructed to establish a committee to draw up 
a preliminary 'draft for an Aftican Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights' which was 
approved by the Assembly in 1981 and entered into force in 1986. " 
As with the OAU Charter the nature of the final version of the ACMPR reflects the 
challenges facing the region at the time of its drafting. The mood of the drafting was 
dominated by the situation of apartheid in Southern Africa, the effects of the failure of the New 
International Economic Order and the overall drift to authoritarianism on the continent. " At 
the time humanists in Africa believed in human rights as the common heritage of humanity 
and an integral part of the African political tradition and saw the ACB? R as means towards 
the full liberation and development of Affica free from both internal and external oppression. 
While the document reflects the humanist view its final provisions were detennined, by 
governments who were not willing to concede any limitations upon their power resulting in 
the final form of the ACHPR not adequately representing the needs and desires of individuals, 
E. Kwam Kouassi. 'The OAU and International Law. ' in El-Ayouty and Zartman, 1984, pp. 45-46. 
OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev. 5, reprinted in 21 International Legal Materials (1982) p. 5 8. 
'9 See B. G. Ramcharan. 'Tbe Travaux Preparatiores of the Affican Comn-ussion on Human Rights. ' 13 Human Rights 
Law Journal (1992) p. 307; Kannyo, in El-Ayouty and Zartman, 1984,163-66 
'0 For a summary of the conferences dealing With democracy and human rights in Affica 
following the Lagos 
Conference see Naldi (1989) pp. 109-110. 
" Ramcharan (1992) pp. 307-314. All states of Affica have signed and ratified the Charter with the exception of 
Ethiopia and Eritrea, 10 RADIC (1998) p. 530. 
" E. Kodjo. 'The Affican Charter on Human and Peoples Rights. ' II Human Rights Law Journal (1990) pp. 
272- 
274. 
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taking a greater concern for state interests. " Nwanko feels the intention of Affican. leaders was 
not to improve the human rights situation in Africa but only to create 'an impression of 
liberalism' to placate western interests. 34 
Under Article I of the ACEPR states are obligated to recognise the rights, duties and 
r__ 
- freedoms contained therein and shall undertake legislation and other measures to give to effect 
to them. This immediately raises the question of the binding character of the ACHPR for 
earlier drafts included the ternis of 'guarantee and ensure respect' for rights, expressmg a
stronger obligation and calling for specific action by governments. These were, however, 
rejected" for the less forceful tone which can be seen as not specifically placing obligations 
upon states to guarantee the rights in the ACBPF, but only to try and give effect to them. " 
Article 25 obligates governments to 'promote and ensure 
... 
respect of the rights and 
freedoms' contained in the Charter and ensure that rights, freedoms, and duties are all 
understood. Article 26 places a duty upon States Parties 'to guarantee the independence of the 
Courts' and 'allow the establishment and improvement of appropriate national institutions 
entrusted with the promotion and protection of the rights and freedoms guaranteed' in the 
ACBPR. Through Article 2 the individual is able to enjoy all rights and freedoms in the 
Charter without discrimination of any kind. Examples given as possibly discriminatory 
distinctions include; race, ethnic group, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national and social origin, fortune, birth, or other status. The inclusion of ethnic 
discrimination is important for Africa and human rights law in general for it allows for greater 
opportunities for those who are not of similar ethnic origin as the leaders. " The inclusion of 
non-discrimination based on origin, birth and fortune is important for individuals who are not 
native Africans but still significant parts of African societies. Article 2 makes a substantial 
" Kodj o (1990) p. 274. 
34 C. Nwankwo. 'The OAU and Human Rights. ' 4 Journal ofDemocracy (1993) p. 5 1. Mule, (1994) describes the 
Charter 'on the one hand as an instrument to forestall agitation for meaningful democracy within the states, and at the 
other end of the spectrum, as a public relations exercise - fronting the Affican leaders as upholders of 
human rights', 
p. 68; C. Anyangwe. 'Obligations of States Parties to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. 
' 10 R, 4DIC 
(1998) p. 659. For the specific example of Tanzania, see 1. Shivji. 'The Rule of Law and Ujamma in the Ideological 
Formation of Tanzania. ' 4 Social and Legal Studies (1995) p. 15 1. 
" R. Gittleman. 'The Affican Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: A Legal Analysis. ' 22 Virginia Journal of 
International Law (1982) pp. 688-689. 
" See Anyangwe (1998) who argues that there is a specific obligation of 'recognition' meaning rights are to 
be 
observed and measures taken to put the rights into practice, pp. 629-635. The Commission 
has expressed a similar 
view in Commission Nationale des Droits de I'Homme et des Libertiey v Chad 
Communication 74/92 (11 October 
1995) reprinted in 18 Human Rights Law Journal (1997) p. 34, unfortunately this has not been played out in state 
practice. 
3' Gittleman (1982) p. 683. 
258 
effort In attempting to adhere to the principle of equality and provide protectlon for all 
individuals, an essential element for an effective democracy. " 
Throughout he drafting stages it was repeatedly asserted that the ACBPR must be African 
in nature and based upon 'the values of Affican civilisation which should inTire and 
characterise their reflection on the concept of human and peoples' rights. '3' Elements giving 
the ACHPR its Affican character include the existence of peoples' rights and the relation 
between individual and society, the concept of duties, emphasis on the fight to development, 
the preference for reconciliatory forms of dispute settlement over justiciable methods. " The 
ACIIPR contains an equal mix of civil and political rights and socio-economic rights, along 
with a number of rights applicable to peoples (not defined). The Charter give no direct priority 
given to any one group of rights placing economic, social and cultural rights at a position equal 
to civil and political rights as directly enforceable rights and not as rights to be progressively 
achieved. Anyangwe goes ftu-ther to say that there are specific obligations upon the state to be 
proactive with regards to socio-economic rights, something lacking from the civil and political 
rights provisions. " The problem faced in providing for both sets of rights is the lack of 
resources for when economies are underdeveloped and debt is out of control, it will prove very 
difficult for any state to ensure the basic rights to their populations regardless of their nature. 42 
Articles 27 to 29 of the ACBPR define the issue of duties which includes duties of the 
individual in relation to other individuals, duties to the family, society, the state, and the 
international community. As with the Inter-American system the inclusion of duties not only 
creates obligations for individuals but also implies obligations upon governments to inspire the 
importance of these duties to society. " The formulation of duties in the ACBPR has been 
described as detrimental to the individual due to the indeterminate language used, providing 
" Umozurike (1997) has commented that due to the diverse nature of Affican societies and the complex factors 
involved the non-disctimination clauses in application should be seen as relative rather than strict mathematical 
forinulations of absolute equality, p. 30. 
" ACHPR, Preamble, paragraph. 4. Naldi (1989) states that the drafters were so determined in assuring that the final 
product was strictly an Affican document that references concerning co-operation With non-Affican entities were 
dropped, p. I 11. Bello claims it is for this same reason that other regional conventions were not copied, see E. Bello. 
'The Affican Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: A Legal Analysis. ' 194 Recued des Cours (I 985-V) p. 28. 
'0 Umozurike (1997) pp. 87-96, who also includes strong moral statements contained in the Charter but does not 
elaborate as to which statements. Also W. Benedik. 'Peoples' Rights and Individual Duties. ' in Kunig, ed. (1985) p. 
63. An inclusion in the Charter which is not necessarily Affican is the protection of the right to property, see Olaka- 
Onyango (1995) pp. 49-50. 
4' Anyangwe (1998) pp. 642-646. He goes on to specifically look at the obligations arising under Articles 16,17,18, 
the rights to health, education and a fan-dly respectively but concludes that issues of resources prevent proactive 
measures by states. 
" See Umozunke (1997) who feels that in the context of Affica, these rights should have been formulated in 
progressive terms otherwise they become a mockery, pp. 4648. 
13 U-0. Umozurike. 'The Affican Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. ' 77 American Journal ofInternational Law 
(1983) p. 907. 
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governments with legally acceptable reasons to treat individuals in a manner cont-ary to other 
human rights principles. " This need not always be the case as Article 28 places the duty on all 
individuals to 'respect and consider' other individuals without discrimination and to 'maintain 
relations aimed at promoting, safeguarding and reinforcing mutual respect and tolerance'. 
Respect and tolerance are essential to a democratic society, not only among individuals, but 
between the government and individuals. If governments fail to treat individuals with mutual 
respect and tolerance it is difficult to require similar behaviour from individuals. Duties have 
also been seen as having a positive side in assisting the process of state building by helping to 
create a greater sense of statehood and patriotism. " Again this depends on whether duties are 
utilised as a means to enhance respect and tolerance in society or as a tool for arbitrarily 
gaining compliance. " 
The inclusion of duties is to be seen as paired with rights in the overall context of society 
and not allow for the suppression of the individual who remains the primary focus of the 
ACBPR 
. 
4' The ACBPR recognises that the individual does not exist in a personal vacuum but 
must be placed in the group context created by the surrounding society as expressed by the 
inclusion of peoples' rights 
. 
4' By including group rights alongside individual rights the 
Charter is attempting to demonstrate that the two do not conflict rather they are 
complementary and reflective of society. 4' The idea of individual rights co-existing in 
harmony with group rights creates a situation of mutual respect and consideration and allows 
for greater participation and dialogue wid-iin a society. " Criticisms against group rights anse 
when the individual is subordinated to the needs and desires of the larger group. " Individuals 
cannot survive without the group, in turn the group depends upon the actions of its members. 
There exists continuous reciprocity between the two in a relation not of subordination but 
UmoZUnke (1983) p. 911. 
T. Huaraka. 'The Affican Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: A Significant Contribution to the Development 
of International Human Rights Law. ' in D. Premont, ed. Essays on the Concept of a "Right to Live. " Essays in 
Honour of Yougindra Khushalani. (Brussells: AIHR, 1988) p. 202. 
4' Take for example Umozurike's (1997) opinion that the duty to the State (Article 27 (1)) could help prevent brain 
drain and a loss of the best and brightest individuals, who instead could put their creative capabilities into the 
State, p. 
65. At the same time this does raise the issue of freedom of movement. 
47 Kodjo (1990) pp. 278-279. 
" R. Kiwanuka. 'The Meaning of "People" in the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. ' 88 
American 
Journal of International Law (1988) p. 82. The inclusion of peoples' rights is seen as distinctly Aftican 
but 
Anyangwe (1998) points out that 'collective nghts, are rights which escape serious mention in domestic law', p. 
626. 
'9 T. van Boven. 'The Relation Between Peoples' Rights and Human Fights in the Affican 
Charter. ' 7 Human Rights 
Law Journal (1986) p. 189; Huaraka in Premont (1988) p. 195. 
so UmozuTike (1997) pp. 117-19. 
" This has been bome out in practice as well, see J. Haynes. 'Democracy and humanrights in 
Ghana: The Record of 
the Rawlings' Regime. ' 90 Afiican Affairs (199 1) pp. 412-413. 
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mutual co-operation. 12 The fonnulation of group rights does not necessarily pose a potential 
threat to the individual but it has been commented that the vague and sweeping statements in 
relation to peoples' rights is a weakness with the result being mere rhetoric and distraction 
from the real problems groups and individuals face. " 
The formulation of group rights in the ACHPR also acts as a basis for the recognition of 
democracy through the exercise of self-determination. Article 20 (1) provides that all peoples 
have a right to existence and that 
[t]hey shall have the unquestionable and inalienable right to self-detennination. 
They shall freely deterniine their political status and shall pursue their econon-& 
and social development according to the policy they have freely chosen. 
Article 20 was originally fon-nulated as a means of preventing outside powers from having an 
impact on the development of African states. Today it could be seen as providing for the right 
of a society to make free choices about its development and the development of the individuals 
within it, which must include the existence of democracy. " However, numerous Aftican 
states has shown that there does not exist a free choice for peoples, either as a group or 
individually, in determining their political status, economic or social structures. 
Participation in the policies that determine the political, economic, and social structures of 
a society has not been common in Africa despite the existence of Article 13 which reads: 
1. Every citizen shall have the right to participate freely in the govennnent of his 
country, either directly or through freely chosen representatives in accordance 
with the provisions of the law. 
2. Every citizen shall have the right of equal access to the public service of his 
country. 
3. Every individual shall have the right of access to public property and services in 
strict equality of all persons before the law. 
The ability to participate may be limited 'in accordance with the provisions of the law' but 
there is no elaboration on what sort of limitations are possible. Furthermore, there is no 
mention of elections or that the will of the people is the basis of government, omissions which 
" See R. Etienne-Mbaya 'The "New" Human Rights in International Law. ' in G. Alfiredsson and P. Macalister-Smith, 
eds. The Living Law of Nations. - Essays on Refiigees, Minorities, Indigenous Peoples and 
Human Rights of other 
Vulnerable Groups. (Kehl: N. P. Engel, 1996) pp. 383-390. 
" S. Neff. 'Human Rights in Africa: Thoughts on the Affican Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights In the 
Light of 
the Case Law from Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland. ' 33 International and Comparative Law 
QuaHerly (1984) p. 
347. 
54 Kodjo (1990) p. 28 1. 
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demonstrate the fear of Affican leaders towards democracy. " The restrictive treatment given 
to participation rights exemplifies the efforts made to ensure that the final document was 
acceptable to the African states of the time, thereby not posing any true challenge to the 
authority of government. 
56 
Many of the rights in the ACBPR suffer from Over expectations that are unlikely to be 
met. " Furthermore the language used in a number of rights provide the potential of arbitrary 
limitations being placed upon the exercise of the rights concerned. The limitation clauses 
allow for rights to restricted depending upon the law, or public need and/or interest which is to 
be defined in various contexts. 5' The extent of limitations in other regional instruments are 
allowable only as necessary in a democracy society, a provision distinctly missing from the 
ACBPR. The existence of authoritarian regimes, often with ineffective or non-existent 
judiciaries allows for the law to used as a tool of oppression and a not as a check on power. 
With the absence of a base-line for determination of restrictions the supervisory body of the 
ACBPR cannot establish the extent to which behaviour is in conformity with the document. 
Even in states with limited democratic accountability the courts are sometimes under pressure 
or influence from government leaders. KodJo points to the 'legal' limits often found in 
domestic statutes concerning collective rights of assembly and association which allow a 
government to proclaim adherence to the ACBPR in principle but actually deny a right in 
practice through the application of the 'law'. ` Chapter 1 discussed the use of vague and 
indeterminate language in human rights instruments. The ACBPR demonstrates the extent to 
which the use of this language by states goes well beyond concerns for flexibility to creating 
an instrument short of effectiveness as the individual encounters numerous obstacles outside of 
their control. 
" B. Wanda. 'The One-Paity State and the Protection of Human Rights in Affican with Particular Reference to 
Political Rights. ' 3 RADIC (1991) pp. 768-769. Van Boven (1986) feels that the Charter declares that the state is not 
an end in itself but that it derives its meaning and legitimacy from the people and in turn represents their rights and 
interests, p. 190. But there exists no concrete evidence to support this. 
56 C. Welch. 'The Affican Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights: A FIve-Year Report and Assessment. ' 14 
Human Rights Quarterly (1992) p. 49. At the 13th Session of the Commission, Assistant S-G of the OAU Osman 
admitted that in relation to democracy and human rights, the Charter reflects what was possible at the time of drafting 
but admits the improvements are possible, 13 African Commission Report (1993) p. 2. 
" Examples include Article 15 providing a right to work, Article 16 on the right to 'enjoy the best attainable state of 
mental and physical health', and Article 17 on the right to education. The economic situation in most socieftes will 
prevent individuals, or in some cases even the bulk of society from enjoying these rights on a regular basis. 
" In general the scope of limitations in the Charter are much wider than any other human rights instruments, see 
C. 
Flinterman and E. Ankumah. 'The Affican Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. ' in H. Hannum, ed. 
Guide to 
International Human Rights Practice, 2nd ed. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992) p. 166. 
" Kodjo (1990) p. 277. 
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Within the Charter framework govenunents maintain the last word retaining 'exorbitant 
power' in the formulation of human rights law on the continent. 'o A further point is that there 
exists no derogation clause to protect rights in exceptional circumstances. This does not mean 
no derogation is allowed, only that extra protection is not available to the individual in times of 
conflict. This omission becomes extra troubling with leaders like Uganda's Museveni saying 
that conflicts are sometimes 'necessary and healthy'. " In his farewell speech to the OAU, 
Nelson Mandela made it clear that democracy and participation are necessary for Affica. in that 
we must all accept that we cannot abuse the concept of national sovereignty to 
deny the rest of the continent the right and duty to intervene when, behind those 
sovereign boundaries, people are being slaughtered to protect tyranny. 
He reminded African leaders that the 'legitimacy of our governments, derive from our 
commitment to serve the interests of the people on the basis of mandates given by the people 
themselves. 62 
As Mandela himself is painffilly aware this has not been the view of Affican leaders of the 
past fifty years. Recently there are calls for reforms to the ACBPR in order to redress its 
inherent mistakes. These calls have not received wide support as it is claimed that it is more 
important to maintain a stable document at this point In time before bringing in change. 
Further it is feared that leaders could manipulate this change to weaken the ACHPR even 
further. Instead greater use should be made of the existing provisions of the ACBPR to 
expand the document and develop greater experience in the culture of human tights on the 
continent. " 
C FUR THER SUPPOR T FoR DEmocRA cY AND HuAL4N RiGHTs 
Following the adoption of the ACIIPR the OAU slowly began to show support for hurnan 
welfare in the context of democracy and human rights. The African Charter on the Rights and 
Welfare of the Child was adopted in 
1990.64 In the same year the African Charter for Popular 
Participation in Development and Transformation was adopted . 
6' The latter document is an 
'0 E. Kouassi in El-Ayouty and Zartman (1984) p. 58. 
" PanAfiican News Agency 'Museveni says some African Conflicts are Necessary. ' (3 May 1998). Stones may 
be 
found at [http: //www. afiicanews. orM. 
6' Farewell Speech To The OAU (8 June 1998). 
63 On the proposals for change see R. Murray. 'Report on the 1996 
Sessions of the Aftican Commission on Human 
and Peoples' Rights. ' 18 Human Rights Law Journal (1997) p. 19. 
64 OA U Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990). To date there are 24 signatories and 8 ratifications, 10 RADIC 
(1998) p. 533. 
" UN Economic Commission for Aftica E. C. A. Res 691 (XXV) in UN Doc. A/45/427 (1990). 
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all-embracing statement on development calling for wide-based participation by all sectors of 
society, the need for human rights and the end to conflicts. It views participation as the 
empowerment of the people to effectively involve themselves in creating the 
structures and in designing policies and programmes that serve the interests of all 
as well as to effectively contribute to the development process and share equitably 
in its benefits. " 
The document provides essential elements for the future development of Affica but in its 8 
year existence it has received Scant attention. 67 
The refugee problem has raised human rights issues bringing about the Addis Ababa 
Document on Refugees and Forced Population Displacements in Affica (1994). 61 The 
document recognises the refugee problem as resulting from, inter alia, intolerance, massive 
human rights abuses, the lack of democracy and public participation and the poor management 
of public affairs. '9 Recommendation One of the document stresses the need to examine the 
factors contributing to refugees including 'the establishment of a firm foundation for 
democratic institutions and governance; the respect of human rights; the promotion of 
economic development and social progress'. Recommendation Two calls upon the leaders of 
Africa to 
rise up to the challenges of practising politics of inclusion and popular 
participation in national affairs, creating a firm foundation for responsible and 
accountable governance, and promoting social progress, economic development 
and a just and fair society. 
Other instruments include the Declaration on a Code of Conduct for Inter-African 
Relations (1994)" which includes an affirmation by governments 
that friendly relations among our peoples as well as peace, justice, stability and 
democracy, call for the protection of ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious 
identity of all our people including national minorities and the creation of 
conditions conducive to the promotion of this identity" 
"Ambrose (1995) p. 175. 
67 See Ambrose (1995) pp. 175-176. 
6' Adopted by the OAU/UNHCR Symposium on Refugees and Forced Population Displacements in 
Affica, Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia, 8-10 September 1994. There is also the older Convention Governing the Specific 
Aspects of 
Refugee Problems in Africa, 1001 UNTS 45 (20 June 1974) 41 parties. See Lawyers Committee for Human Rights. 
Aftican Exodus: Refugee Crisis, Human Rights And 7he 1969 OA U Convention. (New York: The Committee, 
1995). 
69 Part Two, Recommendation 1. 'Root Causes Of Refugee Flows And Other Forced Population 
Displacements. ' 
paragraph 
. 
8. 
'0 Assembly of Heads of State and Government, Thirtieth 
Ordinary Session, Tunis (13-15 June 1994). 
71 paragraph 4. 
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The Treaty Establishing the African Economic CommunitY72 lists in Article 3, under the 
Principles of the Treaty, the recognition, promotion and protection of human and peoples' 
rights in accordance with the ACIFIPR and accountability, economic justice and popular 
participation as aspects of development. The Treaty of the Southern African Development 
CommunitY73 expresses the need to involve peoples in development and integration through 
71 the guarantee of democratic rights, observance of human rights and the rule of law. Article 4 
obliges member states to act in accordance with human rights, democracy and the rule of law. 
Most recently, the foreign ministers of the OAU states met to discuss the issue of human rights 
in Africa and issued the Mauritius Declaration 
. 
7' The docurnent reaffirrns the universality of 
human rights and calls on greater co-operation with NGOs but leaves the primary 
responsibility for the promotion and protection of human rights with the state. The meeting 
and declaration are significant as they mark the first time that leaders have come together to 
discuss the issue of human rights. At the same time but confining the protection and 
promotion of human rights with the state its impact is likely to be minimal since most states of 
Africa have not been active in this regard. 
The stun total of the impact of the ACBPR and other statements in support of democracy 
and human rights in Africa must not be overemphasised beyond the rhetorical level. Affican 
governments have shown a reluctance to accept a human rights framework by not taking an 
early initiative in establishing the ACBPF, by not incorporating the Charter into their domestic 
law and by not taking an active role in engaging with the texts for the benefit of the 
individual. " As Ambrose wams 'Aftican leaders draw up elaborate plans, they often fail to 
actualise them'. " Oloka-Onyango describes these promises as having 'been drowned Mi the 
battle-cries of warlords'. " The activities of the OAU clearly demonstrate the difference 
between reality and rhetoric as sovereignty outbids concern for the individual. The past few 
years has seen an increase in the rhetoric of democracy and human rights in Afiica. It can only 
hoped that Aftican leaders no longer ignore the rhetoric and begin to act upon it for the benefit 
of the individual. 
"3 RADIC (199 1) p. 792. 
7' 5 RADIC (1993) p. 418,15 signatories. 
74 Preamble, paragraph 7. 
75 PanAffican News Agency. "Affican Ministers Adopt Human Rights Declaration. ' (17 April 1999). 
76 T. Orlin. Human Rights Development in Afiica: The Banjul Conference of the African Association of 
International 
Law. (Abo: Institute of Human Rights, 1990) p. 12, quoted in Welch (1992) p. 60. 
7' Ambrose (1995) p. 175. 
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A. THE OA U 
The activities of the CIAU are led by the Assembly of Heads of State and Governments 
(the Assembly) as the supreme organ of the organisation. '9 Below the Assembly are the 
Council of Ministers who perform much of the preparatory work for the Assembly as well as 
overseeing the implementation of Assembly decisions. " There also exists a Secretariat whose 
position is primarily administrative in nature, but which is developing into a more active role 
in the workings of the orgariisation. " Decisions taken by the Assembly are only 
recommendations to member states and those not in favour are not bound by them. " There 
exists no system of formal sanctions for violations of the Charter, except for the suspension of 
membership for non-payment of dues. " 
The organisational structure of the OAU is cumbersome making it difficult for the 
organisation to react quickly to situations as they arise. Member governments are not always 
supportive in their participation due either to unstable domestic situations or prionfies lying 
elsewhere in turn weakening support for the organisation in domestic sociefies. " The OAU 
itself suffers from a lack of resources and technical knowledge and assistance, preventing it 
from carrying out even the basic administrative tasks. " The OAU has been an ineffective 
organisation in many of the areas it proclaims to have competence as members have frequently 
and has openly flouted the principles of the Charter seriously undermining the organisation's 
credibility. " In the promotion and protection of democracy and hurnan rights the organisation 
has failed considerably as other interests have taken priority. " 
" J. Oloka-Onyango. 'Beyond the Rhetoric: Reinvigorating the Struggle for Economic and Social Rights in Affica. ' 
26 California Western International Law Journal (1995) p. 60. 
" OAU Charter, Article VIM 
'0 OAU Charter, Article XHL 
" OAU Charter, Articles XVI-XV111. The Charter also called for a Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and 
Arbitration to handle disputes among member states, (Article XIX) but this body was never fully established or ever 
utilised. 
" E. Kwam Kouassi. 'The OAU and International Law. ' in El-Ayouty and Zartman, 1984,47; ervenka (1977) who 
feels the matter of the binding force of decisions was deliberately left ambiguous, p. 22. 
" See Mulei (1994) p. 67. As of June 1998, over forty-eight million US dollars were owed to the Organisation, 
Panaflican News Agency 'OAU Owed 48 Million By Member States. ' (2 June 1998). One cornmentator has stated 
that the OAU needs to change its position on these matters if it is to retain credibility, Y. El-Ayouty. 'An OAU 
for the 
Future: An Assessment. ' in El-Ayouty, ed. (1994) p. 186. 
84 Tordoff (1984) pp. 259-60. 
" Tordoff (1984) pp. 244-5. 
86 Tordoff (1984) p. 259; Mulei (1994) p. 67. For an extremely positive view of the OAU in strengthening the 
Affican state, fighting against colonialism, furthering African co-operation and promoting human rights see 
Wembou 
in El-Ayouty (1994) p. 16. One author feels that the OAU was not set up to handle all of Affica's secunty 
requirements but only had the purpose of solving problems in Southern Affica on African terms and over 
time it has 
taken to developing its role in other areas, H. Bretton. Power and Politics in Afiica. (London: Longman, 1973) pp. 
89-90. 
" Nwankwo (1993) p. 50; Umozurike (1997) p. 24. 
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The OAU has shown a slowly developing concern for human rights, and most recently 
democracy, as part of its own initiative and as a reaction to pressures fonn inside and oumith 
Africa. " The present Secretary General of the OAU has stated that 
the most serious threat to Africa comes from a sometimes poor relationship 
between the people and their governments 
.... 
the African masses have not by and 
large, been given adequate opportunities to find an outlet for their creative 
energies and apply them to development. " 
One area where the OAU has attempted to become more active is election involvement, 
but to date only small delegations of observers have been sent, primarily as symbolic 
gestures. " This minimal involvement in elections has attracted criticism from govenunents 
even though the OAU has only become involved when its presence has been requested. " 
Support for democracy and human rights by the Assembly has been primarily in the context of 
development. " At its 1990 Summit the Assembly recognised that development depended 
upon wide-based and popular participation in the process of government. It is also necessary 
to create a 'political environment which guarantees hurnan rights and the observance of the 
rule of law, ' along with assuring 'high standards of probity and accountability particularly on 
the part of those who hold public office. "' The right to development has further been defined 
to include the right of every human being 'to participate in, contribute to and enjoy the 
economic, social, cultural and political development of the society. "' The Assembly has 
spoken of the importance of ensuring respect for human rights in enhancing peace, stability 
and development, with the necessity of promoting popular participation in the process of 
government and development in the context of a political atmosphere which guarantees human 
rights and the observance of the Rule of Law. 95 
" Kannyo in Welch and Meltzer (1984) pp. 129,138-139. See also Rarricharan (1992) p. 307. 
'9 Quoted in EI-Ayouty (1994) pp. 188-9. As with the United Nations this Opinion only represents the feelings of the 
SG and not the organisation as a whole. There is nothing in the OAU Charter that allows for the SG's initiatives to 
be 
institutionalised as he will have to rely on informal actions to achieve the most results. EI-Ayouty (1994) p. 184. 
90 See L. Garber. 'The OAU and Elections. ' 4 Joumal qfDemocracy (1993) pp. 55-59. The ability of the OAU to be 
more active in elections is undoubtedly tied to the issue of resources. In the 1997 elections in Liberia the 
OAU was 
only able to send 15 peoples observers, whereas a single NGO from the US sent 40, Panaffican 
News Agency. 'OAU 
to Observee Liberian Polls. ' (13 July 1997). 
9' Garber (1993) p. 55. 
" EI-Ayouty (1994) p. 182. 
9' Declaration of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU on the 
Political and Socio-Economic 
Situation in Affica and the Fundamental Changes Taking Place in the World. Addis 
Ababa, July, 1990. 
" 'Resolution on the Affican Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights. ' Assembly of 
Heads of State and 
Governments, 29tb Ordinary Session, 1993. 
9' 'Resolution on the Affican Commission on Human and Peoples Rights. 
' Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government, 28th Ordinary Session, 1992. 
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While the OAU is slowly becoming '[a]ware of the fact that people have a fundamental 
right to participate fully in the making of policy decisions wl-lich affect their fives at all levels"' 
very little substantive action has been taken to turn the rhetoric into practice. For the OAU to 
provide effective protection for democracy and human rights it will be up to the member states 
to themselves take on commitments to democracy and human rights in their domestic 
settings. " As there is a rise in calls for wide based participation in the development of the 
region it is hoped the OAU will reconsider the position of sovereignty and non-intervention 
allowing for the effective implementation of agreements. " Change will come slow to the 
OAU, as one author has noted '[t]he world has completely changed, since 1989; the OAU has 
not, since 1963. '99 The OAU could follow a similar development to that of the OAS whereby 
support for democracy and human rights in member states was rare but due to the persistence 
of various bodies of the organisation concerned with democracy and human rights both 
members tates and the organisation began to accept the importance of democracy and hurnan 
rights beyond the rhetoric. '00 For that to happen the OAU will need to overhaul its institutional 
arrangements for conducting its activities and resolving disputes as informal arrangements to 
solve problems instead of using Charter machinery which has proven ineffective. "' 
B. AFPJCAN CommissioN oN HumAN AND PEOPLES'RIGHTS 
The onerous task of ensuring governments meet their obligations under the ACHPR has 
been entrusted to a single body in the Affican Commission. All but two states of the region 
have ratified the document but little effort has been made to incorporate the provisions into the 
domestic codes preventing the individual from directly invoking the Charter when protection 
is necessary. Umozurike argues that there is a minimum requirement of implementation of the 
rights in the Charter"' but ensuring compliance means overcoming ideological prejudices and 
the historical nature of the continent, African social structures, and conflicts regarding the 
9' 'Resolution on the African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation. 
' Council of 
Ministers, 52nd Ordinary Session, Addis Ababa July 1990, preamble para. 3, reprinted in 2 RADIC (1990) p. 669. 
9' Mulei (1994) p. 72. A point raised by an official from Angola Pointing to the absence of a democratic culture in 
Affica as contributing to many of the regions problems, Panaffican News Agency. 'Absence of 
Democratic Culture 
Underrnines the OAU. ' (26 May 1998). 
9' EI-Ayouty (1994) p. 189. 
99 EI-Ayouty (1994) p. 179. 
'00 Garber (1993) pp. 5 8-9. 
'0' EI-Ayouty (1994) p. 185. There are currently plans underway for a restructuring of the OAU that will take 
two 
years to implement, Panafrican News Agency. 'Scheme for Restructuring OAU Secretariat 
Adopted-' (23 March 
1999). 
'0' Umozurike (1997) p. 4. 
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visions of the universe and the organisation of the world. 103 Mbaya remarks that the ACHPR 
provides the possibility for creating a solid legal foundation for the protection and promotion 
of democracy and human rights and the task of developing these possibilities he with the 
African Commission. "' The creation of the African Commission experienced a similar 
development process as the AC1HPR as human rights activists wanted a body capable of 
enforcing human rights principles, with even some calling for a court. Govemments were, 
however, reluctant to create a body able to scrutinise their behaviour. "' 
The African Commission was created as a body within the OAU 'to promote human and 
peoples' rights and ensure their protection in Africa. "" The Cornmission's position from the 
start has been opaque since it is originally a creation of the ACIFIPR meaning its mandate is 
confined to the provisions of that document and to those states that have duly ratified it. 
Article 30, however, creates the Commission as a body of the OAU with the task of promoting 
and protecting rights in Afiica as a whole. As it stands, with the wide ratification of the 
ACHPF, this point is a secondary issue but could have easily led to confusion as to the role of 
the Commission. 'O' Under its mandate the Commission possesses three tasks 
- 
promoting 
hurnan rights Africa, receiving communications concerning violations of the Charter, and 
maintaining a reporting procedure by states parties. "' in undertaking its duties the 
Commission is able to utilise any method of investigation and may hear from any person 
capable of erilightening it. "' Articles 60 and 61 allow the Commission to draw inspiration 
from, or take into consideration, a wide variety of international hw-nan rights instruments 
beyond the ACI-IPR. 
The Commission has been most active in its promotional activities and has generated 
some positive successes directly due to its work. "O The Commissioners individually 
undertake the bulk of the Comniission's promotional activities with the sheer size of Affica 
'0' Nguema (1990) 263. It has been noted that Affica has certainly had it problems in developing human rights but 
Europe and the Americas have gone through similar periods, see Mulei (1994) p. 56. 
104Mbaya in Alfredsson and Macalister-SM]th, eds. (1996) feels it is through its confirmation of other international 
human rights instruments which make it a real instrument in achieving the freedom and development of the 
individual, expressing a will to support and protect rights, p. 68. 
"' On the history of the Commission see Bello (1985) p. 36. 
'O'ACHPR, Article 30. 
"' Rules of Procedures of the Aftan Commission (1995) Rule 102 (2) limits communications only to those 
concerning states party to the Charter. See C. Odinkalu and C. Cluistensen. 'The African 
Comniiission on Human 
and Peoples' Rights: The Development of Its Non-State Communication Procedures. ' 20 
Human Rights QuarterlY 
(1998) pp. 23 6-7 
'0' ACHPR, Article 45 details the mandate of the Commission. See E. Bello. 'Tbe Mandate of the 
Aftican 
Commission on Human and Peoples Rights. ' I Aljican Journal ofInternational Lau, (1988) p. 
31. 
'09 ACHPR, Article 46. 
"0 See Ankumah (1996) on how a visit by Umozunke to Ghana resulted in the creation of the 
NGO Ghana 
Committee on Human and Peoples' Rights, p. 2 1. 
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and the existence of only eleven commissioners limiting their ability to promote the 
ACB: PR. "' The state reporting procedure under the Charter is considered pail of the 
promotional work of the Commission. ' 12 The Commissioners have been split over the nature 
and purpose of the state reports with some seeing it as a means of verifying adherence to the 
ACIIPR and others viewing the procedure as only a means of ensuring implementation 
without passing judgment on the actual compliance of states. "' The Commission has taken 
great efforts to improve the reporting procedure"' but states have still failed to take their 
obligation in this regard seriously undemiffiffig the effectiveness of the procedure. "' 
Regarding the protective ftinctions, of the Commission the ACBPR provides for two 
communication procedures concerning violations; one involving inter-state communications 
and the other dealing with communications from groups and individuals. The inter-state 
complaint procedure, which has not been used to date, involves the Commission trying to 
reach a amicable solution to the dispute before referring the matter to the Assembly. "' The 
procedures for other communications allows any interested party, individuals, groups or NGOs 
to lodge a complaint with the Commission concerning the actions of a state party which may 
violate the Charter. "' IAThile in essence any interested party may petition the Commission the 
admissibility of the communication faces a rather more restrictive treatment than other hurnan 
rights systems. "' Upon receipt of a communication if information requested from a state party 
is not received the Commission may come to a decision based on the facts provided in the 
original complaint. "' This has allowed the Commission to be more active in undertaking its 
role instead of being kept paralysed by the inaction or inability of states to co-operate. Once 
the Commission comes to a decision on a communication it forwards the decision to the 
Assembly who is then responsible for taking any action based upon the Commission's 
findings. 
To date the Conunission has been reluctant in its pronouncements and resolutions to 
elaborate upon the content and meaning of many of the articles in the ACBPR. Decisions and 
Ankurnah (1996) also points out that the Conunissioners usually limit themselves to visiting large urban areas and 
educational institutes, p. 2 1. 
1995 Rules ofProcedure, Chapter XV. 
13 Afiican Commission Report (1993) p. I Anyangwe (1998) pp. 637-642. 
114 Reference to Resolution on Subrrýtting reports 
"' See Welch in EI-Ayouty (1994) pp. 65-6. At the 9th Ordinary Session of the Commission only ninety minutes 
was given to the examination of three initial reports. 
"6 ACHPR, Articles 47-54. 
117 Ankurnah (1996) pp. 52-53; Odinkalu and Christensen (1998) pp. 250-252. 
"' ACHPR, Article 56. Umozurike (1997) expresses the opinion that individual communications come under a good 
deal of unnecessary scrutiny, pp. 75-76. 
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comments by the Commission concerning state reports and individual complaints are typically 
brief with little explanation or reasoning provided. Through its resolutions the Commission 
has spoken of the importance of democracy as a principle itself and its contribution to the 
promotion and protection of human rights. The Commission has affirmed 'that the best 
government is one elected by, and accountable to the people' and that the forcible take over of 
government violates Articles 13 (1) and 20 (1). "' In a resolution on Nigeria... the 
Commission stated its belief 'that the restoration of democracy in Nigeria will be a positive 
step in African development' and called upon the government to allow free participation in 
government and elections. Concerning the military take-over in the Gambia, the Commission 
expressed 'that all governments should be based on the consent of the people freely expressed 
by them and through their chosen representatives and that a military government is a clear 
violation of this fundamental principle of democracy', and that military rule 'is a clear setback 
to the cause of democracy and democratic development in the Gambia and Aftica 
generally'. "' In its 'Resolution on the Hurnan Rights Situation in Affica"" the Commission 
expressed alarm at the resurgence of illegal seizures of government, condemning the seizure of 
power by undemocratic means and called upon 'all African Governments to ensure that 
elections and electoral processes are transparent and fair'. In a resolution on education"' the 
Commission acknowledged the importance of education in the effective implementation of the 
ACBPR and that education related to democracy and human fights should involve every organ 
of society. The resolution welcomes effort to ftirther education of democracy and human 
rights underlining 'the importance of education as an active vehicle of inculcating the values 
and corresponding behaviours in civil society based on full respect for human and peoples' 
rights, democracy, tolerance andjustice. ' 
Specifically concerning participation rights, in reviewing tile report of Togo, the 
Commission found it disturbing that Togo claimed the Tight to participation under Article 13 
of the ACBPR could not be guaranteed to all in developing countries. The Conunission did 
not elaborate on its concern only requesting further clarification of the statement. "' fn 
"' See Odinkalu and Christensen (1998) who note that the Commission often gives longer than the stated three 
months, p. 250. 
120 'Resolution on the Military. ' 16th Ordinary Session, 1994. 
121 'Resolution on Nigeria. ' 16th Ordinary Session, 1994. 
122 'Resolution on the Gambia. ' 16th Ordinary Session 1994. 
"' l6th Ordinary Session, 1994. 
121 'Draft Resolution on Human and Peoples' Rights Education. ' 14th Ordinary Session, 1993. 
Resolution on the 
Affican Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, AIHG-/Res. 227(XXIX), published in the Commission's 
6th 
Annual Activity Report, 1992-1993 
125 Initial Report on Togo. 13 Aftan Commission RepoH (1993) p. 13. 
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Katangese Peoples' Congress v. Zaire126 a Communication was submitted calling for the 
recognition of the right of self-determination for the region of Katanga based on Article 20(l) 
of the ACBPR. The Commission stated that '[a]ll peoples have a right to self-determination. 
There may however be controversy as to the definition of peoples and the content of the right. ' 
It went on to say that the exercise of self-deteniiination may vary but must accord with the 
wishes of the people. In this case the Comrnission decided that there had been no violation of 
since there was no evidence of violations of other human rights including Article 13 (1). The 
Commission's statement demonstrates the need for self-determination to contain an internal 
element of continual participation but the Commission's reasoning expressed that self- 
detenuination may occur but only when 'fully cognisant of other recognised principles such as 
sovereignty and territorial integrity' which the Commission is 'obhged to uphold'. The 
Commission finds itself locked in the indeterminacy of the international legal argunient 
proclaiming a right but qualifýing it based on state interests. 
Since its inception the Commission has progressively enhanced its role within existing 
structures and against competing attitudes to slowly develop as a body able to ftuther the 
promotion and protection of human rights in Africa. "' A significant restraint the Comnuission 
has eliminated was the requirements of confidentiality of its proceedings"' that have been 
described as 'unnecessarily restrictive. "'9 By making its own operations more public the 
Commission is able to disseminate information about human rights to the wider public of 
Africa, making individuals aware of its work. "' 
The Commission remains caught in a limiting institutional and practical relation with the 
Assembly, as it is reliant upon the body for its budget, for the publishing of its reports and for 
taking the final decision on the findings of the Conunission. Commentators have described 
this reliance as making the Commission a sub-committee of Assembly with no independent 
authority that has a substantial effect on the ability of the Commission to exercise its 
126 Eighth Annual Activity Report of the Affican Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, 1994-1995, Thirty- 
first Ordinary Session (26 
- 
28 June 1995). 
121 Welch in El-Ayouty (1994) p. 70; Umozun'ke (1997) p. 72 he also remarks this has caused the Commission to 
take a low profile in its work, p. 29. 
128 Under the original 1988 Rules of Procedure, Rule 32 stated the Commission's proceedings are to 
be held in 
camera, with Rule 33 providing for the Commission to issue a communique at the end of its session through 
the SG 
of the OAU. In the 1995 Rules of Procedure, Rule 32 now reads that the Commission's session shall 
be held in 
Public unless it is necessary to hold private meetings and Rule 33 allows the Commission itself 
to issue a 
communique at the end of its sessions. 
129 W. Benedek. 'The Ninth Session of the Affican Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights. ' 12 
Human Rights 
Law Journal ( 199 1) p. 217. 
130 1995 Rules ofProcedure, Rules 107 and 108. Also Welch in El-Ayouty (1994) p. 67. 
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ftinctions. "' Weston has suggested that the close ties to the Assembly, as the leading body of 
the OAU, gives the Commissions work an added degree of significance when action is 
taken. 112 This is unrealistic as the work of the Commission will often come *in direct conflict 
with the members of the Assembly making the pressure upon the Commission to conform 
with the Assembly's wishes immense. "' There is a definite need for the Commission to 
distance itself from the Assembly in order to eliminate the political pressure and become more 
autonomous. The restrictive conditions that have been placed upon the Commission are more 
in line with the preservation of state interests then for providing an adequate remedy to 
individuals concerning violations of the Charter. "' 
Regardless of its drawbacks and limitations the existence of the Commission as a body 
capable of guaranteeing that the principles contained in the ACBPR are respected is significant 
for the region. "' The mere presence of the Commission is a direct challenge to the reluctance 
of the governments to respect human rights and brings into question the sanctity of non- 
intervention into domestic affairs as a legal principal guiding African affairs. "' The 
Commission represents a possibility but has not yet fully developed itself bring into question 
its ability to provide any form of effective protection of human rights when violations of the 
Charter occur or even if the Commission is in a position to act upon the communications its 
receives. "' Due to its lack of substantive impact the Commission has been called 'a toothless 
figer', but one which has been able to legitimise the human rights debate in Africa with the 
potential of increasing the prospect of Afficans themselves taking steps to prevent hurnan 
rights abuses. "' The ability of the Commission to bring the human rights debate into a 
wide public forurn in Africa is significant for the fature. The ability of the Commission to 
move beyond discussion to effective action is limited by its own institutional structure and 
resource factors that hinder the work of all African institutions. Much of the efficacy of the 
Commission relies on the efforts of the individual Commissioners and how they utilise the 
"' Gittleman (1982) pp. 712-713; B. Weston et al., 'Regional Human Rights Regimes: A Comparison and 
Appraisal. ' 20 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law (1987) pp. 622-623. 
112 Weston et al. (1987) pp. 613-614. 
"' See Odinkalu and Christensen (1998) pp. 278-80. The Comrnission's tendency to lean towards state concerns 
over those of individuals is shown by the way in which time frames are set for communications with states receiving 
the greatest leeway. 
134 Kodjo (1990) p. 280. 
Bello (1985) p. 35. 
Welch in EI-Ayouty (1994) p. 53. 
"' Umozurike (1983) pp. 911-12. The point has been raised that in the present framework of the 
Charter the ability 
of the Commission to achieve an amicable settlement in all cases is the best that can 
be expected and should therefore 
not be expected to take on the role of ajudicial body, see Umozunke (1997) p. 79. On 
how the Comrmssion is not 
always effective in achieving this modest goal, see Odinkalu and Christensen 
(1998) pp. 244-247; Nwankwo (1993) 
p. 53. 
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ambiguous and sometimes confusing institutional framework. "9 The persistence of the 
Commissioners and the creation of a human rights court will assist the Commission's efforts at 
strengthening democracy and human rights M the region. In the end the prevailing political, 
social, and economic conditions of Aftica, will determine the Commission's ability to make an 
iMpaCt. 140 
C AFRICAN COURT ONHLTAMNAND PEOPLEVRIGHTS 141 
The existence of the Conin-lission as the sole supervisory body under the ACHPR was due 
to the fact that few governments would accept a judicial body able to pass judgement on their 
behaviour. "' The absence of a human rights court has also been explained due to Aftican 
traditions that do not include confrontational judicial procedures but are more in tune with co- 
operative conciliatory procedures in resolving conflict. "' The situation has now changed as 
the Assembly has adopted the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights 
on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights (1998). Under the 
terms of the Protocol the Court is to be a body of the OAU complementing the protective side 
of the Commission's work, recognising that the Commission has only been just able to fulfil 
its role as a promoter and unable to take on the role as protector. 144 
See Hyden in Cohen et al. (1993) p. 264. 
Umozurike (1997) p. 83. See the Commission's guidelines on state reports and the extra additions they require. 'A 
basis thus exists for much more vigorous action on economic and social tights by the Commission than is laid Out in 
the Charter', Oloka-Onyango, (1995) p. 54. 
140 Neff (1984) p. 346. Also Oloka-Onyango (1995) who feels the Commission has failed in a more active 
interpretation of economic and social rights under the Charter due to political considerations, p. 56. 
"' See Government Legal Experts Meeting on the Question of the Establishment of An African Court of Human and 
Peoples' Rights (6-12 September 1995) Cape Town South Affica. (OAU/LEG/EXP/AFC/HPR (1)) 8 R, 4DIC (1996) 
p. 493 (Cape Town Draft); Second Government Legal Experts Meeting on the Question of the Establishment of An 
Affican Court of Human and Peoples' Rights (11-14 April 1997) Nouakchott, Mauritania. 
(OAU/LEG/EXP/AFC/HPR/RPT (2)) 9 RADIC (1997) p. 423 (Nouakchott Meeting); Draft Protocol to the Affican 
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an Affican Court of Human and Peoples' Rights. 
(OAU/LEG/EXP/AFC/HPR/PROT (111)). 9 RADIC (1997) p. 953 (Addis Ababa Draft); H. Boukrif 'La Cour 
Afficaine des Droits de L'Homme et des Peuples: Un Organe Judiciaire au Service des Droits de L'Homme et des 
Peuples en Affique. ' 10 RADIC (1998) p. 60 
"' 0. Gye-Wado. 'A Comparative Analysis of the Institutional Framework for the Enforcement of Human Rights in 
Affican and Western Europe. ' 2 RADIC (1990) p. 193. 
143 This does not explain the calls for the creation of a court at the Law of Lagos conference and the existence of court 
systems in domestic systems. The emphasis on conciliation and negotiation is partly due to African traditions and is 
beneficial to legal development but it also shows the unwillingness of governments to expose themselves to a 
legally 
binding judgement. C. Flinterman and E. Ankumah. 'The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. 
' in H. 
Hannum, ed. Guide to International Human Rights Practice, 2nd ed. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 
1992)p. 162. 
... Addis Ababa Draft, Preamble, paragrapah 4, Articles I and 2. Opinions of Isaac Nguema, Chain-nan of the 
AfTican 
Commission and Ould Kbalifa, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Co-operation , Mauritania, see 
Nouakchott Meeting, 
p. 424. Also Addis Abbaba Draft, paragraphs 8. 
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The court is to have eleven judges taken from the member states of the OAU as elected by 
the Assembly. 14' By Article 3 the jurisdiction of the Court extends to all cases submitted to it 
concerning the application and interpretation of the Charter, the Protocol 'and any other 
pertinent human rights instrument ratified by the States concerned' 
. 
14' This provides the Court 
with a potentially wide jurisdiction as shared by the Commission. 147 
Access to the court was a contested issue with original proposals giving states premiere 
access with access for individuals and groups limited to 'exceptional' circumstances. "' it was 
discussed at the Nouakchott Meeting that by giving preferential access to governments and 
excluding individuals the Court would not be able to address the needs of individuals. 
Delegates pointed out that states had never used the Commission for complaints and it would 
make no sense to give them exclusive access to the Court. They stressed the fact that it was 
individuals and NGOs who made use of the Commission and it was for them that the Court 
was needed. The result is the present Article 5 wl-iich allows the Commission, a State Party 
which has lodged a complaint to the Commission, a State Party against whom a complaint has 
been lodged with the Commission, a State Party whose citizen is a victim of a human rights 
violation, relevant NGOs with observer status before the Commission, and individuals to 
institute cases directly before it. "' Access for individuals and groups is subject to a separate 
declaration by states under Article 34 (6) accepting the Court's jurisdiction in this area. By 
having individual petitions subject to special declarations the Protocol follows the practice of 
the lCCPR and the ECHR and brings into question the purpose of the Court in providing 
effective protection for individuals. There will most likely be a great deal of reluctance on the 
behalf of African governments to accept the individual jurisdiction meaning the Court will not 
14' Articles II and 14 (1). The independence of the judges is based on international law (article 17 (1)) and a number 
of measures were adopted to ensure that the judges remain independent throughout the functioning of their duties. 
Addis Ababa Draft, Articles 16-19. It is also worth noting that it is up to the Court itself to decide on the ability of a 
judge to carry out their duties but that it is possible for the OAU Assembly to override the decision and remove a 
judge (Article 19 (2)). The independence of judges is important in the Affican context as few domestic judges are 
immune from pressure from government executives, see Ankurnah (1996) p. 125. Recently, the independence of 
Commissioners has been brought into question as a number also hold government positions, see Murray 
(1998) pp. 
21-22. Also Oloka-Onyango (1995) discusses the problems concerning the independence of the judges for the 
proposed court ofj ustice for the African Economic Community, p. 59 note 40 1. 
116 Addis Ababa Draft. 
Article 3 (2) Addis Ababa Draft leaves the matter of settling jurisdiction to the Court an essential element for its 
effectiveness, see G. Naldi and K. Magliveras. 'The Proposed Affican Court of 
Human and Peoples' Rights: 
Evaluation and Comparison. ' 8 RADIC (1996) pp. 947-8. Tunisia put forth a proposal making the jurisdiction of 
the 
Court to be subject to a declaration of acceptance by individual state parties, but this was 
disnussed as being 
unreasonable, Nouakchott Meeting, p. 427. 
Cape Town Draft, Articles 5 and 6. 
Addis Ababa Draft, Article 5 (1) a-d. 
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be seeing very many cases unless the Commission can somehow become very pro-active in 
this area. 150 
In the exercise of its contentious functions the Court has also been given the competence 
of trying to reach an amicable settlement in a case before it, a function similar to that of the 
Commission. The inclusion of this role has been criticised for copying the function of the 
Commission and creating unnecessary overlap. 151 There is the distinct possibility of overlap 
especially considering the fact that parties may petition the Court directly. On the other hand if 
the use of non-justiciable methods for solving disputes is part of the African tradition a 
combination of methods could prove to be more conducive to participation in the Court's 
activities for both states and individuals. 15' The Court is also to have an advisory fimction 
through Article 4 concerning 'any legal matter relating to the Charter or any other relevant 
human rights instruments ratified by the States. ' Once the Court reaches a decision in either 
its contentious or advisory role it will notify the parties involved and the member states of the 
OAU with the Council of Ministers given the task, on the behalf of the Assembly, of 
monitoring the execution of the judgement. 153 States parties to the Protocol agree to comply 
with the Court's judgment in any case in which they are involved and to guarantee execution 
of the judgment but outside of the role of the Council of Ministers it is not clear how the Court 
will ensure its judgements are carried out. 154 
The Protocol will come into force once fifteen states have deposited the appropriate 
ratifications. "' The number needed for ratification was sub ect to intense debate With many 
favouring a much higher nurnber before the Protocol enters into force. At the Nouakchott 
Meeting, Tunisia and Algeria called for two-thirds of all OAU members to ratify, whereas 
Nigeria wanted a simple majority of the OAU members. The apparent logic for basing 
ratification on OAU membership and not parties to the ACBPR was based on the fact that the 
OAU would be financing the workings of the Court. "' By insisting on a high number of 
ratifications governments were openly trying to create fin-ther obstacles to effective human 
rights protection and demonstrating a lack of resolve in actually seeing a court created. The 
success of the Court will depend upon the support given to it by the OAU and its bodies, the 
1 11 1. ing access to the "0 It is hoped that the Court will take a broad interpretation of the adn-: iissibility requirements in gain 
Court, see Naldi and Magliveras (1996) pp. 953-4. 
"' Article 9. Also Nouakchott Meeting, p. 427-8. 
112 Umozurike (1997) pp. 92-3. Mulei (1994) p. 69. 
Addis Ababa Draft, Article 29. 
154 See Nald] and Magliveras (1996) as to how this differs from the other regional courts, pp. 
963-5. 
155 Addis Ababa Draft, Article 34. There are presently 30 signatories and 2 ratifications. 
116 EI-Sheikh (1997) p. 950. 
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attitudes of states and its acceptance in civil society. 157 From the outset, support for the Court 
has been minimal as governments failed to submit comments on the Protocol when 
requested. 151 Representation at the drafting meetings was sparse with only 19 states 
participating at the Nouakchott Meeting that came up with the final wording of the Protocol, 151 
and only 28 in attendance at the 34hSummit which adopted the Protocol. There is no doubt 
that the Protocol establishing the Court is far from perfect and as with any regional Court 
, 
it 
will have problems getting itself established both in terms of support and resources. "' As with 
the ACHPR the terms of the Protocol have not been as strong as hoped in order to obtain 
ratification from states. "' The Court will have the opportunity to develop its role from the 
outset and it is hoped that the pitfalls of the Commission will be avoided and the Court will be 
more effective from the outset. ' 62 While much depends upon the members of the Court in 
establishing themselves, as with the Commission they Will face a number of significant 
obstacles beyond their control in ensuring the effective promotion and protection of democracy 
and human rights in Africa. 
IV. OBSTACLES TO TtIE PROTECTION AND PROMOTION OF DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN AFRICA 
The attitudes and behaviour of the western world towards Africa, both during colonialism 
and since, have significantly impacted the difficulties Africa faces. At the same time, a great 
number of Africa's ills can be attributed, on a case by case basis, to the actions of individual 
leaders taking the region into its present situation. "' These individuals alone are not the only 
reason for Affica's problems but the detrimental impact of those who have abused power 
within Affica is recognised as a major contributor to the continent's ills. When democracy and 
human rights are offered as contributions to possible solutions to Africa's problems criticisms 
arise that these are principles not applicable to African societies, or that the solutions offered 
are colonialism in another disguise. What these criticisms have been unable to eliminate is the 
"' El-Sheikh (1997) pp. 951-952. Nald, and Magliveras (1996) place the onus on the international community 
for 
ensuring the Court has the necessary resources to survive, p. 954. 
Naldi and Magliveras (1996) p. 969. 
Nouakchott Meeting, p. 423. 
"0 There are currently plans for two other courts under economic treaties which 
have in their mandate the protection 
of democracy and human rights, see The Treaty Establishing the African Economic 
Community, 3 PUDIC (199 1) P. 
792, and The Treaty of the Southern Affican Development Community 5 RADIC 
(1993) p. 418. 
"' Naldi and Magliveras (1996) p. 944; Anyangwe (1998) p. 626. 
"' The details of the working of the Court are to be established when the 
body adopts its own Rules of Procedure 
which is to be done in co-operation with the Commission, Articles 8 and 
33.1. EI-Sheikh. 'Draft Protocol to the 
Affican Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an 
Affican Court on Human and Peoples 
Rights: Introductory Note. ' 9 RADIC (1997) p. 95 1. 
163 See generally Mulei (1994) and Umozunke (1997). 
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continual call by Africans to participate in their own self-detemiination. and that of their 
societies, however defined. Democracy and human rights will not automatically end the 
continual underdevelopment of the region. At the same time, it is up to opponents to explain 
how the persistent exclusion of the majority of society is beneficial to the long-term interests of 
the region. As discussed in Chapter 3 the emphasis on various aspects of good governance 
continually return to the necessity of wide-based and active pailicipation by society. 
Increasing participation in the future development of democracy and human rights in Affica 
faces a number of obstacles including but not limited to, the issue of applicability of principles 
of democracy and human rights as universal ideals, the existence of authoritarian regimes and 
socio-economic underdevelopment. 
A. CuLTuRE AND APPLic4mLiTy 
African leaders have continually rejected democracy and hurnan rights as part of a larger 
rejection of western imperialism. "' During the dralffirig of the ACHPR the need for the 
document to be Aftican in nature was expressed, with 'being African in nature' never clearly 
defined but understood to mean that the ACHPR could not be like western legal instruments. 
Discussion and debate concerning the differences between African society and western society 
have been widespread and taken to extremes to claim that conceptions and practices of 
democracy and human rights cannot be similar in any way due to the inherent nature and 
evolution of the particular societies. Writers on the subject have provided varied accounts of 
the development of democracy and human rights in Aftican societies ranging from the 
romanticised. to the non-believers. "' In this debate there is a tendency to group all of sub- 
Saharan Aftica as one common society with all groups possessing a similar past, overlooking 
the diversity which exists within Affica. The historical development of African societies is 
essential for understanding systems of today but is must be kept in mind that democracy and 
hurnan rights are no more a naturally historical part of the European or American tradition then 
to the Affican tradition. "' Traditions of democracy and human rights both in practice and 
16' Nguema (1990) p. 264. 
165 Umozurike (1997) p. 12; For a sampling of these writers see C. Lancaster. 'Democracy in Africa. ' 85 Foreign 
Policy (1991) p. 149; J. Ojwang. 'Liberal Values in Affican Constitutional Development: Some Reflections. 
' 3 
Proceedings ofthe Afiican Society ofInternational Law (199 1) pp. 19-3 1; Ambrose (1995) pp. 1-4. 
166 See M. Ottaway 'Democratization in Collapsed States. ' in 1. Cartman, ed. Collapsed States. - The Disintegration 
and Restoration of Legitimate Authority. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995) p. 243; P. Chabal, 'A Few 
Considerations 
on Democracy in Afiica. ' 74 International Affairs (1998) p. 299. J. Liebenow. Afilcan Politics: Crises and 
Challenges. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986) pp. 46-47. 
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structures Will vary widely according to the Particular challenges a society faces. 167 The 
diversity of practices and structures need not be seen as right or wrong but instead should be 
approached as providing a more comprehensive handling of the issues involved. 168 Ideas of 
democracy, human rights and the rule of law all have a place in the Affican context since they 
are based on respect for the human being, something which all African societies aCCept. 169 
What Africa demonstrates is that the love of fteedorn is universal but so is the propensity to 
deny it to others. 170 
It is not expected that democracy and human rights in Aftica will mirror existing western 
systems. There will always be what has been termed 'the African Cultural Fingerprint' 
-a set 
of institutional and normative values governing the relation between individuals, society and 
nature that are unique to Africa. "' The idea of a cultural fingerprint is not confined to Africa 
as all regional systems recognise specific cultural beliefs and practices that influence the 
systems for the promotion and protection of democracy and human rights. The fingerprint is 
unique to each setting for it demonstrates a specific understanding of how democracy and 
human rights are perceived based on the universal recognition of the value of humanity. "' 
The concepts of peoples'rights, individual duties, emphasis on non-justiciable measures in 
dispute settlement, and anti-colonialism all give the ACBPR a unique African character. "' By 
creating and preserving laws and customs which are common to a specific society or groups of 
societies it is possible to create a system that is recognisable to whom it applies allowing those 
"' M. Haile. 'Human Rights, Stability and Development in Africa: Some Observations on Concept and Reality. ' 24 
Virginia Journal ofInternational Law (1984) pp. 584-585. The author goes on to state that the realisation of human 
rights in the West is not due to the philosophic tradition but to the economic and social changes which created 
favourable conditions for the realisation of human rights in an institutionalised fonn, p. 587. 
"' E. Siegert. 'Human Rights as a System. Interaction. Priorities. ' 3 Proceedings of the Aftican Society of 
International and Comparative Law (199 1) p. 114. In general see A. An-Na'IM, ed. Human Rights in Cross-Cultural 
Perspectives: A Quest For Consensus. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992); A. An-Na'im and F. 
Deng, eds. Human Rights in Africa: Cross-Cultural Perspectives. (Washington D. C: The Brookings Institution, 
1990). 
... N. Busia. 'The New World Order and its Implications for Human Rights and Democracy in Africa -A Critical 
Appraisal. ' 5 Proceedings ofthe Affican Society ofInternational and Comparative Law (1993) p. 93. 
"o L. Adegbite. 'African Attitudes to the International Protection of Human Rights. ' in A. Eide and A. Schou, eds. 
International Protection ofHuman Rights. (Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell, 1968) p. 69. 
... M. wa Mutua. 'The Banjul Charter and the African Cultural Fingerprint: An Evaluation of the Language of 
Duties. ' 35 Virginia Journal ofInternational Law (I 995b) p. 339. 
172 wa Mutua (1995b) pp. 348-352. By forwarding the idea of a cultural fingerprint we are generallsing common 
features for a region but in a manner which is not static or pre-determinative. Instead it allows 
for the inclusion of 
wide cultural practice based on associated world views. 
173 Umozurike (1997) pp. 87-96. The emphasis on culture and traditions in Charter are also seen as uniquely 
Affican 
but this inclusion has also been criticised on the basis that culture and tradition as 
dynan-uc concepts cannot be legally 
defined and 'traditional practices' have been linked with the poor treatment of individuals, see 
Nwankwo (1993) pp. 
51-52. 
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to whom the law apphes to feel part of the system, enhancing legitimacy for rules and 
processes. 
174 
In ftuthering a region's 'cultural fingerprint' it is not to be used as a basis for the complete 
rejection of 'other' systems or wider global ideas and practices. It is essential to establish an 
appropriate balance between universal values and regional/local applications making it 
necessary to look across cultures for understanding. "' There is also the need for co-operation 
among societies and groupings, for no one set of beliefs is superior. By looking to understand 
the differences between societies instead of condemning, the overall structure for the 
protection of the individual will benefit. It is possible to view the ideas of duties, group rights 
and non-justiciability as harmful to the protection of human rights. In certain cases this may 
hold true but to dismiss the validity of these concepts as effective for the individual merely 
because they do not have a precedent in other hw-nan rights system would be wrong. "' 
Systems for the promotion and protection of democracy and human rights are going to share 
common principles and institutional structures regardless of the cultural fingerprint of a 
particular region. This demonstrates the common existence of the value and worth of the 
individual. Differences between systems of protection also reflect the differing social realities 
individuals face. 
In the African context the acceptance of outside sources and beliefs as beneficial and not 
detrimental to Affican societies has been slow in coming. This is perhaps due to the behaviour 
of African leaders in the past who have exploited so-called 'African' beliefs or traditions in 
order to brutally repress their societies. A contributing factor to the rejection of outside ideas is 
the impact of the colonial period that imposed European values upon Africa resulting in 
widespread disillusionment and a loss of identity. During the colonial period, European or 
western ideas and practices were seen as better and right in comparison to Affican ideas and 
practices. Today there remains the tendency of donor nations and those outside Affica who are 
involved in democracy and human rights to triurnph their own brand of democracy and human 
rights without taking into account African perspectives and possibilities. The continuation of 
colonial mentalities is detrimental to the future of Africa making it necessary to resurrect 
Affican ideas of the individual and society which were discounted by colonialism, but 
in an 
174 A Lakishman. 'Traditional Concepts of Human Rights in Afiica. ' in Welch and Meltzer, p. 32. See the discussion 
of 'decisional distance' in Chapter I 
er regional 175 wa Mutua (1995b) p. 358. D'Sa (1987) claims the ACHPR. has much in common ith the oth 
conventions since it would have been imprudent to ignore internationally recognised 
human rights standards, p. 107. 
176 Benedik in Kunig, ed. (1985) p. 94. 
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expanded form combining universal conceptions with localised belief SySteMS. 177 AS 
Umozurike has observed, the development of democracy and human rights in Africa is 
dependent upon Aftican and non-African influences by 'following the universal trend while 
retaining Affican specificity arising from our history, traditions and circumstances. 5178 
B. CoLONL4LISM To A umoRimmmsm. 
- 
INDEPENDENcE To CoLLApsE 
Contempt for ideas and practices associated with Western society is no surprise given the 
detrimental impact of the colonial period and the destruction of the natural evolution of 
Aftican societies. "' It has been argued that colonialism did bring some positive benefits to 
Aftica, in terms of language, technology, etc., as colonial powers felt that they were acting for 
the good of Africa. "' Colonial rule, however enlightened or humanitarian it claimed to be, 
was by its nature authoritarian and an abuse of power as control was exercised through force 
and exclusion. "' In each case the coloniser implemented their own forin of govemance, legal 
systems and institutions for ordering of society under the claim that these systems were better 
than indigenous systems and would bring a better life for Afficans. "' It quickly became 
apparent that the use of these systems by the colonisers was not for the betterment of Afficans 
but for the preservation and advancement of European dominance. "' The rhetoric of the law 
was used by colonisers to portray progress when in reality it only brought wide-spread 
disillusionment as Africans realised they were not benefiting from the colonial presence. It 
became apparent that 'civilisation' meant degradation and the suppression of Afficans and 
Nguema (1990) pp. 264-268. Also Introduction, Welch and Meltzer. p. 8 
Umozurike speaking at the Opening of the 10' Session of the Afiican Commission, Banjul (8 October 1991) 
reprinted in Umozurike (1997) pp. 23 7-8. 
"' See J. Herbst. 'Responding to State Failure in Affica. ' 21 Intemational Security (1997) pp. 127-130. MacDen-not 
feels that a large reason for the lack of human rights adherence in certain states is that 'they have not had time to 
develop political and social systems adapted to their own traditions and needs. ' N. MacDermot. 'The Credibility Gap 
in Human Rights. ' 3 Dalhousie Law Journal (1976) pp. 266-7. 
"0 See C. Young. 'The African Colonial State Revisited. ' II Governance (1998) pp. 106-107. 
"' C. Young. 'Afiica: An Interim Balance Sheet. ' 7 Joumal of Democracy (1996) p. 55.. The extent of force and 
exclusion used varied depending upon the colonial power and the importance of the colony in question, see 
Liebenow (1986) pp. 27-37. 
182 Forms of control over colonies differed between the colonisers. The UK made the widest use of 
'indirect rule' as 
indigenous Afficans were supposedly given a degree of autonomy. The idea of indirect rule represents an example of 
the 'double gesture' discussed in Chapter 1. The work of Lugard demonstrates the emptiness of indirect rule as an 
effective means of self-determination for Afficans. He wrote how 'liberty and self-development can 
be best be 
secured to the native population by leaving them free to manage their own affairs', however this management 
of their 
own affairs could only occur under the laws and policy of the colonial administration, 
F. Lugard. The Dual Mandate 
in British Tropical Afiica. (Edinburgh, 1922) pp. 94-95. Fetter points out how management of the colonies Nvas 
based on the self-interested needs of the colomser which meant issues of econorrucs and 
finances determined to what 
extent Afficans were allowed by the colonisers to secure their own self-development, 
B. Fetter. Colonial Rule in 
, 
4fiica. 
- 
Readingsfrom Primary Sources. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1979) pp. 9-13. d bv 
"' UmozUnke (1997) believes that profits and territory were the primary motive for colonialism as 
demonstrate 
the administrative structures which were created to ensure the maximum exploitation 
of human and material 
resources and appropriation of people and territory, pp. 20-21. 
84 281 their ideas. ' The fact that the imposition of colonial rule did not provide tangible benefits In 
the governance of Africa is demonstrated by the legacy of authoritarian rule that folloNved 
independence. 18' The overall impact was to weaken the effectiveness of indigenous standards 
and traditional institutions by placing them as infýrior but without replacing them with new 
ideas that were able to respond to the needs and desires of Affica. ' 86 
At the decline of colonial rule some democratic refon-ns were instituted swiftly by the 
colonial powers with no transition period to self-rule. 111 The measures introducing self-rule for 
Africans were not democratic since it consisted of the imposition of a form of governance by 
the colonial powers that they felt would best serve the African societies. Large sectors of 
society, those who were most impacted by the changes were not involved in the decision- 
making process M determining the shape of governance. Since the people were excluded from 
the decision making process both during colonial rule and in the creation of independent states 
they felt no sort of allegiance to the colonial rulers or their systems perpetuating the feeling of 
disillusionment. "' In many cases the colonial system of governance and control was quickly 
adopted and used in the post-independence society, allowing powerful African leaders to 
replace colonial masters by similarly using force and exclusion to control society. "' The end 
of colonialism marked a new period in human rights development in African but not 
necessarily an improvement. The leaders of the liberation struggles who used the human 
rights struggle as a rallying cry against colonialism soon became authoritarian on a level equal 
to or worse than colonial leaders. This selective use of the rhetoric of democracy and human 
rights in the post-colonial period provides evidence of the continuing impact of colonialism as 
leaders have a powerful resistance to any significant political change and rely on the continual 
use of repression. "0 
During the independence movement autonomous widespread participation was not 
encouraged nor allowed as social movements were suppressed and activity was channelled 
"' See Hyden in Cohen et al (1993) p. 260. 
ervi in C. Bassiouni ... Oyugi et al p. 44. P. Manikas. 'Transitions to Democracy in Sub-Saharan Affica: An Ov 
and Z. Motala, eds. The Protection ofHuman Rights in AMcan Criminal Proceedings. (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1995)p. 372. 
"6C. Welch. 'Human Rights as a Problem in Contemporary Africa. ' in Welch and Meltzer, pp. 13-15. 
"' L. Diamond. 'The New Wind. ' 39 Aftica Report (1994) p. 50-54. The exception was Portugal ýN, ho linsfituted no 
democratic reforms. 
E. M'Bokolo. UNESCO Courier. p. 14; Hyden in Cohen et al (1993) p. 26 1. 
'Coercion, and not consent, was the prevalent mode of political rule and political change in post-independence 
Affica 
... 
' ShiNji (1995) p. 147. Also R. van Eijk. 'The United Nations and the Reconstruction of Collapsed States in 
Aftica. ' 9 RADIC (1997) pp. 574-575. EI-Ayouty (1994) p. 188; Young (1998) p. 108-111. 
'90 J. Kraus. 'Building Democracy in Africa. ' 90 Current History (1991) p. 212; K. Good. 'Accountable to 
Themselves: Predominance in Southern Affica. " 35 Journal ofModern Aftican Stu&es (1997) p. 547. 
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into the single cause of achieving independence. "' Once independence was achieved, wide- 
based participation was still discouraged and repression was justified as necessary to eliminate 
political elements who threatened the newly established states. '92 Unity was seen as the 
ultimate goal and this unity was defined by controlling elites who viewed any opposing ideas 
as seditious. '9' All energy was channelled into a single party line or ideology and the one- 
party state became an almost regional norm in Africa by the 1980s, expressed as necessary to 
achieve national unity. "' The creators of one-party- states claimed they held full respect for 
democracy and human rights but more and more this idea is being brought into question. "' In 
theory the one-party state could be seen as compatible with democracy and human rights if all 
members of the electorate have equal access, change is possible in the party and the 
government and the needs and desires of individuals may be freely expressed and are acted 
upon by leaders. ' 9' 
Regardless of the institutional set-up of a one-party- system the possibility of abuse is 
always there. If leaders are unwilling to allow for change through a peaceful process which 
may remove the exclusive control of the party the right of participation is denied and other 
rights are not respected. "' In practice the one-party state has been unable to provide a fair and 
just system of governance as the method of rule is often harsh, arbitrary and authoritarian. 
Respect for human rights and democracy only occurs to the extent that it matches the party's 
goals. "' By its very nature the one-party state violates the right to participate freely in 
governance as it denies the right of free association and assembly and prevents the free 
expression of and dissemination of information. "' Under a system of one-party rule the role 
of government becomes subordinate to the party or leading group resulting in exclusionary 
practices and coercion to eliminate any opposition and push forward the goals of the rulers. '00 
"' M. Mamdani. 'Africa: Democratic Theory and Democratic Struggle. ' 39 Dissent (1992) p. 313. 
192 B. Kelso. 'A Sorry Record. ' 39 Africa Repoil (1994) pp. 60-61. 
'9' M. Robinson. 'Aid, Democracy and Political Conditionality. ' in G. Sorenson, ed. Political Conditionality. 
(London: Frank Cass, 1993) pp. 86-87; Liebenow (1986) pp. 40-55. 
19' A. Babu. 'Human Rights and the One-Party State in Affica. ' 2 Netherlands Quar-terly of Human Rights (1989) p. 
188. 
'9' Julius Nyerere, who is seen as the creator of the one-party and its biggest defender, has called 
for the Idea to be 
reconsidered, see J. Quigley. 'Perestroika African Style: One-Party Government and Human Rights in 
Tanzania. ' 13 
Michigan Journal ofInternational Law (1992) pp. 611-612. 
'9' J. Milimo. 'Multiparty Democracy in Affica: Lessons From Zambia. ' 10 Intemational Joumal on World Peace 
(1993) p. 40. 
'9' Quigley (1992) pp. 624-625,646-647. 
"' B. Wanda. 'The One-Party State and the Protection of Human Rights in Africa with Particular 
Reference to 
Political Rights. ' 3 RADIC (199 1) p. 770. 
"9 Wanda (199 1) pp. 758-759,766. 
"0 See Haynes (199 1) generally on Ghana. 
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The end result is inefficient government as policies become unworkable and irrelevant to the 
211 
people as the ability to influence and choose is limited. 
Another detrimental influence on democracy and human rights is the cycle of violence and 
repression created by the frequency of military forms of rule in Africa. "' As with other parts 
of the world, military involvement in political affairs has been widely justified as the best way 
forward for a society. "' In practice military regimes are not conducive to widespread 
participation or dynamic change, as they possess a stubborn belief that their policies are the 
only the only correct ones and must be followed as orders to be carried out. The instability 
caused by rnIlitary participation in politics has impacted Africa in a similar fashion as Latin 
America and there remains the problem of what to do with the continued presence of the 
military after the creation of civilian government. "' Military influence is on the decline as a 
nwnber of states are attempting to consolidate civilian governments. "' The UN Secretary- 
General Koffi Annan has commented in the African context that there is the accepted view 
'that military coups against democratically elected Governments by self-appointed juntas are 
not acceptable has become an established norm. "" The OAU and the Affican Commission 
have likewise spoken out against the inappropriateness of military involvement *in 
govemment. 'O' However the continued existence of war within and between Affican states 
means that the military still has a major role in African politics which stresses the need for 
continued vigilance in this area. "' 
The end of one-party systems and military regimes and the creation of multi-party 
structures have not automatically brought positive results to African societies lending support 
to arguments that multi-party systems exacerbate societal tensions and bring violence, showing 
'0' Babu (1989) p. 190. Shivji (1995) discusses a poll taken in Tanzania in 1991 where 78% percent of the rural 
population favoured the continuation of the one-PartY system but also demanded change in the set-up and structure of 
the system so that it was more responsive and allowed for wider participation, pp. 161-162. 
'0' R. Joseph. 'Africa, 1990-1997: From Abertura to Closure. ' 9 Journal of Democracy (1998) pp. 8-10. On the 
military in Affican politics see S. Decalo. Coups and Army Rule in Afiica: Studies in Military Style. (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1976); R. First. The Barrel of a Gun: Political Power in Africa and the Coup dIat. (London: 
Penguin, 1970); J. Harbeson. The Military in Aftican Politics. (New York: Praeger, 1987). 
'0' Manikas in Bassiouni and Motala (1995) points out the military has not only overthrown democratic governments 
but also one-party states, and other military regimes, p. 377-378 
104 N. Chazan et al. Politics and Society in Contemporary Afiica. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992) p. 66. 
'0' Nigeria is the most obvious examples but it remains to be seen to what extent it is successfill 
in the long-term. 
206Report of the Secretary General on the Work of the Organization. GAOR 52 nd Sess., Supp. 
No. 1 (A/52/1). 
'0' PanAfrican News Agency. 'OAU Draws Measures To Deal with Military Coups. ' (30 May 1997). African 
Commission 'Resolution on the Military. ' l6th Ordinary Session, 1994. 
201 While the end of military rule in Nigeria is a positive step away from the involvement of 
the mi 
i 
litary in politics 
events in Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, Niger, the Congo, and the Comoros all demonstrate 
the military remains an 
active factor in the growth of democracy, see 'West African Bloc Tackles the Flurry of 
Coups. ' 24 May 1999) 
[http: //www. cnn. com/WORLD/afiica/90905/241. 
2 
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they are not conducive to African societies. " This has been held as the justification of one- 
party systems since independence and often used by the mi tary as an excuse for seizing li  
power. As the legitimacy of overt authoritarian rule wanes a new practice of a 6no-party 
system' has emerged but has not necessarily demonstrated a substantive difference in practice 
from one-party SySteMS. 21 0 The 'no-party system' justifies itself by preventing the possibility 
for violence along ethnic lines but in doing so it prevents the possibility of widespread and 
active participation 
. 
211 Inter-ethnic violence in Affica is often less based on political 
differences among individuals but more due to the manipulation of society by leaders 
.2" On a 
scale of relative disruption to society the negative effects of multi-party politics cannot be 
claimed to be greater than authoritarian rule 21 ' and a multi-party system provides greater hope 
for the future. A multi-party system will not be a catch all solution as evidence from existing 
multi-party- systems shows the ability of elites to maintain exclusive control over the political 
process. There is also the lack of experience and understanding as to how a mulfi-party 
democracy will operate which shows the need for patience as a democratic culture evolves. 2,4 
Wiseman charts the present proliferation of political parties in some Affican states as being 
correlative of the lack of democratic progress as the large number of parties create more 
problems than it brings in positive developments for the advancement of dernocracy. ' 15 The 
difficulties experienced with the introduction of pluralistic societies and political systems do 
not mean they are inapplicable to African societies. It does demonstrate the overall instability 
of those societies and their structures due to the legacies of past and unfavourable conditions at 
present. ' 16 
The structures and forms of African societies at the attainment of independence were not 
necessarily part of the natural development of African societies and in recent years the overall 
collapse of societies has been seen as there has been a failure of state structures to provide 
'09 See Shi-vji (1995) who describes the end of the one-party state in Tanzania as followed by 'an upsurge in the 
parochial racial, ethnic, religious and narrow nationalistic rhetoric followed by instances of racial and religious 
violence', p. 149. Also S. Makinda. 'Democracy and Multi-Party Politics in Affica. ' 34 Journal of Modern Aftan 
Studies (1996) pp. 556-557. 
210 Uganda is the leading example of the no party system which has brought increased democracy at all levels of 
society but still raises a number of questions regarding its long-terin viability, see N. Kasfir. "'No-Party Democracy" 
in Uganda. ' 9 Journal ofDemocracy (1998) p. 49. 
211 See Human Rights Watch. World Report 1998. (New York: HRW, 1999) p. 5. 
212 E. K. Quashigah. 'Legitimacy of Governments and the Resolution of Intra-National Conflicts in Afirica. ' 7 X4DIC 
(1995) p. 287. 213 j. Wiseman. The New Strugglefor Democracy in Afta. (Aldershot: Avebury, 1996) pp. I 10- 111, 
214 Makinda (1996) pp. 567,570. 215 Wiseman (1996) pp. 108-109. 
216 Mahmud points out how change does not come easy in any society and while many of the events in 
Affica do not 
appear favourable they can be seen aa positive development, S. Mahmud. 'Democratization and 
the Political 
Dimensions of Adjustment in Affica. ' in Shepard and Sonko (1994) p. 137. 
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effective governance for society. 217 States such as Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda, and Congo 
(Zaire) have fallen into a condition where there exists recognisable borders but everything 
within those borders is lawlessness and anarchy, resulting it what has been termed 'suspended 
statehood. ý218 Others like Sierra Leone, Sudan and Angola are following a very similar path 
and future as a central government may be in control M the capital but not beyond. It is felt 
that the basic inability of the state, as constructed by the colonial period, to accommodate 
ethnic differences is resulting in widespread internal strife and general oppression which In 
turn creates instability and refugee flows contributing to the instability of the entire 
continent. "' The left over colonial arrangements, militarisation related to the Cold War and 
the insistence of sovereignty by the international system allowed for African leaders to 
establish authoritarian rule showing that much of the failure of the state in Africa may be 
directly attributed to individual African leaders. "' The approach taken by African leaders after 
independence was often based on personalised. leadership and patron relations leading to an 
overall lack of faith in state structures as the majority of the population realised it does not have 
a stake in the system. "' The situation has proven detrimental to democracy, as the inability of 
the state to provide for the needs and desires of society is endemic in Affica resulting in the 
inability to internalise democracy. 222 
The solution to the problem is elusive as there remains the attitude of the need to continue 
with the borders defined during colonisation even though the criteria for statehood is not met, 
much less the existence of a connection between the territory, those who claim to rule and the 
population 
. 
22' Based on this wa Mutua speaks of the need to overcome the present state which 
is just the colonial state in another form for it alienates individuals and destroys identity. 224 
217 wa Mutua (I 995a) describes it thus 'The imposition of the nation-state through colonization balkanized Affica into 
ahistorical units and forcibly yanked it into the Age of Europe, permanently disfiguring it. ' [footnotes omitted] pp. 
1114-1115. Also Herbst (1997) p. 120; Young (1998) p. 103. Much of the cause of the collapsed state must also be 
given to the economic conditions, see below and van Eijk (1997) p. 579. 
211 Y. Abdulquwi. 'Reflections on the Fragility of State Institutions in Africa. ' 2 Afiican Yearbook of International 
Law (1994) pp. 3-4. Other terms equally used include 'collapsed states', 'weak state', 'soft state', none of which are 
exclusive to Africa, see van Eijk (1997) p. 573. Authors who emphasise that collapsed states are not the norm and 
there does exist viable states and societies in Africa include C. Clapham. 'Degrees of Statehood. 
' 24 Review of 
International Studies (1998) p. 157; Young (1998) p. 10 1- 102. 
2"A. Abdullahi. 'The Refugee Crisis in Africa as a Crisis of the Institution of the State. ' 6 International Journal of 
Refiigee Law (1994) pp. 562-580; Y. Ghai. 'The Theory of the State in the Third World and the Problem of 
Constitutionalism. ' 6 Connecticut Journal ofInternational Law (199 1) p. 416; wa Mutua (I 995a) p. 1144-1150. 
220 E. Gyimah-Boadi. 'Civil Society in Africa. ' 7 Journal of Democracy (1996) p. 126, also wa Mutua (I 
995a) p. 
1119. 
2" Hyden in Cohen et a], eds (1993) pp. 265-6; Ottoway in Cartman (1995) p. 235. See Shivji 
(1995) who explains 
how the tyrannical use of the law reduced its legitimacy in the eyes of the ruled, pp. 
154-155. For a reVieýv of 
political development in Affica see Chazan et al. (1992) pp. 42-68. 
222 
wa Mutua (I 995a) pp. 1157-1158. Yoyder (1998) p. 486. 
22' Herbst (1997) pp. 122,13 1. 
224 
wa Mutua (I 995a) pp. 1160-116 1. 
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The collapse of states can no longer be dismissed as single events but should be taken together 
as an indication of the problems the continent faces. "' Van Eijk offers the suggestion of 
intervention based on humanitarian grounds when collapse occurs alongside the establishment 
of preventive measures such as economic support and re-establishing the Trusteeshýp 
116 
system. Herbst points out that the finther development of Aftican societies must come from 
the individuals within for any change to the state cannot be imposed from outside again. "' 
Ottaway supports a democratic solution involving a greater amount of the population having a 
stake in the system. This poses the difficulty of providing the best long-run solution but at the 
same time is the most difficult to implement as there is a need for basic agreements as to how 
the democratic process will work which is unlikely. "' Wa Mutua argues democracy is not 
enough for Africa to overcome its problems if it means democratising existing states. He 
expresses the need to 'redraw' the map of Africa by allowing self-determination to flourish as 
the present system can no longer sustain itself and adherence to existing borders is 'a 
straightjacket that continues to deny freedom to millions of Afficans'. 229 
Africa is at a 'critical juncture' and the actions taken now Will detennine whether the 
ftiture is one of 'disintegration' or 'reconfiguration'. 230 The problem faced from an 
international legal perspective is that the conditions for democracy and human rights within 
states, or any of the alternatives offered above, all depend upon the existence of a government 
representative of the population. In a situation where there is no recognisable government or 
the absence of structures for a society to express their needs and desires the ability of 
international law to offer change is severely limited. 231 
C. UNDERDEVELOPMEAT 
The failure of African states has been worsened by the underdevelopment of the entire 
continent, a situation which is also directly attributable to colonial exploitation, neo-colorUal 
activities and the behaviour of state officials. "' Ambrose has placed poverty as perhaps the 
"' Herbst (1997) p. 125. See Oloka-Onyango (1995) 'The fact is that whether by omission or commission, the state 
still has a significant role to play in Affican politics and society', p. 62. 
226 
van Eijk (1997) pp. 585-597. 
227 Herbst (1997) p. 132. 
228 Ottaway in Cartman, ed. (1995) p. 23 5. 
229 
wa Mutua (I 995a) p. 1175. 
230 L. Villal6n. 'The Aftican State at the End of the Twentieth Century: Parameters of the Critical 
Juncture. ' in L. 
Villalon and P. Huxtable, eds. The Aftan State at a Critical Juncture: Behveen Disintegration and 
Reconfiguration. 
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998) pp. 7-8. 
231 Van Eijk (1997) p. 574. 
131 C. Mahalu. 'Human Rights and Development: An Affican Perspective. ' I Leiden Journal of 
International Law 
(1988) p. 17. See G. Shepard. 'Debt, Development and Democracy: The Rights versus 
Efficiency Debate in 
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largest obstacle to democracy and human rights in Africa and one that will probably be the 
hardest to overcome. 233 It has been put forth that African states cannot afford to ensure the 
protection of civil and political rights due to underdevelopment, much less be expected to 
provide socio-econornic rightS. 234 Poor economic conditions and widespread poverty has led 
leaders to emphasis a right to development 
- 
the content of which is determined by the 
government of the time and often used as a tool for the arbitrary abuse of power. 
The control over resources within society by govenunents and elites has lead to massive 
inequalities that are not conducive to the development of democracy. In the absence of 
effective accountability in government large sectors of the population have become 
marginalised both economically and polifically. "' Chabal discusses how mismanagement or 
unequal management of the economy, presently and heavily influenced by the past, results in 
negative effects for the whole of society. "' Even in situations where there exists the 
possibility for economic practices to be beneficial for society, unequal power an-angements 
have brought negative effects as 'political factors determined economic practice. 1237 
It is in Affica that the importance of good governance discussed in Chapter 3 becomes 
very clear. The connection between the civil and political aspects of society and socio- 
economic conditions and possibilities are all part of the necessary framework for society and 
cannot be separated. "' Societies become caught in poor socio-economic conditions which 
when they reach extreme proportions eliminate the ability for self-detem-fination as the 
physical self of individuals is destroyed. Wide-based participation in the economic process is 
non-existent in several respects, as the domestic decisions concerning economic development 
are made by the small ruling groups and their decision making is constrained by the powers of 
us fr tp it Gr en Adjustment. ' in Shepard and K. Sonko, eds. Economic J tice in A ica. (Wes o: e wood) who sees the 
collapse of Somalia as representative of the condition of Africa and an event which is clearly a 'man-made crisis', P. 
1, also Chabal (1992) pp. 150-151. The specifics reasons for the underdevelopment of Africa is highly contested 
debate, see Wiseman in Potter et al. (1997) p. 274. 
23' Ambrose (1995) pp. 145-160. Also P. Huxtable. 'The Affican State Toward the Twenty-First Century: Legacies 
of the Critical Juncture. ' in Villal6n and Huxtable (1998) pp. 280-284. Also Chabal (1995) pp. 48-52; Haile (1986) p. 
301-302. Clapharn (1998) rightly points out that 'States are expensive to maintain' p. 156. 
234 Oloka-Onyango (1995) p. 5 1. 
235 Wiseman in Potter et al. (1997) p. 275. 
236 This will be the primary problem facing the future of democracy in Nigeria. Incoming president 
Olusegun 
Obasanio has stated 'We don't believe democracy will be sustained with the burden of debt we 
have now', but he 
faces the problem that the outgoing military regime has cleaned out most of the governments 
financial holdings, see 
'IMF pledges quick aid if Nigeria sticks to reforrns' and 'Nigeria Brings 15 Years of Army 
Rule to a Close. ' (27 May 
1999) [http: //cnn. con-i/WORLD/africa/9905/27ý3C-NIGERIA-DEMOCRACY. reut/]. 
237 Chabal (1992) pp. 163,150-163. 
2" 0. Mbachu. 'Democracy in Black Affica: A Theoretical Overview. ' 31 Coexistence (1994) p. 153. 
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the international economic system along with continued economic support wj&h is given to 
non democratic regimes. "' 
The situation of underdevelopment has proved costly to democracy and human rights. 
Through internal mismanagement and external pressures economies have continually 
worsened and people become more discontent. Instability has also followed as leaders are no 
longer able to purchase popularity from the population and a loss of legitimacy occurs when 
they are no longer able to provide basic goods. "' It is suggested that the way out of Affica's 
econornic problems is to open up the economic system and process to greater participation 
fi roM indiVdUalS. 241 External actors have a serious role to play concerning the economic 
conditions of domestic societies and the ability of democracy and human rights to grow In 
242 these unfavourable settings. The issue of lack of resources also limits the ability of regional 
institutions to provide effective assistance. The economic conditions of Africa do not provide 
much in the way of hope for the future of democracy and human rights in the region. At the 
same time the region's situation should not be written of as hopeless. As good governance 
takes hold and is put into practice Africans will slowly be able to benefit from the process of 
self-determination as they will be able to participate in the decisions which impact their lives, 
something which has not been common in the past. 243 
V. CONCLUSION 
The prospects for democracy and human rights in Affica are not bright but neither are they 
extinguished. "' The rhetoric of democracy and human rights exists"' and is being used by the 
people of Africa in struggles to exercise their right to self-determination - this time in relation 
to indigenous authoritarian rule and transnational. influences. There is the need to go beyond 
the rhetoric for an overall democratisation of society, not just the establishment of institutions 
"' Haile (1986) p. 302. It is these ruling groups and their close followers who benefit from possessing political power 
and by connection the national wealth, see Quashigah (1995) p. 287 and van Eijk (1997) p. 576-577; Economist ne 
World in 199 7, p. 90. 
210 Joseph (1998) pp. 10-12. On the competition for resources in society and the impact this has on leaders, see 
Young (1996) pp. 57-60. 211 See Haile (1986) p. 328 and generally. 
212 For the impact of external actors and forces and the related literature see Oloka-Onyango (1995) PP. 20-40. 
TOmasevki (1997) observes that external actors have supported the development of democracy in the region but they 
have been motivated less by good will and more by the ability to exploit the vulnerable economic situation of 
Affica, 
p. 18 1. 
243 Some authors feel that international economic organisations such as the World Bank and IMF 
have not been living 
UP to the ideas of good governance as their programs have brought about negative impacts on 
domestic society, see 
generally Shepard and Sonko (1994). 
244 See Gyimah-Boadi (1998) 18-31. See Young (1996) how in some cases authoritarian leaders continue to 
dominate but have in stages taken more liberal positions, p. 57. 
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and holding of elections but almost more importantly improving socio-economic conditions. 246 
Change will not be an easy process as democracy and human rights are dynamic and once they 
become part of the public discussion they are potentially explosive bringing positive results but 
also attracting negative reactions. 247 The colonial experience and subsequent years of 
authoritarian rule have resulted in the lack of experience with democracy and human rights in 
Affica, adding to the explosive potential248 
At present the ability of the actors in civil societies to enhance and ensure the 
dernocratisation process is uneven. "' The poor economic conditions and lack of resources in 
the region effects the ability of civic associations to establish themselves and maintain an 
independent position. "' The development of civil society is finiher troubled due to high levels 
of illiteracy and the lack of agreement over what causes deserve the strongest commitment. 251 
The role of NGOs in the process of development civil society is important as they are able 
to provide a monitoring mechanism for human rights, an educative function for expanding 
knowledge about democracy and human rights and in general providing the necessary action 
and support for a society committed to democracy and human rights. "' Given the economic 
and social circumstances of Africa effective action by NGOs needs to move beyond 
'traditional human rights work' and give greater attention to economic and social issues. "' 
However given the circumstances of Afiica these changes may never be able to fully manifest 
themselves with the result of the creation of 'virtual democracies' where there exists the 
illusion of democratic practice and structures, but without the substantial basis that civil society 
provides. "' 
245 Villal6n in Villal6n and Huxtable (1998) p. 4. But see Makinda (1995) who observes how the rhetoric of 
democracy is continually ignored by African leaders, p. 57 1. 
246 S. Decalo. 'The Process, Prospects and Constraints of Democratization in Africa. ' 91 Aftican Affairs (1992) p-8; S. 
Riley. 'Political Adjustment or Domestic Pressure: Democratic Politics and Political Choice in Africa. ' 13 Third 
World Quarterly (1992) p. 549. Villal6n in Villal6n and Huxtable, eds. (1998) explains how elections alone do not 
tells us about the possibilities for sustained democratisation and have been utilised to hinder the process, pp. 15-16. 
Also Chabal (1998) p. 300; T. Maluwa. 'Discourse on Democracy and Human Rights in Africa. ' 9 RADIC (1997) p. 
70. 
24' Hyden in Cohen et al (1993) p. 256. 
248 See Makinda (1996) pp. 557-558. 
249Gyimah-Boadi (1996) pp. 118-9. See S. Ndegwa. 'Civil Society and Political Change in Africa: The Case of Non- 
Governmental Organizations in Kenya. ' 35 International Journal of Comparative Sociology (1994) p. 19 who argues 
that NGOs in Kenya have been able to overcome legislation against them to contribute to political reform. 
... Gyimah-Boadi (1996) generally. 
25 ' Ambrose (1995) p. 20. Busia (1993) places illiteracy as one of the pressing needs for participatory democracy, p. 
151. 
112 In general see C. Welch. Protecting Human Rights in Afiica: Roles and Strategies of 
Non-Governmental 
Organisations. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1995). Also Ambrose (1995) pp. 99-118. 
253 Oloka-Onyango (1995) pp. 66-70. 
2S4 Joseph (1998) pp. 3-4, he further expresses the position that this creation of the illusion of democracy is something 
both governments and their foreign sponsors engage in, p. 11. The development of civil society 
where NGOs and 
other groups may be active participants in the protection and promotion of democracy and 
human rights is a very 
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The ability of the OAU as the regional institution of Africa to contribute to the growth of 
democracy and human rights is troubled as 'basic tenets in African politics that have acquired 
the lore of sacredness or sanctity' in the eyes of the OAU will hinder development 
. 
2" For 
there to be an effective regional system for the promotion and protection of democracy and 
human rights the OAU needs to seriously reconsider its position and structure as it 'has failed 
to serve the human development needs of the peoples of Affica. 256 Overcoming the issue of 
non-interference in domestic affairs and state sovereignty will be necessary for the OAU to 
emerge as a regional organisation able to effectively act in support of democracy and human 
rightS. 257 The organisation will have to address the issue of collapsed states discarding another 
sacred principle of the inviolability of the borders established by the colonisers, recogrfising the 
lack of effectiveness of the state in providing for individuals resulting Ma lack of identity and 
increased distrust in leaders. There is a need for Africans to experiment and design their own 
forms of a state so that solidarity and social cohesion may be maintained through institutions 
individuals will identify with as institutions which acknowledge and promote pluralism, self- 
government, popular empowerment and equity. "' The OAU needs to accept the internal and 
continual process of self-determination and its applicability in the post-independence period259 
allowing it to meet its expressed purpose of achieving 'a better life for the peoples of 
Aftica'. 260 
The applicability of law and rights in the self-reflecting process will remain an issue as 
efforts to support democracy are still seen as imperialistic and not applicable to the African 
cause, but it will be up to these authors to provide alternatives beyond their critiques. "' The 
uneven area in the region where some states are truly committed to pluralism and others adamantly opposed to it, see 
Human Rights Watch (1999) p. II 
... El-Ayouty (1994) pp. 186-88. 
256 Ambrose (1995) p. 163. 
211 See A. AldnyeTrfi. 'The OAU and the Concept of Non-Interference in internal Affairs of Member States. ' 46 
British Yearbook ofInternational Law (1972-73) pp. 393-400. In the recent seccessionist struggle in the Comoros the 
OAU held an 'unflinching commitment' to sovereignty and territorial integrity, see PanAfrican News Agency. 'OAU 
Appeals to Member States to Intervene in Comoros. ' (8 December 1998). The inability of the OAU to muster an 
form of collective action in the Comoros has resulted 'where the average Comorian no longer have anything good to 
say about the organisation', 'OAU Losing Face in Moroni. ' (27 February 27 1999). 
2" Abdulquwi (1994) pp. 6-8. 
"9 A. Sesay. 'The OAU and Continental Order. ' in T. Shaw and 'S. Ojo, eds. Afta and the International Political 
SYstem. (London: University Press of America, 1982) p. 170-17 1. Anyangwe (1998) points out the need for domestic 
acceptance of these ideas as has occurred in Ethiopia and South Africa, p. 657. 
260 OAU Charter Article 11 (1). The Charter recognises the ability to determine political status and economic and 
social development in Article 20 (1). The growth of sub-regional econorruc co-operation may contribute to the ability 
of the OAU support democracy as the econornic groups are recognising the importance of peace, 
democracy and 
human rights in ensuring conditions conducive to economic growth, see M. Ndulo. 'Harmonisation of 
Trade Laws in 
the Affican Economic Community. ' 42 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1993) pp. 103-106. 
261 Shivji (1995) describes the current support for democracy in Africa as 'being incessantly drummed into our ears 
by the intellectuals of the West and forced down our throats by imperialism and its agencies', p. 
169. He may be 
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role of external actors looms large for the future as outside powers have continually been 
involved in Affican affairs and will continue to do So. 262 The influence of outside actorsvk, ill 
have a substantial impact on democracy and human rights as their involvement needs to be 
based on support for Africans and not the pursuit of self-interest and strategic goals. 263 
Regardless of the opinions or actions of outside actors there remains 'the tenacity of the 
idea that democratic rule ought to exist' in Africa. 264 It is suggested that democracy is the 
beginning of the cure to Africa's ills as greater participation will ensure rights are protected and 
needs and interests are met 
. 
26' The growth of democracy and human rights in Affica will not 
be the same as elsewhere in world as priorities differ. Democracy and human rights in Africa 
go far beyond certain civil and political rights. Alongside the importance of civil and political 
rights the practical need for survival brings emphasis to socio-economic rights, beliefs III the 
importance of community and the individual represents more realistic Views of society and 
concerns for peace and the environment demonstrate the need for concern of the surTounding 
world as part of the overall process of self-deteniiination for the individual and society. 
Africa faces a critical juncture in the development of democracy and human rights in the 
region. It is possible to identify a number of advances that bode well for the fifture of the 
region. The creation of a human rights court and the movement of the OAU to recognise the 
importance of democracy and human rights provide a great deal of hope for the strengthening 
of the regional arrangement. Domestic events throughout the region with a great deal of 
democratic activity occuring demonstrate how the rhetoric of the texts is becoming part of the 
lives of individuals. It is important not to overemphasise these events as the effectiveness of 
what has been achieved is mirýmal or other outstanding factors remain as impediments to 
democracy and hurnan rights. 
South Africa will be holding its second elections this decade, an example of how the 
democratic process can work in a multi-effinic state with a substantial negative past to deal 
with. The extremely high levels of violence and lack of economic progress for a large majority 
of the population keep the benefits of democracy III question. Across the Continent there are 
positive signs but just as many negative ones. Military coups and violent challenges to the 
correct in his observations on the difficulties of rights and law in Africa but he needs to propose specifically what 
to 
do. 
262 In general see Chazan et al. (1992) pp. 377-416. 
263 See Maldnda (1995) pp. 562-573. Events elsewhere in world have attracted more attention from external actors, 
leaving Affica's problems largely neglected, see Mahmud in Shepard and Sonko (1994) p. 151. 
264 Wiseman in Potter, et al, eds. (1997) p. 272 (italics in original). Also Wiseman (1996) where he presents e\-idence 
of the continued move to democracy. 
265 See Oloka-Onyango (1995) pp. 60-62. 
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government continue in western Affica creating widespread instability across the area 
. 
266 If 
Nigeria is able to institute and consolidate its democratically elected goverriment with the 
military finally disassociating itself from politics then its neighbours might soon follow. 
Further instability comes from the unrest across the north of Affica as sections of society 
continue to dispute what is best for the people. Massive refugee flows in the Great Lakes 
region keeps the animosity between states in the region at a high level. Leaders such as 
Mugabwe in Zimbabwe, Moi in Kenya, Museveni in Uganda and Chiluba in Zambia are 
paying a very superficial respect for democracy when in reality they are fiather consolidating 
personal rule of their countries, autocrats in the clothes of democrats. 267 
Democracy and human rights are making progress in Aftica. Slow, difficult progress With 
visible setbacks, but progress nonetheless. "' The impediments to democracy and human 
rights in the region are well known and can be overcome. The only way to overcome these 
impediments will be to ensure that all individuals are given the equal opportunity to participate 
actively in the processes that impact upon their lives. They only ones who know what is best 
for Africa are Africans themselves, therefore they should be given the voice and ability to 
pursue what is best for the region, something that an international law of democracy can 
hopefully make a substantial contribution to. 
... To demonstrate the scale of instability the area faces, last year during the coup in Guinea-Bissau thousands of 
refugees fled north towards Senegal only to meet up with Senagalese r fugees fleeing south due to the war 
between 
the government and rebels, see 'Disaster Feared in Bissau Exodus. ' Guardian (24 June 1998) P. 13. 
ster 0 
... The actions of Mugabe are the most well known as he spoke out against that country's judicial sy nfr 
enforcing human rights standards when the government was accused and found guilty of false imprisonment and 
torture of two reporters, see 'Mugabe 'the Black Mamba' Bares His Fangs. ' Guardian (8 Febuary 1999) P. 
12; 
'Twilight of the Tyrant. ' Observer (14 February 1999) p. 23. Concerning Kenya, Uganda and Zambia, see 
Human 
Rights Watch (1999) p. 9. 
"' The increase of elections throughout Affica is seen by many as evidence of how democracy 
has taken hold. The 
unfortunate side is that many of these elections are marred by Widespread irregularities that 
bring their credibility into 
question, see Human Rights Watch (1999) pp. 7-9. 
CONCLUSION 
1. THE ABSENCE OF REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 
The global popularity of democracy and human rights is a positive development for the 
international system and an area international law needs to take full attention of Presently, the 
rhetoric of democracy and human rights is far greater than the actual ability of individuals to 
effectively enjoy any international egal principle of democracy, with human rights slowly 
moving toward greater effectiveness. Globally the gap between rhetoric and substance 
remains very Wide. Regionally the gap has been closed significantly. In Europe the combined 
efforts of the three regional organisations has significantly brought the rhetoric of democracy 
and human rights closer to the individual. The Inter-American system has shown how the 
rhetoric of democracy and human rights can eventually overcome even the most hostile 
environments in ensuring the law not only speaks about the individual but actual offers 
something to the individual. In Aftica the gap between rhetoric and substance continues to be 
indicative of the overall malaise of the region but with the hope of what has been 
accomplished elsewhere there exists the potential for closing the gap. 
The development of regional arrangements for the protection and promotion of democracy 
and human tights has yet to occur in Asia or among the states of the Middle East. These 
regions have seen efforts at various levels through the initiative of the UN or NGOs but the 
initiative of domestic governments has been sparse with greater attention being placed 
elsewhere, primarily related to concerns of economics, trade, defence and security. The reason 
why it cannot be held that there exists a global norm of democracy is that large sections of the 
globe have yet to subscribe to its principles. Thýis is not to say that the absence of a regional 
arrangement for the protection and promotion of human rights precludes the development of 
democracy. What the previous chapters have shown is that regional arrangements have been 
better able to fta-ther the underlying ideas of an international law of democracy through their 
human rights work that takes into account the peculiarities of the particular region. Hutnan 
rights deal with issues of participation, tolerance, the ability of individuals to be part of the 
forces around them. These are the very same principles upon which democracy is 
based as 
well. These principles do not exist in one set model for all to accept as they do 
differ between 
societies, but difference should not be used as an excuse for their absence. 
I 
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A. Co- oPERA TioN iN THE MiDDLE EA sT 
The League of Arab States consists of 22 states with the purpose Of strengthening relations 
among members and dealing with matters of 'a general concern with the affairs and interests 
of the Arab countries'. The areas of concern for the League cover a wide range of issues with 
no explicit mention of matters related to political or legal co-operation. ' Sovereignty and non- 
intervention are laid down as guiding principles as '[e]ach member-state shall respect the 
systems of government established in the other member-states and regard them as exclusive 
concerns of those states. Each shall pledge to abstain from any action calculated to change 
established systems of govenunent. Q Co-operative efforts within the League have been 
mostly concemed with security issues concerning Israel and in the preservation of the existing 
political order within and between countries. 
The League has established a Permanent Arab Regional Commission on Human Rights, 3 
which has acted in support of human rights in the area generally, as well as in conjunction with 
the UN, but has yet been unable to make any significant progress at the intergovernmental 
level. ' The Arab Charter on Human Rights' was adopted by the League in 1994 but has yet to 
enter into force. The Charter provides that all peoples have the right to determine their own 
govemment and that the people are the source of authority. ' It goes on to cover a wide range 
of rights including socio-econoMIc provisions concerning work and education! The Charter 
allows for full religious freedom, 8a significant measure for the region. The Charter also 
suffers from strong limitation clauses as the rights to religious freedom and participation may 
be limited by the law with no other guidance provided as to the scope of the exercise of the 
law. The Charter will have a supervisory body whose only task will be to receive state reports 
and comment upon them. ' 
' League of Arab States Charter, Article 2, paragraphs a-f 
2 League of Arab States Charter, Article 8. Also H. Hassouna. "Me League of Arab States and 
The UN: Relations in 
the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes. ' in B. Andemicael, ed. Regionalism and the United 
Nations- (Dobbs Ferry: 
Oceana, 1979) p. 299. 
K. Vasak. Ae International Dimensions ofHuman Rights. (Westport: Greenwood, 1982) pp. 576-577. 
1. Pogany. 'Arab Attitudes toward Intemational Human Rights Law. ' 2 Connecticut Journal of International 
Law 
(1987) p. 367. 
' Repiinted in 18 Human Rights Law Journal (1997) p. 15 1. 
6 Articles I (a) and 19. 
'Articles 29-32,34. 
' Articles 26-27. 
9 Articles 
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Beyond the League, Islamic states from across the Middle East and Asia have come 
together in co-operation through the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC). '0 In the 
Charter of the Islamic Conference (1972), " the signatories resolve to work towards solidarity 
among Islamic people as a means towards progress, peace and justice. In doing so they 
reaffirm. their commitments to the UN Charter and human rights, with their objectives 
including the end of racism and safeguarding for individuals their 'dignity, independence and 
national rights'. 12 In so doing there is full respect for non-interference, sovereign equality and 
the non-use of force in inter-state relations. " In 1991 the OIC issued the Cairo Declaration on 
Human Rights in Islam. " The Declaration uses much of the language common to 
international human rights law but places the language into the political context of Islarn, as 
understood by the drafters resulting in a divergence from established international standards. " 
The Declaration itself is also a divergence from the domestic law of many of the OIC states 
raising questions as to what extent it represents a unified Islamic view of human rights. " 
Co-operation among Arab states is marked by tension among leaders as to who is most 
a n, k ble to finther the 'Arab Interest' in both religious and political terms leading to most states 
following their own independent agenda. " There has been some co-operative efforts 
demonstrated by occasional sunu-nits that have been described as the 'highest and broadest 
expression of the collective Arab will'. " These summits also demonstrate the lack of 
substantive will towards co-operation as not all governments are invited, or even choose to 
attend. Co-operative efforts only seem to come about in a time of crisis or as a reaction to a 
specific event" a process likely to continue to shape interstate relations. " This ad hoc 
tendency has been linked to the long legacy of authoritarianism in the region leading to an 
'0 H. Moinuddin. The Charter of the Islamic Conference and Legal Framework ofEconomic Co-operation among its 
Member States. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1987). Report of the Secretary-General. Cooperation Between The United 
Nations And The Organization Of The Islamic Conference. UN Doc. A/53/430 (24 September 1998). 
" 914 UNTS I 11. 
12 OIC Charter, Article H (A). 
" OIC Charter, Article Il (B). 
14 UN Doc. A/CONF. I 57/PC/62/Add. 18. 
" For a review of the Declaration see A. Mayer. 'Universal versus Islamic Human Rights: A Clash of 
Cultures or a 
Clash with a Construct? ' 15 Michigan Journal ofInternational Law (1994) pp. 327-350. 
Mayer (1994) p. 348. 
P. Vakikiotis. Arab and Regional Politics in the Middle East. (New York: St. Martin's, 1984) p. 79. 
C. Tripp. 
'Regional Organization in the Arab Middle East. ' in L. Fawcett and A. Hurrell, eds. Regionalism in 
World Politics: 
Regional Organization and International Order. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995) p. 289. 
"'Pains but No Gains. ' The Guardian (21 June 1996) p. 19. Un'ty. ' The Guardian 
" Arabs themselves question the usefulness of these summits, see 'Arab States Grasp Nettle of 1 
(22 June 1996) p. 14. On the lack of co-operation in general see H. Howard. 'The Middle East in 
World Affairs. ' in 
T. Ismai I, ed. Government and Politics ofthe Contemporary Middle East. (Homewood: Dorsey, 1970) pp. 
467-468. 
'0 Tripp in Fawcett and Hurrell (1995) pp. 296-289. 
emphasis upon the sovereign independent state as the basis for action, 
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1 which iýmpedes fforts at 
collective co-operation. " 
The Arab world is charactensed by strong state systems with the primary purpose of self- 
preservation resulting In the bulk of state resources and activities being controlled by a 
centralised government. " The persistent emphasis on sovereignty hinders the possibility of 
co-operation as governments will view a regional arrangement for the protectIon and 
promotion of human rights as an ffiftingement of their sovereignty. " One of the larger shows 
of unity among states in the region came in response to the rise of a regional human rights 
NGO, the Arab Organisation for Human Rights (AOHR). 24 The growth and impact of the 
AOHR has faced open hostility from governments. At the same time its efforts illustrate the 
problems and possibilities for the region for democracy and hurnan rights and demonstrates 
, 
in 
that hard-work and persistence, based on the belief the democracy and hurrian rights contain 
desired human goods, may lead to small but significant advances 
. 
2' The development of 
regional co-operation in the Middle East will continue to be beset by the general unrest of 
region. There are no quick and easy answers to the problems which exist as even perceived 
positive developments, such as autonomy for Palestine, is tempered by occurrences which 
underline the necessity of human rights development in the region. 26 
B. Co-opmnoNflvAsm 
Regional efforts in support of hw-nan rights in Asia has mainly come from NGOs with 
little effort given to the idea by goveniments. " Many states of Asia are part of the OIC as well 
as members of the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC)28 which has created a system 
" E. Podeh. 'Tbe Emergence of the Arab State Systern. ' 9 Diplomacy and Statecraft (1998) p. 75. 
" E. Sivan. 'Constraints and Opportunities in the Arab World. ' 8 Journal ofDemocracy (1997) p. 103. Even where 
electoral systems are in place they do not provide substantive democracy in terms of actualising a change of 
government, see 'Arab Democracy For EverT The Economist (7 June 1997) p. 68. 
23 Generally, E. Kedourie. Democracy and Arab Political Culture. (London: Frank Cass, 1994). Also Vakikiotis 
(1984) pp. 135-151. 
24 j. Crystal. 'The Human Rights Movement in the Arab World. ' 16 Human Rights Quarterly (1994) p. 43 5. 
2' Generally, Crystal (1994). A reason put forth for by governments for opposition to the AOHR was the already 
existent state of democracy in the region, see Crystal (1994) p. 446. On issues of democracy in the Middle East see 
'Democratisation in the Middle East. ' 7 Journal ofDemocracy (1996) 83-153. 
26 In the short existence of the Palestinian Authority serious questions have been raised concerning human rights as it 
has shown a tendency for centralised authoritarian style of rule with grave human rights abuses. See F. Azzan. 
'Update: The Palestinian Independent Commission for Citizens' Rights. ' 20 Human Rights Quarterly (1998) p. 338 
" D. Bell. 'The East Asian Challenge to Human Rights: Reflections on an East West Dialogue. ' 18 Human Rights 
Quarterly (1996) pp. 655-666. Concerning regional organisation in Asia see M. Haas, ed. Basic Documents ofAsia 
Regional Organisation. (Dobbs Ferry: Oceana) especially volume VIX (1985). Concerning human rights see F. de 
Varennes, ed. Asia-Pacific Human Rights Documents and Resources. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1998); 
V. 
Leary. 'Human Rights in the Asian Context: Prospects for Regional Human Rights Instruments. ' 14- Connecticut 
Journal ofInternational Law (1987) p. 319. 
" See Y. Kodama. 'Asia-Pacific Region: APEC and ASEAN. ' 30 International Lauyer (1996) pp. 367-389. 
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based on flexible and voluntary relations among its diverse members. The Seoul Declaration 
(1991) expressed one of the objectives of APEC as being the achievement of the common 
interests of the region's inhabitants. '9 However the phasis of action has be st ctly ern en ri 
economic staying clear of any political issues which might touch national sensitivities. 30 
States in the region have shown a willingness to discuss the development of regional 
arrangements for human rights but efforts have remained at the rhetorical level with little 
substantive action taken. " As with the states of the NEddle East ideas of sovereignty and 
independence are still very strong, with little willingness on the behalf of governments to give 
any of it up. " The region is further characterised by continued conflicts between neighbouring 
states, underdevelopment, multi-ethnic societies, authoritarian traditions, etc., which all impede 
efforts at co-operation. " The recent economic crisis to impact much of the region has 
hindered the possibility of establishing regional arrangements for human rights. " Co- 
operation in the region does occur in the creation of a common Asian identity as a forni of 
challenge to western conceptions of democracy and human rights but beyond this outward 
projection there is little by way of common interest. " 
Creating a single regional system for Asia is probably impossible due to its geographical 
size, making sub-regional co-operation the most practical solution. " Regional organisation 
does not look imminent in Asia but at the same time the region should not also be seen as 'and 
ground' with no future hope. 
37 
" Kodarna (1996) pp. 3 69-3 70. 
'0 Kodama (1996) pp. 3 78-3 79. 
gion: Progress Made " For a review see C. Dias. 'Regional Human Rights Arrangements in the Asian and Pacific Re i 
and Some Options Available. ' in Centre for Human Rights. Fourth Workshop on Regional Human Righ's 
Arrangements in the Asian and Pacific Region, Katmandu, 26-28 February 1996. (New York: UN, 1996) pp. 73-77, 
hereinafter Fourth Regional Workshop. 
12 R. Foot. 'Pacific Asia: The Development of a Regional Dialogue. ' in Fawcett and Hurrell (1995) pp. 229-241; H. 
de Jonge. 'Democracy and Economic Development in the Asia-Pacific Region. ' 14 Human Rights 
Law Journal 
(1993) p. 30 1. 
" de Jonge (1993) pp. 3 01-3 06. 
34 The recent economic collapse of many domestic economies in Asia cast a shadow of earlier assessments such 
as de 
Jonge (1993) 'South East Asia is political stable and economically prosperous region. ' p. 301. A few years later 
neither point holds true for a number of states. 
" 'Conclusion 
.' 
in Fawcett and Hurrell (1995) pp. 323-324). This is not to say that all of Asia shares the same 
conception of democracy and human rights, see Y. Ghai. 'Human Rights and Governance: 
The Asia Debate. ' 15 
Australian Yearbook ofInternational Law (1994) pp. 5-6. 
3' R. Pinto. 'R6gionalisme et universalisme dans la protection des droits de I'honime. 
' in A. Eide and A. Schou. 
International Protection of Human Rights: Proceedings of the Seventh Nobel Symposium, 
25-27 September 1967. 
(New York: Interscience, 1968) pp. 402-406. M. Haas. 'Asian Intergovernmental Organizations and the 
UN. ' in 
Andemicael (1979) p. 237. 
" de Varennes (1998) p. 3. 
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THE BANGoK DEcL4RA 7yoN oF THE VYEAwA WoRLD CoNFEPENcE 
Prior to the Viema, World Conference preparatory regional meetings were held with a 
purpose of ensunng that the diversity of views in the world were adequately expressed at the 
global meeting. States from Asia and the Middle East came together to issue the Bangkok 
Declaration. " Within the Declaration there is a strong emphasis on sovereignty and non- 
interference in domestic affairs, reinforcing the belief that all states have the right to detem-line 
their political systems, economic, social and cultural development. " The participants felt that 
states have the primary responsibility for promotion and protection of human rights, 'O with 
international measures needed to provide underlying guarantees. " They welcomed the role 
played by national institutions in the protection and promotion of human rights but expressed 
the belief that the 'eventual establishment of such institutions are best left for the States to 
decide'. " The Declaration recognises that human rights are universal in nature but need to be 
considered in the context of the dynamic process of international norrn creation whereby the 
significance of national and regional particularities, historical, cultural, and religious 
backgrounds all become essential elements. " 
The Bangkok declaration exemplifies the continued emphasis upon the state that 
characterises Asia and the Middle East and acts as an impediment to establishing regional 
arrangements for the protection and promotion of human rights. The need for regional 
arrangements is accepted in general but is tempered by the belief that their creation will only 
occur 'on the basis of the conditions of the region"' which presumably implies the attitudes of 
governments. Furthering the protection and promotion of democracy and human rights in 
both regions will be a troubled process, as governments will in principal remain opposed to 
any such progress. There is a definite lack of space for the participation of individuals within 
domestic societies, much less space for the rhetoric of democracy and human rights to develop 
into substance. External actors will play an important role in these regions but they also 
bring 
with them competing concerns of economics and security with issues of democracy and 
human rights beiiag secondary to stability. 
" UN Doc. A/Conf 157/PC/59 (7 April 1993). Viewing the Bangkok Declaration as representative of all of the 
Middle East and Asia is difficult as only 34 states plus the Palestinian Authority attended 
the regional meeting, see 
UN Doc. A/Conf 157/ASRM/Inf 1 (26 May 1993). 
'9 Bangkok Declaration, paragraphs 5-6. 
Bangkok Declaration, paragraph 9. 
Bangkok Declaration, paragraph 15. 
42 Bangkok Declaration, paragraph 24. 
4' Bangkok Declaration, paragraph 8. 
44 Fourth Regional Workshop (1996) p. 5. 
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Both the Middle East and Asia are caught in a circular pattem impacting the future 
development of democracy and human rights. Regional arrangement for the protection and 
promotion would be able to complement and build upon the few initiatives that exist and 
exploit the rhetoric. At the same time governments are unwilling to pursue such an endeavour. 
The result is that individuals are left without any support beyond the textual rhetoric, leaving 
states firmly M control of the priorities and needs of these regions. 
II. REGIONALISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAw 
The process of the Viema World Conference marked a significant development in the 
protection and promotion of global human rights by bringing together regional expressions 
and moving on towards a wider global agreeMent. 45 In the preparatory work for the 
Conference the three regional conferences all drafted their own declarations recognising a 
necessary relationship between regional and global systems of protection. In the Turus 
Declarationý' of Affican states it is stated that the observance and promotion of hurnan rights 
are a global concern to which all states must contribute, but that 'no ready-made model can be 
prescribed at the universal level since the historical and cultural realities of each nation and the 
traditions, standards and values of each people cannot be disregarded. 147 The San Jos6 
Declarationý' from the Latin American and Caribbean states stressed 'the importance of co- 
ordination and co-operation between the UN and the inter-American system of hurnan 
rights'. 49 As discussed above, the Bangkok Declaration recognised that human rights are 
universal in nature but that they must be considered in the context of national and regional 
50 peculiarities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds. 
The Vienna Declaration is a product of these regional collaborations as it proclaims all 
rights are universal" but they must be understood in the context of national and regional 
peculiarities and in light of the various historical, cultural and religions backgrounds. The 
document makes it clear that regardless of the different backgrounds all states are duty bound 
" See C. Schreuer. 'Regionalism V. Universalism. ' 6 European Journal of International Law (1995) pp. 484-485. 
But see Cema who appears to see the regional meeting as a threat to universality, C. Cema. 
'Universality of Human 
Rights and Cultural Diversity: Implementation of Human Rights in Different Soclo-Cultural 
Contexts. ' 16 Human 
Rights Quarterly (1996) p. 742. 
" UN Doc. A/Conf. I 57/PC/57 (24 November (1992). The Tunis meeting was attended by 42 Affican states, see UN 
Doc. A/Conf. I 57/AFRM/Inf. I /Rev. 1 (3 December 1992). 
47 Tunis Declaration, paragraph 5. 
41 UN Doc. A/Conf, 157/PC/58 (11 February 1993). The San Jos6 meeting was attended by 23 states, excluding 
Canada and the United States, see UN Doc. A/Conf. 157/LACRM/Inf 1 (5 Febuary 1993). 
" San Jos6 Declaration, paragraph 22. 
50 Bangkok Declaration, paragraph 8. 
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to protect all human rights. " The Declaration recognises that regional arrangements have a 
fundamental role in protecting human rights and that they should reinforce universal standards 
so long as regional peculiarities do not stand as an excuse for non-compliance with established 
global standards. " The Conference endorsed the strengthening of regional arrangements as 
they have a ftmdamental role to play in the protection and promotion of human rights. 14 
A. UNIVERSAL OR REGioNAL INTERNATIONAL LA W? 
The Vienna Declaration was a significant step in the international system for the protection 
and promotion of human rights as it recognises an important relationship between universal 
and regional views concerning human rights. " It also brought the issue of the relationship 
between universal and regional arrangements in the process of international law into a more 
public fight for discussion. The presence of the UN as the primary means of organisation in 
the international system has led to the belief of the necessity of a universal system of 
international legal regulation, especially concerning human rights. At the same time the 
practical reality of regional arrangements demonstrates the necessity of both co-existing in the 
international system. In the development of the international system universal arrangements 
have often been characterised as too weak and incoherent for effective action while the rise of 
regionalism is seen as fragmentation of the system as well as allowing for abuses by regional 
powers. " There is no logical reason to give absolute primacy to either the UN or regional 
arrangement as the most appropriate means for international legal enforcement as both have an 
equal contribution to make to the overall system. " The existence of regional arrangements 
will not lead to a weakening of the larger international system while at the same time 
'[u]niversality does not mean uniformity. It does mean, however, that regional international 
law, however variant, is a part of the system as a whole and not a separate system, and it 
" Vienna Declaration and Progranune of Action. UN Doc. A/Conf 157/24 (Part 1) (13 October 1993) Part 
paragraph 1. 
52 Vienna Declaration, Part 1, paragraph 5. 
" Any effort at co-ordination of instruments cannot be made to operate to the detriment of the individual, 
see A. 
Trindade. 'Co-Existence and Co-ordination of Mechanisms of International Protection of Human 
Rights (At Global 
and Regional Levels). ' 202 Recued des Cours (1987-11) pp. 114,126. 
" Vienna Declaration, Part 1, paragraph 37. The final document also expressed the need to establish regional 
arrangements in areas where they do not exist, Vienna Declaration. Part 11, paragraph 
76. 
" A. Bayefsky. 'Cultural Sovereignty, Relatiý'jsm, and International Human Rights: Ne" Excuses 
for Old 
Strategies. " 9 Ratio Juriy ( 1996) p. 44. 
Schreuer (1995) p. 477. 
Inter-American Institute of international Legal Studies. The Inter-American 
System. 
- 
Its Development and 
Strengthening. (Dobbs Ferry: Oceana, 1966) p. 3. 
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ultimately derives its validity from the system as a whole. 558 Regional arrangements are not 
able to handle or solve all of the problems of a particular area, a task a universal arrangement is 
equally unlikely to fulfil on a global scale. " 
The UN Charter recognises the existence of regional arrangements in an uneven manner 
as regional arrangements are the first step in action concerning the maintenance of peace and 
security but always subordinate to the global UN system-'O In both theory and practice 
regional arrangements have long been seen as acceptable for international action but 
subordinate to the global system 
. 
61 More recently the co-existence between global and 
regional arrangements is becoming accepted as a practical way forward for international law. '2 
in actual practice the UN has had to resort to various types of regional arrangements in areas 
such as the maintenance of peace and security, 63 economic and social prograrns, ' and 
environmental protection. " 
Regional arrangements provide both positive and negative factors to the development of 
any international law. " They have the possibility of being more conducive for action as states 
in a region will often possess a common history, traditions and cultures and characteristics. " 
The social, cultural, geographic proximity of the states Will bread a similarity of views which 
over time will help to eliminate physical conflict and give rise to greater co-operation. 68 The 
relatively small geographical area involved with a regional arrangement allows for a more 
R. Jennings 'Universal International Law in a Multicultural World. ' in M. Bos and 1. Brownhe, eds. Liber 
amicorumfor the Rt. Hon. Lord Wilberforce. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1987) p. 4 1. An extreme development of regional 
international aw would be bad for the system, a regional positivism would develop resulting in legal chaos, J. Starke. 
'Regionalism as a Problem of International Law. ' in G. Lipsky, ed. Law and Politics in the World Community. 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1953) p. 118. Van Dijk observes that international law is by defin ition not 
universal in character, see P. van Dijk. 'Common Standard of Achievement. About Universal Validity and Uniforrn 
Interpretation of International Human Rights Norms. 13 Netherlands Quarterly ofHuman Rights (1995) p. 106. 
" G. Bebr. 'Regional Organisation: A UN Problem. ' 49 American Journal ofInternational Law (1955) p. 166. 
60 See B. Simma et al. 7he Charter ofthe United Nations: A Commentary. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) p. 
679. Also E. Frey-Wouters. 'The Prospect for Regionalism in World Affairs. ' in C. Black and R. Falk. The Future of 
the International Legal Order, vol. 1. (Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1969) pp. 530-531. 
6'R. Yalem. 'Regionalism and World Order. ' 38 International Affairs (1962) p. 46 1. For a history of regionalism in 
the context of the UN and the League of Nations see R. Akindele. 'From the Covenant to the Charter: 
Constitutional 
Relations between Universal and Regional Organizations in the Promotion of Peace and Security. ' 8 
Israeli Law 
Review (1975) p. 9 1. 
62 The rise of regionalism is seen as a pragmatic response to the increasing needs of the intemational system, 
W. 
Lang. 'New Regionalism in a Changing World Order. ' in K. Wellens, ed. International Law 
Theory and Practice, 
Essays in Honour ofEric Suy. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1998) p. 32; Yalem (1962) p. 460. 
" See Schreuer (I 995)pp. 489498 and references within. 
64 P. Newman. 'Regionalism in Developing Areas: UN Regional Economic Commissions and Their Relations with 
Regional Organizations. ' in Andemicael (1979) p. 339; E. Haas. 'The UN and Regionalism. ' 3 International 
Relations (1970) pp. 796-797. 
6' D. Freestone. The Road to Rio. (Hull: University of Hull Press, 1994) pp. 8-9. 
61 Schreuer (1995) compares it the federalism debate at the domestic level, p. 477. 
67 H. Levie. 'Some Constitutional Aspects of Selected Regional Organizations: A Comparative 
Study. ' 16 Columbia 
Journal of Transnational Law (1966) p. 15; Frey-Wouters in Black and Falk (1969) pp. 
5 53-554. 
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efficient allocation of resources and delegating Of tasks when it comes to problem solving 
procedures 
. 
69 Governments will likely be more inclined to follow the directives of a regional 
arrangements ince supervisory bodies Will possess greater legitimacy being sees as having a 
greater understanding of the more localised situation then a global body-'o The inability of a 
universal arrangement to understand or take into consideration the particularities unique to a 
region often results in action being seen as outside interference. " It is for reasons of closeness, 
and a common experience resulting in a deeper understanding which give regional 
arrangements ahigher degree of legitimacy and co-operation among states. 72 
While regional arrangements present a number of attractive possibilities they also have an 
equal number of negative potentials which impede co-operation. 73 Within regions the actual 
commitment of member states is not always as deep as it is perceived as states may selectively 
use regional or universal procedures depending upon individual needs. Homogeneity is not a 
given or automatic situation within any region and the closeness of states may result in deep 
seeded antagonisms and continued physical conflict. 74 Regional powers may be able to 
manipulate the arrangement In the pursuit of its own self-interested goals. In turn other states 
in a region may prefer universal arrangements as an attempt to avoid a regional power, as well 
as an opportunity for the acquisition of resources not available at the regional level. 7' The 
wide range of experience and knowledge that a universal arrangement, like the UN, possesses 
could help to fill the gaps that a regional arrangement is unable to cover. 76 
B. UNTVERSAL AND REGIONAL SysTEmsFoR DEmocRACYAND HUMANRIGHTS 
The growth of regional arrangements for the protection and promotion of democracy and 
htunan rights should be seen as a positive move since the greater the initiative in ftuthering 
hwnan rights promotion and protection the greater chance for an effective international systern 
" N. MacFarlane and T. Weiss. 'The United Nations, Regional Orgamsations and Human Security: Building Theory 
in Central America. ' 15 Third World Quarterly (1994) p. 283. 
'9 R. Schema. 'The OAS and the Quest for International Co-operation: American Vision or Mirage. ' 13 Case 
Western Reserve Journal ofInternational Law (198 1) p. 10 1- 
'0 A. H. Robertson and J. G. Mernils. Human Rights in the World, 3rd ed. (Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
1992) pp. 223-224; MacFarlane and Weiss (1994) p. 283. 
,IJ. Donnelly. 'International Human Rights: A Regime Analysis. ' 40 International OrganLation (1986) p. 637. 
73 
2 Robertson and Merrills (1992) pp. 223-234; Frey-Wouters in Falk and Black (1969) p. 551. 
J. Nye. 'Regional Institutions. ' in C. Black and R. Falk, eds. The Future of the International Legal 
Order, vol. 4. 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972) pp. 433-436. 
" 1. Claude. Swords Into Ploughshares. 
- 
The Problems and Progress of International OrganLation, 4th ed. 
(Neýý 
York: Random House, 1964) p. 105; Schreuer (1995) p. 479; MacFarlane and Weiss (1994) pp. 283-285. 75 Schreuer (1995) p. 479. 
" Yalem (1962) pp. 468-469. 
17 303 of protection. Universal and regional arrangements for the protection and promotion of 
democracy human rights will share similar goals and purposes but the actual pursuit of these 
goals and purposes will differ throughout the world. 78 The practical existence of universal and 
regional arrangements has the down side of placing greater demands upon states for their 
resources. 79 The increase in reporting procedures and other obligations can actually harm the 
effectiveness of a human rights treaty, as states are unable to meet their responsibilities 
lessening the impact of the obligations entered into. " There is a definitive need to establish a 
international human rights system based on the complimentary co-ordination and co-operation 
between the UN and regional arrangements. 81 The present existence of a wide variety of 
human rights instruments, both universal and regional have in practice reinforced each other" 
allowing for cross-interpretations leading to greater clarification and understanding as well as 
providing the individual with a rich source of possibilities for protection. 
When the UN Charter was drafted suggestions for regional arrangements for the protection 
and promotion of human rights were rejected and accused of deviating from the purposes of 
the UN and not recognising the equal worth of all of humanity. " However, the lack of 
substantive agreement at the global level over human rights issues has caused the UN to 
become more open to regional arrangements. " The UN has discussed the issue of regional 
human tights protection expressing varying attitudes on the issue. Regional arrangements 
have been described as subordinate to UN efforts" and only possibly being able to contribute 
to an effective system of human lights protection. " Over time it has been recognised that 
contacts between the UN and regional arrangements have become regular practice and efforts 
should be made to enhance these efforts. " An attempt to define the relationship between the 
" B. Weston, et a]. 'Regional Human Rights Regimes: A Comparison and Appraisal. ' 20 Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law (1987) p. 588. 
7' L. Miller. 'The Prospects of Order Through Regional Security. ' in Black and Falk (1969) pp. 591-592. 
79 Smithers 'Toward Greater Coherence. ' in Andemicael (1979) pp. 18-20. 
'0 See generally M. Reisman. 'Establishment of a Regional Human Rights Arrangements in the Asian and Pacific 
Region: Experiences of other Regions. ' in Fourth Regional Workshop (1996) pp. 26-30. 
" Trindade (1987) pp. 122-123. A point recognised by Boutros-Ghali while he was SG of the UN, see B. Boutros- 
Ghah. 'The UN and Democracy. ' 4 Law and Public Policy (1995) p. 12. 
Trindade (1987) p. 401. 
Weston et a]. (1987) p. 588; Vasak (1982) p. 451. 
See Vasak (1982) p. 45 1. In 1996 U Thant visited the Council of Europe, the first visit of Its kind, where he said 
'In recent years regional organisations have come to be more clearly regarded as complementary to the world 
Organisation, rather than as substitutes to it. In serving peaceful regional interests, they will, ... more and rnore 
become the pillars upon which the larger structure of world order can be finTfly established' quoted in 
A. Robertson. 
'The Council of Europe and the UN. ' in Anden-iicael (1979) p. 499. 
" 'Regional Arrangements for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights. ' GA Res. 37/172 GAOR 
37" Sess., 
Supp. 51 p. 97, also G. A. Res. 42/152 GAOR 42"' Sess., Supp. 51 p. 125 (all subsequent GA resolutions mentioned 
have the same title as GA Res 37/172).. 
" GA Res. 39/115 GAOR 39' Sess., Supp. 51 p. 209. 
87 GA Res. 41/154 GAOR 41' Sess., Supp. 53 p. 207. 
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UN and regional arrangements was made seeing regional human rights standards as 
complementing universally accepted standards and that an inc y" onsistencies should be dealt 
with by the appropriate bodies. " More concrete reference has been made to the relationship 
seeing regional arrangements as 'fundamental' in reinforcing the global system" and making 
co-operation between regional arrangements and the UN 'crucial'. 90 
The existence and work of regional human rights arrangements i  to be encouraged and 
given greater attentiod' as they mark a defaiitive possibility for improving the effectiveness of
the global human rights system. 9' No matter how effective regional arrangements um out to 
be in the end, the rights they recognise, the institutions established, and the procedures 
prescribed add up to an assault on the global state sovereignty system. 93 In any attempt to 
integrate different systems for the protection of human rights there must be every effort to 
ensure that standards are raised, or at the least, never go below universally agreed minimum 
standards as laid out in the UDHR. 9' Regional arrangements can provide improvement upon 
universally accepted norms as they are in the best position to develop standards that exist at the 
universal level into workable and acceptable principles of actual application. 9' However it is 
not an automatic process that rights protected under regional arrangements Will automatically 
be more advanced than universal arrangements. " The organisation suggested here does not 
call on the UN to impose specific standards on various parts of the world, neither does it allow 
for regional arrangements to establish their own systems of protection which go below 
minimally accepted standards. " 
Regional and universal human rights instruments should be seen as complementing rather 
than competing against each other. " There exist practical problems in the existence of 
GA Res. 45/167 GAOR 45' Sess., Supp. 49 p. 280. 
GA Res. 51/102 GAOR 51" Sess., Supp. 49 p. 207. 
'0 Report of the Secretary General. 'Regional Arrangements for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights. ' UN 
Doc. A/51/480 (I I October 1996) paragraph I 
" Weston et al. (1987) p. 637. 
92 Commission on Human Rights. Resolution 1996/55. 'Advisory services, technical co-operation and the 
Voluntary 
Fund for Technical Cooperation in the Field of Human Rights. ' paragraph 9 that emphasises that the objective of the 
Voluntary Fund is to provide financial support for international co-operation aimed at building up and strengthening 
national and regional institutions and infrastructures which will have a long-term impact on improving 
the 
implementation of international conventions and other international standards on human rights. 
Weston et al (1987) p. 614. 
Vienna Declaration, Part 1, paragraph 37 reads that regional standards should reinforce existing universal standards. 
R. Pinto. 'R6gionalisme et Universalism dans ]a Protection des droits de Fhomme. ' in Eide and 
Schou (1968) 
p. 412; T. Meron. 'Norm Making and Supervision in International Human Rights: Reflections on 
Institutional Order. '
76 American Journal ofInternational Law (1982) p. 761. 
'6 See discussion of OIC Declaration above. 
97 Meron (1982) pp. 761-762. 
" Trindade (1987) p. 23. Claude (1964) viewed the regional/universal relations as being one of 
'concomitant 
Supplements' but with regional playing the subordinate role, p. 112. 
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multiple procedures and attempts to ensure human rights guarantees are applied in a urýform 
way, with minimum overlap. 99 Now that the UN is no longer hostile in its view of regional 
human rights arrangements there is more of a sense of unity in human rights then in 
competition between instruments. "' An integrated approach would prevent unnecessary 
duplication, conflicts and variations ensuring that provisions would be established and 
supervised by the most competent organisations. "' 
The adoption of the ECHR was a direct effort by a regional organisation to develop a 
system of protection and promotion where global efforts were too slow. When the OAS 
adopted the ACHR the issue was raised as to whether the member states prefer-red to have a 
single universal system concerning hui-nan rights or the coexistence of regional and universal 
systems. If the latter was preferred, should the inter-American system be limited to only 
protecting the UN standards or should it develop regional standards as well. In the end the 
establishment of co-existing regional and universal systems of protection was preferred along 
with the development of regional norms in the area. 'O' In Aftica, the development of human 
rights protection and promotion was as much a product of outside pressures as it was internal 
forces, but still based itself upon regional peculiarities. This demonstrates is that the protection 
and promotion of democracy and human rights relies upon efforts at all levels of the 
international system, 103 an area that remains full of potential and possibility. "' 
111. THE GLOBAL APPLICATION OF DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
The most beneficial consequence of a combined regional/w-iiversal approach to the 
protection and promotion of democracy and human rights is its ability to accommodate the 
conflict over applicability of standards through increased dialogue and discussion leading to 
Robertson and Merrills (1992) p. 225. Trindade (1987) points out that the co-ordination of human rights treaty 
agreements can in no way be detrimental to the individual due to the special character of the treaties, p. 
98. Also S. 
Wemers. 'Co-operation Between Jurisdictions on Different Levels in the Field of Human Rights. ' 15 Netherlands 
International Law Review (1968) p. 394. 
'00 TTindade (1987) pp. 24-25. 
'0' Meron (1982) p. 756. The UN Commissioner for Human Rights and attached office will have a 
large role to play 
in CO-ordinating co-operative activities between the UN and regional arrangements, see 
Commission on Human 
Rights Resolution 'Regional arrangements for the promotion and protection of human rights. 
' 1997i34 (I I-Apri'l 
1997). Also Vienna Declaration, Part 11, paragraph 92. 
Tbomas and Tbomas in Rodley and Ronning, 169. 
The combination of regional and universal action has proved fruitful in the 
Inter-American system in the instances 
of Haiti and Guatemala, see V. Vaky. The Future of the Organization of 
American States. (New York: Twentieth 
Century Fund, 1993) p. 26) 
'0' Report of the Secretary General (1996) paragraph 23. 
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greater understanding. "' Arguments concerning the inapplicability of principles such as 
democracy and human rights are commonly based on some sort of cultural relativism 106 
- 
which underlies the assertion that external agents should not interfere with internal affairs 
based on the idea of sovereignty. 'O' Too often expressions of relativism consist of the state 
abusing its position as the exclusive definer of human tights in order to serve its own interests, 
not to preserve tradition or culture. 'O' The context of lights may differ within and among 
societies but there remains a universal duty of all governments to provide effective 
arrangements to ensure the maintenance of the survival and dignity of the individual. 'O' The 
establishment of regional arrangements in the Europe, the Americas and Affica has shown that 
these institutions are just one part of the overall international system. 
A universal system for the protection and promotion of democracy and human rights 
would never be able to require unifonn principles and behaviour across the globe. "' The 
context in which democracy and human rights exist are essential to their comprehension and 
will depend upon the socio-cultural background in which they are applied. "' A significant 
benefit derived from a focus on regional arrangements is that such an approach allows for a 
theoretical formulation between the 'discreteness of the State and the undifferentiated 
international system. "" In determining to what extent democracy and human rights exist In 
the various regional systems, and in individual States, there is the problem of relative degrees 
of importance given to the individual components involved in democracy and human rights. "' 
The importance given to the various aspects of democracy and human rights will vary from 
state to state and region to region, with each state or group of states arguing its system and 
'0' Bell (1996) points out that at the level of the 'basic' human rights such as freedom from torture, genocide, slavery, 
there is little disagreement. It is when rights enter a 'gray area' concerning socio-econom1c rights, family issues and 
addedly participation that conflict over meaning and applicability anses, pp. 642-643. 
'0' A further issue related to cultural relativism is the applicability of democracy and human rights along gender lines, 
see E. Brems. 'Enemies or Allies? Feminism and Cultural Relativism as Dissident Voices in Human Rights 
Discourse. ' 19 Human Rights Quarterly (1997) p. 136. 
107 M. Freeman. 'The Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights. ' 16 Human Rights Quarterly (1994) p. 494. 
'0' See A. Pollis. 'Cultural Relativism Revisted. ' 18 Human Rights Quarterly (1996) p. 316; J. Donnelly. 'Cultural 
Relativism and Universal Human Rights. ' 6 Human Rights Quarterly (1984) p. 411. Press, H. Schue. Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence and US. Foreign Policy. (Princeton: Princeton Uni I 
1980) p. 17. 
"0 See van Dijk (1995) pp. 114-119. 
... P. Baehr. The Role ofHuman Rights in Foreign Policy. (Basingstoke: Macrmllan, 1994) pp. 21-22; Robertson and 
Merrills (1992) p. 225. Cema (1994) disagrees saying there can be no regional norms only 'regional arrangements 
which supervise compliance with international standards', p. 752. 
"' L. Canton and S. Spiegel. 'TheAnalysis of Regional International Politics: The Integration versus 
the Ernpincal 
Systems Approach. ' 27 International Organization (1973) p. 467; H. Bull. The Anarchical Society. -A Study i. n K'orld 
Politics. (London: MacMillan. 1977) p. 305. 
113 A. Ritter. 'Comparative Assessments of Freedom. ' 6 Connecticut Journal of International 
Laiv (199 1) pp. 561 
- 
562. It has been held that the debate over applicability demonstrates a degree of universality on a 
difference in 
emphasis, see de Jonge (1993) p. 302. 
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values are superior without seeing beyond the ideological cloud and looking at the actual 
practices that occur. "' Therefore an effective system for the protection and promotion of 
democracy and human rights must allow for difference but at the same time prevent abuses 
justified by diversity. Diversity is not seen as weakening the international system of hurnan 
rights, when channelled in an effective manner it will strengthen the basis of international 
human rights by providing deeper understandings as to the meaning of democracy and human 
rights. 1 15 
Difference in the applicability of democracy and human rights, commonly viewed as the 
West versus the rest, have a long history in international relationsl 16 and are most commonly 
based upon personal assumptions as opposed to realistic observations. "' Democracy and 
human rights must be 'culturally authenticated' to be acceptable the imposition of certain 
system derived from an outside source can never be seen as legitimate. "' Democracy and 
litiman rights are part of the everyday lives of individuals and should be recognised as such. "' 
The discourse of democracy and human rights provides the ability of individuals throughout 
the world to articulate their concerns and desires related to their day-to-day existence. "O 
International instruments are the beginning of this discourse but since they are static 
docw-nents they cannot be expected to contain the discourse, especially when it comes to 
application. Presently a great deal of the international discourse of democracy and human 
rights focuses on the issue of cultural relativism, emphasising irreconcilable differences rather 
than working towards creating effective substantive law. 12 1 The clearest way to a more 
effective international law of human rights is to listen to the voices of those who have the 
greatest concern with the law and not to confine it through the exclusive use of power. 122 
"' R. Howard. 'Monitoring Human Rights: Problems of Consistency. ' 4 Ethics and International Affairs (1990) P- 
40. M. Freeman. 'Human Rights and Real Culture: Towards a Dialogue on 'Asian Values'. ' 16 Netherlan& 
Quarterly ofHuman Rights (1998) pp. 27-28. 
... Nino expresses the belief that as a sociological fact 'societies differ in their ethical judgements or that people tend 
to follow the prevailing evaluations of their community ... but this does not affect the validity or 
possibility of 
universal moral judgements. ' C. Nino. The Ethics ofHuman Rights. (Oxford: Clarendon, 199 1) p. 103. 
"' For a historical view see H. Bull. 'The Revolt against the West. ' In Bull and A. 
Watson, eds. The Expansion of 
International Society. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984) p. 217. 
See D. Emmerson. 'Singapore and the "Asian Values" Debate. ' 6 Journal ofDemocrao, 
(1995) pp. 96-101. 
G. Joffe. 'Sovereignty and Intervention: The Perspective for the Developing World. 
' in M. Heiberg, ed. Subduing 
Sovereignty: Sovereignty and the Right to Intervene. (London: Pinter, 1994) pp. 89-90. 
"' A-B. Preis. 'Human Rights as Cultural Practice: An Anthropological Critique. ' 18 
Human Rights Quarterly (1996) 
p. 311. 
"0 Preis (1996) pp. 289-290. 
"' See C. Joyner and J. Dettling. 'Bridging the Cultural Chasm: Cultural 
Relativism and the Future of Intemafional 
Law. ' 20 California Western International Law Journal (1990) p. 275. 
122 Freeman (1998) pp. 38-39. z 
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The amount of activity in relation to democracy that has occurred in the past few years 
demonstrates the desire for democracy throughout the world. This activity, as shown 
throughout this work also demonstrates the many obstacles faced in formulating an effecfive 
international law of democracy that is based on hurnan interests and not state interests. One 
commentator, looking to the future, has recently written 
that we need to prepare ourselves for new fonns of democracy in the twenty-first 
century: at the spatial level, as we expand our horizons beyond the nation-state; 
at the normative level, as we recognize that the attaimnent of global democracy 
cannot be divorced from a concem with a measure of economic equality and 
social justice on the one hand, and with the political and cultural diversity of the 
peoples of the earth on the other; and finally, at the institutional level, as we seek 
to reconcile the seemingly irreconcilable 
- 
state interests, class interests, 
religious indentities, national identitiesý economic interests, ecologicial 
imperatives, and so on... 
. 
"' 
These are all issues that an international of democracy must keep 'in mind 'in its 
development and be able to continually address. Democracy and hurnan rights are not systems 
created by certain societies to be copied by others. Instead they are aspirations or goals that 
have been sought throughout history. If democracy is seen as including ideas such as freedom, 
justice, liberty, equality, the rule of law, and participation in the decision making process, then 
it is possible to distinguish its existence occurring in many forrus depending on the 
characteristics and circumstances of the individuals and society involved. "' How and where 
democracy will develop and take hold is not known exactly and academic studies have proven 
indecisive. "' The democracy of Athens and other Greek cities was unique to their 
circumstances"' and depended upon a number of factors that are today seen as extremely anti- 
democratic and in violation of human rights. If human rights are about the physical survival 
and dignity of the human person then it would be difficult to claim the idea is Mapplicable to 
certain societies. How survival and dignity are pursued will differ among individuals around 
the world but will always maintain a common basic standard or goal. Universal legal 
"' P. Resnick. Twenty-First Century Democracy. (Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1997) p. I 
Treadgold, D. Freedom. 
- 
A Histo, 
-ý% (New York: New York University Press, 1990) p. 5. 
IV'See R. Dix. 'History and Democracy Revisited. ' 27 Comparative Politics 1994 pp. 91-105. 12' R. Dahl. Democracy and Its Critics. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989). pp. 18-19. 
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all encompassing means for achieving it. 127 
The future of democracy and human fights depends upon individuals Participating and 
being knowledgeable of the possibilities around them. A regional arrangement is much better 
placed to be close to the individual in order to have an impact when it comes to intemational 
law. Regional arrangements are better placed in terms of resources and understanding to 
address the issues of democracy and human rights a society faces, universal arrangements will 
continue to provide the basic standard that all individuals throughout the world desire. 12' Both 
regional and universal arrangements for the protection and promotion of democracy and 
human fights will provide the necessary processes allowing individuals and society to develop 
themselves as well as develop the attitudes necessary for tolerance and diversity within society 
and the world. 
The development of an international law of democracy will not be a naturally occurring 
process. Neither can it be constructed from a single site in the international system. It must 
consist of co-operative efforts of dialogue throughout the world. Chapter 3 discussed the 
numerous possibilities that exist at the global level that inform an international law of 
democracy. Chapters 4-6 presented the efforts of regional arrangements in the same regard 
and how that level of activity has a serious contribution to make to the global development of 
an international law of democracy. In fact the contribution of regional arrangements to the 
global development of democracy is absolutely essential. It has been continually held that 
there exist universal principles of democracy and human rights that all societies strive for. At 
the same time how these principles manifest themselves in practice will vary due to the 
diversity of society, not only between regions but within regions. In the end the combination 
of efforts work towards a more effective international system from the perspective of the 
individual. 
Europe has seen the development of the rhetoric of human rights and democracy move 
closer and closer to the individual. The European system for the protection and promotion of 
democracy and hw-nan rights stands as an example for global developments in a number of 
regards. The co-operation and co-ordination of the three regional organisations in Europe 
provides guidance as how similar co-operation should (or should not) be fon-nulated between 
A. Cassese. Human Rights in a Changing World. (Cambridge: Polity, 1990) pp. 48-49. 
Commission on Human Rights. Resolution 1997/45 'Regional arrangements for the protection and promotion of 
human rights in the Asian and Pacific region. ' (I I April 1997) paragraph 4 'regional arrangements play a 
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global and regional arrangements. Europe is also significant for its current process of change 
from a small grouping of states to a much larger, more diverse grouping which has not resulted 
in a lowering or fragmenting of standards. The regional organisations of Europe have taken 
democracY and human rights as their guiding principles. Member states have had to follow 
these principles as both individuals and the organisations have worked to put the rhetoric into 
reality. 
The Inter-American system has shown how a proactive nature on the behalf of regional 
organisations is able to bring results in a hostile environment. The region shows the power of 
the rhetoric of democracy and human rights as states there had long proclaimed their virture 
but did not pursue it in day to day life. It ftu-ther shows the benefit of having a regional 
arrangement close to the situation as it was able to exploit this rhetoric in a way a global body 
would not have been able. The development of democracy and human rights in the Americas 
is following a rather unique course but one that is firmly placed in the global system. The 
Americas brought to the global system the criteria for statehood that led to the requirement of 
effectiveness for international law. It is now the Americas that are formulating a clear legal 
standard of democracy that its member states must follow. Hopefully the principles and 
practices of the Americas will become part of the global international law once again. 
Presently Africa is facing numerous difficulties in ftu-thering an international law of 
democracy, as it has faced difficulties in consolidating a system of human rights protection. 
Africa does show how diversity may exist but the goals and principles are able to guide the 
development of the law. Africa has a significant contribution to make to an international aw 
of democracy by bringing its diversity to its development. This diversity must be used to 
enrich an understanding of democracy not to minimise it. Africa unfortunately shows the 
persistence of the state-centric nature of international law and its negative impact upon 
democracy and human rights. African leaders have been able to use the state-based system to 
manipulate the words of democracy and human rights in providing the double gesture of the 
law. The rhetoric of democracy and human rights is slowly taking hold in the region and as it 
does the regional organisation is also slowing becoming more active in the area. 
The Affican 
experience clearly shows that the only effective international law of democracy is one 
that 
takes the individual as its Primary concern and not the interests of states. 
fundamental role in promoting and protecting hum an rights and that they should reinforce 
universal human rights 
standards, as contained in international human rights instruments, and their protection'. 
311 An international aw of democracy will draw upon all of the above momentum to gain 
strength as a guiding principle of the international system. The progress made in the Americas 
and Africa provide hope and possibilities for similar developments in Asia and Middle East. 
As an international aw of democracy develops we must remain ever vigilant that the words 
spoken are not alone substituted for the reality on the ground. The international legal argument 
continues to allow for international aw to speak of concern for the individual but remains 
within the control and under the influence of the interests of states. The development of an 
international law of democracy will assist in improving the condition of the intemational legal 
argument for the benefit of individuals. Democracy consists of individuals being part of the 
processes that impact upon their lives, this includes the development of international law. As 
international law becomes more and more a part of our everyday fives it becomes more and 
more necessary to ensure that all actors in the international system are able to participate and 
notjust an exclusive group. 
In 1907 Elihu Root stated that the best way to ensure a peaceful world is to make sure that 
individuals are aware of the rights and duties they possess through international law. "' To be 
aware of what is happening around them, both domestic and international. In the present 
situation, events of international nature are taken over by the state eliminating the role of the 
individual to a great extent. Both regional and universal arrangements for democracy and 
human rights bring the individual into the international system as a concern and as a 
participant. This must bode well for the future. For international law to continue to be an 
effective part of the international system it must fin-ther itself from the perspective of the 
individual. For if international law is unable to be a credible part in the lives of its largest 
constituency then it is doomed to irrelevance. This piece has only been able to identify the key 
areas of development for an international law of democracy, those areas that are most 
beneficial to the individual. The next step is to exploit these possibilities by bringing the 
individual closer to the texts so that all may participate in the development of the international 
system. International law now has to recoose that effectiveness is no longer sufficient. 
States have been reluctant to recogriise this development as it brings into question their very 
existence. By forwarding an international law of democracy international law will become an 
effective force for the individual, continually responding to the needs and desires of individuals 
showing that ffie rhetonc is not empty. 
12'E. Root. Me Need of Popular Understanding of International Law. ' I American Jounial of 
Intentational Law 
(1907) p. 1. 
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